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Slava Ukraini: a psychobiographical case study of Volodymyr Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse

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Pepperdine University

Graduate School of Education and Psychology

SLAVA UKRAINI:

A PSYCHOBIOGRAPHICAL CASE STUDY OF VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY'S PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY DISCOURSE

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Global Leadership and Change

by

Amber Brittain-Hale

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Martine A. Jago, Ph.D. – Dissertation Chairperson

This dissertation, written by

Amber Brittain-Hale

under the guidance of a Faculty Committee and approved by its members, has been submitted to and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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October 2015—Director at The Brittain Group, San Diego

Dedicated planning and operations expert who contributes to cross-collaborative teams with research knowledge in stakeholder and client affairs.A demonstrated acumen in developing relationships, business analysis, compliance, and communications processes across industries.

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2023—Research Reviewer for ILA's Global Conference

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2023—Brittain-Hale's Foreign Policy Analysis Model (© 2023)

DEDICATION

I thank my family for their love, patience, and support throughout my doctoral journey. Pursuing a doctorate degree is a transformative experience. I am grateful for their understanding and patience as I focused on my work. During the past three years, my family has patiently missed many little things I used to do, but I want to assure them that I will be back to all my projects soon.

To my husband, John, I cannot express how much I love and appreciate you. You have taken on additional responsibilities, managed our home, provided emotional support, and been the "Cooking Daddy" of the neighborhood. Your dedication and understanding have allowed me to focus on my research. I am confident that our family is well cared for. I am grateful for your partnership, which has helped me turn my dreams into reality, and for providing a supportive environment for personal growth.

To my sons, Brittain, Thomas, Dieter, and Henry, I am fortunate and proud to be your mother. Each of you has unique qualities, talents, and strengths that inspire me. I have witnessed your triumphs and challenges and am amazed by your determination and spirit. Your presence has enriched my life, and I am honored to be part of your journey. I love you all deeply and unconditionally.

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To my mother, Pamela, thank you for staying up with me during my AP European History homework. I remember your bubble script handwriting of the "Hapsburg Empire" and the "House of Bourbon" vividly. These small steps started my journey. I have inherited your keen eye for details, which enables me to notice patterns and inconsistencies that might elude others.

Finally, I dedicate this work to my father, Bruce R. Brittain, with a heart full of joy. Although I feel your absence every day, your influence continues. You instilled in me the value of education and the importance of pursuing it wholeheartedly. I will never forget our last private conversation about my acceptance to Pepperdine University and the unmistakable joy and pride that shone in your eyes. Your lasting impact has shaped the person I am today, and I am grateful for your love, guidance, and enduring legacy. We are forever Team Brittain.

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ABSTRACT

Volodymyr Zelenskyy's public diplomacy during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict was examined in this dissertation. Zelenskyy's discourse emphasized his action-oriented traits, Ukrainian identity, and nationalism. The study employed LTA, and LIWC-22, for natural language processing analyses of Zelenskyy's public speeches and diplomatic discourse. Zelenskyy demonstrated agency, adaptability, collaboration, and positive language patterns, suggesting confidence and optimism, according to the data. In addition, the research emphasizes how domestic and international factors influence state behavior, as well as how political demands, cultural, historical, and political factors influence Zelenskyy's decision-making.

This dissertation sheds light on a global leader's psychobiographical characteristics, beliefs, and motivations during a crisis, thereby advancing leadership and conflict resolution. By incorporating transformational leadership theory into LTA, researchers can gain a better understanding of effective leadership and how it develops strong connections with followers. LTA, LIWC-22, and qualitative coding were used to identify themes and trends in Zelenskyy's speeches. The findings show Zelenskyy's linguistic and leadership traits in public diplomacy, emphasizing the importance of understanding leaders' traits in foreign policy decision-making. Psychobiographical profiles aid scholars in understanding a leader's political views on conflict, their ability to influence events, and how they accomplish their objectives. As a result, perceptions of the state as an actor, as well as foreign policy decisions, must consider the effect of individual leaders. Conclusions include the Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model, based on a heuristic qualitative coding framework: HISTORICAL.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides a concise overview of the study, arguing for the examination of a notable political figure, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and his public diplomacy (PD) discourse. It also offers an overview of PD, Online Social Networks (OSNs), and the significance of Zelenskyy's utilization of these networks during the Russo-Ukrainian War in foreign policy analysis (FPA). The chapter presents the problem, purpose, and research questions driving the study, followed by the study's importance. It concludes with definitions of crucial terms to contextualize the dissertation and a summary of the chapter.

Slava Ukraini

Slava Ukraini, which can be translated as "Glory to Ukraine," symbolizes hope, perseverance, and determination for Ukrainians. This phrase has become a representation of the nation in all forms of communication, whether it be state, personal, or from President Zelenskyy himself.

Background of the Study

In February 2022, Russia initiated a comprehensive military operation against Ukraine. Subsequent months revealed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a significant political and military opponent to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelenskyy confronted Russian aggression by managing Ukrainian communication about the conflict and shaping a wider global narrative and policy reaction. Prior to the February invasion, Zelenskyy remained a novice in Ukrainian politics and virtually unrecognized on the global stage. Minimal empirical research had been conducted on his leadership, and forecasts regarding his foreign policy decisions were disproven within mere days (Al Jazeera, 2022; Hookway, 2022; Musafirova, 2021).

The effects of his PD, primarily through direct-to-public communication via OSNs like Twitter and Instagram, precipitated a sea change in international cooperation and strengthened the liberal world order in an alliance with Ukraine (Poushter & Connaughton, 2022).

A crisis in Europe necessitated multifaceted and interdisciplinary examination, prompting questions about President Zelenskyy's distinct approach and unexpected "Churchillian" statesmanship (McTague, 2022a; D. Petraeus, personal communication, June 15, 2022). This research contributes valuable new perspectives to the psychobiographical analysis of global leadership while offering a computational analysis of Zelenskyy's PD through natural language processing (NLP), complemented by a quantitative psychometric evaluation of his PD (de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005). The study recognizes Zelenskyy's employment of OSNs, such as Twitter, Telegram, and other digital platforms, as channels for disseminating PD.

This study is also inspired by the phrase "Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Man", which is thought to have scriptural origins from John 4:23. Despite its unknown origin, the phrase remains clear: a single individual can drastically alter the course of an event. This study seeks to add to existing research on leadership psychometrics through PD, by examining how President Zelenskyy has demonstrated leadership traits throughout the ongoing conflict.

Overview of the Conflict

Before the Conflict

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia presented decades of complexity and importance, particularly within Europe's post-World War II landscape. As a nation, Ukraine held deep roots in resistance and historically constituted an integral component of the Soviet Union. However, since the dawn of the 21st century, the country had shifted its focus toward democracy and Western-oriented aspirations.

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia intensified in 2013 when Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Kremlin allies exerted influence to obstruct the process of official European integration. Coupled with the 2004 Orange Revolution, a popular uprising responding to a rigged presidential election, this event signified a turning point in Ukraine's pursuit of democracy. It was then that the country started to coalesce around the idea of joining the European Union (EU), and the struggle for freedom began to crystallize (Ploky, 2015).

When President Victor Yanukovych withdrew from talks to join the EU in 2013, new resistance emerged. Yanukovych, backed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin's apparatchiks, defied the Ukrainian will and abandoned the process of official European integration (Bentzen, 2020). Political ties to Moscow and the government's widespread influence peddling swayed the decision to withdraw from the EU Association Agreement (AA; Gibbs, 2012; Götz, 2015, 2016a; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Riabchuk, 2012; Semenenko et al., 2020). This decision effectively nullified the Verkhovna Rada's 2012 resolution, which had approved action for closer European alignment by accepting the AA (Götz, 2016a, 2016b; Shveda & Park, 2016; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, n.d.).

At the time of the resolution, Yanukovych made public assertions that Ukraine would endeavor to satisfy the requirements of EU membership while simultaneously and officially pursuing membership in the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia trade agreements. Protests erupted in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, and Ukrainians staged a citizens' movement in Maidan Square. The Euromaidan protests pressured the government to return to its legal mandate to pursue membership in the EU (Afineevsky, 2015; Matsiyevsky, 2018; Shveda & Park, 2016)

As Ukrainians of all persuasions organized a citizen occupation and marches, the campaign against Yanukovych's withdrawal increased. The strength of the Euromaidan movement grew but remained peaceful until it was challenged by Ukrainian state forces (Afineevsky, 2015; Plokhy, 2015). The fighting between democratic forces was deadly; an estimated 100 Ukrainians died for the cause of establishing closer ties with Europe through membership in the EU. Even with officially sanctioned brutality, the protestors continued (Afineevsky, 2015; Kushnir, 2018; Shveda & Park, 2016). This epoch of Ukrainian history, now called the Revolution of Dignity, created enough tension between the citizenry and the executive branch that the president resigned. In February 2014, President Yanukovych fled Kyiv via helicopter to Moscow, after which he was ultimately impeached and remained in exile. Following the Euromaidan protests and the end of the Yanukovych presidency, Ukraine regained its momentum to unify politically and economically with the rest of Europe. Ukraine accepted the AA's political tenants in March 2014. Following the election of Petro Poroshenko, the economic agreements were ratified in June of the same year (Baysha, 2018; Mashtaler, 2021; Matsiyevsky, 2018; Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021; Shveda & Park, 2016).

With these events in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin pressed his advantage of considerable state resources, including military, economics, and neo-imperialist nationalism, to invade Crimea in 2014. This resource-rich peninsula with a long-shared heritage with both nations, Russia's first seizure of Crimea was in 1783, after which control of that territory changed many times throughout the Crimean War, Bolshevik Revolution, and World War II (Kotkin, 2017; Plokhy, 2015; Yale Law School, 2008). The Soviet Union transferred Crimea back to Ukraine in 1954 after the ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians in the decade prior. The transfer was based on Kruschev's economic calculations of

the peninsula's value to Ukraine during a famine, drought, and decline in agricultural production. (Karagiannis, 2014; McDougal, 2015; Semenov, 2021). Recent scholarship has revealed that the political calculus of Kruschev included reaffirming the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians and their "great indissoluble friendship" (M. Kramer, 2014, para. 9).

Russia's revanchist foreign policy and ideologized view of itself as the Third Rome underpinned the invasion of Crimea, citing the need to reunite Slavic brethren under one flag (D'Anieri, 2019; Freedman, 2014; Götz, 2016b; Kotkin, 2022). After the peninsula's seizure, Russia expanded its hybrid war, combining conventional warfare with political, cyber, and other means of action. Ukraine was under war-like conditions in its Russia-adjacent oblasts (provinces) of Donetsk and Luhansk. The Donbas area has been roiled with conflict, referendum, and civil disruption since 2014 (Baysha, 2018; Echevarria II, 2022; Kissinger, 2020; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Shamas et al., 2022). This quasi-civil war between Russia-backed separatists and pro-imperial Russian forces embroiled Ukraine in bloody conflict (Siebens, 2022; Statista, 2022). In action separate from the ongoing military conflict in the Donbas, Russia began massing troops in late 2021, foreshadowing an escalating conflict (Reuters, 2021a; Reuters, 2021b; Lamothe, 2022; Troianovski & Sanger, 2022).

The Conflict

Ukraine, a sovereign, democratic nation, had the Russian Federation on its Eastern flank. In late 2021, Russia had massed troops, including 100,000 soldiers, tanks, and heavy artillery, observed through OSINT and official U.S. intelligence channels (Bellingcat Investigative Team, 2022; A. E. Kramer, 2021; Lamothe, 2022; Reuters, 2021a; Reuters, 2021b). Before the invasion in February 2022, the United States had warned Ukraine and other strategic security partners that an attack was imminent. On February 24, 2022, Russian forces poured into Ukraine from the

eastern borders and Belarus, resulting in acute disruption to the global world order (Adami, 2022; Fivecoat Consulting Group, 2022; GeoConfirmed, 2022).

The United States and global partners needed more confidence in Ukraine's ability to challenge a Russian invasion. They had no confidence in Ukraine and its president (Cochrane et al., 2022a; 2022b; 2022; E. A. Cohen, 2022). Intelligence officials and foreign policy experts predicted that Ukraine would fall to Russia after three days of the war. They based their conclusions on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's inexperience and perceptions of his character (Foer, 2022). However, the West mismeasured Ukrainians' commitment to democracy and desire to become fully integrated members of Europe. Ukraine was demonstrably committed to joining transnational organizations such as the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; Zelenskyy, 2022a). Overall, global partners did not expect the Ukrainian strength and commitment to resist Russian forces.

During the 2022 conflict, President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people fought with determination, demonstrating their strategic and tactical strength. Zelenskyy played a crucial role in galvanizing the will of Ukrainians, world leaders, and international alliances, creating a formidable coalition. One of the critical elements of Ukraine's strength was its strategic communications, which Zelenskyy led. He modeled a compelling rhetorical style, not limited to traditional speeches and forums, and had a deliberate presence on social media platforms such as Instagram, Telegram, and Twitter. This new form of PD has begun to change global opinion and positionality in unprecedented ways (Півторак, 2022).

In addition to Zelenskyy's leadership, the level of preparation behind Ukrainian state-level communication was impressive. Various Ukrainian institutions, including the Department of Defence, the Foreign Minister, and Verkhovna Rada, carried social media channels that

promoted pro-Ukrainian messages, informational updates, and strategic communication (Півторак, 2022). According to Media Detector, social media became the second most accessed source of information by Ukrainians in the immediate aftermath of February 24, 2022, and has continued to grow. The top 100 Telegram Channels between February and August 2022 included 20 run by official Ukrainian institutions or government officials (Півторак, 2022).

The critical point for establishing control over state messaging and forging the identity of Ukraine in the conflict came on February 24, 2022. President Zelenskyy stood on the street and began to live stream via his phone to Instagram. He declared that "Президент тут" or The President is here (Zelenskyy, 2022c). With this declaration and the rest of his statements in the broadcast, he identified Ukraine as a bounded, independent nation-state with a fully intact government, challenging the Russian government's narrative of Ukraine being an apparition or lost province.

Zelenskyy remained in the streets in his newly-minted signature outfit- green tee shirt, puffer jacket, and fatigue-style pants. The optics of this appearance, including his apparel, showed a leader in command. Zelenskyy had to send commands on an analog phone because Russia was interfering with communication bandwidth, which proved the level of preparation by Ukraine (Averre, 2022). The critical piece was that Zelenskyy always maintained communication with his key partners. Ukrainians established a position of superiority in the media and the technical elements of the war, whose hybridity had been a challenge since 2014. It was noted that young Ukrainians, some of the world's most highly trained telecommunications specialists, fought the cyber war voluntarily through social media. OSNs became the primary sources of information for both the Ukrainian state and global audiences (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2022; Pancevski, 2022).

As Ukrainians utilized technology to their advantage, Zelenskyy became the critical communicator for the war. His public-facing diplomacy began to agenda-set for Ukrainian foreign policy. Russia had long excelled at misinformation, political interference, and malign cyber behavior; however, the Ukrainian effort surpassed the Russians in the early days of the war. Ukraine swiftly gained the upper hand. Research revealed that Zelenskyy's social media presence and official state digital platforms experienced a significant increase in scope and reach within just a few weeks. (Півторак, 2022). Ukrainian officials proudly said, "Three days, they said. Ukraine will fall, they said…" referring to their country's predicted capitulation and resistance (Ukraine, 2022).

Europe's Defensive Malaise

Before delving deeper into Zelenskyy's PD discourse, it was essential to recognize a particular aspect of European politics uncomfortable with self-defense. The EU, NATO, and the international community lacked a robust deterrence model, resulting in an inconsistent ethical and moral stance (Michalski & Adam, 2021; Orsini, 2022; Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021). Although power-balancing efforts along NATO's Eastern border increased following Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea, European countries struggled to fulfill their mandatory financial contributions through its collective defense (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Ikenberry, 2018, 2020; Mikhailov, 2021). NATO was not inclined toward military intervention, and there was a reluctance to act, with little thought given to managing escalation (R. Johnson, 2022. Poast, 2022c).

Simultaneously, NATO was the primary external force assisting Ukraine's military reform (Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021). The primary goals of NATO's aid were to promote democratic and civilian oversight of Ukraine's military forces and security institutions and

improve Ukraine's ability to ensure its security. In return, Ukraine has ratified several multilateral agreements since gaining independence, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 (Bentzen, 2020; Gibbs, 2012). Additional details about these international organizations were displayed in Appendices A and B.

The leniency in enforcing compliance and appeasement policies towards Russia has been a concern for several US presidents, including Donald Trump (2017-2021; Grajewski, 2021; Rolfe, 2016; Zug, 2018). Key European nations' perceived weak involvement and low prioritization of security have signaled a lack of genuine commitment to Ukraine's security towards Russia (Baysha, 2018; D'Anieri, 2019; Gibbs, 2012). Other European institutions have also suffered from the post-modern misconception that security was merely a construct or something the US could handle.

The US has been the most significant resource contributor to European security, including maintaining a significant armed forces presence since 1941. European countries needed more mechanisms to regularly reassess the organization's influential position on global policy and security matters (Grajewski, 2021; Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021). There was a need to regain control of the liberal order and renew the collective security culture and post-war realism before February 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed Europe's weak defense posture.

The Russo-Ukrainian War and Zelenskyy's rhetoric had changed the security sentiment on the continent. There was a demonstrable increase in the desire for self-defense among European nations (Cochrane et al., 2022a, 2022b; Götz & McFaul, 2021; McFaul, 2022a). Although Ukraine had long aspired to join NATO, it was not an immediate possibility (Götz & Merlen, 2019). The Russo-Ukrainian War had accelerated this integration, as the conflict-affected international relations beyond its borders. Western governments swiftly supported

Ukraine's accession to international organizations. Countries with historically challenging relationships with Russia include Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. This shift underscored the importance of understanding the impact of Zelenskyy's PD, primarily through OSNs.

Foreign Policy Analysis, Agent-Actors in History, and Zelenskyy

This study aimed to explore the use of PD by Zelenskyy in the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 using the FPA perspective. FPA considers the whole decision-making event, including various factors like economics, social system, international situation, actors, perceptions, motives, values, objectives, communication challenges, and personality, to understand the salience of individual leadership in a conflict (Hudson & Day, 2019). Though International Relations (IR) theories explain state-level power competitions and balancing behaviors, FPA allowed a better understanding of the significance of an individual actor in foreign policy considerations.

Rather than that of decision-makers, this examination of state behavior was the *problematique* (Hudson & Day, 2019). This has been revised to emphasize the human aspect at the core of foreign policy decision-making, the political psychology of behavior, and the impact of individual agents. Investigating Zelenskyy through this study, using an FPA approach, framed the significance of an individual actor in foreign policy considerations for the war.

This study examined leadership in the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 and drew lessons where appropriate from historical events. President Zelenskyy had given empowering speeches throughout his campaign and early presidency. However, the pivotal point in his leadership would be after he denounced the United States' attempts to evacuate him and proclaimed that he would stay in the fight (E. A. Cohen, 2022).

This study considered statesmanship, also known as diplomacy, which referred to a nation's exceptional leadership, distinct from a politician's typical approach. Statesmanship was viewed as the pinnacle of political skill and expertise, characterized by individuals possessing vision, courage, compassion, effectiveness, and civility (Adler, 2022; Burns, 1978; Bellamy, 2019; Menaldo, 2013; Syed, 1963). Such leaders were well-prepared to handle threats, drawing from historical knowledge and expert advice. They served as a unifying force for their nation during times of crisis, utilizing their skills to maximize short- and long-term effectiveness (Allen, 1992; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989). A defining characteristic of a diplomat is their adept use of language, employing their expertise and skills to communicate persuasively and inspire their nation.They maintained a singular focus on the well-being of their country, communicating with honesty, consistency, and optimism while acknowledging the hardships that may lie ahead and calling for unity and sacrifice (Burns, 1978; Michelsen & Colley, 2019; Rolfe, 2016; Solomon, 2015). A true leader displayed a sense of determination and confidence, as exemplified by Zelenskyy's use of OSNs in his diplomacy.

Zelenskyy's leadership style and qualities provided a unique case study that allowed for examining the complex historical, geopolitical, and global factors at play in the conflict. President Zelenskyy has demonstrated an exceptional ability to harness the power of the Ukrainian people, who have a long history of fighting for their freedom, from their 1991 referendum that marked the end of the Soviet Union to the Maidan Revolution and the ongoing separatist conflicts in the Donbas (Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989; Menaldo, 2013; Syed, 1963).

Going Public in the Digital Age

This study explored how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War reflected his personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography. A mixed-methods approach that combined Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), Linguistic Inquiry (LI), and natural language processing techniques was used to analyze Zelenskyy's public speeches to identify his rhetorical tactics, speech patterns, and semantic structures. The study also examined how his discourse and behavior revealed Zelenskyy's psychobiographical dimensions, values, and motivations. The findings were compared with relevant literature on leadership theory, psychobiography, and international relations. This study contributed to leadership and conflict resolution knowledge by applying novel research methods based on natural language processing and related fields.

Problem Statement

The Russo-Ukrainian War presented a major challenge to Ukraine's foreign policy and national security. To address this, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy implemented a unique PD strategy that utilized social media and public speeches to shape both international and domestic perceptions. However, more was needed to understand how Zelenskyy's personality traits, leadership style, and foreign policy were expressed in his discourse and how they impacted his leadership effectiveness during the war. Therefore, this study investigated the relationship between Zelenskyy's discourse, leadership attributes, and foreign policy and how these factors influenced his leadership outcomes during the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Purpose Statement

This study aimed to explore how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War reflects his personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography. Using a mixed-methods approach that combined LTA, LI, and natural

language processing techniques, the study analyzed Zelenskyy's public speeches to identify his rhetorical tactics, speech patterns, and semantic structures. The study also examined how his discourse and behavior reveal Zelenskyy's psychobiographical dimensions, values, and motivations. The study compared the findings with relevant literature on leadership theory, psychobiography, and international relations. This study will contribute to leadership and conflict resolution knowledge by applying novel research methods based on natural language processing and related fields.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

This research purposefully examined the PD of President Zelenskyy to correlate these traits and behaviors with the corpus of research on political psychology and leadership traits. This research examined Zelenskyy's PD discourse by examining his diplomatic record, namely his official speeches. The overarching research question was, "How does Zelenskyy's psychobiography influence his PD discourse, and what does it reveal about his leadership traits, cognition, and communication style?" This research analyzed the phases:

1. May 1, 2019 - July 1, 2019 | Inaugural
2. May 1, 2021 - July 1, 2021 | Mid-term
3. November 23, 2021 - February 23, 2022 | Pre-crisis
4. February 24, 2022 - May 24, 2022 | Crisis
5. May 25, 2022 – November 25, 2022 | Kinetic

- RQ: What is the relationship between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's discourse, personality traits, leadership style, and foreign policy during the Russo-Ukrainian War, and how do these factors influence his leadership outcomes in navigating the challenges to Ukraine's foreign policy and national security?
  - SQ1: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other global leaders through LTA?

- ▪ H1: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy significantly differs from that of other global leaders when analyzed through LTA.

- o SQ2: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other global leaders through Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC-22) Analysis?

  - ▪ H2: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy notably diverges from other global leaders when analyzed through LIWC-22 Analysis.

- o SQ3: What leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions are evident in Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse, and how do they reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style?

  - ▪ H3: Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse exhibits leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions that reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study stems from its pioneering examination of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War, offering a unique perspective on his personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography. This study revealed Zelenskyy's rhetorical tactics, speech patterns, semantic structures, psychobiographical dimensions, values, and motivations using a mixed-methods approach combining LTA, LI, and natural language processing techniques.

This study performed a LIWC-22 (Pennebaker et al., n.d.) analysis of Zelenskyy's discourse for the first time, as well as used the PsychCL (Schafer & Lambert, 2022) large-n data collection of global leaders for LTA, which distinguishes it from previous work. This study has

contributed to leadership and conflict resolution by comparing these novel findings with existing literature on leadership theory, psychobiography, and international relations, highlighting the applicability and potential of innovative research methods based on natural language processing and related disciplines.

Definitions of Terms

Appendix C contains a comprehensive glossary of words, world leaders, international treaties, and concepts. To provide epistemological clarification, the researcher offers prominent definitions.

Transformational Leadership

A type of leadership emphasizing intrinsic motivation and positive development of followers: raising awareness of moral standards; highlighting important priorities; fostering higher moral maturity in followers; creating an ethical climate (shared values, high ethical standards); encouraging followers to look beyond self-interest to the common good; promoting cooperation and harmony; using authentic, consistent means; using persuasive appeals based on reason; providing individual coaching and mentoring for followers; appealing to the ideals of followers; allowing freedom of choice for followers (Bass & Riggio, 2006, pp. 3-6).

Statesmanship

Being well-versed in the principles or art of government. (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

Transformational Statesmanship

A political leader who possesses unsurpassed behavioral and intellectual traits: vision, boldness, compassion, civility, and courage. A skilled rhetorician who communicates hope, unity, national purpose, and certitude while simultaneously emphasizing the nation's high morals, ethics, and purposes. (Researcher's definition).

Crisis

An unstable or crucial time or state of affairs whose outcome will make a decisive difference for better or worse (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

Hybrid-Warfare

Combining conventional warfare with political, cyber, and other means of warfare. (Researcher's Definition).

Diplomacy

Art of conducting relationships for gain without conflict. It is the chief instrument of foreign policy. Its methods include secret negotiation by accredited envoys (though political leaders also negotiate) and international agreements and laws. Its use predates recorded history. Diplomacy aims to further the state's interests as dictated by geography, history, and economics. Safeguarding the state's independence, security, and integrity is of prime importance; preserving the broadest possible freedom of action for the state is nearly as important. Beyond that, diplomacy seeks maximum national advantage without using force and preferably without causing resentment (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2022).

Public Diplomacy (See Appendix D)

A communicative capability of the state which is managed by a specialized institution and implemented by the government, scientific, academic, and cultural communities, as well as by ordinary citizens and aimed at a foreign or global audience. The purpose of PD is to promote national interests and foreign policies of a country, to create a positive image, and achieve mutual understanding by communicating ideas, ideals, and values of nation as well as general information about country, culture, and society through all communication channels, including

but not limited to the media, interpersonal communication, public relations. (Sobolieva, 2021, p. 166).

Infopolitik (See Appendix E)

The communicative ability of third-party communicators, institutions, or states entails "informational soft power" through proactive international communication. Communication consists of accurate and impartial information. It reflects state or supra-state ideals and is free of "unbiased information" (de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005, p. 9).

Conceptual Framework

This study utilizes a framework from FPA to investigate the PD of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine, focusing on PD discourse and the psychobiography of political leadership demonstrated through PD. Specifically, the study aims to understand President Zelenskyy's leadership qualities by analyzing his diplomatic efforts in the Ukraine conflict. The comprehensive FPA framework considers domestic and international variables influencing leadership conduct (Snyder et al., 2002).

It combines Hudson's actor-specific theory (2005), which focuses on individual players who influence foreign policy and analyzes psychobiographical variables such as personality traits, cognitive biases, and emotional states. Additionally, natural language processing psycholinguistic modeling is used to understand decision-makers' language and the psychological processes that influence foreign policy choices. The study seeks to better understand political leadership in conflict situations and reduce perplexity around the subject. The agent-actor-focused paradigm of FPA offers a more nuanced grasp of the complicated interplay between individual agency and broader structural variables in influencing foreign policy by integrating these various methods (Snyder et al., 2002).

The conceptual framework of this study emphasizes the significance of "unboxing the state" or recognizing the internal complexities and variations that can impact foreign policy decisions. This approach opposes the conventional view of the state as a unified actor with a uniform set of interests and objectives (Waltz, 1979). Instead, it acknowledges the multiple actors and interests within states that can influence foreign policy decisions, including bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, and domestic political considerations. An FPA framework offers a comprehensive analysis method, stressing the interplay of domestic and international variables that influence leadership conduct. This paradigm allows for the agency of individual players within the broader system by analyzing the psychobiographical variables that affect decision-making, such as personality traits, cognitive biases, and emotional states. Furthermore, natural language processing psycholinguistic modeling analyzes the decision-maker's language and comprehends the underlying psychological processes that influence foreign policy choices.

The use of FPA to apply psychology and social psychological theory to decision-making in international politics (i.e., foreign policy decision-making; FPDM) does not examine the outcome. Rather, it is an examination of the leadership communication psychometrics of Volodymyr. This is an updated version of previous research that attempted to use a methodical investigation of the impacts of leader personality (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002; 1987a, 1987b, 2005; Schafer & Lambert, 2022). The agent-actor level becomes the new focal point of the investigation when (FPA) is utilized with leadership theory and LTA (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). The use of FPA and LTA as a framework for examining the unitary leader of a state is the primary focus of this particular piece of research (Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019).

This study employs FPA to examine how leaders control and influence the political atmosphere and environmental constraints. Research shows that leaders are reactive to domestic

and foreign constituencies and circumstances rather than exhibiting mastery over events and policymaking. FPA integrates various subgenres of analysis, such as linguistic research and psychobiographical examination, to offer a comprehensive and deeply contextualized understanding of leaders who are principally responsible for foreign policy decisions (Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019).

The agent-actor level of analysis can demonstrate how sensitive a prevailing leader is to the information in its setting, which can help us understand the actions and policies that such leaders are likely to persuade their governments to follow (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001). Leaders who are contextually responsive and "attuned to contextual information" tend to demonstrate more pragmatic and situationally driven behavior. However, we must examine the political problem in close detail to determine what will likely occur (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 94). Foreign policy formation may be influenced by various factors, including public opinion, the views of influential lawmakers, influential interest groups, and advisors (Lippmann, 2022). If leaders are goal-driven, their conduct will focus more on their views, attitudes, interests, and ideals, and they may be less sensitive to contextual information. By understanding the factors that drive these leaders, we can gain insights into the decision-making atmospherics of governments and unitary actor involvement in these processes (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, 2001; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001).

