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Abstract

Trade credit extended to suppliers in the video game industry does not serve as a commitment device for large customers in determining which vendors to make relationship-specific investments in. Suppliers of video games are better off investing in relationships with trade creditors than seeking out large customers. The costs of large customer relationships are lower sales growth and less long-term debt leverage. Also, large customers don’t form relationships with suppliers in this industry, which has high research and development expenditures nor do they facilitate economic viability with regard to continued independent operational performance or listing on a stock exchange.

JEL Codes

G10, G30, G32

Keywords

Trade credit, innovation, relationship-specific investments, suppliers, large customers, economically-linked firms, vertical supply chain

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

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