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International Security Problems and Solutions
by Patrick M. Morgan

A review by Jacqueline Sittel

Patrick Morgan’s *International Security Problems and Solutions* provides “a framework that embraces the traditional way of thinking about security studies with its focus on intergovernmental wars, and the rising concern about wars inside societies” (xiv). He evaluates each solution “in terms of how well it seems to work at each level of security and how each deals with various security dilemmas” (15).

Morgan analyzes the relationship between security and war on the systemic, state, and societal levels. Yet, how he addresses the effects of these relationships is unbalanced. Morgan offers strategic and structural solutions, as well as tactical and practical solutions to the problems of war and security. Although he appropriately addresses the advantages and disadvantages of each solution with respect the three tier security framework, Morgan fails to fully acknowledge and attend to the threats non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations, pose nor adequately discuss the possibility of using the solutions in providing security against them. His discussion of Wilsonian Collective Security, deterrence, and peace enforcement (PE) and peace imposition (PI) as solutions fails to respond to the security threats posed by non-state actors.

Morgan provides a clear analytical overview of how security and war affect international politics. He defines security as “the quality of being and feeling safe from harm” (1) and emphasizes the role security plays in international politics as a primary concern for the international system, governments, and societies. War is a starting point for a discussion
of security, since both war itself and the fear of war are threats to security. His biggest strength in analyzing security as it relates to international politics is his discussion of the systemic, state, and societal, needs of security. He explains that although “the three levels of security overlap somewhat and each can reinforce tendencies toward peace and security...what makes for security at one level can mean considerable insecurity at another” (8, 9). Rather than categorizing the security of the international system, of individual states, and of societies as separate entities, Morgan succeeds in acknowledging the inevitable interactions the three levels of security have with one another and the effects these interactions produce on the international political system. Although his arguments surrounding the effects of interactions are compelling, Morgan focuses on the negative aspects of the interactions. This provides an unbalanced view of the effects on the international political system by disregarding the possible benefits of the interactions.

Systemic security directly affects state security because “a safe and orderly system may require --is normally assumed to require-- seriously curbing the autonomy of states, which means damaging those aspects of their security related to their having a good deal of freedom to do as they please” (9). Clearly, the interaction between the international system and states produces what states view as adverse effects. Morgan again focuses on the negative effects of security level interactions, providing the example of state governments taking part in international agreements aimed at suppressing nuclear proliferation as producing adverse effects to states in placing limits on state autonomy. Additionally, he advances his argument saying “the capacity for peoples to identify...closely with their states has been the most powerful force in the history of international politics, and it has often clashed with efforts to make the international
system less violent or unstable” (10). Again he describes that “advocates of a stable, secure international system have often insisted that some societal security has to be sacrificed for that purpose” (13) Morgan refers to the negative results of the interaction between systemic and societal security, once more providing an unbalanced view of the effects the interactions have in international politics.

Morgan follows his introduction of security’s role in international politics with an introduction to the role of war in international politics as “directly and deeply harmful to security” (17). After admitting that “on war, no explanation fits at all” (18), Morgan provides a balanced analysis of war’s impact on international politics, in regard to systemic, state, and societal security. He describes states’ use of war as “a tool in the season for security” (21) to maintain systemic stability through a balance of power.

Morgan continues to explain how war impacts on state and societal security levels, noting that a state’s vulnerability to attack can fluctuate as governments use societies to increase both support for war and their pool of battle resources. At the systemic level war creates “simultaneous fighting among all the great powers, usually over a long period of time” (28). However, Morgan balances his negative analysis citing systemic wars as having positively impacted systemic security by encouraging states to establish and act in accordance with international agreements ruling that “general great-power wars are intolerable in terms of their costs and their consequences” (31). Morgan introduces thoroughly the roles security and war play in international politics through his analysis of the relations among security, war, and the systemic, state, and societal security levels, despite presenting the effects of interactions among the three security levels in an unbalanced manner.
According to Morgan:

Each solution, as a strategy for peace and security, involves a conscious effort to bring about a general state of affairs that will be safer, including steps to avoid, neutralize, or defeat resistance to it. The underlying view is that security via an end to fighting will not just happen; it has to be arranged (36).

Morgan addresses the advantages and disadvantages of each strategic and structural solution, yet does not adequately take into account the threats non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations pose to the systemic, state, and social security. Nor does he discuss the possible utility of the solutions in providing security against such actors.

