Jonathan Edwards "Freedom of the Will"
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Department
Philosophy
Major
Philosophy
Abstract
Jonathan Edwards Freedom of the will attempts to combat the Arminian notion of free will by addressing its inconsistencies, and in doing so proposes a deterministic view of the will that maintains the responsibility of actions on Human agents. Edwards criticizes core principles of the Arminian view on the basis that they propose an infinite regress and in some cases even imply determinism. Replacing the Arminian notion, Edwards argues for a deterministic view of the will deriving from god’s universal sovereignty. This type of determinism raises the question, if god determines the will is he not responsible for immoral actions? Edwards address this question as well as clarifies his deterministic stance by defining moral necessity. He denounces the common use of necessity, which implies an aspect of forcefulness, and instead defines it as an inherent connection between things. This type of necessity exists in the relationship between blameworthiness and action as moral necessity which is “a perfect connection between moral causes (which are dispositions of the heart) and effects”. This distinction, which separates necessity from pure causation, helps alleviate his stance of implying responsibility on a super-agent because: if the blameworthiness of an evil disposition is on its cause then there will be a regress of cause and blameworthiness. Instead Edwards promotes that volitions are derived from their nature, for when we investigate the link between causes, moral responsibility, and the nature of actions, we find that it is in the nature of something, not its cause, that a fault is ascribed. Edwards’s distinction points out a flaw with causal regress, but because he does admit that all events have causes he leaves questions unanswered like: what causes the nature of these beings? Contemporary discourse like Woo’s Is God the Author of Sin? Addresses these questions and other qualms with Edwards’s stance. On the other hand, the insight of Frankfurt type examples strengthens Edwards view as it gives a new, and clearer, explanation for the consistency of determinism and moral responsibility ascribed to humans. Edwards work on free will provided a Philosophical as well as theological approach to addressing the questions of the will, which then led to a strengthened reformed philosophy that maintains determinism with human moral responsibility.
Faculty Mentor
Garrett Pendergraft
Presentation Session
Session B
Location
Plaza Classroom 189
Start Date
1-4-2016 4:45 PM
End Date
1-4-2016 5:00 PM
Jonathan Edwards "Freedom of the Will"
Plaza Classroom 189
Jonathan Edwards Freedom of the will attempts to combat the Arminian notion of free will by addressing its inconsistencies, and in doing so proposes a deterministic view of the will that maintains the responsibility of actions on Human agents. Edwards criticizes core principles of the Arminian view on the basis that they propose an infinite regress and in some cases even imply determinism. Replacing the Arminian notion, Edwards argues for a deterministic view of the will deriving from god’s universal sovereignty. This type of determinism raises the question, if god determines the will is he not responsible for immoral actions? Edwards address this question as well as clarifies his deterministic stance by defining moral necessity. He denounces the common use of necessity, which implies an aspect of forcefulness, and instead defines it as an inherent connection between things. This type of necessity exists in the relationship between blameworthiness and action as moral necessity which is “a perfect connection between moral causes (which are dispositions of the heart) and effects”. This distinction, which separates necessity from pure causation, helps alleviate his stance of implying responsibility on a super-agent because: if the blameworthiness of an evil disposition is on its cause then there will be a regress of cause and blameworthiness. Instead Edwards promotes that volitions are derived from their nature, for when we investigate the link between causes, moral responsibility, and the nature of actions, we find that it is in the nature of something, not its cause, that a fault is ascribed. Edwards’s distinction points out a flaw with causal regress, but because he does admit that all events have causes he leaves questions unanswered like: what causes the nature of these beings? Contemporary discourse like Woo’s Is God the Author of Sin? Addresses these questions and other qualms with Edwards’s stance. On the other hand, the insight of Frankfurt type examples strengthens Edwards view as it gives a new, and clearer, explanation for the consistency of determinism and moral responsibility ascribed to humans. Edwards work on free will provided a Philosophical as well as theological approach to addressing the questions of the will, which then led to a strengthened reformed philosophy that maintains determinism with human moral responsibility.