The Path to Prosperity in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Obstacles at the Crossroads

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Despite America’s lengthy nation-building project in Afghanistan, many Afghans still lack the basic resources and security necessary for a viable nation. Furthermore, the insecurity in Afghanistan is increasingly spilling over into their neighbors, stressing an already fragile region. While we in the West have largely forgotten Afghanistan, its neighbors look on with trepidation as they prepare for potential unrest. With vast amounts of natural resources and increased competition between the Russians and Chinese over the region, Afghanistan and its insecurity could lead to continued Central Asian economic and political stagnation. Despite the dangers in failure, inconsistent action and a destabilizing mission have plagued the U.S. Afghanistan mission for ten years. If the U.S. is going to continue to be involved in state building operations, a holistic plan that integrates cultural, political, military and economic policies must be implemented and dynamically updated to suit the prevailing conditions. While the road to a stable Afghanistan will be difficult, it is possible. Admitting defeat now will only create a more costly and chaotic future for Afghanistan and its neighbors that we may not be able to afford.

*By wisdom a house is built, and through understanding it is established; through knowledge its rooms are filled with rare and beautiful treasures.*

- Proverbs 24:3

**Afghanistan the Lynchpin**

The success of an independent Afghanistan will be critical in the social and economic development of Central Asia. The position of Central Asian nations at the crossroads between Asia and Europe lends them an ever-growing importance in the shaping of the new global world. Therefore, as the U.S. experience in Afghanistan continues to demonstrate, it is necessary to understand this region and its inhabitants in order to make appropriate policy decisions. However, the efforts of the U.S. in Afghanistan has thus far been plagued by inconsistent action.
and lack of coordination between civilian and military reconstruction groups, symptoms stemming from the lack of an overarching plan. If the U.S. continues to act in this region of the world, it must recognize the cultural, political, and economic elements that impede state-building and regional development.

With increased globalization, the rise of hostile non-state groups, and persistent resource scarcity, poverty and conflict pose dangerous consequences for the larger world community. While Central Asia is kept nominally stable by autocratic leaders left over from the Soviet era, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all share destabilizing elements, capable of leading to failed states and civil wars. As Afghanistan’s history aptly exhibits, failed states in this region are easily compromised by groups with hostile intent towards the U.S. and its allies. Additionally, despite a global economy that has enabled many formerly poor nations to reach relative prosperity, much of Central Asia remains at medieval levels of development. The principal danger is that further conflict will squander more human and natural resources, depriving Central Asia of economic prosperity and derailing the wider Asian continent. With this in mind, the dividends of wise foreign participation and systematic internal reforms will prove to be immensely rewarding to Afghanistan and the region.

**Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires**

Afghanistan is a landlocked nation of desert steppe, extreme elevation changes, and fertile valleys. While these features geographically isolate the country, it has long been a pivotal hub in regional commerce and politics because it lies between the Far and Middle East. Numerous historical and modern invasions attest to the tensions and liabilities implicit with life at the crossroads. Historian Stephen Tanner argues that a geographic rather than a political map explains why “Afghanistan’s claustrophobic passes have born mute witness to armies of Persians, Greeks, Mauryans, Huns, Mongols, Moghuls, British, Soviets, and Americans -- among others -- including many of the most famous captains in history.”¹ This cyclical pattern of invasion and associated phenomena is the most salient force in the shaping of Afghanistan, both past and present.

It is no surprise that the formation of modern Afghanistan took place in the tumult of Russia and
Great Britain’s imperial designs. Between Britain’s Indian empire and Russia’s desire to control ever-larger swaths of Central Asia, Afghanistan served as a battlefield and buffer state, in constant flux with the fortunes of the great powers.² This so-called Great Game of Central Asia led to Afghanistan’s other eponym -- graveyard of empires -- as neither the British nor the Russians were ever able to fully subdue Afghanistan despite a century of attempts.³ The British were the first to commit a pattern of blunders that would later haunt the Soviets and to an extent hinder the U.S. endeavor in Afghan nation-building. Historian Louis Dupree attributes the British calamity to “the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, the placing of an unpopular emir on the throne, the harsh acts of the British-supported Afghans against their local enemies, and the reduction of the subsidies paid to the tribal chiefs by British political agents.”⁴

