Document Type
Religion and Philosophy
Abstract
In their paper, Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification Fantl and McGrath offer a seemingly intuitive and attractive route to a revision of what counts as epistemic justification and knowledge. They argue that knowledge is not just a matter of evidence, but depends in part on one’s practical situation. Higher stakes and different utilities can change whether a belief is knowledge-constituting. This essay will argue that Fantl and McGrath’s attempt to use their Knowledge-Action principle (KA) to back pragmatic encroachment ultimately fails.
Recommended Citation
Kuzyk, Mahali
(2026)
"A Case Against Pragmatic Encroachment,"
Global Tides: Vol. 20, Article 1.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol20/iss1/1
