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First Page

1

Last Page

25

Document Type

Note

Abstract

Americans who use their legal names to send and receive mail through traditional postal services have long maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in that mail under the Fourth Amendment. Courts have also recognized that even those who use aliases with traditional postal services have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their mail. But circuit courts have split over whether Americans who use aliases in mail purely for criminal purposes—such as sending or receiving drugs—should have that same expectation of privacy. More specifically, courts disagree over the correct approach to analyze a defendant’s criminal-alias mail for purposes of Fourth Amendment standing, which is a prerequisite for determining if the government has violated a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Should courts analyze other indicia relevant to the defendant’s criminal-alias mail to affirm or deny Fourth Amendment standing? Or should courts legalistically affirm or deny Fourth Amendment standing for Americans who use criminal-alias mail? This Note analyzes a recent case, United States v. Morta, in which the Ninth Circuit joined several sister courts and adopted the “other indicia” approach. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit was right to do so, because the other-indicia approach provides a more thorough analysis of Fourth Amendment standing than the “legalistic” approach. Moreover, the Note argues that Morta refined the application of the other-indicia approach by explicitly articulating the need for courts to consider indicia of “connection” in their other-indicia analysis. Ultimately, by adopting and refining the other-indicia approach, Morta makes it easier to prove Fourth Amendment standing for Americans who use aliases in mail for lawful purposes, while appropriately making it harder to prove Fourth Amendment standing for those who use aliases in mail for purely criminal purposes.

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