Single, influential leaders have been found to act as predominant leaders under the following conditions: (1) they have a general, active interest and involvement in foreign and defense issues, (2) the regime leadership perceives the immediate foreign policy problem to be critical to the regime's survival — it is perceived as a crisis, (3) the current situation involves high-level diplomacy or protocol (a state visit, a summit meeting, or an international conference),

and (4) the immediate foreign policy problem is perceived as a crisis (M. G. Hermann, 2001; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989).

Theoretical Framework

For this study, this researcher drew from LTA to analyze leadership behavior in foreign policy decision-making (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). LTA identifies seven traits useful in assessing leadership style. Several personality traits can affect an individual's behavior in social and professional settings. The first is the need for power, which involves the desire to influence others and impact situations. Another trait is conceptual complexity, which refers to the ability to perceive multiple aspects of a situation and integrate them into a coherent whole. Additionally, individuals may prefer accomplishing goals or maintaining relationships, known as task versus interpersonal focus. Self-confidence, or the belief in one's own abilities and judgments, is another important trait. Locus of control is also relevant, describing the extent to which one believes that events are determined by one's own actions or by external factors. Distrust of others, or the tendency to be suspicious or wary of other people's motives or intentions, is another trait that can affect behavior. Finally, in-group bias, or the degree of attachment or loyalty to one's own group or culture, is another factor that can impact individual behavior (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, 2005).

LTA is frequently used to evaluate political leaders' leadership qualities and decision-making behavior. The framework has been applied in various contexts, including analyses of presidential decision-making in the United States and international negotiations. It is heavily based on the empiricism of leadership research of global leaders (M. G. Hermann, 1978, 1980a; 1980b, 1984a, 1987a; Snyder, 1954, 1962; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989). LTA is also

used to assess candidates' leadership qualities in election campaigns and the potential impact of leadership changes on foreign policy outcomes.

Hermann's LTA (1999/2002) offers a useful framework for understanding how leadership characteristics influence foreign policy decisions. By examining these traits, policymakers and academics can gain insights into leaders' decision-making processes and evaluate the possible effects of leadership changes on foreign policy outcomes. A contemporary dataset of world leaders presents a broader empirical foundation for LTA, allowing for correlations with Zelenskyy's specific metrics. At the time of this study, no LTA had been conducted for the Ukrainian president. (Schafer & Lambert, 2022).

As an augmentation to LTA, this study peripherally considers Transformational Leadership and the key constituencies of that theory (Burns, 1978). Considering the foundational research conducted for the political leadership inquiry, the premise of transforming versus transactional leadership manifests through enduring, dually beneficial exchanges of knowledge and shared experience (Burns, 1978). Researchers can obtain a deeper understanding of effective leadership by taking into account the main components of transformational leadership, namely individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and idealized influence into LTA (Bass & Riggio, 2005).

Burns (1978) argued that transformational leadership could result in long-lasting, mutually beneficial relationships between leaders and followers through exchanging knowledge and experience. Incorporating the concept of transformational leadership into LTA can provide a deeper understanding of effective leaders' qualities and how they can use these qualities to build strong and productive relationships with their followers. This is consistent with the concept that influential leaders have unique traits and use their abilities to motivate their followers to

greatness. By incorporating transformational leadership theory, researchers can obtain a more nuanced grasp of the leadership qualities that drive success by incorporating transformational leadership theory.

Transformative leadership requires more finesse but pays out more abundantly over time (Burns, 2012). Whenever potential followers have such a need or want, a transformative leader may rely on it to further the shared purpose (Burns, 2012). Further, the transformative leader works to fulfill the deeper needs of their followers and involves them on every level. PD is a leadership strategy for Zelenskyy that incorporates these ideals. The result of a shift in leadership is a dynamic that raises the standard for everyone involved, making followers become leaders and, perhaps, leaders into moral actors (Burns, 1978).

There are times in history when a moral, transformational leader becomes a hero by transforming the consciousness of their citizenry (Rolfe, 2016). Leadership can exist without morality, but moral leadership often arises when transformational leadership reaches its peak. Moral leadership arises when leaders use transformational leadership to establish high ethical standards and motivate followers to aspire to those standards. By igniting people's ambitions and desires, this type of leadership has the potential to change people's lives and identities. Understanding the characteristics and actions contributing to successful and moral leadership can provide researchers and practitioners with useful insights (Burns, 1978/2012).

Limitations

This study is subject to probabilistic variables beyond the researcher's control. It presents a case study of a single individual, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, who had been in office for three years at the time of the study, serving as a wartime president from February 24, 2022 to November 2022. Any period after November 2022 will not be included in the analysis.

Theoretical frameworks from leadership, FPA, and PD paradigms contribute to our understanding of political leadership, statesmanship, and PD. However, the complexity of these subjects and the vast amount of literature available can make it challenging to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the topic. While analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian War can provide valuable insights, no single perspective can fully explain the emergence of Zelenskyy's specific prominence at the center of the conflict.

In addition to the above limitations, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of the specific tools used in this study, namely LIWC-22 (Pennebaker et al., n.d.), LTA with Profiler Plus (Levine & Young, 2014), and SPSS. While these tools are widely used in linguistic and leadership analysis, they have limitations and potential biases that may affect the results. The accuracy of the results obtained from these tools is subject to the quality of the input data and the algorithms used to analyze the data.

To maintain consistency, all data has been processed using Profiler Plus and LIWC-22 in English. The speeches were from the President of Ukraine's official website in English. Additionally, the large-scale dataset from Schafer & Lambert (2022) utilized for comparison was exclusively in English. Any non-English verbal content underwent translation before processing, using high-quality translations, primarily from government sources or news outlets. Although translations may have imperfections, it is essential to recognize that many structural similarities exist across languages. These similarities complement Profiler Plus's natural language processor (Levine & Young, 2014).

Furthermore, the researcher's biases and subjectivity may influence the interpretation of the results. Therefore, while these tools are valuable in providing quantitative data for analysis, it is crucial to approach their results and acknowledge their limitations cautiously.

Delimitations

This study is limited by several factors, including the researchers' non-native knowledge of Ukraine's language, culture, and politics. Previous research was utilized to provide context for the psychological aspects of linguistic analysis. Nonetheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that the results may be affected by genre-specific factors exclusive to the speeches of the leader being examined. These factors could lead to different outcomes when applying the same LIWC-22 and LTA methodology on larger sample sizes, distinct subjects, various communication types, or languages.

The research was conducted using a limited number of speech samples, specifically those by the President of Ukraine, which were available on the official presidential website. The study was also confined to five specific periods rather than being extended indefinitely. These periods investigated were: (a) May 1, 2019 - July 1, 2019, (b) May 1, 2021 - July 1, 2021, (c) November 23, 2021 - February 23, 2022, (d) February 24, 2022 - May 24, 2022, and (e) May 25, 2022 - November 25, 2022.

Assumptions

The present research assumes that the published speeches from Volodymyr Zelenskyy accurately represent his communication style and leadership traits. These speeches encompass spontaneous and planned presidential communication and provide a comprehensive spectrum of leadership qualities. Following standard practice, the speeches were sourced from an officially-sanctioned website and therefore considered validated data on a public figure. While the website contained versions of the speeches in English, Russian, and Ukrainian, only the English version was used in this study, with the assumption that all three versions were identical in meaning.

Throughout the research process, it was assumed that the samples selected for analysis would remain accessible, operable, and consistent. Additionally, it was assumed that the software

tools employed in the analysis, such as LIWC-22, LTA through Profiler Plus, and SPSS, would function as intended. Moreover, the study assumed that its mechanistic and artificial intelligence components would effectively extract, decode, and interpret the linguistic patterns and transformational leadership arcs in all analyzed speeches.

Positionality

I will provide a detailed account of my positionality in this research to ensure transparency and acknowledge any potential biases. As of the time of writing, the Russo-Ukrainian War had been ongoing for fourteen months. Although I do not have any direct experience of the situation in Ukraine and have not yet personally met the subjects of my research, I will use the first-person perspective to contextualize this highly nuanced topic.

History, Literature, and Language

I connect with my topic through the narratives and historiography of war, resilience, and literature, recognizing that history is a collection of stories that can impart valuable lessons. Language and linguistics, shaped by human experiences, are an essential focus of this study. War histories often portray hero narratives and the brutality of combat, with these accounts often being the most memorable pieces of literature. For instance, in the Iliad, King Priam, after losing his son, says, "I have endured what no one on earth has ever endured — I kissed the hands of the man who murdered my son" (Silk, 2004, p. 691).

During my academic career, I have attended three private Christian universities that have helped me focus on education, philanthropy, and developing my skills. During my studies, I developed an interest in exploring the growth of constructive dialogue through leadership and how individuals can collaborate toward a shared objective. As an undergraduate, I worked on research with a prominent political science professor, exploring the correlation between

assassinations and regime change. We hypothesized that removing a leader from a unique alignment of power structures and decision-making would alter the course of history.

Applied History and Leadership

Using historiography to analyze human decision-making and promote ideals such as liberty and good governance is theoretically sound. Historical events, analogies, and frameworks are crucial in this pursuit and have been documented in Greek classics, scripture, and literature. The author, a woman raised in a military family with a pioneer heritage, holds deep patriotism and celebrates Pioneer Day, which reminds her of the importance of a homeland without fear and persecution. She believes that individual, religious, and national sovereignty protects against unrestricted government power and promotes freedom, which should be a top priority for governments.

Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are fundamental human rights that the author values, and she believes that analyzing narratives throughout history can strengthen nations and the human spirit. To illustrate this point, she cites George Washington's quote from Thomas Paine at Valley Forge, urging his troops to persevere during a crisis (Paine, 1775/2022).

The influence of American Constitutionalism has impacted the world's pursuit of freedom under the law, and the author acknowledges the exceptionalism of the United States and its responsibility to serve humbly. Language has the power to articulate political ideologies and institutions, and analyzing tales of liberty can reveal how language conveys struggles, dreams, and plans. However, history has shown that throwing off the monarchical yoke was never guaranteed, as chronicled in *The Last King of America, The Misunderstood Reign of George III* (Roberts, 2021). In addition, language can fight against injustice and articulate the human predicament, as seen in works like *The Guns of August* by Barbara Tuchman, who vividly described the devastating effects of World War I (Tuchman, 1962). Drew Gilpin Faust's *This*

Republic of Suffering explores the impact of the Civil War on America. Her words encourage a combination of innovation and interpretation in shaping our understanding of history and its impact on society (Faust, 2008). These works illustrate how language can shape our perception of historical events and their significance.

Organization of the Study

The study is structured into five chapters following Pepperdine University's Graduate School of Education and Psychology guidelines. The first chapter comprehensively reviews the research topic's historical, political, and technological aspects. This study focuses on the novel and significant leadership of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the Russo-Ukrainian War period. Chapter Two contains a literature review organized according to the researcher's conceptual framework, which integrates principles of FPA and focuses on Zelenskyy's PD discourse, including the application of natural language processing (NLP) and linguistic inquiry (LI). Chapter Three describes this study's research methods and methodology, including the qualitative and quantitative data analysis instrumentation. Chapter Four presents the research findings from analyzing speeches, LIWC-22 scores, LTA with Profiler Plus metrics, SPSS analysis, and visualizations. Finally, Chapter Five discusses the findings, including any conclusions and future research opportunities.

- *Chapter 1: Introduction*
    1. Background of the Study
    2. Purpose of the Study
    3. Problem Statement
    4. Significance of the Study
    5. Methodological Approach
    6. Definition of Terms

7. Theoretical Framework

8. Research Questions

9. Positionality

10. Organization of the Study

- *Chapter 2: Literature Review*

- *Chapter 3: Research Methodology*

- *Chapter 4: Presentation of Findings*

- *Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings*

Chapter Summary

Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the study on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Russo-Ukrainian War, which commenced in February 2022. The chapter provides a background of the conflict and its implications, highlighting the changes in international cooperation. It also offers insights into Zelenskyy's personality and his impact on international relations through PD. Additionally, the chapter outlines the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological frameworks used in the study and previews pertinent literature.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Context of the Study

This psychobiographical case study examines three key aspects of Zelenskyy's approach to PD: his linguistic style, leadership traits, and use of digital media (e.g., OSNs). Based on what is known in the literature, the extraordinary popularity, success, and resolve of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the Ukrainian President during a high-impact hybrid war, which began in February 2022, was unexplained by foreign policy models or conceptual theories. Due to this insufficiency of contemporary theoretical or conceptual approaches, this review will seek psychobiographical insights into Zelensky's personality, values, and leadership attributes that may have influenced his leadership style and PD discourse. Through this synthesis of research questions, this literature review aims to comprehensively understand the relationship between Zelensky's leadership style, PD efforts, and psychobiographical factors that may have shaped them. Each section below will detail the extant findings in the literature.

This literature review aims to provide a comprehensive, integrated examination of leadership dimensions, including psychobiography, focusing on the role of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Drawing from LTA and various sources on statesmanship, transformational leadership, leadership in war, rhetoric, communication, and nationalism, the review seeks to understand the traits driving leaders and their sensitivity to contextual information. By analyzing the gathered data through systemic, interdisciplinary, and multifactorial empiricism, the study aims to gain insights into decision-making atmospheres and the involvement of unitary actors in shaping foreign policies and political strategies.

Overview of Zelenskyy and Public Diplomacy

On the first day of the Russian invasion, February 24, 2022, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy effectively utilized social media and PD, demonstrating crucial leadership skills that impacted foreign policy, public opinion, international coalition-building, and the enforcement of sanctions regimes (Mc Tague, 2022b; Poushter & Connaughton, 2022). The research in question examines five phases of Zelenskyy's presidency. However, it primarily focuses on two specific periods: the crisis period from February 24 to May 24, 2022, and the kinetic period from May 25, 2022, to November 25, 2022.

These periods are considered unique in the history of warfare (Ackerman, 2022) and are, therefore, of particular interest in understanding Zelenskyy's leadership and its impact on the conflict. Interestingly, Western politicians and Zelenskyy's adversary, Putin, failed to comprehend Zelenskyy's fundamental psychobiographical character, leading to their inability to develop predictive foreign-policy modeling (Friedersdorf, 2022; Łukasz, 2020; Mikhailov, 2021; Place, 2020; Williams, 2022; Woolley, 2022). Nevertheless, the subsequent wave of opposition in Ukraine to Russia's invasion produced a new direction for the conflict, which some researchers theorize is a direct result of Zelenskyy's leadership (Adams, 2022; Adler, 2022; Agence France-Presse, 2022b; Al Jazeera, 2022; Britzky, 2022; Foer, 2022; Marson, 2022; Ukraine, 2022).

The literature has recognized Zelenskyy's leadership as a modern model of statesmanship, with research supporting this notion (King, 2022; Lister, 2022; Yakovlev et al., 2020). Zelenskyy's leadership is a crucial point of defense against Russian aggression in Europe. The variables of leadership that are consistent with the study relate to leadership traits, psychobiographical data, and discourse. The complexity and multifaceted nature of the crisis

required a multifactorial and multidimensional approach to develop a framework for understanding Zelenskyy's leadership. Thus, the study reviewed the literature to identify theories that could explain how a political novice could become a transforming actor in the context of a geopolitical crisis (Afshar & Umrani, 2019; Haslam, n.d.; Howell et al., 2020; Keselman & Saxe-Braithwaite, 2020; MacMillan, 2022; Mehta & Chandani, 2022).

Coding of the Literature Review

In FPA, qualitative resource coding is a standard research method that helps manage and analyze data from various sources, such as interviews, official documents, and news reports. This strategy involves identifying and categorizing key patterns and themes within the data to facilitate interpretation and analysis. This methodology has numerous advantages, including efficiently organizing and analyzing vast data from diverse sources. This enables researchers to concentrate on the content and substance of the data as opposed to its quantity alone.

In addition, the qualitative resource coding method enables researchers to obtain a comprehensive and in-depth comprehension of the data, thereby enabling a nuanced analysis and interpretation of foreign policy decision-making. By identifying crucial themes and patterns, researchers can better draw connections and inferences from the data that might have otherwise gone unnoticed. Overall, qualitative resource coding is an indispensable instrument for foreign policy analysts, as it enables rigorous and systematic analysis of complex data from various sources.

This method is particularly relevant to this study as it systematically compares Zelenskyy's PD discourse with that of other global leaders through the use of LTA and LIWC-22 (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, 2005; Pennebaker et al., n.d.). It also allows for identifying Zelenskyy's psychobiographical dimensions that shape his discourse and behavior. By utilizing this methodology to analyze Zelenskyy's PD discourse, this study aims to contribute to the

literature on leadership theory, psychobiography, and international relations, providing new insights into his personality, leadership style, and foreign policy decisions.

Waltz, Wendt, and FPA

Exploring the theoretical underpinnings of FPA show divergence between key theorists, neorealism (Waltz, 1959, 1979), constructivism (Wendt, 2012), and FPA, Hudson and Day (2019). Understanding these frameworks allows this researcher to winnow the analysis of Zelenskyy's PD discourse and leadership. FPA is the best approach to examine leadership traits, linguistic psychometrics, and diplomacy, which reveals political leadership's psychobiographical profile or political psychology. FPA's strength is how it examines state leaders making foreign policy decisions and how their personality, cognition, and communication style affect their behavior.

FPA, when used to explain state behavior, is more comprehensive and explanatory than neorealism and constructivism. Explaining human decision-making is not accomplished through neorealism, developed by Waltz (1959, 1979). Neorealism argues that structural factors of the international system, such as the balance of power and security threats, mainly drive state behavior. Constructivism, proposed by Wendt (2012), contends that social factors, such as norms and identity, shape state behavior. Table 1 below illustrates the main components of these two frameworks and contrasts them with FPA's human-centered approach to FPDM (Hudson & Day, 2019). This approach is essential for understanding Zelenskyy's leadership in the Russo-Ukrainian War, which had significant implications for Ukraine's foreign policy and national security in 2022.

The FPA conceptual approach can be applied iteratively to analyzing various phenomena. FPA has the potential to broaden its evaluative capabilities, which currently encompass historical facts, analogues, and externalities, by including aspects such as political decision-making,

communication, and leadership analysis (Hudson & Day, 2019). FPA's primary goal is to help

practitioners comprehend historical patterns and the various interdisciplinary and multi-level

external factors that can influence an organization.

Table 1

Theoretical Approaches to FPA

Waltz (1979)	Wendt (1999)	FPA (Hudson, 2005)
Neorealism	Social Constructivism	Only human beings have ideas
Black-box states	Ideas = preferences and interests	Only human beings can create identities
Anarchic system	Material realities	Only human beings can change identities
First Image, man (1959)	Explains past realism + neorealism	Only human beings can act on the basis of identity
Balance of power	Materially similar or dissimilar states can act differently based on ideation	Only human beings are agents in IR
State capabilities	Constructed identities	Using bedrock material
State actors shape system behavior	State actors shape the structures and resultant behavior	Sprouting ideas, persuading others, transmitting them through institutions
State power all the way down	Ideas all the way down	Human beings all the way down
Removed humans and ideas	Removed humans without whom there are no ideas	Humans, agency, and ideas
Cannot Explain Behavior		**Grounds Decision-Making at Human Level**

Waltz (1979)	Wendt (1999)	FPA (Hudson, 2005)
Explains state decision-making relative to capabilities and threat Focus on state strength and capabilities, deterrence	It cannot explain socio-national identities It cannot explain identity formation It cannot explain identity change	All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers acting singly or in groups. Humans perceive and react to the world around them. Humans shape and are shaped by the world around them.
FPA is the only approach with any conceptualization of human agency.		

As stated by Hudson and Day (2019), using the framework of FPA can shed light on the decision-making processes of individuals, both in international and domestic policy, given the increasingly interconnected and globalized nature of the world. According to Hudson and Day's research, the six tenets of FPA are multi-factorial, multi-level, multi/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specificity. By incorporating these tenets, FPA enables a comprehensive analysis of decision-making processes that consider various variables from different levels of analysis. This method is agent-centered and actor-specific, considering the psychological, sociological, and economic factors influencing decision-making. FPA provides a framework for analyzing complex phenomena in a globalized world, thereby reducing ambiguity and enhancing clarity.

The six tenets of FPA found in research by Hudson & Day (2019) are listed below:

- Multi-factorial

- Multi-level: Variables from all levels of analysis, from micro to the macro are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect decision-making

- ○ Psychological

- ○ Sociological

- ○ Organizational behavior

- ○ Anthropology

- ○ Economics

- ● Multi-/Interdisciplinary

- ● Integrative

- ● Agent-oriented

- ● Actor-specificity

The literature review in the following section utilized FPA as a framework for coding, evaluating, and prioritizing strategic risks, systemic variations, and atmospherics through rank analysis and environmental scanning. Additional theoretical support for the coding approach to the literature and exploration of the research phenomenon drawn from contemporary research topically related to rank analysis and environmental scanning (Bronfenbrenner, 1993; K. S. Albright, 2004; Saldaña & Mallette, 2017; Schmieder-Ramirez & Mallette, 2007). Its use for state and non-state actors, organizations, and entities allows for comprehensive, bidirectional, historical, and emergent data analysis (Allison & Ferguson, 2016; Armitage & Guldi, 2014; Neustadt & May, 1988; Walton et al., 2016).

An Examination of the Literature

International Relations

In this study, the first level of analysis is international relations (IR). The framework of IR, which explores how countries and other actors interact with each other in the global arena, is

fundamental to understanding the data at hand. Examining factors that influence or are influenced by events and issues beyond national borders provides a valuable lens for analysis. It will define foreign policy and FPA as essential tools for understanding and evaluating a country's actions and decisions in IR. The review will also delve into research on psychobiography, presenting psychobiographical studies as an approach to analyzing leaders' personalities and motivations within the field of International Relations (IR). In addition, the review will examine leadership as a critical factor that affects IR dynamics and processes. Finally, the role of individual agents in shaping IR outcomes will also be explored.

International Relations. A review of the IR literature sought an explanatory approach to understanding the conditions surrounding the Russo-Ukrainian War (Romaniuk, 2011; Waltz, 1988; Weber, 2001) and the emergence of Zelenskyy as a global leader. This conflict, which intensified on February 24, 2022, has few antecedents due to the structure and state adherence to the global norms and conventions that followed WWII (Baysha, 2018; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Hazony, 2022; Ikenberry, 2018; 2020). Research revealed a limited number of great-power vs. minor-power battles (Glaser, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2001; Shirkey, 2019); hence, the advent of the Russo-Ukrainian War is rare. The predominant theoretical strain of the IR discipline concentrates on systemic-level actors and those of the state as variables (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Waltz, 1959; Waltz, 1979), which is inadequate to explain the Putin rationale and Zelenskyy rebuff in this conflict.

Anderson (1983) and Götz and Merlen (2019) argue that transnational threats and perceptions of geopolitical risk are subjective and dependent on an observer's position within the global status quo. The Russo-Ukrainian War has disrupted the Western liberal order, prompting IR theorists to search for explanations (Götz & Merlen, 2019). Some scholars suggest that

Russia's actions represent an attempt to distance itself from the West while maintaining coercive control over its former satellite states (Blank, 2020; Franklin & Waddis, 2004; Götz & McFaul, 2021; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Klvaňová, 2019; McGlynn, 2017; Saari, 2014; Sherr, 2013). Russia perceives itself as the antithesis of Western decadence and views itself as the keeper of conservative moral values, positioning itself as the Third Rome (Galeotti, 2022b; Morrell, 2022b). However, Russia has demonstrated no resolve for global leadership despite its desire to be a hegemonic power (Glaser, 2010; Götz, 2017; Götz & Merlen, 2019) and does not promote economic stability or support classical liberal ideals. Soft power is a more effective means of achieving global leadership, but Russia has not utilized this approach (Nye, 1990; Nye, 2017).

The current literature on International Relations lacks sufficient empirical evidence to explain the Russo-Ukrainian War, and scholars have criticized the explanation of great-power balancing (Mearsheimer, 2001; 2022; Nichols, 2022; Pouliot, 2010). The limitations of realist theories in comprehensively explaining the seizure of Crimea in 2014 have been noted, and this can also be applied to the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018). Realist theories center on hegemonic power competitions among states, neglecting the impact of leadership within those states (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1959; Waltz, 1979). While structural theories highlight how the international system's design constrains the behavior of hegemonic powers, they fail to explain the Russo-Ukrainian War (Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019). Consequently, there is a need to identify patterns of conduct among big powers in anarchic systems.

Waltz (1979) has argued that while anarchic systems share fundamental principles, the configuration of such systems can vary based on the number of major powers involved and how they share power. This variability can sometimes result in significant differences in state behavior. Nonetheless, realist scholars often dispute three central ideas: the anarchic nature of

the international system, the inability of states to ascertain each other's intentions, and the goal of states to survive (Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1988). While system-level analysis can explain the stability of the international political system, it fails to account for the impact of human decision-making within a state, which can disrupt the system (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018).

The Russo-Ukrainian War highlighted the importance of a head-of-state's national security and foreign relations responsibilities and their role in international affairs. As the primary decision-maker in a democratic state like Ukraine, Zelenskyy's assumed leadership skills are expected to be stable, predictable, and long-lasting (Avolio et al., 2009; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Byman & Pollack, 2001; M. G. Hermann, 1980a; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989; McDermott, 2004; Taylor, 1991). However, the lack of a sufficient explanation in IR literature for Zelenskyy's emergence as a global leader suggests the need for other explanations.

Foreign Policy. The greater that surface and the greater the contact with the enemy's Army, consequently the more that Army spreads itself out, the greater the effects of arming the Nation will be. Like a slow, gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy's Army. As it requires time to produce its effects, therefore whilst the hostile elements are working on each other, there is a state of tension that either gradually wears out if the people's War is extinguished at some points and burns slowly away at others or leads to a crisis, if the flames of this general conflagration envelop the enemy's Army, and compel it to evacuate the country to save itself from utter destruction (Clausewitz, 1832/2017, p. 798).

The excerpt discusses Clausewitz's concept of arming the nation and its gradual destruction of the enemy's army. It also explores the international lens by exploring foreign policy and subfields, including traditional and PD. PD has undergone significant changes due to

technological advancements, leading to the modernization of statecraft that emphasizes the importance of openness, accountability, and citizen involvement in government policies, facilitated by the dissemination of policy ideas through digital channels and coverage in media outlets worldwide. These changes have significant implications for international relations and foreign policy making.

Foreign policy is a state's actions towards other nations or transnational organizations. It differs from domestic policies, which refer to actions taken within a state's borders, such as taxation, healthcare, or legislative actions. International relations is the umbrella term for traditional and PD's recently emerged iteration. Traditional diplomacy involves person-to-person communication between diplomats or national representatives, while PD involves official state communication through social media or public discourse. These different approaches to diplomacy have important implications for how states engage with each other and seek to promote their interests on the global stage.

Public discourse has changed in significant ways due to technology. A statesman has his own Instagram or Twitter account from the front lines without waiting for the press to report his narrative. According to Haluga and Kurecic (2021), the modernization of statecraft, or diplomacy, is occurring due to technological advancements, the increasing significance of peacekeeping, the professionalization of administration, and the rise of internal specialization. This modernization of statecraft emphasizes openness and accountability at all levels of government, coverage in mainstream and alternative media outlets throughout the world, the dissemination of policy ideas via digital channels, and citizen involvement (Gold, 2020; Haluga & Kurecic, 2021; Kernell, 1986; Michelsen & Colley, 2019; Rauchfleisch & Kovic, 2016; Rottinghaus, 2006; Scacco & Coe, 2016).

An insufficiency in foreign policy is its emphasis on state-level activity, with minimal focus on the action and impact of individual leaders. According to Snyder et al. (1954; 1962; 2002), ignoring the importance of individual players in international relations and focusing solely on state-level activity is a blueprint for stasis. They argued that international relations were focused on a restricted range of foreign policy objectives and were influenced by organization theory (Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019). Formal study in personality and leadership has assumed that leaders have characteristics, inclinations, and behaviors (Bentley, 2014; M. G. Hermann, 1993). In addition, research indicates that their personalities, views, values, and attitudes can affect their conduct, leadership, and political outcomes. The literature assessment of foreign policy principles explaining Zelenskyy's leadership decisions, PD success, and a national groundswell of support is insufficient. The state-as-actor and FPDM theories are relatively toothless in this environment.

However, a few scholars recognize the importance of investigating individual actors in foreign policy decision-making. Lasswell (1930, 1948a) initiated the rigorous research of personality and politics with his theory that individuals transfer their underlying internal struggles onto the political realm. An early scholar interested in the relationship between psychology and politics, George (1969) refined a theory on the operational code and researched it methodically. Defining an operational code entails identifying the leader's fundamental political ideas on the inevitability of conflict in the world, the leader's judgment of their capacity to influence events, and the chosen means and manner of achieving goals (George, 1969).

According to George (1969), operational codes encompass rules of conduct and behavioral standards. This new identity or character structure is subsequently internalized by a person who transforms. Various factors, including economic constraints and geopolitical

realities, shape foreign policy decisions. However, it is important to acknowledge the human decision-maker role and psychological characteristics in shaping policy choices (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). Unfortunately, studying foreign policy has often excluded psychology due to a lack of data.