While it is fashionable to relate many current wars to aspects of older conflicts,⁵ in the case of Afghanistan, a pervasive sense of déjà vu proves especially hard to ignore.⁶ The Soviet era was a recent, clear, and documented instance of failed intervention and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Though many specific lessons from the Soviet decade in Afghanistan are perhaps applicable to today’s conflict, as far as this essay is concerned, more useful analysis lies with how this era paved the way for civil war and the rise of the Taliban.

Afghanistan’s precipitous downfall began in 1978 when Soviet-backed leftist Afghan army officers deposed President Muhammad Daud Khan. The communist regime that followed attempted to transform Afghanistan along Marxist-Leninist lines, aiming to align Afghanistan with the Soviet hegemony and secure Moscow’s largesse.⁷ The social and religious reforms dictated by the new regime, however, provoked Islamists and traditionalists into an ever-growing insurgent movement that by 1979 had gained control over most of the provinces.⁸ The Soviet Union, worried that this uprising could spread to the Central Asian republics⁹, installed a moderate communist leader in the hopes that this would appease the anti-regime forces.¹⁰

The loose tribal and ethnic coalition called the Mujahedeen attracted an eager league of benefactors from the U.S. to China, who jumped at the opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union dry through proxy war.¹¹ While the Mujahedeen were initially quite broad in its composition, former Afghan Army officer Ali Jalali describes how the movement became more extreme as the “U.S.
intelligence believed that the Islamists were the most zealous and devoted anti-Soviet fighters and deserved to be supported.” Jalali experienced firsthand how this aid, channeled through similarly radical Pakistani intelligence, “marginalized mainstream Afghan forces that embraced moderate religious and nationalistic orientation, but lacked strong leadership.” Through this support and determination, the Mujahedeen claimed victory over the weary Soviet forces after ten years of bloody conflict. The U.S. calculation to support the more radical Afghan factions would, however, be Pyrrhic triumph. Jalali counters that “the cost of Washington’s victory in the Afghan power game was the advancement of the Jihadi mentality which motivated a worldwide terrorist network centered in Afghanistan.”

Civil War ad infinitum

Immediately after the Soviet defeat, the loss of the “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” mentality soon digressed into open war between the multitude of Afghanistan’s ethnic, religious and political divisions. Jalali further describes this power struggle as involving “neighboring states pursuing strategic interests, and extra-regional players with ideological, security and or economic stakes in the chaos.” In combination with what Hekmat Karzai of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies characterizes as “a culture of international neglect,” Jalali adds that “neighboring countries furthered their policies by engaging and supporting rival afghan factions while fueling internal strife and blocking the emergence of a broad based legitimate government.” In a statement that encapsulates the whole situation, he attests that “the turmoil was both the cause and consequence of state failure in the war-torn country.”

In this power vacuum of lawlessness, violence, and poverty, a group called the Taliban was poised to gain control of Afghanistan. According to Karzai, the Taliban traces its name from the Arabic word for “student,” a reference to its historic relationship to deeni madaris or Islamic schools. However scholarly its roots, the Taliban holds to the extreme views of a dogmatic sect of Sunni Islam called Deobandism, distinguished from moderate Islam in pursuing an active Jihad with global ambitions. Empowered by U.S. contributions, the Taliban “gained in popularity by presenting [itself] as a viable and constructive political alternative, since within weeks [it] had restored security in the southern provinces.” At this juncture it is important to note that now, as then, most Afghans value security and relative stability, perhaps even at the
expense of severely curtailed freedoms and civil rights. Initially, however, the promise of the
Taliban included such lofty goals as those outlined by Historian Martin Ewans\textsuperscript{22}:

- to end the conflicts between rival Mujahedeen groups that continued to disintegrate the
country and cause lawlessness
- to restore peace and security for all Afghans and protect their rights and liberties
- to disarm the populace, removing weapons that were abundant after Afghan-Soviet war
- to unite the people under one central government
- to end the corruption by various parties and establish a credible and accountable
government
- to enforce Sharia law, establish the Islamic state, and preserve the Islamic character of
Afghanistan \textsuperscript{23}

However, as time went on, the Taliban found it difficult to harmonize the pursuit of these goals
with the preservation of the “Islamic character of Afghanistan.” In view of Afghanistan’s
inherent splits, a common Islamic bond was arguably contrived. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Taliban had to resort to other methods in order maintain control. Influenced by the extremist
ideology of its backers — from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan intelligence (ISI) — the Taliban
adopted severe repression and Orwellian tactics as a political expediency.\textsuperscript{24}

Furthermore, the transnational terror group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, found this nation
an ideal host for the training and export of its brand of extremism. With jihad infrastructure left
over from the fight against the Soviets, Osama bin Laden was quickly able to mobilize further
support from many “wealthy Arabs throughout the Middle East….as [he was] were keen on
seeing a doctrine similar to Wahhabism spread across Central Asia.”\textsuperscript{25}

By the end of 1997, the Taliban had imposed severe rules and regulations on of much of the
country. Karzai describes how “couples were stoned to death if caught in adultery; thousands of
widows were banned from employment; schools and colleges were closed to girls; T.V. music
and soccer were all banned.”\textsuperscript{26} Significantly, as the Taliban reneged on their social contract, it
saw Afghans voting with their feet as they “sought to remove their children from the scene in
order to evade conscription into the front-line action against the Northern Alliance.”\textsuperscript{27} Journalist
Ahmed Rashid uses stronger language to explain that the Taliban’s ethos was “utterly alien to
Afghan culture and tradition.” With this growing disquiet, the quick initial fall of the Taliban after the coalition invasion in 2001 is largely attributable to groups such as the Northern Alliance and others who had long chafed under Taliban rule.

Obstacles to a New Afghanistan

In a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, Senator Kerry quoted a U.S. military officer who told him with frustration, “We haven’t been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years. We’ve been fighting in Afghanistan for one year, eight times in a row.” Rashid documents how the American plan initially rejected nation-building, as President Bush had declared as late as September 26, 2001, “We are not into nation-building, we are focused on justice.” As the obvious need for aid became apparent, a large coalition of international military and reconstruction forces under U.N. and U.S. direction became involved. Initially this nation-building impetus was tempered with Secretary of State Collin Powell’s qualification that “It isn’t a huge Marshall Plan kind of investment.” With such vague goals and shortsighted revenge, the major international players have been caught off guard with the Hobbesian decline of Afghanistan.

Militarily, U.S. planners also failed to understand the changing nature of conflict in an age of laser-guided bombs and predator drones against soldiers on horseback. It is easy to underestimate the degree to which the Vietnam War continues to affect American political and military thought and practice. Warfare for American forces has become characterized by a style of combat first proven in the first Gulf War, one that stresses remote weapon delivery systems over conventional infantry operations. American aversion to using ground troops in operations from Somalia through Afghanistan testifies to U.S. leaders’ fear of another Vietnam-style war. U.S. experiences in nation building have proven even less fortuitous, as Rashid reports that Washington has been involved in just six of such operations—Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, Somalia, and the states of the former Yugoslavia. None of them was initiated by the United States, except for Somalia, which failed. The United States never took part in UN peacekeeping operations, although it has funded and supported many of them. The lack of a clear mission, compounded by the concurrent war in Iraq, explains much of the past malaise in Afghanistan that the “eight, one year wars” analogy describes. In a recent address
at West Point, President Obama did not gloss over the facts that violence is again breaking out in the provinces, the opium trade is expanding, and the Taliban is resurfacing. The Commander in Chief explicitly acknowledged that, “although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces.”\(^{35}\) In committing an additional thirty thousand troops and all that goes along with them, it appears that the U.S. will be getting serious about nation-building in Afghanistan.

