The Primordial Principle to Government-Security Interaction in States: A Case Study of the People’s Republic of China
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Keywords
government, government-security, security apparatus, China, Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang
Department
Political Science
Major
Political Science
Abstract
My research addresses the question of whether it is possible to develop a theory that can account for the various interactions between the government of a state and that state’s institution of organized violence (i.e. its security apparatus). In my Theory Development section, I argue that “primordial” environmental, biological, and psychological circumstances created a distinction between the innate corporate interests of government and its security apparatus. The corporate interests and identities of each have survived into the 21st century and remain as opposite centers of political gravity in a state. I characterize the relationship between government and its security institution as consisting of one of three possible paradigms—or equilibriums— of power: government cooptation, government-security institutional independence, and security-domination. I set out to apply these equilibriums to a case study of government-security relations in the People’s Republic of China, both to establish their veracity and classify the “resting point” of political power between Mainland China’s government and its security apparatus. Specifically, I find that the recent downfalls of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang indicate that the government cooptation equilibrium is the dominant equilibrium in Mainland China. I conclude with brief remarks about what Mainland China’s model implies for the country’s future stability.
Faculty Mentor
Christopher Soper
Funding Source or Research Program
Political Science Honors Program
Presentation Session
Session A
Location
Plaza Classroom 189
Start Date
3-4-2015 3:45 PM
End Date
3-4-2015 4:00 PM
The Primordial Principle to Government-Security Interaction in States: A Case Study of the People’s Republic of China
Plaza Classroom 189
My research addresses the question of whether it is possible to develop a theory that can account for the various interactions between the government of a state and that state’s institution of organized violence (i.e. its security apparatus). In my Theory Development section, I argue that “primordial” environmental, biological, and psychological circumstances created a distinction between the innate corporate interests of government and its security apparatus. The corporate interests and identities of each have survived into the 21st century and remain as opposite centers of political gravity in a state. I characterize the relationship between government and its security institution as consisting of one of three possible paradigms—or equilibriums— of power: government cooptation, government-security institutional independence, and security-domination. I set out to apply these equilibriums to a case study of government-security relations in the People’s Republic of China, both to establish their veracity and classify the “resting point” of political power between Mainland China’s government and its security apparatus. Specifically, I find that the recent downfalls of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang indicate that the government cooptation equilibrium is the dominant equilibrium in Mainland China. I conclude with brief remarks about what Mainland China’s model implies for the country’s future stability.