McDermott (2004) elucidates that understanding a leader's psychobiographical profile influences foreign policy decisions in a larger sense. A political leader's ideas on the influence one can have on historical events, his strategy and tactics, and his understanding of the nature of politics and political warfare can all be uncovered by a researcher (Josselson & Hopkins, 2015; Lasswell, 1930, 1948a; McDermott, 2004).While a foreign policy can explain some nuances of state action and international relations empirics, it lacks the emphasis on individual actors, thus being insufficient to explain the emergence of Zelenskyy as a global leader with impactful discourse.

Psychobiographical Study. Psychobiographical research in political psychology seeks to connect human decision-making with theoretical underpinnings, offering a powerful tool for analyzing the background, subtext, and implications of real-world leadership case studies (Byman & Pollack, 2001; George, 1969; M. G. Hermann, 1980a, 1999/2002, 2001; Hudson, 2005; Waltz, 1959). This approach falls within the parameters of FPA and helps explain leaders like Zelenskyy as agent-actors (Alden & Aran, 2017; Hudson & Day, 2019; Jervis, 2018; Rosenau, 1966). The literature indicates a correlation between FPA and existing psychobiographical leadership studies (Bridgman et al., 2020; Diehl et al., 2019; M. G. Hermann, 1993, 1999/2002; Schafer & Lambert, 2022; Shearer & Mitchell, 2021; Walker & Matsa, 2021).

In contemporary scholarship, objective assessments of leadership components such as language qualities can be conducted through modern approaches, including artificial intelligence (Boyd et al., 2022a, 2022b; Boyd et al., 2020; Chernenko, 2020). To obtain relevant data, ideas, or methodologies, scholars have explored Discourse Analysis, Political Discourse Analysis, and LI in the literature (Carta, 2019; Carta & Naminio, 2021; Gough, 2001; Oddo, 2011; Yanovets & Smal, 2020).

Psychobiographies of political leaders typically utilize a psychological lens and case study method based on longitudinal data and historical facts (Ferrer & Ponterrotto, 2020; Van Niekerk et al., 2019). Applying psychological concepts, principles, or theories to gain insight into individuals' past or present lives is psychobiography (Kasser, 2017; Mayer & Kovary, 2019; McDermott, 2004; Tackman et al., 2019; Van Niekerk et al., 2019). Such biographies usually emphasize the reflexive relationship between individuals and their political, social, and cultural contexts and promote a more rigorous scientific approach (Ferrer & Ponterotto, 2020; Kasser, 2017; Schultz & Lawrence, 2017).

Psychobiography has contributed to understanding the connection between opinion and personality by systematically examining the specific character and implications of a subject's political attitudes and views (McDermott, 2004). Given the complex interplay between attitude and behavior, analyzing how a leader's political ideals inform their actions and tactics can shed light on the persistence of specific themes or agendas during their time in office. Enhanced analytical rigor could combine historiographic and qualitative methods with quantitative approaches (Kasser, 2017; Schultz & Lawrence, 2017). While some psychobiographies have focused on the subject's cognitive, developmental, or social history or environment, most have been influenced by depth psychology (Ferrer & Ponterotto, 2020; McDermott, 2004; Menaldo, 2013).

Psychobiographical analysis of world leaders has been used to develop frameworks and predictive abilities to aid intelligence services and governments in addressing foreign policy and statecraft challenges (Boyd et al., 2020; Kasser, 2017; McDermott, 2004; Wendt, 2012). However, some researchers caution against fixating on figures whose actions seem abnormal or idealized, as this can skew the interpretation of their conduct (McDermott, 2004). To understand leaders like Zelenskyy, it is essential to consider their charisma and typical behavior, as these attributes can significantly influence their decision-making process and leadership style (Cortelleza & Bruni, 2021; Hrubych, 2020). LTA can assess these characteristics by examining specific traits contributing to a leader's overall style and effectiveness.

LTA from M. G. Hermann (2005) posits that the following seven traits are useful for assessing a leader's style, which can be applied to analyze Zelenskyy's charisma and behavior:

- Need for power: Zelenskyy's desire to influence others and impact situations can be indicative of his charisma and drive to create change.

- Conceptual complexity: Zelenskyy's ability to perceive multiple aspects of a situation and integrate them into a coherent whole may contribute to his effectiveness in navigating complex political landscapes.

- Task versus interpersonal focus: Zelenskyy's preference for either accomplishing goals or maintaining relationships can provide insight into his priorities and how he balances diplomacy with achieving objectives.

- Self-confidence: Zelenskyy's belief in his own abilities and judgments can contribute to his charisma, as a confident leader is often perceived as more capable and trustworthy.

- Locus of control: Understanding whether Zelenskyy believes that events are determined by his actions or by external factors can shed light on his approach to problem-solving and decision-making.

- Distrust of others: Zelenskyy's tendency to be suspicious or wary of other people's motives or intentions can impact his interactions with both domestic and international actors, shaping his diplomacy and negotiation strategies.

- In-Group Bias: Zelenskyy's degree of attachment or loyalty to his own group or culture can influence his decisions and policies, affecting how he prioritizes national interests over international cooperation.

By examining Zelenskyy's leadership traits through the LTA framework, we can better understand his charisma, behavior, and decision-making processes, providing valuable insights into his leadership style and effectiveness in navigating the complex political context of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Psychobiographical analysis can provide insight into leadership and decision-making, with some attention paid to presidential decision-making and foreign policy implications (George, 1969; M. G. Hermann, 1980a, 2001, 2019; M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; Kernell, 1986; Tulis, 1987, 2007, 2017). However, more than traditional at-a-distance analysis is needed for assessing a president's leadership impacts through attributes. The LTA technique emphasizes that trait reliability is the low variability of qualities and behaviors. A subset of leadership traits is subordinated to crisis responses (M. G. Hermann, 1980a).

The PsyCL data set addresses this gap by providing a large-n data set of psychological characteristics of foreign policy actors, drawing on LTA and other psychological research

programs (Schafer & Lambert, 2022). The PsyCL data set enables researchers to compare the psychological characteristics and leadership traits of leaders like Zelenskyy against a cohort of global leaders, providing an opportunity to fill gaps in the role of psychology in foreign policy and supporting the FPA framework. The data set assesses psychological characteristics using a common method in the literature, content analyzing the verbal material of actors from a distance (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). Ignoring human decision-makers and their psychological characteristics risks missing critical factors in understanding foreign policy outcomes.

Research suggests leaders experience impaired decision-making abilities during crises, with tendencies toward conflict-driven postures (Thiers & Wehner, 2021). Linguistic and multidisciplinary approaches can identify crisis periods through analysis, with increased emotionalities and a decline in analytic thinking observable in the executive discourse during stress (Boyd et al., 2022a). Governments without additional protections against leadership fallibility are vulnerable to factors influencing foreign-policy decisions, according to M. G. Hermann and C. F. Hermann (1989).

Psychobiography can aid in understanding leadership techniques and principles, contributing to the link between opinion and personality by systematically examining the character and effects of a subject's political attitudes and views (Houghton, 2007; McDermott, 2004; Preston, 2000). Researchers can discover what factors limit or enable their decision-making by comparing a leader's stated goals with their actions. Examining how a leader's political principles influence their actions and strategies can assist in understanding recurring themes and agendas throughout their career.

Foreign policy outcomes cannot be understood in isolation from foreign policy actions, as well as the leadership abilities and decision-making opportunities of a head of state or other

international actors (C. F. Hermann, 2012; M. G. Hermann, 1980a; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989; Snyder et al., 1962, 2002). It is crucial to consider the intricate interplay between attitudes and behavior to comprehend geopolitical crises, such as the ongoing situation in Ukraine.

The scholarly literature supports the notion that a politician's personality affects how he perceives his environment and makes decisions accordingly. Hermann (1980a) suggests leaders like Zelenskyy, who lack official government training and skills, may rely on instincts, predispositions, and personal traits. Furthermore, research shows that the individual's interest in international affairs influences the connection between personal qualities and foreign policy actions (Kosinski et al., 2013; McDermott, 2004; Sherman & Serfass, 2015).

Overall, the psychobiographical approach helps understand Zelenskyy's leadership, as it examines how a leader's character and values shape their country's foreign policy decisions (M. G. Hermann, 1980a; 2001; M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998). This body of work emphasizes the importance of foreign policy confidence in a political leader's ability to influence events (Burns, 1978; Götz, 2016b; Mock & Larson, 1939; Paine 1775/2022; Pluta, 2013; 2015; Syed, 1963; Tolz & Teper, 2018; Tulis; 2017; Zug, 2018).

Leadership. An examination of leadership is a critical consideration in this section. This will be explored by examining leadership traits, agent-actor impacts, and the role of psychobiographical research. The question of statesmanship, or rather the leadership by a head-of-state, is the investiture of state power into an individual. Burns (2012), a seminal researcher of political leadership, defined it this way, "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources to arouse, engage, and satisfy the

motives of followers" (p. 25). That power remains only as long as government officials execute their orders and conformity of action prevails (Ludwig, 2002; Morgenthau, 1948).

IR cannot explain the variance in leadership behaviors and decision-making (M. G. Hermann, 1979, 1987a; Hudson & Day, 2019; Waltz, 1979). IR accounts for the role of an individual only speciously and without consideration due to the magnitude of the impact of leadership in significant conflicts, such as Napoleon Bonaparte's in the 19th Century or Winston Churchill's in the 20th Century. Burns' (1978/2012) research prompted a call for psychobiographical data to augment political leadership studies and their influences. He encouraged its use for a more comprehensive understanding of leadership decision-making through explorations of the motivations and behaviors of leaders.

Burns (2012) dismissed power, achievement, and ideology as hallmarks of great leadership, instead emphasizing "conscious purpose" (p. 233), furthering the notion that psychobiographical data is necessary to understand statesmanship. Leadership research began with a premise to explain political acumen and better understand single-actor impacts (Burns, 1978). His definition of transforming leadership is "A relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents" (Burns, 2012, p. 17). In foundational research on the relationship between leaders who transform and followers, Burns (2012) examined political leadership, which was identified as imbued with power. However, the power of leadership was not ordinary, cruel, or subjugating; rather, it was "relational, collective, and purposeful" (p. 23). The crux of transforming leadership is the relationship between leader and follower, which facilitates the "aspirations and expectations' of each (Burns, 2012, p. 25). An additional Zelenskyy speech provides insight into his use of aspirational speech and shared purpose - please see Appendix F. Purpose is an integral

consideration for Burns, for without purposeful leadership and the "dimensions of intent," there is no leader-follower relationship (p.10). According to Burns, the essential questions to explore revolve around leadership processes, encompassing paths to power, complexity, and decision-making.

Burns (1978) explored the concept of heroism by focusing on the notion of a "hero in history," which examines the development of an exceptional leader who embodies all the characteristics of effective leadership (p. 400). Burns contends that the personalities and beliefs of extraordinarily charismatic leaders have altered the course of history. However, our difficulty defining charisma and the essence of greatness hinders our understanding of the "hero in history" (Burns, 2012, p. 400). Burns (1978) examined the concept of heroism by concentrating on the idea of a "hero in history," which explores the development of an exceptional leader who embodies all the traits of effective leadership. Burns argues that the personalities and beliefs of exceptionally charismatic leaders have changed the course of history. The conception of the "hero in history" is clouded by our inability to pin down the concept of charisma and the nature of greatness (Burns, 2012, p. 400). The concept that a true leader serves as the spiritual and governmental father of his people, the source of authority, the lawgiver, the statesman, and the mobilizer of popular support is a central tenet of the heroic ideal (Burns, 1978, p. 583). Research has looked for an alternative story to heroism as it relates to transformative leadership, considering the charismatic statesman. His presence may inspire his followers regardless of the efficacy of his programs or the validity of his views. Therefore, a certain kind of leader must be respected and looked up to while still being seen as a reliable source of moral ideals. The conceptual treatment of "hero in history" is a subject evaluated briefly in this study and directly relates to Burns's (1978/2018) research on leadership.

C. F. Hermann et al. (2001) showed that individuals, when dealing with issues of leadership, in particular with foreign policy, should be studied at the individual level of decision-making. This unitary or predominant leader can be deterministic for the state's behavior, foreign policy decisions, and building alliances (Drezner, 2020; C. F. Hermann, 2012; M. G. Hermann, 1978; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989). As a unitary leader, a head of state has the opportunity for the most impact and accomplishment when they challenge constraints, respect them, are open to information, are pragmatic, and are charismatic (C. F. Hermann et al., 2001). M. G. Hermann (1980a) further explains that leadership with little or no training and lacking foreign policy expertise will demonstrate decision-making behaviors consistent with internal values. The leaders' social, emotional, cognitive, and environmental influences contribute to the sum of behavioral attributes (Bronfenbrenner, 1993).

The investigation of whether transforming leadership (Burns, 1978/2018) was applicable outside of military settings was initially disputed, but importantly, it has been concluded that it is a convertible philosophy (Bass & Reggio, 2006; Hamad, 2015; Keselman & Saxe-Braithwaite, 2020). Transformational leadership is characterized by emphasizing followers' intrinsic motivation and positive development, raising awareness of moral standards, highlighting crucial priorities, fostering higher moral maturity among followers, creating an ethical climate with shared values and high ethical standards, encouraging followers to prioritize the common good over self-interest, promoting cooperation and harmony, employing authentic and consistent methods, using persuasive appeals based on reason, providing individual coaching and mentoring for followers, appealing to followers' ideals, and allowing freedom of choice for followers (Bass, 1999; Bass & Riggio, 2006).

In state leadership, transformational leadership introduces an enhanced individual and collective identity in followers, allowing the leader to inspire and arouse purpose (Afsar & Umrani, 2019; Bass & Riggio, 2006). Under challenging conditions, particularly within the construct of a state, this amplified sense of morale leads to demonstrably more significant commitment, engagement, and loyalty from followers (Avolio & Luthans, 2006; Bass, 1990, 1999).

Actor-Agent. The focus of this study on the intersection of international politics and human decision-making is aimed at something other than the general public to provide a new standard for decision-making by leaders. Instead, its goal is to develop a contemporary framework for leadership and diplomacy. Several theorists urge international leadership to stop basing their beliefs on what they think human nature should be and start basing their beliefs on what human nature is; in other words, to move away from doctrine and dogma and toward reality (Syed, 1963). Literature from a more classic period of political leadership argues that true statesmen and leaders are the ones who need to take on the role of protectors and gentlemen artists. They cannot allow themselves to be guided and led by the common man; instead, they must guide and lead the common man (Lasswell, 1936).

The foundation of leadership philosophy is the investigation of power and the quest for liberty, followed by the identification of tangible needs. Liberty and power are opposites, and the loss of liberty was the price for unchecked authority (Burns, 1978). For political theorists and proponents of international relations, political power represents one of social science's most complex and contentious issues. Morgenthau (1948) distinguished between opposing definitions of power to define it as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (p. 13). He went on to elaborate on this definition for scholars of international relations by stating that political

power is the mutual relations of control between the bearers of authority and the public

(Morgenthau, 1948). Therefore, the ongoing domestic contentions for leadership power are an

extension of international power balancing in the domestic arena (Morgenthau, 1948). In this

vein, identifying the personification of state power through the leadership of a single executive is

historically consistent with Hobbesian (Hobbes, 1668/1994) and Machiavellian (1513/2014)

treatises.

Theorists could not quantify the effect that leads them to generalize about the influence of

individuals in international politics, missing the opportunity to tease the specific traits and

behaviors out of transformational leadership within IR (Byman & Pollack, 2001). Byman and

Pollack (2001) explained the value of examining individual leaders: "Indeed, individuals not

only affect the actions of their states but also shape the reactions of other nations, which must

respond to the aspirations, abilities, and aggressiveness of foreign leaders" (p. 109). The majority

of contemporary leadership research fails to take into account the impact of a genuine statesman.

By ancient literature and current academics, a revered leader relies on his educated judgment

(Burns, 1978; Drezner, 2020; Menaldo, 2013; Syed, 1963). For example, Aristotle (2014)

described a person with sober pride who puts virtue above glory while remaining unwaveringly

superior by fully embracing politics from a position of independence. In addition, Menaldo

(2013) explained that the magnanimous man's contempt for people could be changed into a

generous affinity with the state.

A statesman serves as an example for citizens, enforces constitutional ideals, and boosts

national feeling (Tullis, 1987, 2007, 2017), while their practical actions would benefit political

stability (Kendall, 2018). A statesman understands temporality and history and their relationship

to politics and political philosophy. Over time, statecraft weaves competing traits in human

nature together. There will be perspective-taking (Reiche et al., 2019), outlining the community's overall interests, and idealizing a workable system for everybody. His decisions will build civic virtue, and the public will nurture their polity via education, obedience, and self-control (Kendall, 2018; Menaldo, 2013).

Research has explored whether agent theories can explain Zelenskyy's leadership. The argument for analyzing statesmanship as a factor is based on Waltz's (1959) First Image, which emphasizes the role of individuals. That focus was on individual actors as the level of analysis in questions of global power, a position augmented by Aristotle, Clausewitz, and Machiavelli (Cosans & Reina, 2018). Scholars continue to debate whether the structure of agent theories can explain Zelenskyy's leadership (Cochrane et al., 2022b). Additional research suggests that elegant theories of individual statesmen and their distribution of traits, impacts, and history-shaping are critical to understanding the discipline (Byman & Pollack, 2001). There is often a geopolitical construct that conflict always leads to war, coined the "Thucydides Trap," but it can be avoided through deliberate and wise decision-making of statesmen (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Russia Matters, 2022).

This constellation of strategic risk, national self-interest, and economic determinants requires a close read by social scientists to understand the constraints and unconscious motives (Allison, 2022). By understanding the psychobiographical makeup of leaders in international relations, there will be a better guide to leadership analysis. An increased capacity for understanding the challenge of coexistence among states and their leaders is essential for furthering IR theory. This dilemma was when Churchill and Roosevelt negotiated with Stalin, a murderous dictator in his own right (Allison, 2022; Brzezinski, 1984; Warner, 1967).

Byman and Pollack (2001) argued that the individual leader plays a crucial role in international politics. They suggested several theories emphasizing the importance of studying the individual actor in political leadership. These include the idea that people form their state's strategies, influence the behavior of opposing states, and determine the state's final and secondary purposes. The theories also indicate that states led by risk-taking or delusional leaders are more likely to start conflicts, whereas states headed by reliable leaders have enduring partnerships. Individuals can also influence the second and third images of state power and the international order.

In addition, Byman and Pollack (2001) suggested that the exceptionality of individual statesmanship is woven throughout history and that the discipline has only touched the surface of comprehending the function of the first image. Anker (2007) also observed that the heroic motif of a leader fighting foreign foes and rescuing citizens in political speech is infused with power, authority, and credibility. Obtaining and maintaining specific places in international relations necessitates continuous surveillance and adjustment to current global political interactions.

For effective execution, both parties require transformational diplomacy, which requires a shift in the entire system and all foreign policy players. On the other hand, the importance of contemporary information technology and communication strategies cannot be emphasized. They are essential for effectively carrying out transformational diplomacy, gathering and evaluating information, and communicating with the general public to convey the intended message.

History

History is, in its essentials, the science of change. It knows and teaches that it is impossible to find two events that are ever exactly alike because the conditions from

which they spring are never identical. (Bloch, 1949, p. 151)

This literature analysis examines the historical evidence of the Russo-Ukrainian War and its relationship with current events. While existing literature has established a consistent but changing relationship between history and current events, none of it covers the full scope of the phenomenon that emerged in the Russo-Ukrainian War, specifically the leadership of Zelenskyy. However, existing historical narratives can be used to create a foundational map of analogues and parallels in war, imperialistic ambition, great powers versus small countries, and the rise of nationalism as a unifying power. By overlaying the events of 2022 in the Russo-Ukrainian War on this map, it becomes apparent that these themes are unified under a single conflict, creating an unprecedented 21st-century great war, with President Zelenskyy at the forefront of foreign policy and strategic communication. Therefore, this section will explore the underpinnings of applied history, historical leadership, and the significance of new history in understanding this complex phenomenon.

Applied History. Applied history served as one of the foundational underpinnings of the conceptual approach as it emphasizes the need to examine history to understand the present. As such, this section will utilize an applied historical understanding of the Russo-Ukrainian War, tracing the conflict's roots to past events. President Truman of the United States played a significant role in challenging the U.S.S.R both rhetorically and strategically, as he declared the official position of the United States to assist free peoples to resist subjugation. Truman's rhetoric, decisiveness, and historical literacy contributed to the ideological bifurcation of the U.S.S.R. and the United States. His administration oversaw the creation of important security alliances such as NATO and the United Nations.

These alliances, whose genesis came from conversations at Dumbarton Oaks

Conversations, are critical components of the current war atmospherics in 2022. Truman's ideological duality, instantiating a progressive peacetime rebuilding of Europe and evolution of international institutionalism while calling for strong action and challenge to the malign actions of the U.S.S.R in Eastern Europe, played a pivotal role in shaping the Cold War dynamic that comprises a portion of the historical and geostrategic conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian War (Allison & Ferguson, 2016; Anker, 2007, 2014; Dumbarton Oaks Archives, 2017; Neustadt, 1990, 2007/2017; Office of the Historian, n.d.; Preston, 2000; Rolfe, 2016; Waltz, 1979; Yale Law School, 2008).

A review of the historiography of Ukraine, Russia, and the modern nation-state confederation of Europe was conducted to identify theories that explain Russia's War in Ukraine and the conditions for Zelenskyy to emerge as a prominent global leader. Contemporary International Relations (IR) observations about the Russo-Ukrainian War are primarily based on realist tenets, which explain the war as a balance of power between Russia and NATO/EU expansion. The Yalta Conference settlements and post-WWII institutionalism still exist today (D'Anieri, 2019; Götz, 2016b; Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Michalski & Adam, 2021; Semenenko et al., 2020).

When examining historical antecedents and similarities, the Russo-Ukrainian War can be seen as an antidote to Francis Fukuyama's prediction that the "end of history" would bring an end to the willingness to risk one's life for an abstract goal and the global ideological struggle that called forth courage and imagination (Fukuyama, 1992). Russia, which has long lagged behind Europe in economic and social development, has been directed by a pervasive tension that has influenced its state behavior and outward postures, particularly towards its former vassal states and on the world stage. Russia's insistence on influencing the state actions of its sphere of

influence nations has led to a fortress of isolation, with a state narrative based on its sovereign brand of democracy and anti-Western sentiment (Hazony, 2022; Kotkin, 2017; P. Kennedy, 1987; Kragh & Åsberg, 2017; Kushnir, 2018; Troianovski & Sanger, 2022).

According to P. Kennedy (1987), Russia's failure to comply with international law and its policy of prioritizing its security while ignoring the security concerns of its neighbors has led to its isolation from the rest of Europe. This approach has further damaged Russia's relationships with Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, China, and Japan. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a significant blow to the Russian elite, who lost half of their bipolar hegemony and superpower status. To maintain a sense of national pride and power, some proponents of Russian imperialism promoted the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not due to internal issues but rather a result of Western malice or poor decision-making by leaders vying for power (Baysha, 2018; Burns, 1978; Friedersdorf, 2022; Götz, 2016b; Götz & Merlen, 2019; C. F. Hermann et al., 2001; Kotkin, 2022; Mezrich, 2015; Mock & Larson, 1939; Pomerantsev, 2014; Riabchuk, 2012). Russia's current foreign policy echoes that of other former colonial powers, suggesting a difference in values between Russia and Ukraine after their political separation in 1991 (Gibbs, 2012; Götz, 2016b; Kushnir, 2018). While Ukraine was pursuing a path toward independence, democracy, and westward alignment, Russia decried the loss of its superpower position, and schisms emerged from a values-based "Europeanness" in Ukrainian identity, language, and culture (Baysha, 2018; D'Anieri, 2019; Kotkin, 2022; Riabchuk, 2012).

Despite the realist understanding of Russia's post-Cold War security imperatives, which precludes value judgments and emphasizes state-level realism, it cannot account for Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its potentiality of NATO support. Thus, the persistent narrative of Russia as an evil empire and the United States and its allies as beneficent is challenged by

realists (D'Anieri, 2019; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Mearsheimer, 2001, 2014; Morgenthau, 1948). This is because the emphasis on state-level realism has an indeterminacy gap, which cannot account for the realpolitik failings of the theory.

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and supported a war in Ukraine's Donbas region, claiming to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (Götz et al., 2015; 2016b; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015; Plokhy, 2015). The Russian narrative emphasized Crimea's historical ties to Russia and Sevastopol as a "city of Russian glory" (Baysha, 2018, p. 129), creating a fault line between Westernization and the old-world past (Baysha, 2018; Morrell, 2022a). The war between Russia and Ukraine is a contest of wills at a crossroads of history, representing the signifiers of Western ideals versus Russia's hybrid-war efforts to paint Ukraine as an ahistorical morass (Baysha, 2018; Agence France-Presse, 2022a; Bloomberg News, 2022; E. A. Cohen, 2022; M. Reynolds, 2022).

Russia's aggressive invasion and conflict characterization have further isolated the country. In the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia committed war crimes by bombing hospitals, targeting children, torturing and murdering Ukrainians (Fivecoat Consulting Group, 2022; Fridman, 2022; GeoConfirmed, 2022; Lamonthe, 2022; Macaes, 2022; Statista, 2022; Yermak, 2022). The humanitarian crisis during Russia's aggression led global observers to lament that good was powerless and evil had the upper hand in Ukraine (Adami, 2022; Bellingcat Investigative Team, 2022; Berry, 2022; Foer, 2022; Hoover Institution, 2022; OSINTtechnical, 2022; Sorokin, 2022). Putin's declared intention of freeing Ukraine from Nazi rule through invasion defied operational reality, as Russian forces experienced catastrophic losses and killed many ethnic Russians while posing as Ukraine's liberator under a hyper-

nationalist banner (Cochrane et al., 2022a; Nazaryan, 2022; Satariano & Reinhard, 2022; Wilson & Courtney, 2022).

In 2014, Russia seized Crimea and supported its war in Ukraine's Donbas region with propaganda, claiming to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (Götz, 2015; 2016b; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015; Plokhy, 2015). Russia's narrative emphasized Crimea's historical ties to Russia and its significance as a "city of Russian glory," specifically Sevastopol (Baysha, 2018). This conflict not only involved contested territories but also highlighted the clash between modernization and the old world past, with Western ideals of liberty, democracy, and human rights pitted against Russia's hybrid warfare tactics and emphasis on cultural ties to Ukraine (Baysha, 2018; Hoover Institution, 2022).

Russia's invasion and actions during the conflict, including the targeting of hospitals and the murder of Ukrainians, have further isolated the country (Fivecoat Consulting Group, 2022; Fridman, 2022; GeoConfirmed, 2022; Lamonthe, 2022; Macaes, 2022; Statista, 2022; Yermak, 2022). Despite Russia's long-standing authoritarian regime, Putin's justification for invading Ukraine to free it from Nazi rule defied operational reality (Cochrane et al., 2022a). Russian forces also suffered significant losses, including many ethnic Russians, while posing as Ukraine's liberators (Nazaryan, 2022; Satariano & Reinhard, 2022; Wilson & Courtney, 2022).

Ukraine's identity as a European nation with a complicated history between Orthodox and Catholic, and Central European and Eurasian empires, has contributed to the regional disparities in the conflict (Janičatová & Mlejnková, 2021; Lovelace, 2022; Popa, 2021). The question of how much cultural hybridization a nation can tolerate while maintaining unity in a hybrid war is central to the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Boyko, 2021; Hertling, 2022b; R. Johnson, 2022; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015).

Carl von Clausewitz's theories on war and politics provide essential insights into understanding the conflict's root causes and emerging narratives (Echevarria II, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1988). His observations of the emergence of single-state entities after the Peace of Westphalia capture the birth of international relations (Echevarria II, 2022). Clausewitz's understanding of the European system and the balancing behaviors of geopolitics, particularly the correlation between military might and national economic strength, remain relevant today (M. K. Albright, 2022; Allison & Dillon, 2014; Cosans & Reina, 2018; Kotkin, 2022).

Clausewitz's Trinity (Figure 1), which includes violence, hatred, and enmity, conceptualizes the paradoxical considerations of war (Clausewitz, 1832/2017). In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the linkages between enmity and strategic power are evident, with Ukraine's response to the invasion and perceived superiority through creative and unified efforts highlighting the importance of human emotions and leadership rhetoric (Cochrane et al., 2022e; E. A. Cohen, 2022; Echevarria II, 2022; Foer, 2022; Lister, 2022; Marson, 2022).

Clausewitz's theory identifies the Russo-Ukrainian War as a war of national resistance or liberation, in which citizens take up weapons, and resentment and hostility hold tactical importance. In this type of warfare, defense is seen as superior. A nation will mount a defense to live, which is a morally superior purpose to the invader's subjugation mission. Ukrainians have vowed to continue their resistance by insurrection if their regular forces are defeated. Clausewitz's examination of war yielded key findings that although an army may be defeated and its government ousted, the people will perpetuate the resistance. The observation stated above is not unique to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Similar patterns have been noted in other recent occupation-related wars, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US

participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The compelling plea of Ukraine's cause to the global free

world in the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine garnered substantial economic and

military aid. Ukrainians have resisted the incursion with inventive, united, and determined efforts

(Adler, 2022; Ackerman, 2022; Echevarria II, 2022; McTague, 2022a; Olearchyk & Reed, 2022;

Zelenskyy, 2022b, 2022d).

Figure 1

Clausewitz's Trinity for Ukraine

Adapted from "Clausewitz's Divisions: Analysis by Twos and Threes" by Hugh Smith, 2016,

Military Strategy Magazine, 5(3), para. 22

(https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/Clausewitzs-Divisions-Analysis-by-Twos-and-Threes/), Copyright 2016 by IJ Infinity Group. Adapted with permission.