**A Brave New World**

With the increased security provided by the influx of troops, an exceedingly rare window of opportunity has opened for rebuilding Afghanistan and solidifying its currently shaky foundations. First and foremost, the availability of more troops enables the U.S. and its allies to extend a greater tactical flexibility over a larger territory rather than remaining separated from the general population in forward operating bases. However, this operation must be done with extreme caution; propaganda painting U.S. troops seen as occupiers and killers can gain valuable support for the Taliban’s cause. Karzai points out that “Operations where force is used should be controlled, because if one innocent civilian is killed, it diminishes the goodwill of a whole family, a community and a tribe.”\(^{36}\) More and more attention is being paid to winning the hearts and minds of Afghans\(^ {37}\) because a viable Afghan government must beat the Taliban at providing security and order. Unequivocally, General William Wallace posits that conflicts like that in Afghanistan can be won “only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic informational and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace.”\(^ {38}\)\(^ {39}\)

If violence is ousted from the outer provinces and security nominally restored, the central government in Kabul will be able to spread its reforms and services to those who are currently isolated. Any government must have the infrastructure to provide public goods and services to its citizens. Therefore roads, electricity, and communication networks must be set up and maintained. The current situation in Afghanistan is analogous to that of San Francisco if all bridges in and out of the city were all destroyed and the only way in to the area was through the southern base of the peninsula. While increased troop numbers will help provide basic needs and
basic infrastructure, the political, economic, and agriculture reforms discussed later will prove ineffective unless these can first be secured.

**Unlimited Liability**

The largest challenges to a viable Afghanistan are governmental corruption and staggering economic hurdles. While the 2009 Transparency International rankings listed Afghanistan at 179 out of 180 countries in terms of perceived governmental corruption (from least to most), the amount of international involvement in Afghanistan certainly separates it from Myanmar at 178 and Somalia at 180. Thus while this number is unfortunate, it is pragmatic to expect such a rating from a country only recently thrust into democracy. This conclusion is not to say that this level will be forever acceptable, but rather that incremental improvements should be pursued.

Ultimately the largest roadblocks in Afghanistan’s development are represented in the U.N.’s Human Development Index. The HDI measures such criteria as “a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita.” HDI 2009 places Afghanistan with a composite score of .352 out of 1, second only to Niger, whose .340 puts it at the bottom of the scale. In comparison with its Central Asian neighbors, Tajikistan earns a .688, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan .710 each, Turkmenistan a .739, and Kazakhstan a .804. When the HDI is extrapolated with figures from the CIA World Factbook, the seriousness of these problems is clear.

The median age of the Afghanistan’s population is 17.6 years old and 44% of the population is between the ages of 0 to 14, while only 2.4% is over 65. While this rate is concurrent with that of a population that has suffered 30 years of war and out-migration, it more worryingly attests to the low levels of medical access in a country where life expectancy is 44.6 years. Furthermore, if such a young populace were educated, such an age discrepancy would not be as critical. As things stand, literacy rates are 43.1 percent for males and an incredibly low 12.6 percent for females, who on average complete only four years of school. Even four years is surprisingly high considering the Taliban prohibition on female education. As 24% of the population is urbanized, it is apparent that a large uneducated cohort will need to be integrated into the national economy if Afghanistan is to grow.
The impending human capital crisis is compounded by Afghanistan’s hobbled economy, dependent largely on illicit opium trade. The World Factbook calculates that if the country’s entire poppy crop were processed it would yield 648 metric tons of pure heroin. An opium-based economy is a huge dilemma for the new government since according to economist Alastair Mckenchnie, the crop comprises 35 percent of GDP and “employs as many as 2 million people.” Unfortunately, the greater evils of opium production include funding insurgent forces as well as contributing to “other criminality such as the appropriation of custom revenues and illegal taxation, trafficking in people and body organs, forced labor, practices similar to slavery, export of archeological artifacts, arms trading, land seizures, and real estate speculation based on armed force or corruptly obtained contracts.”

