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First Page

731

Last Page

810

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Energy transition has a governance problem. And much of the literature fails to address this problem. That is, it discusses who should make energy transition decisions (the President, Congress, state governments, etc.). But this perspective misses the core substantive problem: how should we share the benefits and burdens of transition? Without answering this energy transition “how” question, any answer to “who” risks appearing as arbitrary decision-making. In this Article, I am the first to submit that we can solve this “how” question using the property-law doctrine of correlative rights. Energy-transition governance is what political economists call “polycentric.” It requires different stakeholders and decision-makers to make energy-transition decisions at the same time, rather than relying on a single decision-maker. A growing literature argues that the polycentric nature of energy governance is itself a key energy-transition problem. According to this literature, polycentric governance leads directly to tragedies of the commons and anticommons of unsustainable resource overuse and underuse. This literature argues that the only way to avoid such tragedies is to centralize decision-making authority and do away with polycentric governance altogether. I challenge this position. I argue that we can solve the underlying tragedies if we apply the correlative-rights lens to the polycentric relationships themselves. By combining polycentric governance with correlative rights, I propose the idea of “polyrelativity” as a new analytical framework. Polyrelativity avoids the need for creating a centralized energy leviathan. Instead, it shows how shared decision-making can lead to energy-transition success.

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