        War Time Leadership. A deeper comprehension of wartime leadership studies (Burns, 1978) can offer valuable context for Zelenskyy's leadership by drawing parallels with historical and contemporary examples. Analyzing the role of a king during a crisis, historically speaking, can shed light on how leaders have navigated difficult situations in the past, providing insights into Zelenskyy's approach (Burns, 1978; Cosans & Reina, 2018; C. F. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Kotelenets & Barabash, 2019). Likewise, examining modern wartime statesmanship can reveal how contemporary leaders handle similar challenges and offer comparisons with Zelenskyy's leadership (Burns, 1978; Cosans & Reina, 2018; C. F. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Kotelenets & Barabash, 2019).

        A significant challenge in studying the empirics of the Russo-Ukrainian War and leadership models is that analyses often focus on either wartime presidents or peacetime generals (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Mearsheimer, 2001; Menaldo, 2013; Neustadt, 1990; Neustadt & May, 1988). This limitation may lead to an incomplete understanding of Zelenskyy's leadership in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, as it does not account for the nuances and complexities of his specific situation.

        The gap in research amongst contemporary scholars or industry approaches that approximate leadership by a head of state is vast. Adaptation of other theoretical approaches is necessary for this study. Recognizing agency necessitates using the First Image (Waltz, 1978) or single-actor analysis. This dimension of unitary actor impacts has been understudied in recent decades through the amelioration of nations and peoples. Therefore, in the amalgamation of disciplinary lenses, *transformational statesmanship* will be the nomenclature used for this study.

The central question in this research is the decision-making and leadership motivation of the head of state and its influence, power, and efficacy on the relevant citizenry.

Scholarship for the Russo-Ukrainian War, Zelenskyy, and modern diplomacy is lacking. Avolio et al. (2009) and Bass (1990; 1999) have conducted little research on the leadership attributes of individuals outside of a private sector context. Additionally, Francis Fukuyama's (1992; Kiçmari, 2018) prediction of the end of courage, valor, and heroism with men's hearts failing them has proven to be wholly inaccurate in light of the events that unfolded in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Therefore, this inquiry aims to understand modern leadership and PD, using Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the base case. Zelenskyy's speech at the 58th Munich Security Conference, a week before the invasion, set the tone for his wartime diplomacy and is included in the analysis as Appendix G. The historical section of the analysis has uncovered the importance of applied history in the literature. Next, the literature review will explore the contributions of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

Churchill.

I am convinced that every man of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley or surrender. If this long island story of ours is to end, at last, let it end only when each of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground. (Churchill, 1940, as cited in Larson, 2020, p. 56)

Within the realm of history, an important figure to examine is British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during WWII. Rhetoric has played a significant role in geopolitical power games since Thucydides' Peloponnesian War writings (Engels & Saas, 2013; Menaldo, 2013; Zug, 2018). Leaders' public statements have been a tool of international diplomacy, a source of unfiltered intelligence, and a means to mobilize ideology in the struggle for moral and

psychological advantage (Russia Matters, 2022; Toye, 2014). Churchill's eloquence and rhetoric were critical to his influence as a wartime leader. His impassioned speeches during WWII inspired confidence in the British people (Manchester & Reid, 2012). Real-time sentiment analysis conducted by the British government during the war revealed the public's high morale as captured in private correspondences (Larson, 2020).

Churchill knew words could affect hearts and minds and mold views, so he strove to encourage his audience with impassioned remarks. Contemporary observers of the Prime Minister noted his "keep handy" dossier of poetry and biblical passages (Larson, 2020). Churchill's speeches during WWII are well-known examples of propaganda in which the English language is used as a tool of statecraft. On one occasion, when Churchill addressed Parliament to notify them of British Royal Navy operations launched against the French, he did it in a manner akin to a "maritime thriller" (as cited in Larson, 2020).

Churchill's persuasive communication was critical to his early wartime leadership, especially in the first few months of his inauguration as Prime Minister in May of 1940. Charteris-Black (2013) describes Churchill's use of oratory as "both the artist's brush and the bully's cudgel that might goad opponents into submission." Churchill's statements frequently reflected his determination to achieve victory at all costs. Crespo-Fernandez (2013) calls Churchill's oratory "overt propaganda" during this period and views it as intentionally deployed to win hearts and minds.

Churchill's passionate speeches provided hope to the British people in the early 1940s, making him a symbol of national resolve in the face of increasing militarism in Germany. Churchill's rhetoric aimed to convince his compatriots that they could fight the Axis Powers (Toye, 2014). After an awe-inspiring performance by the British Royal Air Force, Churchill

moved the House of Commons with his statement, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" (Larson, 2020, p. 182). The resulting sentiment in the British public was exceedingly high, as reported through an official mail study. The department tasked with censoring mail and telegraph correspondence noted a paradox: public sentiment was highest in proportion to the damage to the surrounding area (Larson, 2020). Churchill regularly used his speeches during the war to extol his country's greatness, courage, and dedication, winning the hearts of the British people and strengthening ties between the UK and global alliances (Charteris-Black, 2013; Crespo-Fernandez, 2013; Menaldo, 2013).

Churchill is regarded not only for his leadership during a crisis but also for transcending the murky politics of office-seeking and political survival, according to Menaldo (2013). However, Rolfe (2016) disputes this notion and argues that Churchill was a shrewd political operative with a strong command of leadership rhetoric. Regardless, Allen (1992) posits that the public only celebrates true statesmanship, not simply elected officials. On May 8, 1945, the war in Europe ended, and Churchill made a speech in which he acknowledged that "nearly the entire world was united against the evildoers, who are now prostrate before us" (Larson, 2020, p. 501). Churchill's commitment to speaking fearlessly, honestly, and at times alone earned him international acclaim and respect. On that day, a group of British civilians gathered outside the palace and, after cheering for the king and queen, cheered for Churchill and applauded him wildly (Churchill, 2007; Larson, 2020; Manchester & Reid, 2012).

Yalta. This section explores the significance of the Yalta Conference in 1945 as a historical background to the Russo-Ukrainian War. At the conference, Russia aimed to restore the pre-1941 geographical status quo, establish stable regimes in Eastern Europe, and have a strong voice in Europe's government (Office of the Historian, n.d.; Yale Law School, 2008).

Russia also wanted all its Soviet republics, including Ukraine, to be admitted as individual entities, but only Ukraine and Russia were granted sovereign status. Despite being recognized as a singular entity, Ukraine's sovereignty was challenged and overshadowed by Russia until it voted in a 1991 referendum to leave the Soviet Union (See Appendix T). While Russia claimed that these individual states had the right to self-determination, Ukraine could never determine its direction, subjugated by Russia's interests (Office of the Historian, n.d.; Yale Law School, 2008).

The Yalta Conference created a geopolitical landscape in which Russia's interests subjugated Ukraine's right to self-determination. This unresolved geostrategic and nationalist debate laid the foundation for the current conflict of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Eastern Europeans consider the Yalta Conference unfinished business, and Europe's division into eastern and western spheres of influence is an underlying current to the 2022 conflict. Russia does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation but counts it as a "near-abroad" and claims long-standing interests in neighboring countries.

Thus, the Yalta Conference's incomplete peace led to the subjugation of Ukraine's sovereignty, creating geopolitical tensions that have persisted for decades and contributing to the current conflict in Ukraine. The present Russo-Ukrainian conflict has its roots in the postwar Yalta Conference and the United Nations charter, which subjugated Ukraine's right to self-determination (Brzezinski, 1984; Office of the Historian, n.d.; Manchester & Reid, 2012; Mearsheimer, 2001; YES, n.d.; Yale Law School, 2008).

The post-WWII hypothesis was that international institutions like the United Nations would ensure enduring peace and stability, but this has yet to be realized, and the rules-based international order remains challenged. The inability of international institutions to prevent and resolve conflicts effectively has created a power vacuum that has been exploited by various

actors, including Russia, in pursuing their interests. The absence of effective mechanisms for enforcing international law and norms has made it easier for countries to engage in aggressive behavior without fear of consequences. In contrast, the lack of a robust global governance system has made coordinating collective action against such behavior challenging. This situation has allowed conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian conflict to persist and escalate, with little prospect for resolution without a significant shift in the global order. (Hazony, 2022; Ikenberry, 2018; 2020).

The Russian government has long opposed the status quo since the Cold War's end, not supporting a unipolar form of global dominance (Dumbarton Oaks Archives, 2017; Office of the Historian, n.d.). Putin's speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference foreshadowed this disapproval, stating that the unipolar paradigm lacked a moral foundation (D'Anieri, 2019; Götz & Merlen, 2019). Russia does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation but counts it as a "near-abroad" and claims long-standing interests in neighboring countries (Baysha, 2018).

New History. This section will highlight the prologue to the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022 and present more recent events in Ukrainian history.

In New Princedoms, difficulties abound. And, first, if the Princedom be not wholly new, but joined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince, so as to form with them what may be termed a mixed Princedom, changes will come from a cause common to all new States, namely, that men, thinking to better their condition, are always ready to change masters, and in this expectation will take up arms against any ruler; wherein they deceive themselves, and find afterward by experience that they are worse off than before. (Machiavelli, 1513/2014, p. 26)

Prologue to Russia's War on Ukraine. An important context is that Ukrainians have a history of rebelling against existing power structures and Russian dominance, with varying degrees of success (Caldararo, 2014; Frydenborg, 2022; Huntington, 1993; Kushnir, 2018; Plokhy, 2015; Saari, 2014; Wanner, 2014). Examples of Ukrainian uprisings include the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014, which aimed to protect their independence, values, and national sovereignty (Plokhy, 2015; Saari, 2014). Ukrainians have a unique and unwavering determination to defend their country's independence. In contrast, experts suggest that Russians have failed to learn from their past defeats due to their reluctance to acknowledge them, whereas Ukraine has been successful due to its resilience in the face of conflict (Dobbins et al., 2019; Wilson & Courtney, 2022).

In the 2019 presidential elections, Zelenskyy emerged victorious as a political newcomer who promised change. Due to Ukraine's threatened existence, Zelenskyy called it a "Big Israel" (Shapiro, 2022). Clausewitz's notion of the will of the people driving conflict is exemplified by Ukraine's commitment to maintaining its independence. Modern warfare has evolved from an interstate occurrence to one fought among the people. Conflicts focus on sustaining conditions until treaties or peace agreements are reached, which can take years or decades (Echevarria II, 2022; UA Post, 2022). The ongoing conflict in Ukraine exemplifies this trend, with hybrid warfare characterized by non-state actors, including civilians, militias, and Putin's colonial army (Cochrane et al., 2022e). Despite the challenges, some argue that Ukraine's efforts in maintaining resilience and determination hold hope for the future of humankind (E. A. Cohen, 2022).

Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Volodymyr Zelenskyy's election as president in 2019 was partly due to his recognizable profile as the lead character in the TV series Servant of the People (Dkhair & Klocko, 2021; Korosteleva & Samokhvalov, 2019). He was perceived as an anti-

establishment figure who wanted to reclaim Ukraine's sovereignty and drew support from

Ukrainians disillusioned with post-Maidan corruption and pervasive war (Amirov, 2021;

Matsiyevsky, 2018; Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021; Shveda & Park, 2016).

During the initial phase of his presidency, Zelenskyy was seen as seeking more robust

relationships with Poland and, to a lesser extent, Hungary, and was viewed as an earnest global

partner (Łukasz, 2020; Mikhailov, 2021; Mironenko, 2020; Paterson & Sniderman, 2022;

Yakolov et al., 2020). However, Zelenskyy's failure to outline clear international policy aims and

his government's inability to foster dialogue with Russia was criticized (Mironenko, 2020;

Oxford Analytica, 2020). Some experts suggest that Zelenskyy's popularity decreased when he

stopped characterizing Moscow as the aggressor, which led to an uncertain perspective of the

problem among his partners (Łukasz, 2020). Additionally, the absence of a ranking between

domestic and foreign affairs by Zelenskyy further complicated matters (Matviyishyn, 2019;

Place, 2020).

Zelenskyy and his team faced domestic and foreign crises, including Kyiv's role in US

impeachment proceedings and domestic infighting and leaks (Łukasz, 2020). Despite these

setbacks, the government continued to press on with key reforms (Oxford Analytica, 2020).

Before the Russo-Ukrainian War began, Zelenskyy's administration took measures in 2021 to

preemptively secure the state by sanctioning hundreds of foreign and Ukrainian persons,

including Russia-linked Ukrainians, traffickers, and gang leaders (Perevoshchykov & Dudka,

2021).

Zelenskyy's approval rating was at a record low in February 2022 when Russia invaded

Ukraine (Rating Group UA, 2022a). However, in the early months of the Russo-Ukraine War,

the global opinion of Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian constituency increased significantly. Before

the start of the war, United States intelligence sources had assessed Zelenskyy as an underqualified, weak leader who lacked resilience. International audiences showed low confidence in his leadership (Hookway, 2022; Rating Group UA, 2019; Williams, 2022).

The Crisis. During the crisis months (February 24 - May 24) and the kinetic phase (May 25, 2022 - November 25, 2022) of the Russo-Ukraine War, Zelenskyy transformed his image as the president by changing from sharp suits into military gear and leaving the office for the battle trenches (Averre, 2022; Daly, 2022; Zelenskyy, 2022b). Zelenskyy also accelerated the pace, messaging, and reach of his strategic communications to the Ukrainian people and global audiences, using various mediums such as analog phone systems, mobile phones, and Twitter (Cochrane et al., 2022e; Adler, 2022). These shifts in Zelenskyy's manner and style paved the way for his transformational statesmanship to emerge. This capability as a statesman is foundational to leadership (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1990, 1999; Bass & Riggio, 2006).

He used his role as a war communicator to showcase the moral differences between Ukraine and Russia, destroy the enemy power, and unite Ukrainians against the fractured enemy forces. Zelenskyy's lack of neutrality in Ukrainian state communications reinforced the critical attributes of a unitary president and commander through discourse. He used the cross-webbed construction of identities and history to create a universal, moral, and historical identity for Ukrainians and global audiences (Baysha, 2018).

Zelenskyy's use of OSNs is a potent and concise communication tool and has become the Ukrainian government's lingua franca of statecraft and foreign policy (Adler, 2022). The composite of the Russo-Ukraine War and its messaging is delivered through a modern iteration of the radio address or newspaper headline.

Zelenskyy's leadership during the crisis months and the kinetic phase of the conflict transformed the image of the presidency, showcasing his strategic communication skills and statesmanship. He changed his style from sharp suits to olive drab and left his office to join the battle trenches, sending a message of wartime leadership (Averre, 2022; Daly, 2022; Zelenskyy, 2022b). Zelenskyy's messaging was consistent on themes of Ukrainian unity and defying Russia's hybrid war, and he used OSNs as the most potent, concise communication tool to deliver his messages (Adler, 2022). His direct-to-PD is analogous to BBC or Radio Free Europe broadcasts during WWII.

Zelenskyy's behavior and words during the conflict showed that he was willing to risk his own life to defend his country, inspiring further unification among its citizens (Friedersdorf, 2022). His resolve and vision sparked action and brought the country closer together, proclaiming that his compatriots fought for European, or liberal-democratic, principles and liberties in addition to Ukrainian ones (E. A. Cohen, 2022). The earnest and unmediated appeal made by Zelenskyy to the European leaders resulted in an unprecedented influx of international assistance (E. A. Cohen, 2022).

Zelenskyy's leadership during the conflict revealed that the individual actor, the unitary president, is a critical component of leadership research and discourse, drawing on multidisciplinary approaches into a conceptual framework of coalitions, movements, and democratization (Baysha, 2018). Zelenskyy's messaging, behavior and bravery during the conflict showcased his practical leadership skills, which had a decisive impact on the success of Ukraine's defense (E. A. Cohen, 2022; Freedman, 2014; Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021).

New Imperialism. New Imperialism. In this section, we will review the literature on socioeconomic theories to identify a research gap regarding the role of capital and economics in

predicting foreign policy decision-making and Ukraine's resistance to Russian aggression. Some economic theories seek to explain the causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War, such as Russia's desire to dominate markets in oil and gas and its loss of hegemony in neighboring countries. Ukrainians are collectively traumatized and united in challenging Russian expansionism and neocolonialism. Russia seeks to increase its power over other nations and prevent Ukraine from gaining sovereignty. Putin's strategic vision is to rectify historical mistakes by reuniting Crimea and unifying the Slavic peoples under the Russian flag.

However, this argument must be reevaluated to explain Russia's economic self-destruction due to war, exclusion from European markets, and the collapse of domestic industries. The literature attempting to explain neo-imperialist rationales inconsistently applies capitalist theories. Therefore, there is a need for an economic theory that can explain the impact of statesmanship and communication. However, understanding classical imperialism can provide a context in which these factors can be analyzed. As Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin noted:

> We have to admit that we have been too naïve about Russia and that today we are paying the price, a high price, that of our dependence on Russian energy. We have built our assumptions about Russia's activities on wrong ideas. We should have listened more closely to our friends from the Baltic States and Poland who lived under Soviet rule. (EU Parliament, 2022).

The literature on socioeconomic theories reveals a gap in research on how capital and economics can predict foreign policy decision-making and Ukraine's defiance in the face of Russian aggression. Sartre (1956/2001) and Yu (2020) explore the concept of new imperialism, which refers to former colonial powers' continued exploitation and control mechanisms. In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russian neocolonialism took the form of economic and

political domination over countries that formerly comprised the Soviet Union. Russia uses military interventions, economic sanctions, trade agreements, and energy resources to exert influence and maintain control over these countries. It has been accused of taking control of its resources and strategic locations.

Waltz (1979) argues that imperialism was a capitalist endeavor that pursued new capital and trade for an imperialist state. This philosophy and action were evident in the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Twitter trends such as #russiancolonialism highlighting the neocolonialism of Russia's actions. This economic domination tends to create a situation where the recipient is economically or politically dependent on the imperialist nation (Baysha, 2018; Hyrenevech, 2021; Rolfe, 2016). Europe's current fuel supply crisis results from this modern globalist presupposition (Friedersdorf, 2022; Galeotti, 2022a; Reuters, 2022c).

This neocolonialism also revives conversations about past atrocities, such as the Holodomor, a manufactured famine resulting from the state policies of the USSR (Frydenborg, 2022). This event decimated the Ukrainian population, and similar policies affected other satellite countries. In the 1920s, the Soviet state sought to modernize its production and expand its state capacity through central planning and collectivization. Peasants had their land and animals taken away and were forced to work on communal farms, from which the government took a percentage of the harvest (Hyrenevych, 2021). These policies were implemented to modernize agriculture and increase productivity, with Stalin believing that lagging behind other industrialized countries would destroy the Soviet Union in a future great-power struggle (Mearsheimer, 2001).

In the literature, scholars have identified a correlation between Russian aggression and conflict with its historically imperial policies. There have been calls to revisit Soviet governance

through the lens of post-colonialism (Hrynevych, 2021; Sherr, 2013). Post-imperial and post-colonial studies have highlighted the multiethnic makeup of the Soviet Union during collectivization, and these populations suffered demographic devastation (Hyrenvych, 2021). The problems with the Soviet system, including the use of terror and the strict execution of collectivization programs, can be traced back to Stalin and the Soviet Politburo (Hyrenvych, 2021), who dehumanized Ukrainians. Burns (1978/2018) described the relationship between the citizenry and the USSR as "forced bondage and fatal contracts" (p. 132).

The Russian state has seen itself as the exclusive power in Eastern Europe. It has a rotating set of moralistic claims, including workers' paradise, the Third Rome, and a superpower entitled to annex its neighbors (Klvanová, 2019; Morrell, 2022). In its neo-imperialist pursuits, Russia has been working to compel Ukraine into its orbit of aligned states rather than allowing it to decide its allegiances for decades. In 2013, President Yanukovych rejected signing the Association Agreement to join the EU, claiming that Ukraine could not compromise commerce with Russia, which opposed the accord. Many experts believe Russia's attempt to force Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic Union caused the agreement's collapse (Baysha, 2018). This economic coercion triggered the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine, which led to Yanukovych's ouster, Russia's seizure of Crimea, and the eruption of a hybrid war in the Donbas (Baysha, 2018). Russian disinformation efforts and hybridization of malign activities have exploited socio-economic differences in Ukraine for decades (D'Anieri, 2019; Baysha, 2018). Researchers found that in the early 1990s, 80% of Donbas referendum participants opted for federalism shortly after Ukrainian independence, and 87% backed Russian as a second-state language in 1994 (Baysha, 2018).

Before his ouster, President Yanukovych promoted anti-Ukrainian measures that socially isolated Ukrainians and weakened their language, culture, and identity (Baysha, 2018). In this internal imperialism, Ukrainian strongmen exploited political power struggles, only to be echoed by Russia, creating a perception that Ukraine denied its rights to historically Russian-speaking or bilingual regions in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russia's gray area operations amplified the message that the Ukrainian language was imposed on ethnic Russians (Amirov, 2021; Baysha, 2018). Local politicians struggled to address the severe economic and social issues resulting from the post-communist transition throughout the Donbas and used the Ukrainian language issue for domestic political ends (Baysha, 2018; R. Johnson, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2014).

The research showed that Russia sought to create additional power concerning other countries, mainly to thwart Ukrainians' attempt at sovereignty (Aronczyk, 2008; Orsini, 2022; Riabchuk, 2012; Sofiienko, 2020). Putin has advocated that Russians and Ukrainians are the same and are united in heritage, religion, and ethnicity (Götz, 2015, 2016b; Putin, 2014), and a New Russia, that is the Russian Federation, and its aspirations are the successor to Tsarist Russia and the USSR, which does not recognize a separate Ukrainian ethnicity (Kushnir, 2018). Putin's strategic vision for Russia is to fix the mistakes of history by reuniting with Crimea and joining the Slavic peoples under the Russian flag (Fridman, 2022; Kotkin, 2022; Plokhy, 2015; Putin, 2014; Tolz & Teper, 2018). Russia's ideological bent is not wartime Russian propaganda but a commandment of the Third Rome (Morrell, 2022). The literature reviewed showed a concentration of Russian state effort to create Russki Mir (Russian World), which denotes a unified polity (Saari, 2014). Putin publicly identified his country as the Third Rome a year before he seized Crimea, and through Russia's defensive sovereignty and coercive diplomacy, has tried to recast history (Grajewski, 2016, 2021; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015; Kushnir, 2018).

Russia's efforts at PD from the time of the Soviet collapse to the seizure of Crimea are summarized by Saari (2014). Russian objective through their post-Soviet brand of PD (PD) is only partially disguised under the official auspices of the state. Saari's (2014) research shows the specific neocolonial exploitations at work through Russian PD. After the Orange Revolution, Moscow, consistent with the old imperial powers, increased its efforts to spread pro-Russian ideology (Langdon & Tismaneanu, 2020; Robinson, 2018). The specific strategy that promoted a pro-Russian sentiment was leveraging a range of political actors, funding and facilitating non-governmental actors, saturating media markets abroad, and history and language campaigns (Sofiienko, 2020; Wanner, 2014; Way, 2014).

Putin restated the claim on March 18, 2015, one year after Crimea's annexation, when he stated, "Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization, and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus" (Putin, 2014). Additionally, to promote his image as a worldwide champion of traditional principles, Putin has courted the support of the Russian Orthodox Church's high officials (Morrell, 2022).

Russian "strategic conservatism" is designed to sow social and political discord with and inside the West. Russia, as the Third Rome, and Putin, the global defender of conservative values, believe in their aggressive behavior as an inherently righteous, necessary action (Franklin & Waddis, 2014; McGlynn, 2017; Morell, 2022b). Russian officials have exploited tension on social issues, like gay rights, within Western countries, accomplished through troll farms and disinformation campaigns (Sushko, 2022a). This strategic political maneuvering aims to sow discord and fracture society as Russian officials characterize the West as decadent and immoral.

By doing so, they exploit these social issues in other countries to situate themselves as the keeper of traditional values and religion (Kuzio, 2019).

Imperialism ambitiously seeks to subsume the multiethnic culture of its empires. The review of literature for this study showed language, cultural artifacts, legal systems, and other state apparatus to targets of colonial powers (Hyrenvych, 2021; Larson, 2020; Plohky, 2014); Russia's neo-imperial fever dream, Russki Mir, couches offensive foreign-policy as the reunification of Kyivan Rus (Kuzio, 2019). The deployed strategy in Ukraine promoted the notion that Ukrainians are Russians (Caldararo, 2014; Wanner, 2014). Putin published an essay in 2021 declaring that Ukraine did not exist independently and had no identity (Langdon & Tismaneanu, 2020; Hoover Institution, 2022; Satariano & Reinhard, 2022). At the same time, Russia worked in the Donbas to relocate Ukrainian citizens into Russian-controlled territory, destroy Ukrainian cities, and target Ukrainians as an ethnic and political group. Contemporary reports on the Russo-Ukrainian War from both mass media and Twitter emphasized the illegality of Russia looting controlled territories (Cotovio et al., 2022; Coyle, 2022; Gettleman & Oleksandr, 2022; OSINTtechnical, 2022).

Contrary to the narrative of shared historical identity, Ukraine has existed as a sovereign state for vast periods throughout history. Russia mistakenly attributes a shared identity to the foundation myth that Kyiv is the "mother of Russian [rather than Rus'] cities," from which modern Russia is claimed to have emerged (Baysha, 2018; Kushnir, 2018; Plokhy, 2015). However, literature from 1674, written by the Monks of the Kyivan Cave Monastery and printed in the Synopsis, disputed this notion. The Synopsis memorialized public sentiment for the religious, dynastic, and ethnonational unity of Eastern Slavs against Poland and the Ottoman

Empire, thus establishing the identity of Ukrainians as separate from surrounding principalities (Plokhy, 2015).

The separate historiography of Ukraine is explicit in its detail that Russia, then the USSR, and now the Russian Federation, has perpetually oppressed, exploited, and caused widespread death and destruction in Ukraine. Zelenskyy emphasizes Ukraine's historical independence and resilience through his messaging through OSN, that is, from all official accounts from himself and those of Ukraine; please see Appendix H for examples. From Catherine the Great's nation-building to Stalin's faminogenic policies, the Holodomor (Frydenborg, 2022; Hrynevych & Sorokowski, 2021; Kotkin, 2017, 2022; Nazaryan, 2022; Robinson, 2018; Ulam, 1973; Zeldin, 2022). An economic imperative is at the heart of the alliance of Western governments against Russia because of its revanchist ideologies and outward aggression, including full-scale war with a democratic neighboring state (McDougal, 2015). The persistent Ukrainian resistance can be viewed as a resistance movement or uprising against a colonial power or authority through an anti-colonial lens. This type of rebellion is often motivated by a desire for independence and self-determination by the people living in the colonized territory. In many cases, anti-colonial rebellions are driven by political, economic, and social factors, such as oppression, exploitation, and discrimination by colonial authorities. Scholars have criticized Russia not only for violating the sovereignty of Ukraine but for flouting international law, of which it is a signatory (Kotkin, 2022; Fridman, 2022; Cochrane et al., 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d, 2022e; Friedersdorf, 2022; Poast, 2022b)

In response to Russia's irredentist posturing, and subsequent full-scale invasion, the western-aligned bloc of countries turned to economic pressures (Siebens, 2022). Economic warfare is a wholesale "unprecedented package of export, debt, banking, and individual

restrictions" (Orsini, 2022, p. 2). In the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Zelenskyy was vocal about the malign economic influence of Russia within Europe and the global system (Cochrane et al., 2022e; Fridman, 2022; Kotkin, 2022). Western nations began the flurry of economic statecraft, which fundamentally altered the post-war institutional postures in the 1940s (Orsini, 2022).

This new imperialism in Russia wants a trade and security relationship. They must seize power by insisting that other countries buy their oil and are in servitude, but not for the countries' benefit or economic growth. Scholars have called Russia "Weimar on the Volga," meaning it is a fascist state which mixes messages of religion, nationalism, and imperialism under the control of a strong man (Cochrane et al., 2022b).

> All trade with Russia must be stopped! So that it can't sponsor the killing of our children. Ukrainians all over the world! Contact politicians, talk to journalists, put pressure on business to leave the Russian market. So that their dollars & euros aren't paid for our blood. The price for this war against UA must be extremely painful for Russia. This pressure is a task for all Ukrainians at home & abroad, as well as for all friends & partners of our country. Everyone in the world must take a moral stand. Not only the state but also companies. (Zelenskyy, 2022d)

The political assessments, contemporary observations, and historical data reviewed for this study present many positions and multifactorial considerations for the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, the literature that focuses on the precepts of imperialistic expansionism and cultural co-option or subjugation has historical antecedents parallel to this war's events. Kotkin (2022) discusses an analogous historical event through comparison: the U.S.S.R.'s 1939 invasion of Finland. Kotkin's rationale for using the Finnish example is thus, the Finns maintained their

dignity, just like the Ukrainians have. Kotkin's historical analysis of Stalin and his current analysis of the war in Ukraine revealed similar patterns and foreign-policy decision matrices (Fridman, 2022; Kotkin, 2017; Kotkin, 2022). Zelenskyy's Instagram shifted to strategic communications when the invasion began, and his verbiage suggests that as head of government, he understood his responsibilities to Ukraine (Izhutova, 2019).

