Power & Paralysis
Presentation Type
Poster
Presentation Type
Submission
Keywords
nternational Institutions, United Nations UN Security Council, Veto Power, Permanent Five (P5), Humanitarian Intervention, Global Governance
Department
International Studies and Languages
Major
International Studies
Abstract
International institutions are viewed as essential for maintaining global stability, yet their effectiveness is heavily debated. This paper argues that institutional effectiveness is conditional on the political alignment of major powers, specifically the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5). Using a comparative case study of Libya, Syria, and Sudan, the analysis examines how variations in P5 consensus shape institutional responses to humanitarian crises.
The findings show that when major powers are aligned or refrain from using veto power, institutions can take meaningful and timely action, as done in Libya. In contrast, geopolitical divisions, specifically the repeated use of vetoes in Syria, lead to institutional paralysis despite widespread humanitarian violations. Sudan illustrates how partial consensus leads to limited, insufficient responses.
These results suggest that the primary constraint on institutional effectiveness lies not in design, but in power politics, highlighting the need to reconsider the role of veto power in global governance.
Faculty Mentor
Amanda Rizkallah
Funding Source or Research Program
Academic Year Undergraduate Research Initiative
Location
Waves Cafeteria
Start Date
10-4-2026 1:00 PM
End Date
10-4-2026 2:00 PM
Power & Paralysis
Waves Cafeteria
International institutions are viewed as essential for maintaining global stability, yet their effectiveness is heavily debated. This paper argues that institutional effectiveness is conditional on the political alignment of major powers, specifically the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5). Using a comparative case study of Libya, Syria, and Sudan, the analysis examines how variations in P5 consensus shape institutional responses to humanitarian crises.
The findings show that when major powers are aligned or refrain from using veto power, institutions can take meaningful and timely action, as done in Libya. In contrast, geopolitical divisions, specifically the repeated use of vetoes in Syria, lead to institutional paralysis despite widespread humanitarian violations. Sudan illustrates how partial consensus leads to limited, insufficient responses.
These results suggest that the primary constraint on institutional effectiveness lies not in design, but in power politics, highlighting the need to reconsider the role of veto power in global governance.