Document Type

Religion and Philosophy


This paper will begin with a brief introduction of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee’s definitions and examples ascribed to their original argument for Evidentialism in order to provide context for the remainder of the paper. The paper will turn to Jonathan Way’s concerns surrounding the original argument for Evidentialism, and break down his revamped definitions of Evidentialism and what Way calls “incentives”. Then, the paper will turn to Way’s solutions to the concerns he addressed, where he introduces the “argument from good reasoning” and the Link principal, a modified and refreshed version of Feldman and Conee’s “argument from reasoning”. Further to Way’s concern, the paper will then go into a section called, “Destroying the Argument from Reasoning”, where Way provides examples where the “argument from reasoning” of Feldman and Conee fails. The paper will then culminate with a philosophical evaluation of Way’s solutions, criticizing his solutions for the “argument of good reasoning” and the Link principle with counterexamples, but also anticipating responses from Way to my criticisms. The paper culminates with a restatement of the concerns I addressed and ends with an open-ended statement, emphasizing further exploration.

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