The realist school of international relations has only a nominal acknowledgment of neoimperialism, such as those brief explorations by Waltz (1979, 1988). Mearsheimer is perhaps the most well-known of the realists who were vociferous in the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022). The argument that imperialism is not a motivating factor had a long refrain in Mearsheimer's work (2001, 2014, 2022). The historical record reviewed for this study strongly refutes the contention that NATO expansion, Western offensive realism, and Western encroachment are the casus belli. The historiography of Ukraine shows that Russian imperialism and Soviet expansionism pre-date NATO (Götz & Merlen, 2019; Kotkin, 2017, 2022; Larson, 2020; Plohky, 2015). In the war, it is not only Zelenskyy and the official Ukraine social media channels pushing back against Russia's co-opting of history, but most departments in the Ukrainian government-run socials. See Appendix I for an example from the Ministry of Defence.

The scholarly community's indifference towards the issue of annexation stands in stark contrast to the principles of liberalism and globalism. Nonetheless, referendums held in October 2022, which claimed to reflect the popular will in officially recognizing Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, took place (Applebaum, 2022; refer to Figure 2). Putin's grandiose annexation of four provinces, constituting approximately one-seventh of Ukraine's territory, elicited condemnation from Western leaders, albeit in a superficial manner (Applebaum, 2022). Zelenskyy, on the other hand, denounced Putin's actions and remained steadfast in his

commitment to anti-colonial, anti-imperial, and liberal values that he had come to embody

(McTague, 2022a; Mironenko, 2020; Ochkina, 2019).

Figure 2

Zelenskyy's Tweet about UN Denouncement of RU Annexations

From *Twitter*, by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022h,

(https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1580295103088066560). In public domain.

Next Year in Yalta. Throughout 2022, the Russo-Ukrainian War continued from its crisis

phase to a total kinetic war. Ukraine performed militarily beyond any expectations (Cochrane et

al., 2022b). The Ukrainian spirit and commitment were measurably high, as well as their support

of President Zelenskyy (Rating Group UA, 2022a; 2022b). In addition to their battlefield

successes, Ukrainians have been focused on developing their civil society through deliberate,

transparent actions since the Orange Revolution of 2004. As part of that endeavor, a group of

global strategists, academics, and Ukrainian stakeholders formed a think tank called Yalta

European Strategy (YES, n.d.). YES was created to solve problems related to Ukrainian

integration into Europe and address all atmospheric challenges facing that nation. Symbolically,

YES met in Crimea, at Livadia Palace, where "Europe was divided in 1945," and the vision of

unification to a wider Europe could begin (YES, n.d.). After Russia's 2014 invasion, it decamped

to Kyiv (Cochrane et al., 2022e). In a similar aspirational, nationalistic fashion to Cubans,

Palestinians, or other displaced peoples. Therefore, proclaim "Next year in Yalta" (Cochrane et

al., 2022e).

Socio-Political

This literature review has employed a socio-political lens to curate and evaluate sources,

emphasizing key elements such as nationalism, discourse, narrative, infopolitik, and PD.

Nationalism.

I have, through life, felt that I was above all, and quite simply, a Frenchman. A family

tradition, already of long date, has bound me firmly to my country. I have found

nourishment in her spiritual heritage and in her history. (Bloch, 1949, p. 209).

In the study of socio-political themes, the role of nationalism in FPA is a crucial area of

investigation. Through an exploration of existing literature on this topic, this section seeks to

provide insights into the complex dynamics of intercultural FPA, which are crucial to

understanding effective leadership in diverse cultural contexts. *Nationalism* is a powerful force

that unites nations and is increasingly being built and reinforced through digital platforms and

social networks (Anker, 2014). The agenda for nation-building in Ukraine was based on three

complementary perspectives of nationhood: nationhood in the past, nationhood within the

territory, and nationhood beyond territorial boundaries (Plokhy, 2015).

The construction of national identity in Ukraine is influenced by these perspectives, which emphasize historical, cultural, and ethnic origins and the importance of territorial integrity and alliances with Western countries and institutions (Plokhy, 2015). Anderson's theory of *imagined communities* can be used to understand better how national identity is constructed and contested in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. According to Anderson, nations are not naturally existing entities but imagined communities formed through shared symbols, histories, and narratives (Anderson, 1983; Sutryin, 2021). This theory can be applied to analyze how different actors construct and contest national identity in the context of the Ukraine conflict and how media and propaganda shape public perceptions of the conflict (Solomon, 2015).

Nationalism is especially significant in Ukraine due to its diverse population, which includes ethnic Russians and Ukrainians who speak different languages and practice different religions (Wanner, 2014). Nationalism has become a key concept in the current conflict to unify the country, which has a history of partisanship but has never had a strong unifying leader (Plokhy, 2015). Foreign policy can shape nationalist and political language to emphasize power, heroism, and triumphalism, and political leaders may utilize nationalism to unify their people during times of crisis (Anker, 2014). Despite its complexity, nationalism remains a powerful mechanism for cementing connections and identities beyond cultural qualities. Leadership with strong nationalistic ties tends to demonstrate a more participatory style of foreign policy (M. G. Hermann, 1980a; Solomon, 2015).

The use of digital communication can create a sense of nationalism by promoting the idea of universal truths that transcend regional differences and contribute to the global trend toward democracy (Rolfe, 2016). In addition, collective behaviors such as sharing and trust can create a sense of belonging and foster a moral economy (Siapera et al., 2018). Community building and

sharing knowledge through person-to-person and online self-efficacy tools are also crucial for learning and growth (Canavez et al., 2021). Populism is a "people's movement" that challenges the status quo and conventional politics (Canovan, 1999). The conflict between the politics of redemption and pragmatism is inherent in representative democracies and can lead to populist discourse (Rolfe, 2016).

While many IR researchers believe that all human social reality is discursive, critical components of social reality cannot be represented discursively (Campbell & Jamieson, 2008). The Real is linked to the idea of the subject's absence and is not represented in the Imaginary and Symbolic, which are the registers of ideas, images, and speech (Solomon, 2015). Humans try to find perfect words to represent the truth, but language is ever-changing and dynamic, making it difficult to achieve (Solomon, 2015). Desire, individual experience, and political discourse are studied to understand the mechanisms of subjectivity and discursive power and how political signifiers elicit passionate discussions and mold individual identities (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Solomon, 2015). The struggle between reality and idealism is inherent in democracy and produces stories of victory and tragedy, strength and weakness, and insiders and outsiders (Rolfe, 2016). However, this problem cannot be resolved through internet dialogue and has real-world consequences, as ideas have legacies and trajectories that cannot be quickly abandoned (Rolfe, 2016).

Ukraine. The development of Ukraine as a nation can only be examined by considering the complex geopolitical landscape of Eastern Europe. While there may be differences among individuals in Ukraine, their shared nationalist identity has proven to be a unifying force, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, which has solidified and strengthened the country (Afineevsky, 2015; Baysha, 2018). The Ukrainian people have

demonstrated a steadfast commitment to maintaining their independence, as evidenced by their involvement in the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity (Baysha, 2018; Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021). Scholars like Shveda and Park (2016) argue that Ukraine's development can be understood as a journey toward becoming a state grounded in democratic and liberal values but with a solid patriotic center. In this paper, we will examine the significance of nationalism, discourse, narrative, infopolitik, and PD in Ukraine's development and the country's position in the broader geopolitical landscape.

The Russo-Ukrainian War put Ukraine in a classic international relations dilemma, with the country trying to balance its security interests against Russia's more powerful ones (D'Anieri, 2019). However, the Euromaidan period and Ukraine's evolution driven by national interests have shifted the country's focus to self-determination, replacing traditional balancing behaviors (Waltz, 1988). For Ukraine, a collective commitment to its strategic and vital interests is not just a matter of power balancing in international relations but essential for its survival. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, unifying language and slogans played a crucial role in building momentum and purpose in the conflict, with #SlavaUkraini became the nation's calling card, hashtag, and anthem (Andrés, 2022; Jalonek, 2022; Paus, 2022). Nationalism and unity demonstrated during the conflict align with the literature, which suggests that nationalism can be a channel for reform, emancipation, civil liberties, and human will rather than a form of rabid populism (Burns, 1978; Josselson & Hopkins, 2015; Lasswell, 1930, 1948a; Lowry, 2018; Syed, 1963). Drawing from Clausewitz's Trinity of Paradoxes, Ukraine's defense strategy used a more evolved version, a Trinity of Trinities. This is a whole-of-nation approach to defense and includes passion, chance, reason, fighting, policy, strategy, fighting, people, and army

government (Clausewitz, 1832/2017; E. A. Cohen, 2022; Coker, 2017; Echevarria II, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2001; Smith, 2016; Waltz, 1988).

According to Hudson and Day (2019), Ukraine's shift towards a pro-European society marked a significant departure from its Soviet past and the corrupt regime that defined it. Despite international relations experts who believed that Ukraine's self-determination was impossible, the Ukrainian people did not subscribe to this view and used social media to voice their opinions. Ukraine faced several challenges, including Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, an ongoing conflict in the Donbas, and the recognition of separatist regions, which fueled a strong sense of nationalism in the country (Boyko, 2021; Cochrane et al., 2022b; Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2021; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Ochkina, 2019; Shveda & Park, 2016; Way, 2014). As Jervis (1976) argued, decision-makers and their successors cannot bind themselves to the status quo, and changes in minds, leadership, values, and opportunities can arise. The emergence of #SlavaUkriani during the Russo-Ukrainian War exemplifies this idea that minds can change, and new values can emerge (see Figure 3).

Figure 3

Clausewitz (1832/2017) Trinity of Trinities Paradox Adapted for Ukraine

Discourse. The transformation of Ukraine into a pro-European society marked a departure from its Soviet past and the kleptocracy that defined it. This transformation was spurred by challenges faced by Ukraine, such as dealing with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas, which prompted a strong sense of nationalism (Boyko, 2021; Cochrane et al., 2022b; Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2021; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Ochkina, 2019; Shveda & Park, 2016; Way, 2014). Understanding the discourse surrounding Ukrainian nationalism during the Russo-Ukrainian War, particularly the rhetoric of its leaders and citizens, can provide insight into the country's transformation and relationship with Russia.

Therefore, a closer analysis of political discourse, using tools such as LIWC-22, can offer valuable information on the personalities and strategies of political leaders and shed light on the broader political landscape. Understanding Zelenskyy's PD discourse requires identifying the opposing narratives within Ukraine and the cultural imperatives that provide ground for discourse and political power (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015). In a crisis, discourse and the rhetoric of its people and leaders can create homogeneity within a country when nationalism bolsters its capacity and self-image. Therefore, the Russo-Ukrainian War provided an opportunity to restructure and reevaluate the identity and character of the community, and leadership is expected to symbolize a society's ideals, practices, and identity (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).

Discourse analysis can complement related subjects like International Relations (IR) and FPA and can concentrate on the interactions between levels of analysis that are often thought of as distinct using language analysis (Tannen et al., 2015; Carta, 2019; Carta & Narminio, 2021). Social media, specifically Twitter, is considered the public square of modern statecraft. Politicians use language to reveal themselves to peers and opponents in the public square. Their

words can be analyzed using tools like LIWC-22 to establish correlations between political

discourse and individual leader personalities (Pennebaker et al., n.d.; M. G. Hermann,

1999/2002; Yanovets & Smal, 2020).

Political discourse involves navigating power dynamics, collaborating with institutions

and players, and maintaining hegemonic dominance, among other functions (Kampf, 2015). In

times of existential crisis, leaders typically use particular rhetoric, such as promising a brighter

future, moralizing against transgressors of international law, or focusing on shared national

history (Budd, 2016). Political Discourse Analysis examines these communications and how

language in political settings performs actions, realizes goals, and produces meaning across

multifactorial contexts (Danowski et al., 2021; Kampf, 2015; Zappavigna, 2015). The subgenres

of political discourse provide the substance of analysis, such as governmental directions or

legislative discourse (Kampf, 2015).

Leaders employ legitimation strategies to construct dialogue aligned with the four

components of the investigatory framework: authorization, moralization, rationalization, and

mythopoesis (Mirhosseini, 2017; Panahi et al., 2021). National branding is the ultimate cultural

formation within a state, reinforcing national identity and strengthening both exogenous and

endogenous perceptions of this identity (Aronczyk, 2008). The national discourse provides

opportunities for a moral basis of citizenship through a greater understanding of the nation-state's

purpose, engendering allegiance and affiliation (Aronczyk, 2008). The national discourse is a

powerful tool for building a shared sense of identity and fostering social cohesion by shaping and

reflecting a society's values, beliefs, and norms. It can also provide a moral foundation for

citizenship by promoting a sense of responsibility and duty towards the nation and its people. As

such, analyzing the political discourse surrounding national identity and citizenship can offer

valuable insights into a country's social and political landscape and its relationship with other nations and international actors.

Narrative. Analyzing political discourse has led to understanding how language and rhetoric can shape a state's identity, ideology, and historical events. However, a deeper understanding of a state's identity and historical events can also inform the discourse used by its leaders. This is where the concept of narrative comes into play. Narrative is a combination of stories that relate to a particular experience, location, leader, state, nation, or event and explains what the state represents, has gone through, or has faced. It offers a perspective or knowledge that is often implicit, unconscious, and unquestioned.

The power of rhetoric and discourse has been studied since ancient Greece, and Aristotle's framework for rhetoric remains relevant in modern discourse analysis (Campbell & Jamieson, 2008; Krizek, 2017). Narrative has become a crucial tool in diplomacy and a powerful means of communication that can impact regional and multilateral alliances. Diplomats use narrative to convey their state's business, empowering the state and its citizens. It is crucial to distinguish between a statesman's narrative and rhetoric versus a propagandist's, which seeks to mobilize hatred against the enemy and demoralize them. In contrast, the transformative power of narrative or political dialogue has become essential to diplomatic work, utilizing modern communication paradigms such as social media and PD. Narrative serves a vital function in society, such as expressing, representing, and modifying interests, establishing consensus and dispute resolution frameworks, and even increasing the visibility of small states, which can shift power in international relations and alter the path of history (Haluga & Kureric, 2021; Michelsen & Colley, 2019; Rauchfleisch & Kovic, 2016; Scacco et al., 2018).

Infopolitik. The power of narrative in shaping international relations is closely tied to

infopolitik, which refers to using information and communication technologies for strategic

purposes in international relations. Infopolitik uses various tools, such as OSNs, propaganda, and

PD, to influence and shape public opinion and policies in other countries (see Appendix E). As

such, the use of narrative in infopolitik has become increasingly important, as it enables states to

not only convey their message but also to shape public perceptions and attitudes towards their

policies and actions. Therefore, it is important to understand the interplay between narrative and

infopolitik in the modern age of international relations.

The EU originated the word *Infopolitik* to describe its approach to communication and

define its goals (de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005). As they show support and make themselves

known, the goal is that "infopolitik implicitly acknowledges both that institutions should take

proactive international communication seriously and that the nature of that communication

should be based on accurate and unbiased information" (de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005, p. 8).

The parlance around infopolitik proved problematic as the number of lexical choices was vast. de

Gouveia and Plumridge (2005) found that in English, the array of terms included

> PD, cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, soft power, political communications,
>
> perception management, propaganda, intercultural dialogue, dialogue of cultures,
>
> dialogue of civilizations, crisis management, media management, media relations, public
>
> affairs, public relations, strategic communications, global communications, strategic
>
> influence, psychological operations, information operations, and media operations (de
>
> Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005, p. 8).

The term infopolitik encompasses the communication, discourse, and diplomacy of

nations in the EU, including the management of information and communication for national

benefit. Sobolieva (2021) suggests that state communication can be analyzed at socio-political levels and explored linguistically and individually. State power has traditionally been considered an amalgamation of sea power, strategic air power, land capabilities, and nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer, 2001). However, IR theorists have argued for a focus on human behavior and its impacts. State power is now seen to rest upon the "strategic equation" of military, economic, political, and psychological power (Mock & Larson, 1939). This equation is partly embodied in the narrative that defines perceptions of state power.

The power of narrative is demonstrated in Russia's strong reaction to institutional communication that does not favor it and in the United Nations Department of Global Communications' decision to avoid using specific terms to describe the situation in Ukraine (O'Leary, 2022). The United Nations has acknowledged the power of narrative by aiming to recast events in Ukraine using different terms. UN officials have cited the reputational danger to the institution should a perception of bias be presented in official or semi-official communications when dealing with the crisis, particularly those related to Russia, a member of the United Nations Security Council (Canavez et al., 2021; Cross, 2013; O'Leary, 2022; Sandrin & Hoffmann, 2018). In response, Zelenskyy has called upon the UN to act or dissolve (Petridou et al., 2019; Stevis-Grindeff, 2022; Zelenskyy, 2022b).

Public Diplomacy. PD and infopolitik are closely intertwined in the modern information age. As nations engage in information campaigns to shape global public opinion, the methods of PD become increasingly important. Infopolitik refers to the use of information and communication technology to further national interests, which can include strategies such as propaganda and cyber warfare. PD, on the other hand, aims to influence foreign publics through cultural exchanges, media outreach, and other forms of soft power. While infopolitik may be

used to spread propaganda and disinformation, PD aims to build relationships and understanding between nations. As such, the success of a nation's PD efforts may depend on its ability to navigate the complex landscape of infopolitik.

The evolution of PD has increased the sophistication of theoretical constructs. These constructs range from the Fulbright Scholarship program, which aimed to share ideas through art and education, to definitions such as "white propaganda," which refers to the white lies of a government (Sobolieva, 2021; see Appendix D). PD utilizes Lasswell's communication theory (1948b), which is based on answering the five Ws: Who?, Says what?, In which channel?, To whom?, and With what effect?

Throughout his political science and psychology research, Lasswell (1930, 1936, 1938, 1948a, 1948b) viewed communication as a holistic process and sought ways to maximize understanding and efficiency. This perspective is especially relevant when examining PD, such as Lasswell's research on communication and conflict in Ukraine. Sobolieva (2021) incorporated Lasswell's communication theory into the analysis of PD, resulting in the definition adopted for this study:

> [T]he communicative capability of a state which is managed by a specialized institution and implemented by the government, scientific, academic, and cultural communities as well as by ordinary citizens, and aimed at a foreign or global audience. The purpose of public diplomacy is to promote national interests and foreign policies of a country, to create a positive image, and achieve mutual understanding, by communicating ideas, ideals, and values of the nation as well as general information about country, culture, and society, through all communication channels, including but not limited to the media, interpersonal communication, public relations. (Sobolieva, 2021, p.166)

Sobolieva (2021), in the modernization of Lasswell's approach, instructs observers to consider these criteria to understand the scaffolding of PD: a communicator (C), target audience (TA), message (M), a channel of communication (CC), and purpose of communication (PC). Using these coded components of PD, this researcher has matched them to the specific concepts present in this study:

- C) Communicator: Volodyrmr Zelenskyy

- TA) Target Audience: Global or Foreign Audience

- M) Message: Ukraine will fight. Ukraine will win.

- CC) Channel of Communication: OSNs, Mass Media, Direct-to-Public

- PC) Purpose of Communication: #SlavaUkraini

Public diplomacy (PD) is a means of demonstrating leadership, particularly during crises (Allen, 1992; Valenza, 2021). The literature suggests that it is not politicians in office who are revered or respected but rather leaders who embody the values and virtues of the nation. For example, during the early Revolutionary period, Americans celebrated George Washington's birthday in 1777 because he embodied the nascent nation's values and emphasized the importance of charity, humility, and a peaceful mindset (Allen, 1992).

Diplomacy, or the art of statecraft, is a crucial component of foreign policy that requires leaders to be knowledgeable, self-aware, and capable (Haluga & Kurecic, 2021). According to Krasner (2006), transformational diplomacy fosters change within nations rather than interactions between states. Copeland (2009) expanded on this idea with an operational definition that includes "meaningful exchange" and "demonstrable expression in policy development and action" (p. 102). Unlike traditional diplomacy, transformational diplomacy is about the character of state political regimes rather than the international balance of power.

Contemporary political leaders can collaborate and work with all levels of government and civil society groups using transformational diplomacy. It requires continuous, high-quality education, the host country's language mastery, and current forms and communication instruments (Haluga & Kurecic, 2021).

Zelenskyy utilized PD in various ways. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Zelenskyy spoke to the European Parliament on February 24, 2022. He later addressed several national parliaments and the United States Congress (see Appendix H). He brought the Ukrainian people's cause to all parliamentary houses and used his words to rally policymakers and urge them to do more (Adler, 2022; Berry, 2022; Del Monte, 2022; Jacinto, 2022). Zelenskyy emphasized that Ukraine is the gateway to Europe and is protecting the values of the international liberal order, mainly European values. He reiterated this at the European Parliament and in the national parliaments of EU countries, arguing that Ukraine has earned the right to be a full member of the EU. Zelenskyy's direct appeal resulted in European nations' and institutions' policy development and action (Adami, 2022; Berry, 2022; EU Commission, 2022; B. Johnson, 2022b; Russia Matters, 2022; Zelenskyy, 2022a).

Zelenskyy also asked members of NATO to set up a no-fly zone and make the airspace over Ukraine safe. He thanked many parliaments for the sanctions they had already put in place and called for stricter sanctions and, in some cases, an embargo on all trade. Specifically, Zelenskyy asked Italy to stop being a "refuge for murderers' ' (Soguel, 2022; Zelenskyy, 2022a; 2022b). He urged French businesses to stop doing business in Russia and stop giving money to people fighting the war in Ukraine. In his speeches in February and March of 2022, Zelenskyy asked for help rebuilding after the war. For example, he has asked Swedish architects and businesses to join a new project and "patronage" the rebuilding of certain cities (Del Monte,

2022). Zelenskyy's effective use of transformational diplomacy helped coalesce European nations into a more modern alliance oriented toward the actual threats of Russian aggression rather than the softer sentiments of semi-appeasement before the war.

Technological

As technology evolves, it has become increasingly intertwined with politics and conflict. In the modern era, it is only possible to analyze politics by considering the role of technology, particularly in the realm of information. This section of the literature review builds on the previous discussion of infopolitik by examining the intersection of technology and conflict. Specifically, this section will explore the concepts of hybrid warfare, open-source intelligence, mass media, social media, Twitter, and Twiplomacy. This literature examination will include the technological impact on politics and conflict. By examining these concepts, we can better understand how technology shapes modern warfare and diplomacy.

Hybrid-Warfare. Hybrid-warfare, a concept that combines military and technological tactics, has been used throughout history and has evolved in modern times by integrating cyber activity (Kofman & Rojansky, 2015). Russia's use of this strategy in its conflict with Ukraine, particularly in the annexation of Crimea, is an example of its effectiveness (Janičatová & Mlejnková, 2021). Despite this, Ukraine has shown resilience in adapting to the constant threat of hybrid-warfare, with innovations such as the creation of war apps, the maintenance of analog communication systems, and the formation of voluntary IT Army units (Cochrane et al., 2022a; Harwell, 2022a; Peterson, 2022; Popa, 2021). These efforts have led to successes, such as using Russian soldier IDs by the IT Army to inform their families of their deaths (Harwell, 2022b; Pancevski, 2022). Nonetheless, anticipating and counteracting Russia's hybrid-warfare methods

remains crucial in the ongoing conflict (Kofman & Rojansky, 2022, Sushko, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c).

Hybrid-wars are a complex phenomenon that targets the vulnerabilities of a state or inter-state political communities to exacerbate polarization and erode core values of coexistence, harmony, and pluralism. Hybrid threats have been used in Ukraine to exacerbate existing divides and undermine political institutions. (Kong & Marler, 2022). Building confidence is critical for countering these dangers because trust is required for any policy or strategy reaction to being effective. As polarization within political groups can make it challenging to create consensus in decision-making processes on all levels, trust is not only essential at the level of public confidence in the state. However, it is also essential for people's trust in one another (Kong & Marler, 2022). As a result, establishing, rebuilding, and fortifying confidence is critical to achieving long-term fortitude in the face of hybrid dangers that jeopardize the security of the state and its community. This necessitates ongoing institutional and policy efforts to forge strong ties between the state and the people, backed by legitimate transparency, ownership, and equality (Bilal, 2021).

According to Bilal (2021), the Russo-Ukrainian War was a confrontation between free and closed societies. By creating social safety networks, civil society organizations, and volunteer militias to address the challenges of modern warfare, Ukrainian society as a whole has demonstrated national cooperation and effort consistent with Clausewitzian theory (see Figure 3; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015). Ukraine has effectively countered Russia's cyberwar efforts despite Russia's entire-society approach. The social media campaigns of Ukraine have effectively bolstered national morale, exposed Russian war crimes, and garnered international support. In addition, Ukraine has successfully crowdfunded for defensive weapons.

The war has illuminated the significance of a whole-society approach to warfare, as both parties compete on social media with information and disinformation. Russia's hybrid tactics, designed to exploit the openness of Western liberal democracies, have primarily been ineffective against the resilience and adaptability of Ukraine. As noted by Kong and Marler (2022), Russia's cyberattacks and pretexts for invading Ukraine failed, ultimately leading to the deferral of the invasion.

Open Source. The duality of hybrid-warfare during the Russo-Ukrainian War has showcased the importance of technological advancements in warfare. *Open-source intelligence* (OSINT) refers to publicly available information that can be legally and ethically acquired, processed, and disseminated (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.). This can contain news reports, social media posts, satellite photographs, and other publicly available data. Smith-Boyle (2022) argues that OSINT has played a significant role in the war in Ukraine. The increased internet and social media use has made OSINT an essential component of the intelligence community. The literature reviewed the impact of hybrid warfare and OSINT on the Russo-Ukrainian War and their potential for future conflicts (Kallenborn, 2022).

Both militarily and politically, OSINT has played a significant role in determining the Russo-Ukrainian War. OSINT has provided valuable intelligence on Russian military movements, plans, and operations, including areas attacked by Russian forces, eavesdropping on Russian communications via unencrypted radio waves and cell phones, and social media posts from Russian soldiers and Ukrainian citizens. By refuting Russian disinformation and disclosing war crimes, OSINT has shifted international opinion in Ukraine's favor. In addition, OSINT has provided evidence for future cases of war crimes, as face recognition software has been used to link Russian personnel depicted in social media posts to their identities (Bellingcat, 2022).

In addition, OSINT has bolstered the confidence and national pride of the Ukrainian people by exposing Russian military mistakes and highlighting Ukrainian victories. OSINT sources have utilized novel methods to provide information to the Ukrainian military and intelligence agencies and their allies. These sources have also aided humanitarian organizations by providing information about the requirements and living conditions of those residing in Ukraine's contested oblasts (R. Johnson, 2022; Kallenborn, 2022; Kofman & Rojansky, 2015; Kotelenets & Barabash, 2019; Kong & Marler, 2022; Lovelace, 2022; Popa, 2021).

OSINT sources that have benefitted Ukrainians and their leadership include

- Reports from local and international news organizations

- Posts on social media from people on the ground

- Satellite photos of military units' locations and movements

- Maps and other geographic data

- Documents and reports made available to the public by the government

- Data and statistics on the conflict's economic, social, and political impact

- Collecting and evaluating open-source information necessitates specialized knowledge and abilities, as well as access to the appropriate tools and resources.

The emergence of OSINT has become an essential tool in gathering intelligence and providing insights into public interest journalism and digital advocacy. As OSINT practitioners scrutinize online data, they can provide unique perspectives and details about conflicts that may not be visible to traditional reporters. This is particularly important in breaking through the fog of war and determining the truth about specific events on the ground, providing audiences with a deeper understanding of the conflict (Poast, 2022a; Somfalvy & Pleines, 2021).

OSINT can help create broad narratives about the progress and legitimacy of the war by scrutinizing every event, which is critical as Russia fabricates news to intensify its assault. This includes false claims about US chemical weapons laboratories in Ukraine and other fabricated information to manipulate the information environment. In response, top OSINT organizations from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Ukraine are working collaboratively to maintain a live picture of the conflict based on events such as military losses, civilian fatalities, and attacks, using social media images and locations (Pancevski, 2022).

This shift in the use of OSINT has been fundamental in the context of Russia's hybrid warfare and infopolitik in the Russo-Ukrainian War. By combining military, economic, and informational means, Russia aims to influence and shape the information environment to advance its political objectives. OSINT has become an essential tool in countering these efforts, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the conflict and providing valuable insights into the tactics and strategies of both sides. In addition, OSINT has played a crucial role in providing evidence for future war crimes trials, linking faces of Russian soldiers pictured in social media posts to names, and revealing evidence of Russian war crimes (Pancevski,2022).

President Zelenskyy has proven to be a master of utilizing OSINT to bolster Ukraine's efforts against Russian aggression, as highlighted by several experts. His administration has prioritized the development of the country's OSINT capabilities, which has played a crucial role in countering Russian propaganda and disinformation (IFCN, n.d.). Through his leadership, the Ukrainian government has leveraged OSINT to expose false flag operations, discredit Russian claims, and provide key intelligence to the military (Zelenskiy, 2022). Additionally, Zelenskyy has been active on social media, using his platform to amplify Ukraine's message and increase awareness about the ongoing conflict (Zelenskyy, 2022a). By utilizing OSINT innovatively,

Zelenskyy has strengthened Ukraine's ability to withstand hybrid threats and positioned the country as a leader in the global fight against disinformation and propaganda.

