Epidemic Circularity Part 2: From Incapable to Capable Responses
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Keywords
Epistemic circularity, circular reasoning, source of belief, reliability
Department
Philosophy
Major
Philosophy
Abstract
If epistemic circularity is not altogether fallacious, it is at least of dubious merit. To determine the reliability of a source of belief, epistemically circular arguments depend on premises which themselves depend on the source in question. The structure of circular reasoning is common to both epistemic circularity and logical circularity, but while it the latter is only ever superficially plausible, it may be asked of epistemic circularity whether it is ever only superficially implausible. The first part of my project consists in framing the problem of epistemic circularity, establishing the broad applicability of the issue and why we should take seriously its ramifications for a skeptical worldview. In the second part, I consider various responses that epistemic circularity has elicited from philosophers, why these responses fail, and what we should look for in a capable response. I argue that we cannot wholly evade epistemic circularity, but nor should we be skeptics about knowledge: where a formidable epistemic response cannot be, a competent pragmatic response must do.
Faculty Mentor
Garrett Pendergraft
Funding Source or Research Program
Academic Year Undergraduate Research Initiative, Summer Undergraduate Research Program
Presentation Session
Session D
Location
Rockwell Academic Center 175
Start Date
3-4-2015 5:30 PM
End Date
3-4-2015 5:45 PM
Epidemic Circularity Part 2: From Incapable to Capable Responses
Rockwell Academic Center 175
If epistemic circularity is not altogether fallacious, it is at least of dubious merit. To determine the reliability of a source of belief, epistemically circular arguments depend on premises which themselves depend on the source in question. The structure of circular reasoning is common to both epistemic circularity and logical circularity, but while it the latter is only ever superficially plausible, it may be asked of epistemic circularity whether it is ever only superficially implausible. The first part of my project consists in framing the problem of epistemic circularity, establishing the broad applicability of the issue and why we should take seriously its ramifications for a skeptical worldview. In the second part, I consider various responses that epistemic circularity has elicited from philosophers, why these responses fail, and what we should look for in a capable response. I argue that we cannot wholly evade epistemic circularity, but nor should we be skeptics about knowledge: where a formidable epistemic response cannot be, a competent pragmatic response must do.