Reducing or eliminating the opium trade would tremendously reduce governmental corruption and other societal ills. However, the catch is that with everyone wanting a piece of the pie, curtailing production becomes a nearly impossible endeavor without incurring significant political and economic costs. While reliance on a single crop will never lead to long-term economic development, cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan demonstrates that the short-term costs are also unsustainable if Afghanistan wishes to join the licit world economy. Mckenchnie presents an ugly circle in which continued opium reliance leads to further corruption, diminished government capacity and rule of law, and finally to increased macroinstability. While additional coalition forces will largely reduce the rate of poppy growing, the problem with corruption and a lack of suitable economic replacements remain Afghanistan’s limiting factors.

**A New Way Forward**

Taken as a whole, the disastrous recent history of Afghanistan coupled with current economic, societal, and political disorder adds up to an exceedingly difficult equation with an ever-elusive solution. Like a puzzle whose pieces are always changing shape, Afghanistan’s final configuration will prove difficult to determine. Nevertheless, new study of what makes societies and nations fail or succeed is increasingly useful in plotting out a rough map of Afghanistan’s future development requirements. Paul Collier, former director of Development Research at the World Bank and current economic professor at Oxford University, has moved past common
assumptions on what makes countries poor and offers solutions through quantitative analysis.

Collier, in his book *The Bottom Billion*, focuses significantly on how proper governance affects growth and whether growth can be attained with poor governance. He finds that while good governance can improve the growth by up to 10%, terrible governance can destroy the economy much more decisively.

Extrapolating his findings to Afghanistan is especially troubling given its high government corruption and economic immaturity. Fortunately, a growing economy can exist under a poor government if certain criteria can be met. Bangladesh is the model here, as its economy continues to grow despite being plagued by poor governance and a recent military takeover. Bangladesh’s government, although corrupt, adopted relatively liberal export policies that enabled it to export large amounts labor-intensive goods competitively. Collier writes, “the government merely has to avoid doing harm rather than actively doing much good; exporters simply need an environment of moderate taxation, macroeconomic stability and a few transport facilities.” Such reforms are especially appealing for Afghanistan as “such a development strategy need not be very demanding of government” to ensure success. Additionally, if Afghanistan specializes in similar high labor goods and services with moderately liberal trade policies, the country could regain its importance as a regional trade hub. In order to achieve such liberal trade policies, Collier presents governmental checks and balances as key in preventing conflict and poverty. Without them, “patronage will often win out over honest politics in the struggle for votes.”

Collier also identifies the lack of coastal access as a large contributor to perpetual poverty, as landlocked nations’ trade options are greatly diminished or dictated by their coastal neighbors’ whims. If Afghanistan were surrounded by more prosperous countries, like Switzerland in Europe, then this would be less of a problem. However, since Afghanistan is surrounded by the poor and landlocked nations of Central Asia, instability in any of these countries drastically affects the others. For comparison, Collier calculates the global “spillover” average: for every additional 1% neighboring countries grew, the neighbor country would grow by .4%. For Afghanistan however, Collier posits that “globally, resource scarce landlocked countries seem to
make a special effort to piggyback on the growth of their neighbors—for the landlocked the spillover is not 0.4 percent but 0.7 percent.” Afghanistan should then orient itself to becoming a regional trade facilitator because it has few natural resources of its own. Furthermore, partnerships with various regional coastal nations could further its global trade exports. With time and the improvement of other Central Asian republics’ trade policies, a Central Asian co-prosperity sphere like the European Coal and Steel Community would contribute significantly to sustained growth and economic diversification.

Many Americans view Central Asia as an inconsequential backwater, difficult to locate on a map. However, as Collier comments, after the 9/11 attacks “the whole topic of failing states is fashionable because people have an uneasy sense that it probably does matter.” For Central Asians, a viable Afghanistan will be pivotal in the growth of their economies. Collier calculates that over its history, a failed state can cost itself and its neighbors $100 billion in total. If applied to Central Asia, a wider regional community is imperative to giving millions of people significantly higher standards of living.