Mass Media. The Russo-Ukraine conflict has seized global consciousness and underscores the irrefutable significance of mass media in formulating international discourse, informing public sentiment, and impacting political determinations. As a fundamental instrument for disseminating information, mass media has assumed a critical function in this conflict by offering real-time updates, unveiling concealed realities, and amplifying the voices of those afflicted by the hostilities. This unparalleled access to information has augmented our comprehension of the intricate dynamics and accentuated the authority mass media wields in crafting narratives, mobilizing support, and holding relevant actors accountable. Due to the rapid advancements in technology and the widespread use of social media platforms, the role of mass media in the Russo-Ukraine war is hefty. Mass media carries a substantial responsibility to report and convey the truth accurately (Habermas, 2017; McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

Historically, mass media combined people, activity, information, and organizational structure within a particular worldview. This was essential to preventing isolation and communicating truth (Vos & Buckner, 2016). Habermas (2017) defined socio-technical systems as organizational development techniques that use media in social activity. Most social substructures are complex socio-technical systems, and several views are essential for human engagement with media (Brake, 2013; B. C. Cohen, 1957; Habermas, 2017). Digital technologies have driven the convergence across the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres, triggering a revolution in government capability, sovereignty, and power (Habermas, 2017; Hadi et al., 2020; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Menshikov & Neymatova, 2020; Petridou et al., 2019).

The convergence generated by internet media reshapes global outlines, extending global goals and boosting company economic power (Crilley & Pears, 2021; Habermas, 2017).

Before the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the mass media environment underwent ownership concentration, commercialization, and tabloidization (Ryabinska, 2011). Current research has not yet delved deeply into the effects of media and brands on a global level, necessitating large-scale data studies to understand better contemporary media influence (Scacco et al., 2016). The ability of citizen discussions to influence traditional media demonstrates the potential of social media in directing mainstream media's agenda and presents opportunities for further research (Scacco et al., 2016). Moreover, research indicates that Twitter may serve more as a news outlet than a social network for high-profile individuals and events (Scacco & Coe, 2016).

Zelenskyy's engagement with mass media through OSNs helped establish his reputation as an adept communicator and expand his reach (Evans, 2019; Fitri, 2022). Once in office, he used Twitter to address his citizens and the international community, emphasizing the high stakes of the Russo-Ukraine War (Fitri, 2022). His strategic use of mass media broadened the impact of his messaging, countering Russian propaganda and nurturing pro-nationalist sentiment in Ukraine (Adami, 2021; Kallenborn, 2022). Mass media has been crucial in amplifying Zelenskyy's PD efforts, positioning him as an exceptionally effective global communicator. His tactical use of platforms like Twitter has allowed direct engagement with Ukrainian citizens and the international community and combated misinformation and propaganda, fostering unity and pro-nationalist sentiment within Ukraine. Consequently, mass media has proven to be an indispensable asset for Zelenskyy, enabling him to navigate the complexities of the conflict, rally

support, and articulate his stance. Zelenskyy's PD exemplifies mass media's immense power and responsibility in shaping international discourse and influencing political outcomes.

Social Media. OSNs have become an essential aspect of mass media in the digital era, revolutionizing the dissemination and consumption of information. These platforms enable real-time communication, foster diverse viewpoints, and magnify voices on a global scale, thereby playing a crucial role in shaping public opinion and guiding political discourse. As OSNs continue to develop and intertwine with traditional mass media, their impact on society and politics is anticipated to increase, further emphasizing the importance of responsible, accurate, and ethical reporting in preserving journalistic integrity and public trust. The impact of social media, or OSNs, on political leadership and its reach is a significant tool in modern politics. The development and mass adoption of social media has created opportunities for political leaders to increase their frequency and reach, particularly those who outperform others in the space (Conway et al., 2015; Hall et al., 2018; Gainous & Wagner, 2013; Jürgens & Jungherr, 2015; Lam et al., 2021; Lee & Oh, 2012). Using social media for statesmanship increases the likelihood of an individual being considered influential (Conway et al., 2015). In Ukraine, social media is a primary source of information for the population (Semen, 2021).

E-leadership, which refers to leadership that is mediated by technology, is a relatively new field that requires a rethinking of conventional leadership theories to provide inspiration, vision, and purpose (Avolio & Luthans, 2006; Bass, 1990; 1999; Bass & Riggio, 2005; Burns, 1978/2018). The emotionality of followers is also an important consideration, particularly in high-stakes conflict scenarios, as the connection between the leader and follower is reinforced with emotion (Avolio et al., 2009). As technology continues to improve, the influence of social

media on how leadership is demonstrated is expected to increase significantly (Anker, 2014; Avolio & Luthans, 2006; Danowski et al., 2021; Karami et al., 2020; Srikanth et al., 2022).

Social media has become increasingly vital in crisis communication, offering a two-way communication channel that facilitates information dissemination and reception (Haq et al., 2022). As discussed in the literature review, the fusion of mass media and technology has led to the emergence of hybrid-warfare, which integrates traditional and non-traditional methods, including cyber and information warfare. In this regard, OSNs have significantly impacted the nature of conflicts in the 21st century. Hybrid-warfare is a complex phenomenon that combines military and non-military tactics to manipulate mass media to further the strategic goals of the aggressor. In the Russo-Ukraine conflict, Russia has been accused of using mass media to spread disinformation, propaganda, and fake news and amplify divisive narratives and create confusion among Ukrainian citizens and the international community. Russian cyber operations have been accused of manipulating social media platforms to amplify the reach of propaganda, spread false information, and sow confusion. Hybrid warfare tactics are expected to become more sophisticated and challenging to detect, requiring ongoing vigilance and accountability to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information ecosystem.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is an example of the potential of real-time social network connectivity to capture and disseminate information more effectively than in previous conflicts of the 21st century (Adler, 2022; Chen et al., 2022; Haq et al., 2022). The war has demonstrated how social media platforms, such as Twitter and Telegram, can be utilized to counter disinformation, rally support, and document the course of the conflict, as previously highlighted in the discussion on mass media's role in Zelenskyy's PD.

Furthermore, the war has shown how social media can support and challenge hybrid-warfare narratives. They provide a platform for various actors, including state and non-state entities, to disseminate their messages and influence public opinion. As technology advances and the integration of mass media with OSNs deepens, it is crucial to consider the potential consequences and responsibilities that emerge from their use in times of conflict (Rauchfleisch & Eisenegger, 2020. The role of OSNs in crisis communication has evolved significantly, and their impact on conflicts like the Russo-Ukrainian War cannot be understated. As the lines between mass media, technology, and hybrid warfare continue to blur, it is essential for researchers, policymakers, and media practitioners to acknowledge the potential of OSNs in shaping the course of conflicts and, ultimately, their outcomes.

Twitter. At its core, Twitter complements digital diplomatic tools demonstrating the changing balance of power from institutions and governments to people and networks. This power transfer has demonstrated an impact on how conflicts are fought. Patrikarakos (2017) studied conflict in the 21st century, particularly in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya. His findings support academic positions that social media, particularly Twitter, allow people and their experiences to become the subject of conflict studies. Hashtag diplomacy, a long-tailed outcome from the original hashtag, focuses global attention on conflict zones and events (Potnis & Tahamtan, 2021; Small, 2011). See Table 2 for key Twitter vocabulary terms.

Table 2

Select Twitter Vocabulary from Appendix J (Twitter, n.d.c)

Term	Definition
@	The @ sign is used to call out usernames in Tweets. Users include @ to mention other usernames in Tweets, send a direct message, or link to a profile.

Term	Definition
Hashtag	A hashtag is any word or phrase immediately preceded by the # symbol. A hashtag aggregates Tweets with the same topic or words
Retweet	The act of sharing another account's Tweet to all followers by clicking or tapping on the Retweet button.
Tweet (n.)	A Tweet (up to 280 characters) may contain photos, GIFs, videos, and text
Tweet (v.)	The act of sending a Tweet.
Twitter	A global information network made up of short messages (including photos, videos, and links)
Username	A username (or handle) is how a user is identified on Twitter and is always preceded immediately by the @ symbol.
Verified Account	A verified Twitter account receives a blue check icon to indicate that the creator of these Tweets is a legitimate source.

Twitter is the specific type of social media used as a form of public discourse within this discussion. Twitter is considered a resource of information and evidence from various subcategories, including social, political, financial, and cultural information (Gold, 2020; Karami, 2020). As a social media platform and an open-source data channel, researchers have found that Twitter benefits political and linguistic inquiry due to its public-facing feed, belied by easy access and low cost (Gold, 2020). Gandy (1982) defined the value of information subsidies as information that is "made available at something less than the cost a user would face in the absence of the subsidy" (p. 61). Research into linguistic categories is hypothesized to have value in predicting political orientations, which would be additive to political and psychological applications (Sylwester & Purver, 2015).

Twitter not only connects with the public, and journalists utilize the platform to gather news. Tweets are more like information subsidies than press releases (Conway et al., 2015; Gandy, 1982; Jungherr, 2014a; 2014b). These information releases are transmitted to both

journalists and the general public (Parmalee, 2013). In addition, tweets can, directly and indirectly, influence the public. Increased public exposure makes tweets similar to YouTube videos, Facebook posts, and blog posts, also seen by millions (Gainous & Wagner, 2013; Jungherr, 2014a). Media professionals and political operatives view Twitter as a resource to "collect data, enhance audience reach, and follow the activities of high-profile news sources" (Conway et al., 2015, p. 4). The regularity of social media communication and increasing amounts of linguistic information are shared on Twitter daily (Kaur & Sasahara, 2016).

OSNs provided a glimpse to social scientists of technological disruption in the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian War (Janičatová & Mlejnková, 2021; R. Johnson, 2022; Kallenborn, 2022; Pancevski, 2022; Satariono & Reinhard, 2022). Researchers hypothesized that there was the potential to transform politics. New communication technologies could bring forward previously unknown candidates, information dissemination channels, agenda-setting, information subsidies, policy coordination, and new communication practices (Jungherr, 2014a; 2014b). Alternatively, conjecture offered that the legacy politicians, movements, and known entities would dominate cyberspace just as they had in traditional media (R. Davis, 1999; Jungherr, 2014b; Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Neuman, 1991; Schweitzer, 2011). In addition, public consumption of tweets promoted the reach of news and data published on the platform as traditional media outlets parroted information previously and amplified such stories (Parmalee, 2014).

Social research exploration of political candidates and Twitter consistently showed that select individuals in campaigns, or global leaders in office, outperform their counterparts by levels of magnitude (Conway et al., 2015). Political actors and statesmen who demonstrated prominence in the traditional atmospherics of the social contest were also the most visible on

Twitter (Jungherr, 2014b). These most influential Twitter accounts provided information

subsidies that created, informed, and influenced public opinion through agenda-setting

mechanisms (Conway et al., 2015; Parmelee, 2014). A review of extant literature has shown that

political communication styles remain consistent for a single actor, whether shared in traditional

mass media and public settings or adapted to Twitter (Jungherr, 2014a). However, the speed with

which information is disseminated and its reach are more effective than that of older

technologies (Rufai & Bunce, 2020).

The data provided through social network analysis showed that Twitter could "foster

civic and political engagement" and "enable new and meaningful interactions" (Jungherr, 2014a,

p. 9). Theoretical approaches to Twitter analysis are generally based on network and sentiment

analysis, which lend themselves to quantitative study. For this study, the importance of following

and follower relationships, which Jungherr (2014a) explained are tracked through @messages,

@mentions, or Retweets, helped to identify the nodes of network connection, especially in the

case of prominent political figures (Al-Rawi, 2021; Jungherr, 2014b; Rufai & Bunce, 2020). As

mentioned, interactions with political leaders' tweets increased the message's reach and added to

its virality (Gainous & Wagner, 2013; Rufai & Bunce, 2020; Small, 2011).

An examination of Twitter as a tool for agent-actor impacts was observed with President

Donald Trump in the United States (Drezner, 2020; Lowry, 2018; Thiers et al., 2022). Globalism

has long obscured the interactions of unitary leaders and their effect on the atmospherics of

global leadership (Hudson & Day, 2019). The emergence of Donald Trump, along with his 88

million Twitter followers (see Appendix K), exposed the weaknesses in realist arguments for

systems-only thinking. Proponents of international relations theory struggled to explain the

influence of Trump in the modern age (Jervis, 2018; Ott, 2017). However, by examining the

linkages of leaders to followers via social media engagement and PD action, the visibility of a unitary action is elevated (Parajon et al., 2019a; Parajon et al., 2019b; Zug, 2018).

Social media, including Twitter, provided a glimpse to social scientists of technological disruption in global leadership (Janičatová & Mlejnková, 2021; R. Johnson, 2022; Kallenborn, 2022; Pancevski, 2022; Satariono & Reinhard, 2022). Researchers hypothesized that there was the potential to transform politics, and through Twitter mapping, an appreciable inter-webbing of social interaction and united purpose of the public can be observed (Bode et al., 2011; Groshek & Al-Rawi, 2013; Han, et al., 2020).

OSNs have become increasingly important for PD in recent years. One example of this is the role of Twitter in the Russo-Ukrainian War. According to Haq and Nechyporenko (2022), Twitter played a critical role in the Pre-crisis, Crisis, and Kinetic phases of the conflict by enabling communication, agenda setting, and a direct feed of information from Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to the public through his Twitter (@ZelenskyyUa), Telegram (@Zelenskiy) and Official Website accounts. Twitter also provided a platform for cyber reporting from the front lines of the conflict and leaked Russian intelligence (Bellingcat, 2022; @CalltoActivism; Sushko, 2022a; Sushko, 2022b; Sushko, 2022c). These examples demonstrate the importance of OSNs like Twitter for PD. They enable governments and individuals to communicate directly with the public and provide real-time information about important events. The impact of OSNs on public sentiment during the Russo-Ukrainian War will be explored in more detail later in this study.

Twiplomacy. The advent of social media and OSNs has led to a transformative shift in diplomacy, giving rise to a new form of statecraft known as digital diplomacy. As traditional PD grapples with the challenges posed by the digital age, it has become essential to incorporate

online diplomacy, leveraging social media and other communication tools to engage in effective PD. This digital statecraft, or virtual diplomacy, has expanded the horizons of global PD by presenting novel opportunities for communication and interaction. One notable example of this emerging paradigm is Twiplomacy, a euphemism for diplomatic outreach and PD by heads of state, leaders of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and ambassadors through social media. Despite its increasing prominence, Twiplomacy, or digital diplomacy, remains a contested concept among foreign policy practitioners and scholars, who debate its effectiveness and traditional standing in diplomatic circles.

Table 3

International Entities Digital Reach Using Twitter

Rank	Name	Handle	Followers	Factor	Scaled (1-100)
1	World Health Organization (WHO)	@WHO	10.7M	21x	100
2	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	@UNICEF		14X	67
4	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	@REFUGEES		8x	35
6	The World Bank	@WORLDBANK		7x	30
8	European Commission	@EU_COMMISSION	1.7M	6x	23
11	The International Monetary Fund	@IMFNEWS	2M	4x	18
27	International Atomic Energy Agency	@IAEAORG	224K	2x	8
33	European Parliament	@EUROPARL_EN		2x	7
35	Council of Europe	@COE	513.1K	2x	7

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the migration to the digitized diplomatic arena, with global leaders turning to online options for bilateral and international discussions. As a result, the most important international institutions have recorded increased reach and impact of their Diplomatic actions. Twitter-based research at Twiplomacy.com has used a rank analysis of the United Nations and intergovernmental organizations cooperating with the UN to measure their reach and impact, which includes the scale and factor measurements of organizational impact. The primary elements of this new foreign policy reality are the alterations of diplomacy and its operations in a shifting information-communication environment, as well as the efforts of foreign policy practitioners to adapt to the new networked and network-forming PD realm. Please refer to Table 3 for a scaled ranking of international entities' digital reach using Twitter (Gurskas, 2016; BCW Twiplomacy, n.d.; Chen et al., 2021).

Zelenskyy has emerged as an influential figure in international relations since 2019, thanks to his leadership style that heavily incorporates technology and pro-Ukrainian sentiments (Allen, 1992; Hamad, 2015; Oxford Analytica, 2019). His use of Twitter, where he has a reach of 6.7 million and a high engagement rate of 2.9% to 4.8%, compared to the typical 1.1% or less engagement rate for large accounts engaged in diplomacy, has contributed significantly to his influence (Adams, 2022; Berry, 2022; King, 2022; Monte, 2022; Yakovlev et al., 2020). Twitter and other OSNs have become essential for politicians and advocacy groups to bypass traditional news channels, as established news outlets often pick up and amplify tweets (Conway et al., 2015; Lovelace, 2022).

Zelenskyy's use of OSNs reflects his agenda-setting motivations and has significantly influenced his policies and positions (see Figure 4 for an example). Institutions and international organizations with the most interactions with Zelenskyy and other prominent global leaders on

Twitter are among the highest-ranked digital diplomats (see Appendix K). The use of social media platforms such as Twitter has provided politicians with a platform to generate news stories and increase their reach, making it a compelling political medium (Chen et al., 2022; Jungherr, 2014)

Figure 4

Public-Facing Twitter Usage Example

From *Twitter*, by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 2022g,

(https://twitter.com/zelenskyyua/status/1577006943499350016). In public domain.

Zelenskyy's digital diplomacy efforts extend beyond Twitter and also include other OSN platforms like Instagram and Telegram, which he uses to expand the reach of his statecraft and PD efforts (see Appendix L for more examples). Through his use of technology, media savvy, and pro-Ukrainian sentiments, Zelenskyy's message on Telegram went viral, lasting for almost eight minutes, where he condemned the atrocities of war and directly challenged Russia (Allen, 1992; Hamad, 2015; Oxford Analytica, 2019).

This example highlights the importance of OSNs, their impact on international relations, and their significant role in shaping public opinion and influencing foreign policy decisions.

Zelenskyy's use of digital diplomacy has allowed him to connect with a broader audience, including the Ukrainian diaspora, and to showcase his leadership abilities in times of crisis (Adams, 2022; Berry, 2022; King, 2022; Monte, 2022; Yakovlev et al., 2020).

As OSNs evolve and influence, foreign policy practitioners must adjust their communication strategies to these new instruments to effectively conduct PD and shape global public opinion (Conway et al., 2015; Lovelace, 2022). Zelenskyy's success in utilizing digital statecraft and virtual diplomacy to engage with the international community and drive policy development demonstrates the potential impact of OSN-based PD efforts:

> Do you still think that we are 'one nation?' Do you still think that you can scare us, break us, and make us make concessions? You really did not understand anything? Don't understand who we are? What are we for? What are we talking about? Read my lips: Without gas or without you? Without you. Without light or without you? Without you. Without water or without you? Without you. Without food or without you? Without you. Cold, hunger, darkness, and thirst are not as scary and deadly for us as your "friendship and brotherhood.'' But history will put everything in its place. And we will be with gas, light, water, and food ... and WITHOUT you! (Haq & Nechyporenko, 2022)

Zelenskyy's digital diplomacy is broader than Twitter. He also utilized other OSN platforms, such as Instagram and Telegram, to promote his messaging and expand the reach of statecraft and PD (Gurskas, 2016; Radicioni et al., 2021; Schünemann, 2020). Twiplomacy was a significant aspect of Zelenskyy's leadership. He maintained a regular presence on social media platforms before the invasion, including media marathons, Twitter, Telegram, Instagram, and Official Ukraine sites (Fitri, 2022; Matviyishyn, 2019; Musafirova, 2021; Perevoshchykov & Dudka, 2021; Zelsnkiy, n.d;). However, after the invasion in 2022, Zelenskyy's use of OSN

increased dramatically, along with his leadership abilities' visibility to the public (J. A. C.

Brown, 1963; Caesar et al., 1981; Flores et al., 2022; Kernell, 1986; Krizek, 2017; Laracey,

2009; Scacco & Coe, 2016; Scacco et al., 2018; Zug, 2018).

Zelenskyy's PD efforts have been amplified using digital platforms to broadcast his

speeches to a broader audience. Through platforms like Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram,

Zelenskyy has been able to communicate his message beyond traditional media channels,

reaching audiences that may not have been accessible before. By leveraging these digital tools,

Zelenskyy has communicated directly with the Ukrainian people, foreign governments, and

international organizations. This has helped him expand his reach and influence on the global

stage and generate more support for Ukraine's stance in the ongoing conflict with Russia.

Zelenskyy's primary channel of exposure, aside from traditional media, was Twitter, which he

used dynamically, consistently, and with far-reaching effects for political discourse, emergency

notifications, and diplomacy (Bayram & Ta, 2019; G. Blank, 2017; Kaur & Sasahara, 2016; Lin

et al., 2014; Rufai & Bunce, 2020; Silver & Andrey, 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld, 2018; Vos &

Buckner, 2016).

While traditional research has relied on quantitative analysis, researchers have

encouraged a more subjective investigation of the role of OSNs in politics (Jungherr, 2014).

Twitter provides real-time temporal dynamics in politics, diplomacy, and followership

interactions. Research into political leadership and OSN includes sentiment analysis, linguistic

inquiry, leadership paradigms, foreign-policy analysis, and psychobiographical studies that

examine how Twitter is used in international relations and PD, as reflected in OSN activity.

These approaches are supported by research studies such as those conducted by Al Rawi (2020),

Chen et al. (2022), and Karami et al. (2020).

Geopolitics

Geopolitics is the study of the relationship between geography, politics, and international relations and how these factors shape nation-states' strategic interests and foreign policies. It is an important element of this literature review framework because it helps understand the challenges and opportunities a country faces in its foreign policy. This section will analyze four aspects of geopolitics: geopolitical risk, strategic threat, international law, and alliances.

Geopolitical Risk. Geopolitical risk, which refers to the potential threat posed by wars, terrorism, and interstate conflicts to the peaceful development of international relations, is a constant reality in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics such as Georgia (Baysha, 2018). Geopolitical risks such as military conflicts or economic instability in a particular region can make it difficult for a country to achieve its foreign policy goals. Additionally, shifts in the global balance of power can render a country's foreign policy objectives unachievable, requiring adjustments to its approach to addressing these changes. Geopolitical risk includes the possibility of these events and the new risks associated with escalating existing crises (Caldara & Iocoviello, 2018).

Kissinger (2020) argues that balancing strategic security and safety margins is especially difficult for countries that need both. Furthermore, Europe allows the United States to bear the burden of balancing security and safety expenditures (Kissinger, 2020). According to Kissinger, modern foreign policy must balance risks in the international system, which has undergone a historic shift due to nuclear weapons, "political and psychological warfare" (2020, p. 9). The most critical takeaway from Kissinger is that incremental territorial incursions and minor offenses are not worth "all-out war" when considering history (Kissinger, 2020, p. 9). However, Kissinger is unpopular in Ukraine due to his opposition to international support for the country

and his suggestion that their struggle should be replaced with a more accommodating posture (Cochrane et al., 2022e).

Realism, which suggests selfishness and undermines the idea of a common European home, has been rejected by twenty-first-century Europe (Mearsheimer, 2001; Mezrich, 2015; Cochrane et al., 2022b). Realism contradicts less confrontational policy positions around contemporary issues such as climate change. A globalist orientation argues that significant issues should be addressed through multilateral institutions, and states will work together for solutions (Mearsheimer, 2001). Western governments' reluctance to engage in geopolitical posturing against Russian expansionism in Europe has its own consequences (Baysha, 2018). D'Anieri (2019) characterizes the body politic that defends Russia's advancements in Ukraine from 2014 onward as "cautious" and "defensive" postures. These postures were drawn because of the West's expansionism encroaching on Russia's borders (D'Anieri, 2019).

However, D'Anieri argues that these justifications are drawn from the realist ideological side of international relations and are too deterministic. The flux in the international system, where Russia's motivations can be viewed from different perspectives, is a jumbled mess of anti-NATO sentiment on one side but ambivalent about Ukraine joining the EU on the other (D'Anieri, 2019).

Social scientists have criticized liberalism's ability to unite nations and cultures (Huntington, 1993; Menaldo, 2013), with some arguing that conquest and war have been more consistent with its unification of countries than ideals (Syed, 1963). Realist scholars contend that military threats, arms build-up, and hardline policies promoting great power politics will continue to exist (Blank, 2020; Gotz, 2015; Gotz, 2016). When geopolitical pressure is low, dominant states use economic incentives and institutional mechanisms to influence their

neighbors. When under significant geopolitical strain, they often resort to more aggressive actions, such as using military force and economic coercion. When the pressure is moderate, regional hegemons adopt a hybrid strategy (Götz, 2016). In this context, realism justifies Russian aggression in its near-abroad, as Moscow's primary objective is to prevent neighboring states from unifying with any external power (Bentley, 2014; Götz, 2016; Mearsheimer, 2014).

Therefore, the main targets of Moscow's geopolitical offensive have been in countries like Ukraine and Georgia, which seek closer links with NATO and the EU (D'Anieri, 2019; Friedersdorf, 2022; Götz, 2016; Gotz & Merlen, 2019). Russia's geopolitical excursions are driven by deep anxiety about domestic issues and a desire to topple the liberal order that emerged after the Cold War (Lane, 2019; Lo, 2015; Mearsheimer, 2014), as well as to bolster its legitimacy at home (Gotz, 2016).

The purpose of such a plan is to undermine Russia from the inside and, if possible, to oust the existing government in Moscow in favor of one that is more sympathetic to the West if a prosperous and democratic Europe is a core national security interest of the Western alliance, as it has been for the past 80 years. President Dwight Eisenhower commented, "there is no alternative to peace" (Kissinger, 2020, p.3). The Russian regime must be resisted, contained, and ultimately dethroned. Europe's posture has maintained that a prosperous and democratic Europe is the crucial geopolitical goal for the future, as it has been for the past 80 years. According to Gotz and Merlen's research (2019), the best defense is a good offense.

Bass (1990) explains that Churchill, who contributed so much to the survival of Britain in 1940, was the same Churchill whose obstinacy contributed to the mistakes of 1941," as an underprepared Singapore fell to the Japanese. He oversaw Britain's unprecedented disasters in Greece and Crete (1990, p.26). Bass's transformational leadership theory allows for leaders to

develop and is contextual. Imagine the proving ground of a neighborhood built upon geopolitical

entanglement and the east-west shifting of massive armies throughout history. This is Ukraine

(Plohky, 2015). Transformational leaders, characterized by powerful behavioral traits and

charismatic ability, can be influenced by their environment and, in turn, change the culture of

those they lead (Bass, 1990).

Strategic Threat. The concept of risk in international relations can encompass a range of

potential harms one state can inflict on another through its policies. One element of risk is

strategic threat, which refers to the potential harm one state can inflict on another through its

policies. Morgenthau (1948) suggested a typology of state policies, dividing them into two

categories: those that seek to maintain (or protect) the status quo and those that seek to increase

their power or territory. Historical events, such as the Afghan forces' massacre of a British army

and its camp followers in 1842, illustrate strategic danger. The incident demonstrated how the

Afghans' willpower defeated the British's better equipment and training, a phenomenon that can

be viewed through Clausewitzian theory (Clausewitz 1832/2017).

According to Morgenthau (1948), states, like people generally, are motivated by an

innate desire for dominance over others. He described the relationship between those who wield

power and those who are susceptible to it as a "psychological relation" (Morgenthau, 1948, p.

14). In addition to using physical force, power can also take the shape of ideological influence,

economic pressure, or persuasion. According to Morgenthau, the self-regulating balance of

power and normative tools like international law, are the only two mechanisms that can keep the

peace between nations since states do not adhere to moral standards (Morgenthau, 1948).

Understanding the potential risks in international relations is crucial for policymakers to

ensure the safety and security of their nation. States must be aware of the strategic threats other

countries may pose to their interests and develop appropriate strategies to counteract them. As such, risk assessment is an essential component of foreign policy decision-making.

International Law. In an increasingly interconnected and complex global landscape, understanding the potential risks inherent in international relations is paramount for policymakers seeking to safeguard their nation's security and interests (MacKinnon, 2022). States must stay alert and assess the strategic dangers other nations may pose to their interests, developing well-informed strategies to minimize such risks. As a result, risk evaluation has emerged as an essential component of foreign policy decision-making, especially when navigating the complexities of international law (ICC, 2011). This review seeks to investigate the role of international law in shaping geopolitical risk and conflict, examining how legal frameworks and norms can influence the dynamics of international relations, and assessing the extent to which adherence to or defiance of these legal structures affects the stability and security of nations worldwide.

The Russo-Ukrainian War prompted many considerations of state power and the role of leadership. Regarding the strategic security concerns of the Cold War, Honig (2009) asked, "how do we handle emergencies?" (p. 1). The question, a staple of democratic and legal theory, points to justification. Why suspend civil liberties? How can a sovereign state proclaim an emergency, suspend the law, or adopt and normalize exceptional actions to safeguard democracy from its enemies? Is torture, detention without habeas corpus, deportation, rendition, or invasion acceptable (Honig, 2009)? These questions emerged during the Russo-Ukrainian War, which applied to state power and the role of leadership.

The literature was reviewed for the significance of international law, alliances, and the interplay of state authority and leadership in geopolitics. The war shows how interconnected these variables are and how important they are for preserving global stability and security:

- *International law:* The Russo-Ukrainian War emphasizes the role of international law in regulating state behavior and preventing conflicts. International law violations can result in serious repercussions such as sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and armed action. Adherence to international law is critical to preserving a rules-based international system that promotes cooperation and dispute settlement.

- *Alliances:* Alliances facilitate collective action, resource sharing, and deterrence against potential aggressors. In the face of intricate geopolitical challenges, they also serve as a mechanism for coordinating diplomatic and military responses to crises.

- *State power and leadership:* The Russo-Ukrainian War underscores the role of state power and leadership in shaping the course of international affairs. The acts of leaders such as Zelenskyy, Putin, and others have direct repercussions for the region's security and safety. Effective leadership, diplomacy, and communication are essential for handling complicated geopolitical circumstances and encouraging state collaboration.