Morgan initially discusses the threat non-state actors pose to the international system with regards to the cheap victory strategy (CVS). He outlines the advantages of the strategy according to the three tiered security frame noting that states gain a restored sense of autonomy while societies benefit from less deadly and destructive war. CVS’s disadvantages destroy systemic security, resulting in “the worst wars ever fought, wars that threw the international system into upheaval, turmoil, and disruption” (73). In addition to mentioning advantages and disadvantages of the CVS, Morgan applies the strategy to possible use against the threat of non-state actors, stating “analysts debate whether full application of the RMA in the future to irregular warfare (guerrillas, urban terrorism, ambushes) will also produce cheap victories, but it remains a possibility” (70). Morgan satisfactorily applies CVS as a strategic and structural solution to the problem of security and war in relation to state and non-state actors.
Unfortunately, this is where it ends. He discusses Wilsonian collective security (WCS), a method of collective security that “seeks to keep the peace and provide protection among the members themselves…to protect them from each other” (133), and looks at the advantages and disadvantages of the strategy in his three tiered security framework. WCS increases systemic security because states have a pool of combined resources available to deter attacks. The level of systemic security will depend on how states comply with their agreement to uniformly respond to acts of aggression. States remain relatively autonomous under WCS yet gain security from their relations with one another. Societal security increases as fewer wars result in less death and destruction to society. Morgan address the threat of non-state actors in his discussion of WCS, but he fails to support the utility of applying the solution to a non-state actor, stating “attacks on a state from inside, and its military responses to those attacks are especially difficult for an international security arrangement to handle, and this is certainly true of WCS” (139). Although Morgan does address the threat of non-state actors in WCS, his response to the utility of the solution to such a threat is notably weaker compared to the one given in his discussion of cheap victory strategy.

Morgan’s struggle to incorporate the threat of non-state actors into his strategic and structural solutions is evident through his failure to mention the threat of non-state actors in his discussion on deterrence. Morgan explains that deterrence is advantageous at the systemic level, as evident through the prevention of a ground war during the Cold War, mutually assured destruction prevented both the Soviet Union and the United States from attacking one another. Deterrence’s failure, however, could result in complete destruction of the international system. Like systemic security, societal security remains strong
through the prevention of large wars. Yet in the same way, deterrence’s failure could result in complete societal destruction. Deterrence continues to be successful at the state level, as states maintain their sovereignty and have yet begin a nuclear war. Morgan does not acknowledge the threat of non-state actors or the possibility of deterring non-state actors in the event they acquire weapons of mass destruction. The question arises as to how one would utilize deterrence with regards to non-state actors. Since non-state actors must reside within some state threatening a non-state actor with mutually assured destruction would consequently threaten a state. Despite his successful attention to the advantages and disadvantages of each solution in regards to his three level concept of security, Morgan’s discussion of strategic and structural solutions is therefore inadequate with regards to the threat posed to the three tier conception of security, failing to fully attend to the utility of the solutions in providing security against these entities.

Morgan also looks at the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical and practical solution as they pertain to his security framework. But, like his discussion of strategic and structural solutions, he does not comprehensively apply these solutions to non-state actors. Morgan’s presentation of negotiation and mediation is adequate, however, as he not only provides the advantages and disadvantages of the negotiation and mediation solution at each security level, but also mentions, though briefly, the role of negotiation in dealing with non-state threats and the utility of applying the solution to such threats. Negotiation and mediation contribute to systemic security, according to Morgan, as evident through the lack of war between the great powers in recent years. At the state level, Morgan describes negotiations as increasing state legitimacy and autonomy, but mediation as a manipulative interference in state affairs. Negotiation and mediation are
viewed as successful on a societal level, most notably in dealing with threats posed by non-state actors. Morgan attends to the problem of threats from non-state actors and comments on the utility of the solution in addressing the threat, remarking “Negotiation and mediation are widely pursued to enhance societal security, especially in the present day when almost all wars are internal-civil wars, guerrilla wars competing terrorisms” (203). He then concedes: “many internal conflicts have been eased through negotiation and mediation, but they are not always a reliable recourse in terms of societal security” (203), admitting the flaws of negotiation and mediation as solutions to threats from non-state actors. Morgan thus provides a well balanced discussion of the utility of the solution when applied to threats by state and non-state actors, while at the same time addressing the three level conception of security.

International solutions do not adequately address non-state actors’ threats. Morgan discusses advantages and disadvantages of peace imposition and peace enforcement in relation to his three tier security framework. He fails to mention however, the application and utility of the solutions with regards to threats from non-state actors. But, as Morgan points out, intervention by peacekeeping forces violates state sovereignty: “A peace imposition operation…bolsters state autonomy by rejecting outright aggression, but many states are uneasy about PE and PI for internal wars or humanitarian disasters, fearing that they erode sovereignty to much” (253). PE and PI often do not benefit greatly the societal level of security, as the solutions are used as a last resort, and much destruction to society has already occurred by the time PE and PI take effect. Not unlike his presentations of strategic and structural solutions, Morgan’s discussion of tactical and practical solutions
fails to satisfactorily comment on the utility of the solutions in ensuring security in the face of threats from non-state actors capable of waging war.

Morgan’s presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of strategic and structural, and tactical and practical solutions to the problem of war and security appropriately addresses the three level conception of security, and so fulfills his commitment to providing a framework for security studies. However, Morgan’s failure to address the threats non-state actors pose to the international system, governments, and societies, as well as his consequent failure to apply solutions thereto hurts International Security Problems and Solutions, as he ignores major threats influencing current trends in international politics.