In the past, the U.S. has led the international community in pursuing nation-building in Afghanistan with inconsistent effort and incomplete understanding. However, with the recent influx of security forces and other resources to aid Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy, a new chapter has been opened in the region’s history. This opportunity must not be wasted and historical mistakes must be learned from and corrected. Collier writes, “Donors should be committed for the decade not just the first couple of high-glamour years” and also, “International security forces should likewise be committed for the long haul.” Ultimately Afghanistan and the neighboring nations bear the responsibility for their futures and serious reform must be taken in order to ensure success. The current obstacles at the crossroads are great, and the easy solutions have already been tried. However, if and when Central Asia is able to overcome such impediments, the benefit to their people and the world will far outweigh current costs.

Endnotes


5 One must be careful with such comparisons. While the Mujahedeen were supported in their fight against the Soviets by massive U.S. aid and arms influxes, today’s Taliban enjoys no such assistance, reports Yaroslov Trofimov, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Trofimov quotes Taliban officer Mullah Muttawakil who complains, “If we compare the two cooperations, today Pakistan is doing nothing.” Additionally, while pundits and laymen alike may draw conclusions from comparisons of Afghanistan and Iraq to Vietnam, the author of this paper finds such comparisons misleading and unproductive.

6 A repetition of historical significance occurred when the United States chose the ruins of a massive Soviet airfield near the city of Bagram to be their primary coalition base. Jalali recalls that, “Alexander the Great twenty-three centuries earlier had built Bagram as Alexandria-in-the-Caucasus,” the seat of his Asian conquests (24).


8 Yaroslave Trofimov.

9 Another key difference between the U.S. invasion of Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was that the Soviet Union was fighting a defensive war in its back yard. The civil war in Vietnam posed little threat to the mainland U.S., while an unstable Afghanistan near their border republics threatened the Soviets greatly.

10 Yaroslave Trofimov.

11 Yaroslave Trofimov.


Hekmat Karzai, 79.


Hekmat Karzai, 58.

As cited in Hekmat Karzai, 59.

These points are listed in full because they provide a comparison on how successful the current international coalition has been in meeting such goals in their state-building endeavor.

Hekmat Karzai, 60.

Hekmat Karzai, 60.

Hekmat Karzai, 60.

Hekmat Karzai, 61.

Ahmed Rashid, 14.

Ahmed Rashid, 80-83.


Ahmed Rashid, 74.

Ahmed Rashid, 75.

However, military theorist T. R. Fehrenbach’s maxim that, “[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud” (as quoted in, Army, *FM-03 Operations*, 2001), is appearing increasingly relevant in this age of failed state rebuilding.

Ahmed Rashid, LII

Barack H. Obama, "President Obama’s Speech at West Point" (address, Address to West Point, United States Military Academy, New York, December 3, 2009),


Hekmat Karzai, 78.

For additional examples on the negative externalities created by reliance on sheer force alone in counterinsurgency operations see, David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009). Kilcullen’s insight is that in these clan and ethnic based wars, oftentimes killing an insurgent will only compel his son, brother, or other relative to pick up his rifle and fight back.

39 For an in depth look on Counterinsurgency strategy look to, John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: University Of Chicago Press, 2005). In conjunction with this prominent work in counterinsurgency studies, Nagl recently wrote the forward to the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual and as such, his theories and writings will contribute to U.S. military doctrine for some time to come.


42 The United Nations


50 Alastair J. Mckenchnie, 104.

51 Alastair J. Mckenchnie, 105.

52 Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 64.

53 Paul Collier, 65.

54 See also, Devin Hagerty, "Bangladesh in 2007: Democracy Interrupted, Political and Environmental Challenges Ahead," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 1 (2008), Academic Search Elite, for a more detailed analysis on Bangladesh’s problems with democracy and thriving export sector.

55 Paul Collier, 66.

56 Paul Collier, 65.

57 Paul Collier, 65.

58 Paul Collier, 65.
59 Paul Collier, 146.
60 Paul Collier, 64.
61 Paul Collier, 58.
62 Paul Collier, 58.
63 Paul Collier, 73.
64 Paul Collier, 74.
65 Paul Collier, 152.

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United States Military Academy, New York, December 3, 2009.