- *Limitations of international institutions:* The conflict highlights the limitations of international institutions in preventing aggression and enforcing compliance with international law. The complicated network of accords and agreements must be constantly reassessed and adapted to handle new security challenges. This requires strong political will, state collaboration, and a dedication to international law and multilateralism ideals.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is a stark warning of the value of international law, alliances, and leadership in international coalitions and diplomacy. It also emphasizes the constraints of international organizations and the need for ongoing evaluation and revision of treaties and agreements to handle changing security challenges successfully (International Criminal Court, 2011). Research often fails to understand international law's sclerotic power, relevance, and capabilities to correct state behavior (Boyko, 2021). Realist theories suggest that the law-making process and multilateral accords will create power structures that are preventative, pragmatic, and rigorously applied to violations of international law (Bentzen, 2020; Boyko, 2021). Scholars credit international alliances, customs, precedents, and supranational organizations, particularly the International Criminal Court, for applying the law. The Rome Statute, which established The Hague as the seat of the Court and declared its purposes concerning the mission and purposes of the United Nations, is also the governing treaty of international laws and jurisdictions (ICC, 2011).

The data indicates that, while Europe has powerful groups, these organizations cannot compel individual countries to act against their strategic interests. International organizations also have a limited autonomous influence on great power conduct (Mearsheimer, 2001). Kissinger (2020) argues that it is a fallacy to believe that international agreements are entirely predicated on rational and negotiability. The true power, Kissinger cites, is the ability of a nation to vindicate its view of justice or preserve its "vital interest" with force (p. viii). In contemporary conflict, the practice has empowered the public and its media with the arguments and views they need to participate in the most effective critiques.

The name-and-shame approach, which the international legitimation- and norm-focused democratic theory approach brings to emergency politics (Honig, 2009; Izhutova, 2019), has

permitted an opening for the conflict in Ukraine. A particular form of sovereignty—unitary, determined, devoted to its own invulnerability—is most likely to emerge when catastrophe presents itself in international affairs (Honig, 2009). Zelenksyy emerged in the crisis as just this. The norms-based international law constructs suggest that the West should have applied more pressure in the early months of the crisis, thereby making it clear that the violative nature of the war would not be ignored (Cochrane et al., 2022b).

Herein, Zelenskyy emphasized Russia's international law violations via state media and Twitter (Jacinto, 2022; Mackinnon, 2022; Radynski, 2022; Soguel, 2022). In fact, under international law, Russia's violations of Rome Statute tenets from February to May 2022 included: crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of aggression, and the crime of genocide (GeoConfirmed, 2022; ICC, 2011). In exchange for its membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty following the collapse of the U.S.S.R., Ukraine was offered security assurance through the Budapest Memorandum (Appendix C; D. Petraeus, personal communication June 15, 2022).

According to the conditions of the Budapest Memoranda, should Ukraine be the target of threats, aggression, or adverse actions in which nuclear arms are a factor, the country might request quick Security Council intervention from the United Nations. The web of international law and codified security arrangements which should have offered security guarantees to Ukraine, have needed more fidelity offered to them, or at least insufficient to have deterred the current war (Galeotti, 2021; Hoover Institution, 2022; McFaul, 2022a) For a comprehensive list and context of international laws and treaties to which Ukraine is a party, please refer to Appendix C.

The significance of the reaction on OSNs to the United Nations' delayed response in condemning Russia's annexation of Ukraine is multifaceted. As founding members of the United Nations, Russia, and Ukraine have a shared history within this international institution, which aims to preserve the sovereignty of nations and individuals (Dumbarton Oaks Archives, 2017). The eventual condemnation of Russia's actions in October 2022 and the strong support for Ukraine highlights several critical linkages between international law and PD:

The public response on OSNs to global events, particularly those concerning international law and human rights, indicates a high level of public awareness and engagement (Hoover Institution, 2022; B. Johnson, 2022a). The celebration of the United Nations' decision on OSNs demonstrates widespread solidarity and support for Ukraine, which can bolster Ukraine's diplomatic efforts, raise funds for humanitarian assistance, and strengthen the international community's resolve to address the conflict (Orsini, 2022). The reaction to OSNs underscores their ability to shape public opinion, mobilize support, and amplify messages, which has helped reinforce the importance of upholding international law and the principles of sovereignty (Danowski et al., 2021). The delayed response by the United Nations in condemning Russia's annexation of Ukraine has raised questions about the institution's effectiveness in fulfilling its mission. The OSN reactions may also affect international relations and geopolitics, potentially leading to further actions or policy changes by various countries (Rauschfleisch and Eisenegger, 2020).

The overwhelmingly supportive response to the United Nations' condemnation of Russia's annexation of Ukraine demonstrates the power of digital platforms in raising awareness, shaping public opinion, and influencing international affairs. This reaction highlights the

importance of upholding international law, the principles of sovereignty, and the role of global

institutions in preserving peace and stability (see Figure 2).

Alliances. This section will explore the crucial role of alliances, including NATO and the

EU, in addressing security threats and maintaining regional stability during conflicts. These

partnerships serve as the basis for coordinated action, resource sharing, and deterrence of

prospective adversaries. They also serve as critical means for coordinating diplomatic and

military reactions to emergencies, which is critical when dealing with complex geopolitical

issues**.**

In 2004, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine garnered Western support for the country's

pro-democracy movement, leading to the need for institution-building and partnerships in

Europe. Meanwhile, Russia has long opposed NATO expansion and sees it as a threat to its

national security (Mearsheimer, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2022; Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2019).

The Kremlin believes that NATO's offensive military actions, such as in Yugoslavia,

Afghanistan, and Libya, further underline this threat (Galeotti, 2022a).

As an independent nation with the sovereign right to choose its geopolitical alliances,

Ukraine faces complexities and challenges due to its ongoing conflict with Russia (Kuzio, 2019;

Baysha, 2018). This conflict, which violates international law and presents a geostrategic threat

to the EU, underscores the potential consequences of alliance formation on regional security and

economic stability (EU Commission, 2022; Petridou et al., 2019). The absence of a "Europe-

wide peace deal" and the perception that the EU's enlargement resembles NATO expansion have

contributed to recurring competition and hostility between Russia and the West (Waltz, 1979;

Mearsheimer, 2014). While major powers during the Cold War had to consider the risks

associated with geopolitical balancing, minor powers had more flexibility in choosing their alliances (Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1988).

Zelenskyy's emergence as a leader of a Western alliance against Russia challenges traditional state ideas, as his role now involves leading efforts against the Russian Federation (Hudson & Day, 2019). The resistance to Russia's EU-Ukraine association deal is driven by economic concerns and the belief that East-West ties are a product, rather than a cause, of the 2014 crisis (Plohky, 2015).

In light of Ukraine's inherent right to determine its own geopolitical alliances and foreign policy course, the outcome of the Ukraine crisis will be crucial to Europe's future defense and diplomatic constructs (Cochrane et al., 2022e; EU Commission, 2022; Petridou et al., 2019; Plokhy, 2015). Waltz's research indicates that alliances in international systems are fluid and subject to change (1979). The country's pursuit of alliances aims to strengthen its democracy, uphold the rule of law, and promote human rights. However, forging these alliances can be challenging, as evidenced by the ongoing conflict with Russia and its implications for regional stability and cooperation (Burns, 1978/2012).

The Russo-Ukrainian War is often analyzed in the context of Russia's encirclement, with scholars like Baysha (2019), Herbut et al. (2021), and Mearsheimer (2014/2022) attributing Russia's invasion of Ukraine to realist power balancing. The complexities of the conflict involve overlapping contestations, and historical gaps in alliance formation and participation have posed challenges for Ukraine.

Understanding the Russo-Ukrainian War requires a multifaceted approach considering external factors, such as realist power balancing, and internal factors, like Ukraine's resilience and determination (R. Johnson, 2022). Addressing the complexities and challenges in alliance

formation and participation is crucial for fostering regional stability and achieving a lasting resolution to the conflict.

Geopolitics encompasses various factors that shape international relations, including strategic risk, international law, and alliances. Understanding strategic risk and its implications on foreign policy decision-making is crucial for states to safeguard their national security interests. At the same time, international law provides a framework for promoting cooperation, dispute settlement, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Alliances are critical for coordinating diplomatic and military reactions to emergencies and maintaining regional stability during conflicts. However, the complexities and challenges involved in forming and participating in alliances and the potential economic consequences underscore the need for a multifaceted approach to geopolitical analysis. Considering these factors, policymakers can make informed decisions that promote regional stability, protect national security, and uphold international norms and structures.

Analytics

The use of analytics in FPA has emerged as an essential tool for understanding the intricacies of PD in today's interconnected world. By implementing sophisticated techniques such as data-driven analysis into the research of algorithms, sentiment analysis, linguistic inquiry, natural language processing, and LTA, specialists in foreign policy can gain invaluable insights into the intricate dynamics that underpin diplomatic interactions and inform policy decisions.

Algorithms. The literature reviewed provided data on the role of social media and algorithms in disseminating and receiving Zelenskyy's speeches to understand how they influence public perception and foreign policy outcomes. By analyzing Zelenskyy's linguistic

patterns in the context of OSNs, we can explore how his rhetoric is tailored to maximize

engagement on these platforms and how his PD strategies may be adapted to navigate the ever-

evolving digital landscape. This approach will allow us to comprehensively understand the

relationship between social media, algorithms, and the linguistic inquiry of Zelenskyy's PD

discourse.

In FPA, understanding algorithms lends to a contextual understanding of the

multifactorial and actor-specific themes on social media platforms. Understanding how these

algorithms can amplify or suppress content allows foreign policy experts to better anticipate the

effects of digital diplomacy efforts and devise more effective strategies for engaging with

domestic and international audiences. Social media has been found to support democratic ideas,

promote positive political attitudes, and increase political knowledge (Bridgman et al., 2020;

Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018; Walker & Matsa, 2021; Xiao & Su, in press).

Moreover, social media has overtaken traditional media channels as the primary source of

news and information diffusion worldwide, disrupting conventional media outlets (Shearer &

Mitchell, 2021; Xiao & Su, in press). Communication technology advancements have made

platforms like Twitter and Telegram essential for users seeking and consuming news content

(Bode & Dalrymple, 2016; Mirer & Bode, 2015; Shearer, 2021; Su, 2021). News consumption,

regardless of the medium, influences people's attitudes and behaviors through information

acquisition, increasing current knowledge, enhancing self-efficacy (Halpern et al., 2017),

encouraging interpersonal dialogue (Su & Xiao, 2021), and promoting civic involvement (Diehl

et al., 2019).

Park & Kaye (2018) examined public consumption of social media and social media

news, identifying two distinct ways of using open-source news: as news consumers (internalizing

behavior) or information producers (externalizing). They found that the news ecology is more

sophisticated and constantly evolving than traditional news media. Curatorial news (curated

social media feeds and follows) via social media is an important research metric, as it provides

insight into news consumption habits and how users analyze content or add new values by

quoting or sharing (Park & Kaye, 2018). Various studies have correlated the news use of social

media consumers with increased political awareness, internal political effectiveness, and online

and offline political involvement (Park & Kaye, 2018; Rauchfleisch et al., 2017; Rauchfleisch &

Kovic, 2016; Salloum et al., 2017; Scheffauer et al., 2021). The digitization of communication

and media distribution has introduced a hidden, mediating force of algorithmic control. This

unseen, technical, and transformational power behind media platforms, particularly social media

platforms, presents content, news, and journalism in a subtly manipulated manner (Brake, 2017;

Karami et al., 2020; Lovelace, 2022; Srikanth et al., 2022).

News organizations, politicians, and international organizations depend on search engines

and social media to generate interest in their content, driving readers and viewers to their

destinations (Bode et al., 2011; Brake, 2017; Potnis & Tahamtan, 2021; Scheffauer et al., 2021;

Small, 2011). Social media algorithms promote topics based on interest and engagement,

creating "trending" subjects. The precise algorithms behind these trends are kept secret for

commercial reasons, fostering an amplificatory environment for voices in the public square

(Brake, 2017; Groshek & Al-Rawi, 2013). This amplification has enhanced, distributed, and

reinforced political messaging into an "ambient" presence in the digital space (Conway et al.,

2015; Gainous & Wagner, 2013; Jürgens & Jungherr, 2015).

However, this also establishes a contemporary, digitally-based gatekeeper for news

distribution to the general public, with an infinite supply of content (Brake, 2017; Jungherr,

2014a; 2014b; Small, 2011). Lippmann (1922) once noted the limitations of journalists, saying, "all the reporters in the world working all the hours of the day could not witness all the happenings of the world… the range of subjects these comparatively few men manage to cover would be a miracle indeed…" (p. 214). In contrast, the reach and availability of platforms like Twitter effectively counter this statement (Davis, 2022; Han et al., 2020). Twitter and social media have played a role in other 21st-century conflicts (Patrikarakos, 2017). However, during the Russo-Ukrainian War, every missile, every hour, and every detail was captured by cell phone cameras and networks, documenting the active conflict in real-time (Statista, 2022). This open-source and civilian reporting showcased warfare as it happened, revolutionizing how we understand FPA and international conflicts.

Utilizing algorithmic neural networks and news consumption in the Russo-Ukrainian War provides valuable insights into the ecology of social media usage and the interconnections between information producers and consumers. Social media as a framework for the information environment during the war, especially after February 24, 2022, reveals significant growth, expansion, and production of news, infopolitik, and PD. This increased activity benefits algorithmic predictive modeling, enabling it to reach global audiences more effectively and enhance our understanding of the evolving information landscape.

Linguistic Inquiry

LI and natural language processing techniques are also invaluable for FPA, as they facilitate the automated analysis of vast amounts of textual data. By identifying patterns, trends, and key themes in public discourse, these techniques can help inform diplomatic strategies and detect emerging narratives that may influence international relations. The significance of language's function as a formative influence on political discourse and decision-making emerged

in the literature review.

LIWC-22 and LTA will be used as critical analytical methods to investigate Zelenskyy's communication in this study of his formal addresses. The LIWC-22 technique will be used to analyze the language patterns in Zelenskyy's talks, finding the occurrence of particular words, sentences, and topics. This in-depth linguistic study will provide insights into Zelenskyy's mentality, beliefs, motivations, and foreign policy strategy. LTA will be used to evaluate Zelenskyy's leadership qualities and decision-making based on the content and context of his speeches. LTA will provide a complete knowledge of Zelenskyy's leadership style and its consequences for his foreign policy choices by systematically analyzing the characteristics that appear from his discourse.

When LIWC-22 and LTA are applied to Zelenskyy's speeches and comments, they will comprehensively study his personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography. This in-depth study will help us better comprehend Zelenskyy's actions and tactics during the Russo-Ukrainian War and his approach to PD. Language has developed into an essential instrument for comprehending politicians' rhetoric and their influence on public opinion and policy making. Additionally, the psychometric data obtained from public communications on open-source platforms can shed light on other significant aspects of their psychology. This concept is not a particularly novel one. In the early 20th century, social scientists paid close attention to the fact that behavior is inextricably linked to cognition and emotion (Boyd et al., 2020; M. G. Hermann, 1987a, 1999/2002). The idea of concurrent psychological processes is also inherent in the descriptions of personality data produced today (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).

Linguistic analysis of framing, which refers to how a message is conveyed to the general public, is an essential inquiry component. A president has the power to affect the public's

perception of an issue and have influence over how that issue is treated by simply framing the issue in a particular way (Anker, 2013). A president might present an issue as a threat to the nation's safety to draw attention to the urgent need for action and garner support for the administration's stance (Sacco & Coe, 2016; Tulis, 2017).

The importance of linguistic inquiry to support FPA can be considered through the following categories derived from the literature examined (Boyd et al., 2020; Boyd et al., 2022; Hudson & Day, 2019; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). In social sciences, *context* is generally understood as the external factors surrounding an individual, such as their physical or social environment or a specific situation under study. However, it is also possible to view words within layers of context. For example, verbal cues and traits are revealed within a discourse involving certain people at a particular time and location. The context in which words are used to ensure an understanding of how they relate to underlying psychological processes remains provisional (Boyd & Schwartz, 2020).

Research for LIWC-22 heavily promotes context as intrinsic to linguistic modeling. Boyd and Schwartz (2020) indicated that it becomes difficult to determine what individual words reveal about a person's psychology without context. When examining words through the "words as attention" lens, the psychological interpretation of a word might be decontextualized, leading to an unclear psychosocial understanding. A better approach would be the "words in context as attention" framework, which considers individual characteristics (Boyd et al., 2022; Pennebaker et al., n.d.).

Expanding upon this concept, examining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's speeches and statements necessitates a thorough analysis of the language employed and the contextual factors they convey. Such contextual factors encompass the prevailing political

atmosphere, the target audience, and the particular circumstances underpinning the speech. Utilizing the "words in context as attention" framework enables a more profound comprehension of Zelenskyy's objectives, intentions, and psychological condition, subsequently facilitating a more precise interpretation of his message and subsequent actions (Boyd et al., 2020; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). The language used by heads-of-state in their foreign policy statements and communication can reveal goals, motivations, and strategies. Analyzing how leadership traits affect foreign policymaking, comparing leadership styles and approaches, and studying connections between leadership and foreign policy issues help determine the effects of transformational leadership. Investigating the long-term effects of leadership on foreign policy outcomes by observing changes over time can also be useful.

Many variables contribute to psychological constructs like personality, behavior, and emotions. Furthermore, the outcome of computational processes shows similarity in self-other agreement, profile similarity, or behavioral metrics when involving many variables. When analyzed comprehensively, these multivariate constructs present unique explanatory challenges (Sherman & Serfass, 2015).

The literature substantiated the connection between personality and behavior. Subjectively there can be multiple perceptions of an individual's operational code and FPDM. Behavioral science uses multivariate constructs that include a large number of psychological variables. Personality, behavior, emotions, motives, situations, and other personality constructs are multivariate (Sherman & Serfass, 2015). These multiple perceptions will vary depending on the level of analysis, the observer, and the multivariate constructs.

Social media platforms, including OSNs, can be employed in personality analysis, particularly for public figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Researchers often

aim to identify agreement, similarity, or consistency between profiles, but they may also explore distinctions between profiles or determine how one profile sets itself apart from others (Sherman & Serfass, 2015). Kosinski and colleagues (2013) assert that publicly accessible digital records on social media can be utilized to "accurately predict a range of highly sensitive personal attributes" (p. 8). Their study's findings demonstrate a prediction accuracy for personality trait prediction akin to test-retest reliability based on a multifactorial assessment encompassing written text (Kosinski et al., 2013).

Consequently, examining Zelenskyy's speeches on OSNs, personality analysis, and preliminary multifactorial, multivariate research may unveil missed opportunities for intelligence officials and global leaders to understand Zelenskyy's tenacity and decision-making processes better. LTA (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002) is a method that combines both FPA and analytical approaches to examine political leaders' characteristics and decision-making styles.

As an analytics-driven examination, LTA has evolved into a computational linguistic analysis through tools like Profiler Plus (Levine & Young, 2014). This analytical framework offers a crucial lens for assessing and understanding the traits of key actors involved in diplomatic exchanges. By gaining insight into political leaders' behavior, foreign policy experts can better anticipate their actions and tailor their strategies to optimize diplomatic outcomes in various international contexts (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, 2005).

Conceptualizing personality traits can benefit from interdisciplinary collaboration and technological development. The big data approach to personality measurement methods combines academic and psychological research with innovation (Boyd et al., 2020). By transforming a single behavioral data item into measures of a complete universe of psychological processes, we may start to glimpse the prospect of comprehending how psychological processes

coalesce into personality. Vast amounts of behavioral data provide the means to capture previously undetected personality traits and other serendipitous phenomena that go beyond the conventional, theoretical ground truths like the factorial or polarized personality structure. Big behavioral data offers ways to capture previously unrecognized personality features and other unpredicted events. This can provide a detailed insight into an individual's personality over a wide range of material conditions, which is helpful if our goal is to comprehend human behavior better (Boyd et al., 2020).

We can identify patterns, trends, or differences by analyzing the comparison outcome of psychological variables between Zelenskyy's speeches across different phases and the speeches of other leaders. This analysis allows us to gain insights into Zelenskyy's leadership style, communication strategies, and potential influences on his audience compared to other leaders, ultimately helping us understand the unique aspects of his approach to foreign policy and PD.

Public Sentiment. Public sentiment analysis has become increasingly significant in understanding public opinion and identifying trends in attitudes toward various issues. By examining user-generated content's emotional tone and sentiment, diplomatic actors can gain valuable insights into the public's perspective on critical matters. This knowledge enables them to tailor their messages more effectively and respond to shifting public sentiment, ultimately enhancing their ability to communicate and engage with domestic and international audiences. In this context, we will explore the role of public sentiment analysis in PD and its implications for crafting effective communication strategies.

The literature highlights the significance of public sentiment analysis as part of the analytics considerations in this study. Danowski et al. (2021) aimed to identify social connections or networks based on sentiment semantics, which comprise discourse related to

specific targets, such as politicians. Whether positive or negative, the sentiment expressed on social media is seen as a network or an official correlation with the subject (Danowski et al., 2021). Research by Anker (2007, 2014) and others demonstrate that sentiment and legitimacy often correlate in political power, with public opinion being highly subjective.

Studies have shown that presidential rhetoric can significantly impact public opinion, particularly regarding foreign policy and ideological positions (Beasley, 2010; Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019; Tulis, 2007). Additional research by Rottinghaus (2006) showed a match of 70% congruency between presidential policy statements and public opinion. This congruency provides additional data to support claims of presidential rhetoric having measurable impacts. Furthermore, Danowski et al. (2021) found that sentiment was synchronously correlated with increased media coverage, which affects attention, information seeking, analysis, decision-making and broadens the view of the situation.

Table 4

Top Hashtags and Mentions (Haq et al., 2022)

Hashtags	Mentions
Ukraine	ZelenskyUA
Russ	NATO
Putin	POTUS
UkraineRussiaWar	Ukraine
Russian	UN
Kyiv	vonderleyen
Ukrainian	elonmusk
Kharkiv	KyivIndependent

The widespread use of social media, specifically OSNs, allows for extensive public sentiment research, especially during conflicts (Haq et al., 2022). OSNs, as opposed to traditional media, greatly influence public sentiment due to their wider reach and ability to generate interest in political topics (Parmelee, 2014). Analyzing conflict data, such as during the Russo-Ukrainian War, can reveal public opinion and mood; see Table 4 for additional data (Haq et al., 2022). By understanding the role of social media and public sentiment in modern transformational statesmanship, researchers and leaders can better comprehend and respond to public opinion in various political contexts.

These most used Hashtags and Mentions demonstrate a level of public understanding and engagement that could not have been captured as quickly, accurately, or without interventions like Tweets (Chen et al., 2022; Kallenborn, 2022; Lovelace, 2022; Schünemann, 2020). Haq et al. (2022) collected 1.6 million Tweets for their Twitter data set in the first week of the Russo-Ukrainian War. This sampling revealed a range of sentiments focused on Ukraine and @ZelenskyUA. Subsequently, the following categories of hashtags and mentions either frame the narrative of the war as Russian aggression (Russ, Putin, Russian) or mention Western institutions and leaders in Tweets calling for help. Examining analytics as part of the literature study will help quantify aspects of Zelenskyy's statesmanship through PD discourse and leadership traits.

Utilizing analytics in FPA is an effective strategy for gaining insight into PD in the digital age. Using algorithms, sentiment analysis, linguistic inquiry, natural language processing, and LTA, foreign policy experts can harness the power of data-driven insights to navigate the complexities of global diplomacy and make more informed decisions in pursuit of strategic goals.

Theoretical and Conceptual Gaps and Inconsistencies

International Relations

This literature exposed several theoretical understandings and construct gaps. As the conceptual approach to the study was multidisciplinary and multi-factorial, as well as developed around FPA, the gaps are present at each level of analysis.

Theoretical Inconsistencies. The Russo-Ukrainian War has disrupted the Western liberal order, which has prompted scholars to seek explanations beyond realist and structural theories. While such an event is rare, given states' adherence to global norms and conventions following WWII, there is a need to identify patterns of conduct among big powers in anarchic systems. Geopolitical risk perceptions and transnational threats are subjective and dependent on an observer's position within the global status quo. Russia's actions in the war aim to separate itself from the West while maintaining coercive control over its former satellites, positioning itself as the Third Rome. However, Russia lacks resolve for global leadership and does not promote economic stability or support classical liberal ideals.

While foreign policy theories focus on state-level activity, the role of individual actors in foreign policy decision-making should be recognized. Psychobiographical research on political leaders can provide insight into their character, values, and decision-making process. This approach utilizes a psychological lens and case study method based on longitudinal data and historical facts, emphasizing the reflexive relationship between individuals and their political, social, and cultural contexts.

The literature on psychobiography stresses the importance of understanding leadership's impact on followers and the state. Effective leadership in international politics requires statesmanship, transformative diplomacy, and effective communication strategies. As critical

researchers on political leaders have suggested, understanding the psychobiographical makeup of leaders in international relations can guide leadership analysis and facilitate the development of a contemporary framework for leadership and diplomacy.

Gaps. Realist theories need to be more comprehensive in explaining the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War because they overlook the importance of leadership within states (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018). While system-level analysis can explain the stability of the international political system, it fails to account for the impact of human decision-making within a state that can disrupt the system. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, the role of a head-of-state's national security and foreign relations responsibilities in international affairs was emphasized. However, the lack of a comprehensive explanation in IR literature for Zelenskyy's emergence as a global leader suggests the need for other explanations (Avolio et al., 2009).

To understand international relations and foreign policy-making comprehensively, there needs to be more emphasis on individual actors and their psychological characteristics and leadership traits. Although foreign policy can explain some nuances of state action and international relations empirics, understanding the impact of leaders on foreign policy decisions is crucial. However, there are contradictions within the research, with M. G. Hermann et al. (2001) arguing that individual leaders significantly impact foreign policy decisions and Waltz (1979) stating that IR needs to explain leadership behaviors and decision-making fully. Furthermore, there is some uncertainty or disagreement about the generalizability of Burns' work beyond military settings.

To develop a contemporary framework for political leadership, it is important to study the intersection of international politics and PD. The review highlights the need to examine

individual leaders and their impact on international politics, emphasizing the significance of statesmanship as a factor contributing to effective leadership in international politics. The review also stresses the need to understand the psychobiographical makeup of leaders in international relations and how it can guide leadership analysis. The need for transformative diplomacy and effective communication strategies is also highlighted.

While traditional at-a-distance analysis is inadequate for assessing a president's leadership impacts through attributes, modern approaches such as artificial intelligence can objectively assess leadership components like language qualities. Psychobiography enables researchers to compare the psychological characteristics and leadership traits of leaders like Zelenskyy against a cohort of global leaders, providing an opportunity to fill gaps in the role of psychology in foreign policy, supporting the FPA framework. Examining how a leader's political ideals inform their actions and tactics through psychobiographical analysis can shed light on the persistence of themes, agendas, or complex interplay between attitude and behavior. Ultimately, psychobiography is essential in understanding the link between opinion and personality in political leadership, particularly in crises such as Ukraine.

History

The Russo-Ukrainian War has been significant, with far-reaching consequences for the global order. This literature review explores the relationship between history and current events in the context of the conflict, particularly in the leadership of President Zelenskyy. While existing literature has established connections between history and current events, it can only cover some of the scopes of the phenomenon that emerged in the conflict. However, the review argues that existing historical narratives can create a foundational map of analogues and parallels in war, imperialistic ambition, great powers versus small countries, and the rise of nationalism as a unifying power.

Theoretical Inconsistencies. The analysis in this literature review explores the relationship between history and current events in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War. While the existing literature has established some connection between history and current events, it cannot cover the entire scope of the phenomenon that emerged in the Russo-Ukrainian War, particularly regarding President Zelenskyy's leadership. However, the review argues that existing historical narratives can be used to create a foundational map of analogues and parallels in war, imperialistic ambition, great powers versus small countries, and the rise of nationalism as a unifying power.

The review shows that the inability of international institutions to prevent and resolve conflicts has created a power vacuum that has been exploited by various actors, including Russia, in pursuing their interests. The vacuum has allowed conflicts like the Russo-Ukrainian War to persist and escalate, with little prospect for resolution without a significant shift in the global order. The review shows the enduring importance of Carl von Clausewitz's theories on war and politics in understanding the conflict's root causes and emerging narratives. It emphasizes the importance of national resistance and defense in such conflicts, highlighting the Ukrainians' determination to resist the invasion and garner support from the global community. The review also sheds light on the significance of Ukraine's identity as a European nation with a complicated history in contributing to the regional disparities in the conflict.

Gaps. The review identifies a gap in contemporary scholarship on wartime leadership, particularly in the case of heads of state during the conflict. Gaps in the literature show the benefit of studying "statesmanship" to understand presidents' decision-making and leadership motivations during wartime. Another gap is exposed when understanding that Ukraine's sovereign identity directly relates to Russia's motivations for the invasion, although there is still

no comprehensive theory to explain it. Although the review highlights the role of international institutions and the lack of global governance in perpetuating conflicts, the literature shows little explanation for how these factors relate to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Socio-Political

As an element of the framework shows a thin connection between contemporary narratives and leadership impacts. In contrast to propaganda, the transformative power of narrative, or political dialogue, has become an essential component of diplomatic work. A communication paradigm that includes new media, worldwide public relations, and rapid information conveyance fosters trust, compassion, and understanding. Infopolitik describes institutional-level approaches to communication goals, but it is poorly implemented, inconsistent, and placating.

Research demonstrates further advantages to civil society, such as representing, representing, and modifying interests, reaching consensus, and establishing a dispute resolution framework. However, in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the need to appease Russian sensibilities compromised the impartiality of infopolitik—the inconsistencies in global communication opened opportunities to examine the effectiveness of Zelenskyy's PD in this space.

This focus revealed the perpetual human ability to produce meaning in speech—rhetoric, and diplomacy, an art form, with the Aristotelian focus on achieving human comprehension through discourse. Politics and power are often confused in academia, especially in critical departments that examine culture, society, and politics. For this study, social media, specifically Twitter, was considered the public square of modern statecraft. The literature does not go far enough to examine discourse as mediated through technological channels, open-source

platforms, or warfare. Discourse is principally studied by political scientists concerning political campaigns but not in conflict.

The literature had a few inconsistencies in its overview of the importance of narrative in political discourse and diplomacy. There was a continuum of relevance from Aristotle's framework for rhetoric in modern discourse analysis, which emphasized the power of narrative in shaping a state's identity, ideology, and historical events. It also distinguishes between the use of narrative by statesmen and propagandists and emphasizes the transformative power of narrative in diplomatic work. The paragraph concludes by emphasizing the vital role narrative plays in society, such as expressing, representing, and modifying interests, establishing consensus and dispute resolution frameworks, and increasing the visibility of small states. Overall, there was agreement in analyzing the importance of narrative in political discourse and diplomacy.

Gaps. The Russo-Ukrainian War is a complex and ongoing conflict that has led to significant political, economic, and social changes. One reason for the theory gaps in the literature regarding nationalism and foreign policy in the context of this conflict is the constantly evolving nature of the conflict itself. The war involved a range of actors, from state to non-state actors. It has been fought through various means, including traditional military tactics, cyber warfare, and propaganda campaigns. These complexities make it challenging to fully understand the role of nationalism in shaping the conflict and its potential consequences.

There are additional gaps in the literature as there needs to be more consensus among scholars and policymakers regarding the appropriate response to the conflict. Some argue that a strong stance against Russian aggression is necessary to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In contrast, others advocate a more conciliatory approach emphasizing

diplomacy and negotiation. This disagreement over the appropriate response to the conflict has led to competing narratives and perspectives on the role of nationalism and other factors in shaping the conflict.

The involvement of international actors, such as the United Nations and the EU, in the conflict, adds another layer of complexity to the analysis of nationalism and foreign policy. The role of these institutions in promoting cooperation among nations and mitigating the potential negative consequences of nationalism is an essential area for further exploration. However, it is often overlooked in discussions of the conflict. Overall, the complexity and ongoing nature of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the lack of consensus among scholars and policymakers regarding the appropriate response contribute to the literature gaps in the nationalism theme.

One gap in the literature review of PD is the need for more attention to its limitations and challenges. For example, while PD can be a powerful tool for shaping public opinion and building relationships between nations, it can also be susceptible to the same disinformation and propaganda campaigns that infopolitik seeks to counter. Language barriers, cultural differences, and geopolitical tensions can constrain PD efforts. Acknowledging these challenges would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between PD and infopolitik

Technological

The technological components of the Russo-Ukrainian War offered an opening for Zelenskyy to emerge as a uniting world leader. This phenomenon might be regarded as nationalism enabled by technological advancement.Ukrainians have been developing social safety networks, civil society organizations, and volunteer militias to take on the challenges of modern warfare. This review examined a whole-of-society response through literature,

traditional news, and online networks and provided examples of national cooperation and effort consistent with Clausewitzian theory.

Inconsistencies: The rise of OSNs has revolutionized how political leaders engage with their domestic and international audiences (Bode & Dalrymple, 2016; Mirer & Bode, 2015; Shearer, 2021; Su, 2021). In this new media landscape, social media platforms have become essential tools for disseminating information and shaping public opinion. Research has shown that social media can support democratic ideas, promote positive political attitudes, and increase political knowledge (Bridgman et al., 2020; Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018; Walker & Matsa, 2021; Xiao & Su, in press).

Several studies have explored the role of social media and algorithms in FPA, news consumption, and political communication (Brake, 2017; Karami et al., 2020; Lovelace, 2022; Srikanth et al., 2022). However, the connection between these topics and the linguistic inquiry of political leaders' speeches remains an area of further exploration.

Linguistic inquiry and natural language processing techniques have proven invaluable for FPA, as they enable the automated analysis of vast amounts of textual data (Boyd et al., 2020; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Applying methods such as LIWC-22 and LTA to political leaders' discourse can provide insights into their personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). Studies have also demonstrated the potential use of OSNs for personality analysis, particularly for public figures like Zelenskyy (Kosinski et al., 2013; Sherman & Serfass, 2015). However, further research is required to provide concrete examples of how social media data and OSNs can be integrated into analyzing political leaders' PD discourse. The literature has established the significant impact of OSNs on PD in the digital age and the usefulness of linguistic inquiry methods in analyzing political leaders'

communication. This review has identified areas for further exploration, such as integrating social media data and OSNs into analyzing political leaders' speeches and applying LIWC-22 and LTA to examine Zelenskyy's PD discourse. By delving deeper into these topics, future research can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities of PD in a digital era, where social media platforms and online networks play a pivotal role in shaping political communication and engagement with global audiences.

Gaps. A research gap exists in examining the interplay between mass media, PD, and big-data analysis of public sentiment during the Russo-Ukraine conflict. The strategic use of mass media and PD to influence public sentiment in a conflict zone has received limited attention. With the availability of big-data analysis tools, it is crucial to investigate the effect of mass media and PD on public opinion and their potential to influence conflict outcomes. Future research could shed light on the use of mass media in hybrid warfare and the ethical considerations surrounding this application.

While extensive literature exists on warfare and its various aspects, research is needed to explore the Clausewitzian trinity and its modern applicability. A contemporary paradigm that comprehensively understands the interdependent relationship between institutions, society, and leaders in warfare is needed. This gap warrants further exploration, as technology and the scope of warfare have evolved since Clausewitz's initial introduction of his trinity. Contemporary conflicts require a clear lens on this enduring framework, accommodating the complexities and nuances of modern warfare.

Geopolitics

The analysis under the geopolitical frame has demonstrated that international law's sclerotic strength, relevance, and ability to remedy state conduct are understudied. Realist

theories propose that lawmaking and multinational treaties establish preventive, pragmatic, and strictly implemented power structures. The Russo-Ukrainian War has shattered the liberalist belief in international institutions as mitigation against conflict. International Law as a construct requires further examination to understand its lack of deterrence in the 21st century.

Inconsistencies. The literature revealed inconsistencies in international norms and theories. There could be more consistency regarding Russian aggression in its neighboring states. On the one hand, the geopolitical risk analysis justifies Russia's actions as a preventive measure to avoid its neighbors from unifying with external powers based on a realistic perspective (Waltz, 1979). On the other hand, the review of international law highlights that Russia's actions violate several international laws and treaties, which implies that Russia is not complying with the normative framework established by the international community.

Similarly, a review of strategic threats supports that states are motivated by a desire for dominance over others, suggesting that Russia's actions are consistent with this strategic outlook. However, international law emphasizes the importance of international norms and structures in promoting cooperation and dispute settlement, which implies that Russia's actions are not aligned with the principles that underpin the rules-based international system.

These inconsistencies reflect the tension between different theoretical perspectives on international relations and the complex nature of geopolitical issues. While realism emphasizes the importance of power politics and the pursuit of national interest, international law stresses cooperation and adherence to shared norms and rules. In practice, these perspectives conflict, leading to different interpretations of state behavior and policy choices.

Gaps. The Russo-Ukrainian war has highlighted critical gaps in the existing literature on geopolitics, especially in terms of how conflicts that defy international law and challenge

regional security alliances can strain the resources of these alliances and pose significant challenges to the existing international order.Future research should address the gaps in the literature surrounding the Russo-Ukrainian war, particularly regarding its defiance of international law, challenges to alliances, and strain on regional security. Understanding the underlying factors driving the conflict and potential solutions for achieving lasting stability and cooperation in the region is important.

Analytics

Theoretical inconsistencies and gaps in the existing literature call for a deeper investigation into the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Zelenskyy's role as a political leader, and the influence of OSNs on public perception. Current research on news consumption, social media algorithms, and trending topics does not adequately address the complex interplay between these factors and their impact on the public's understanding of Zelenskyy's actions and policies. This suggests a need for more comprehensive studies that analyze big data approaches to personality measurement and incorporate psychobiographical research and case studies to gain a more profound insight into global leadership dynamics. By addressing these theoretical gaps, future research can provide a clearer picture of the contextual factors shaping PD discourse and offer a better understanding of human behavior in the digital age.

Inconsistencies. While the literature acknowledges the importance of public sentiment analysis in understanding public opinion and its influence on political power, there needs to be more consistency in how sentiment analysis is applied to various contexts, particularly in the digital age. The growing role of OSNs in shaping public opinion and their impact on political discourse requires further investigation, especially concerning political leaders like Zelenskyy during the Russo-Ukrainian War. The existing literature highlights the correlation between

presidential rhetoric and public opinion, but there needs to be a gap in understanding how social media and OSNs affect this relationship. Additionally, the literature needs to fully explore the potential of sentiment analysis in examining the impact of leaders' communication strategies during conflicts.

Moreover, the literature needs a comprehensive examination of the interplay between sentiment analysis, OSNs, and PD discourse in contemporary political events. This gap calls for further investigation into the role of social media in shaping public sentiment and the implications for crafting effective communication strategies during conflicts. By addressing these inconsistencies and gaps in the literature, future research can better understand the complexities of public sentiment analysis and its role in PD. This knowledge will enable diplomatic actors to adapt their communication strategies in response to shifting public opinion and more effectively engage with domestic and international audiences in the digital age.

Gaps. A notable gap in the existing literature is the examination of social media platforms and OSNs for psychobiographical analysis of political leaders like Zelenskyy. Current literature must include specific examples of integrating such information into diplomacy research. This calls for further investigation into utilizing social media data and OSNs to analyze Zelenskyy's PD discourse effectively.

Moreover, the literature needs more clarity on considering the context in analyzing Zelenskyy's speeches and statements, highlighting the need for a comprehensive exploration of contextual factors in his PD discourse. Future studies should provide a clearer explanation of how context will be taken into account, enriching our understanding of the complexities of his communication strategies. A significant gap in literature arises from the need for studies examining Zelenskyy's speeches and statements using LIWC-22 and LTA. The literature should

address this gap by outlining the application of LIWC-22 and LTA in Zelenskyy's PD discourse, contributing to a deeper understanding of his communication strategies and implications.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 2 of this psychobiographical case study on Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, and his leadership traits, statesmanship, and use of PD, the literature reviewed the foundational, conceptual, and theoretical constructs necessary. The literature review used an applied history matrix to select, code, and analyze relevant research related to the problem outlined in the previous chapter. The literature review covered a multivariable, multilevel, and integrated repository of research and data to provide the most comprehensive understanding of actor-specific PD.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy's leadership influenced foreign policy, public perception, international coalition-building, and sanctions regimes in the period adjacent to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Reading this literature, both scholarly and contemporary resources, provided the broadest spectrum of analysis and data for the historiography of the Russo-Ukrainian challenge, as well as insights into the actions, behaviors, and leadership decisions of Volodmryr Zelenskyy.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, the researcher describes the methods and procedures used in the study, including the research philosophy, approach, design, inclusion and exclusion criteria, data, and analysis techniques. The chapter details the mixed methods approach used to analyze Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse through linguistic inquiry and trait analysis. This section comprehensively describes the research methodology employed in investigating the correlation between Zelenskyy's linguistic style, leadership traits, and PD efforts. It includes an in-depth explanation of the study design, sampling approach, data collection methods, and analysis techniques utilized to achieve the study's objectives. This research aimed to demonstrate the usefulness of mixed methods in PD.

Introduction

The purpose of this psychobiographical case study was to examine Zelenskyy's PD discourse for its leadership trait and linguistic dimensions. It used natural language processing and linguistic inquiry to yield data related to psychometric variables and leadership traits. To achieve this, two analytical tools were used: the LTA tool by Profiler Plus (Levine & Young, 2014) and the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC-22; Boyd et al., 2022a) software. The LTA tool is a validated assessment tool used to measure leadership style and traits from speeches, which is derived from extensive research into political leadership assessment and psychological analysis (for further reading, see M. G. Hermann, 1978; 1979; 1984b; 1987a; 1993; 1999/2002; 2001, 2005; M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001). The second tool, LIWC-22, is a software program to analyze language for psychometric dimensions, such as clout, authenticity, and emotional tone

(Boyd et al., 2022a; Pennebaker et al., n.d.). This study combined qualitative and quantitative data to examine the relationship between Zelenskyy's linguistic style, leadership characteristics, and their impact on his PD efforts. The qualitative component entailed a discourse analysis of Zelenskyy's public speeches using LTA and LIWC-22 coding. Using software such as Profiler Plus LTA and LIWC-22, the quantitative section analyzed the linguistic content of these statements. The psychometric scores and leadership attribute evaluations derived from Profiler Plus LTA and LIWC-22 data were quantitatively analyzed using SPSS.

The goal of this research was to use these findings to inform research on Zelenskyy's PD, global leadership, and international relations. Leadership discourse in conflict is also a consideration of this research as it examines presidential discourse use during the Russo-Ukrainian War from February to November 2022 (see Table 5). This study contextualizes the PD discourse a head of state uses for official communications. The study sought to answer the following overarching research question: What is the relationship between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's discourse, personality traits, leadership style, and foreign policy during the Russo-Ukrainian War, and how do these factors influence his leadership outcomes in navigating the challenges to Ukraine's foreign policy and national security? This question was then parsed into the following three sub-questions, and hypotheses were formulated to address each question:

- SQ1: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's PD discourse similar to other global leaders through LTA?

  - H1: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy significantly differs from that of other global leaders when analyzed through LTA.

- SQ2: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other global leaders through LIWC-22 Analysis?

o   H2: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy notably diverges from other global leaders when analyzed through LIWC-22 Analysis.

- SQ3: What leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions are evident in Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse, and how do they reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style?

    o   H3: Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse exhibits leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions that reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style.

Table 5

Detail of Date Wise Speeches and Significance

Date	Significance
May 1, 2019 - July 1, 2019	Inaugural Phase
May 1, 2021 - July 1, 2021	Mid-term Phase
November 23, 2021 - February 23, 2022	Pre-crisis Phase
February 24, 2022 - May 24, 2022	Crisis Phase
May 25, 2022 - November 25, 2022	Kinetic Phase

Research Design

The study used a mixed methods approach and a case study research design to examine the linguistic style and leadership traits of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine (2019-present).

The case study investigation examined Volodymyr Zelenskyy's psychobiographical empirics as demonstrated through PD; Zelenskyy disseminated his discourse through official speeches, which were shared via OSNs. This research's core compared President Zelenskyy's

PD with other global leaders from existing datasets (M. G. Hermann, 2005; Schafer & Lambert, 2022; Levine & Young, 2014).

The study examined the relationship between Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD during the Russo-Ukrainian War over five distinct phases: Inaugural (start of his administration), Mid-term (mid-point of his term), Pre-crisis (three months before the invasion), Crisis (first three months of the war), and Kinetic (May 25, 2022, to November 25, 2022). These phases importantly consider the historiography of leadership, a spectrum of context from Zelenskyy's unexpected electoral victory to the conclusion of the Kinetic phase. Data are accessed through the Official Website of the President of Ukraine. The study employs Jago's (2024) six-step process, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5

Research Principles Adapted from Jago's (2024) Six-Step Process

Adapted from upcoming publication, Martine Jago, 2024. Copyright 2024, Martine Jago. Adapted with permission.

Step 1: Goal

Examining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War, this study investigated how his personality, leadership style, foreign policy, and psychobiography are reflected. The study aimed to explore these factors of leadership against the challenges to Ukraine's foreign policy and national security. The study used a mixed-methods approach that combined LTA and LIWC-22 programs which utilize natural language processing techniques (NLP) to analyze Zelenskyy's public speeches, thereby identifying his rhetorical tactics, speech patterns, and semantic structures. The study also examined how his discourse and behavior revealed Zelenskyy's psychobiographical dimensions, values, and motivations. By comparing the findings with relevant literature on leadership theory, psychobiography, and international relations, this study aimed to contribute to leadership and conflict resolution knowledge. Applying novel research methods based on natural language processing filled a gap in existing research.

Step 2: Approach

In the current study, the researcher used a mixed methods research approach. The contribution of combined qualitative and quantitative methods to theoretical development is sometimes undervalued. Forging new theoretical grounds and defining previously unrecognized challenges are possible outcomes of an exploratory mixed-methods study. Research questions are often employed instead of more narrowly focused hypotheses in this context. This understanding means that research approaches should be applied broadly or narrowly, based on the study's primary purpose (Holton & Burnett, 2005). The researcher asked research questions to explore the role of PD and leadership traits over time. Data analyzed by the LIWC-22 software and

Profiler Plus- LTA (Levine & Young, 2014) were used to determine the presence and significance of variables; see more details in Appendix N (Boyd et al., 2022a; 2022b)

Instead of focusing on simple cause-and-effect relationships, this method takes a more holistic approach by investigating and analyzing the interrelationships between and among many variables (Haq et al., 2022; Su & Xiao, 2021; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010; Yanovets & Smal, 2020). Trends and patterns in the data were identified, and the phenomena were submitted to secondary statistical analysis. In contrast to studies based on a cause-and-effect relationship, this one is correlational (Stockemer, 2019).

Step 3: Worldview

The researcher's worldview is based on a post-positivist paradigm, which steers away from positivism's nature of law approach (E-IR, 2021; Loughlin, 2012; Park et al., 2020). Post-positivism is becoming increasingly prevalent among social science leadership and policy researchers, as a method of focusing on collecting subjective information. It employs analysis, observation, and discussion to complement the IR field.

The current case study includes mixed methods analysis, and the default worldview would follow the positivist research philosophy based on the theories of Auguste Comte (Bridges & Comte, 2009). However, as mentioned previously, the positivist paradigm does not suit this study or the researcher (Karoub, 2008). Therefore, a post-positivist linguistic inquiry is more suited to the researcher's view and the subject. Post-positivist linguistic inquiry allows for the study of language created and utilized by a broad spectrum of academics, including linguists, political scientists, communication researchers, and others. Researchers well-known in this field illustrate how language plays a role in creating political discourse and decision-making, how

power and ideology play a part in language and communication, and how the media and popular culture impact political discourse and public opinion.

Post-positivist linguistic inquiry is a multidisciplinary and varied area, with scholars from various academic fields and professional experience. The reflexive considerations for post-positivism investigation fit this study, a single case study of a limited, contextualized subject. Ultimately, post-positivism is predicated on a changing cultural environment that no longer demonstrates fidelity to conventions.

Post-positivism is a theoretical framework that has gained traction in FPA due to its emphasis on human agency and the significance of ideational factors such as culture, identity, and language in shaping and influencing international relations. This approach recognizes that foreign policy decisions are not made in a vacuum but rather in complex and changing environments that require a nuanced understanding of the actors involved, the history of the conflict, and the broader context in which the decisions are being made.

Ukraine's President Zelenskyy offers the same opportunities for exploratory, subjective study corroborated with linguistic inquiry analysis. A post-positivist method to examine Zelenskyy's use of PD contemporaneously allows for meaning-making. The researcher's concept of intersubjective, meaning-making processes produces knowledge (positivist) while interacting with and shaping a studied world (post-constructivist).

Post-positivism is an international relations paradigm that questions the underlying assumptions and frameworks of IR theory. Instead of viewing the international system as a permanent or objective fact, post-positivism emphasizes that it is a social construct shaped and influenced by individual and group views, values, and ideas. Post-positivism highlights the significance of human agency in defining and shaping international relations, rejecting the notion

of a pre-determined or objective international system. This perspective also emphasizes the role of ideational elements such as beliefs, values, ideas, culture, identity, and language in shaping and influencing international relations. Post-positivism challenges classic IR theory assumptions and frameworks.

Step 4: Methodology

This case study established President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse, linguistic markers, and psychometric dimensions as a novel research topic. It aimed to establish the extent of a link between linguistic variables by analyzing LIWC-22 software-obtained statistical data (Boyd et al., 2022a; 2022b; Pennebaker et al., n.d.). The study used natural language processing in Profiler Plus's LTA program to analyze speech data. In this novel research area, a combination of methods (qualitative and quantitative) served to examine the subject comprehensively (Haq et al., 2022; Su & Xiao, 2021; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010; Yanovets & Smal, 2020). This research detected trends and patterns in the data and statistically defined the phenomena.

This study examined the variables' data, relationships, and distributions. The variables were not manipulated; they were identified, mined, and analyzed in a natural setting that has not been altered. This macro-level theoretical investigation focused on explicit behavior (leadership communication) and the metrics used to assess it. Systematic data collection necessitated the judicious selection of the units examined and accurate measurement of the variables. Within the scope of this study topic, each variable has just one probable source: the Official Speeches of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine during the period of data collection (President of Ukraine, n.d).

Step 5: Method

This study used systematic sampling and selection intervals for the data collection. The interval selection coincides with five key phases of Zelenksyy's presidency: Inaugural, Mid-term, Pre-crisis, Crisis, and Kinetic.

Setting and Sample

This research aimed to analyze the PD discourse of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The research relied on President Zelenskyy's formal communications, which gave a complete log of diplomatic discourse events.

These events were analyzed using LTA and LIWC-22 methods. These analyses aimed to reveal patterns in Zelenskyy's diplomatic discourse, which included external requests for assistance, displays of determination, call to action, and statements of appreciation. Each of these discourse events was translated and stored by Ukraine on the official presidential website under "Speeches" (President of Ukraine, n.d.). By employing LTA and LIWC-22, the study provided a more in-depth understanding of the linguistic and leadership characteristics present in President Zelenskyy's PD during his presidency and the Russo-Ukrainian War in accordance with the selected phases of time between 2019-2022.

Data were obtained from the Official Website of the President of Ukraine, (President of Ukraine, n.d.), an open-source repository of Zelenskyy's speeches collated from various platforms. These principally direct-to-public speeches were distributed via OSNs. Speeches from the Crisis and Kinetic phases are transcribed and translated by official Ukrainian officials from video transmissions shared almost daily on Zelenskyy's official social media channels, including Instagram, Telegram, and Twitter (Zelenskyy, n.d.a; n.d.b). Zelenskyy's public speeches and

social media broadcasts are done in Ukrainian and translated into Russian and English for official use.

The study used all of President Zelenskyy's speeches within the five identified phases:

- May 1, 2019 - July 1, 2019

- May 1, 2021 - July 1, 2021

- November 23, 2021 - February 23, 2022

- February 24, 2022 - May 24, 2022

- May 25, 2022 - November 25, 2022

Exclusion criteria for Zelenskyy's speeches will be those outside the selected timeframes or those not in English. The official website for the President of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, n.d.) served as the source data, as it contains Zelenskyy's speeches in English only.

Human Subject Considerations

This study did not involve human participants, which aligns with previous claims in open-source network analysis, data mining, and linguistic research that informed consent is typically not required. The study relied solely on existing records and publicly available data, making it ethically acceptable (Gold, 2020). Under these specific conditions, where data is publicly accessible and utilized accordingly, ethical permission is considered implicit (Gold, 2020). Consequently, this study does not require Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval.

The IRB Category of Research

This study falls under the "exempt research" category for IRB purposes. It exclusively utilized publicly available archival data from a head-of-state without communicating or contacting living respondents. Therefore, Pepperdine University's Graduate School of Education

and Psychology IRB approval was not required for this research on PD based on open-source

data.

Step 6: Tools

Instrumentation

The instrumentation of this study involved multiple instruments (see Table 6). The

official website for the President of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, n.d.), served as the source

data for Zelenskyy's speeches in English. A web scraping tool, specifically BeautifulSoup

(version 4.12.0), was utilized to extract the speeches and their corresponding dates from the

website (Crummy, n.d.; Tidelift, 2023). The study utilized BeautifulSoup, PyPi, and Python to

scrape and analyze data from the official website of the President of Ukraine. The extracted data

was then stored and managed in Google Sheets for further analysis. The LIWC-22 (version

1.3.0) and the Profiler Plus LTA software were utilized for linguistic and sentiment analysis of

the extracted data. To analyze the quantitative data obtained through the Profiler Plus LTA and

LIWC-22 instruments, IBM SPSS was used as the primary statistical software package. Overall,

combining these instruments facilitated the efficient and accurate extraction, organization, and

analysis of the data necessary for this study.

Table 6

Instrumentation Used in the Current Research

Instrument	How to Access
President's Website	ttps://www.president.gov.ua/en
Python	https://www.python.org
PiPy	https://pypi.org/
BeautifulSoup	https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/

Instrument	How to Access
Google Sheets	https://www.google.com/sheets/about/
Profiler Plus-LTA	http://profilerplus.org/
LIWC-22	https://www.liwc.app
SPSS	https://www.ibm.com/spss

The first step in the instrumentation and process of this study involved using the official website of the President of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, n.d.). The researcher then utilized Python (n.d.), an open-source programming language that provides developers with a framework for writing code that can interact with other software and tools. The researcher created, mined, scraped, downloaded, and managed Zelenskyy's speech data using Python with PyPi and BeautifulSoup.

The researcher used BeautifulSoup to extract data from HTML and XML files. This Python library parsed the HTML source code of the official speeches website into an internal structure tree based on HTML elements. BeautifulSoup was installed through the Python package installer pip (PyPi, 2023). Various BeautifulSoup methods and attributes were utilized to navigate and search the HTML structure. For instance, the.find() method was used to locate specific tags or sets of tags within HTML, whereas the.get() method was used to retrieve a specific attribute of a tag. Appendix O contains a partial sample of the BeautifulSoup source code utilized for this investigation.

The output scores of LIWC-22 and Profiler Plus-LTA were analyzed with SPSS, a statistical analysis program used in social science research. SPSS was used to calculate descriptive statistics such as mean, median, and standard deviation scores, as well as inferential statistics such as t-tests and ANOVA, to determine the significance of the results by analyzing the correlations between all the variables.

The researcher examined the LIWC-22 output scores to determine the frequency of various language categories in Zelenskyy's utterances. The Profiler Plus-LTA scores were analyzed to determine the prominence of particular cognitive abilities and leadership characteristics in Zelenskyy's speech. The SPSS analysis assisted in identifying patterns and relationships within the data, thereby shedding light on the linguistic and leadership attributes of Zelenskyy's speeches.

Measurements

The instrumentation in this study was used to measure linguistic and psychometric variables, which created a composite sketch of leadership traits, behaviors, and cognitive processes in the aggregate. The research questions examined the relationship between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse, personality traits, and leadership style. These findings were considered within the contextual setting (see Chapter 2) of the Russo-Ukrainian War to determine how these factors collectively impacted his leadership outcomes in addressing the challenges to Ukraine's foreign policy and national security.

Communications from Zelenskyy were measured for four summary variables and other sub-variables with LIWC-22 and seven leadership traits with Profiler Plus-LTA.

Public Diplomacy. This study uses the definition of PD articulated by Sobolieva (2021). Namely, PD is described as

> the communicative capability of a state which is managed by a specialized institution and implemented by the government, scientific, academic, and cultural communities as well as by ordinary citizens, and aimed at a foreign or global audience. The purpose of public diplomacy is to promote national interests and foreign policies of a country, to create a positive image, and achieve mutual understanding by communicating ideas, ideals, and

values of the nation as well as general information about the country, culture, and society,

through all communication channels, including but not limited to the media, interpersonal

communication, public relations. (p.166)

LIWC-22. Zelenskyy's discourse events were measured with a linguistic inquiry via

LIWC-22. LIWC-22 is a text analysis method that uses word counts to extract discursive

elements such as mood, viewpoint, social issues, and grammar (e.g., parts of speech). LIWC-22

comprises two parts: software and a "dictionary." LIWC-22 outputs provided a map that related

important psychological categories (Analytical, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone) to

Zelenskyy's feelings and other linguistic discourse constructions. Text analysis modules in

LIWC-22 which were selected for this study included the Main Text Processing Module (Boyd

et al., 2022a; Pennebaker et al., n.d.).

This study scored the four summary LIWC-22 factors on a 100-point scale. LIWC-22

contains new and reformulated dictionaries and subdictionaries with additional categories of

speech included in the formulaic calculations of the software (see Appendix N). LIWC-22

software categorizes specific words or word stems (more than 2,300) and more than 64

psychometric dimensions based on the trait or quality attributed to the word. These dimensions

include standard language categories (e.g., articles, prepositions, pronouns—including first-

person singular, and first-person plural.), psychological processes (e.g., positive and negative

emotion categories, cognitive processes such as the use of causation words, self-discrepancies),

relativity-related words (e.g., time, verb tense, motion, space), and traditional content dimensions

(e.g., sex, death, home, occupation; Pennebaker & Stone, 2003; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).

Through linguistic inquiry, the data provided measured outputs for LIWC-22 psychometric

variables. This study utilized those data for measurement against the concepts advanced through the research questions, namely the psychobiographical metrics of Zelenskyy's PD discourse.

The Basic Dictionary updates include changes and additions such as categories as determiners, cognition, affect, social, and behaviors. The Expanded Dictionary changes and additions include determiners (*second, one, that, mine, a*), cognition (*all-or-none language, certitude, memory words*), affect (*tone, emotion, swear words, social behaviors*), social processes (*behavior, prosocial behavior, moralization*), culture (*politics, ethnicity, technology*), lifestyle (*home, work, money*).

These additional categorical psychometric statistics appear in the output panel of LIWC-22 after the operation has run. These additional 17 categories are predominantly associated with psychological processes (Boyd et al., 2022a). The additional psychometrics are detailed in Appendix N. According to LIWC-22 (Boyd et al., 2022a; Pennebaker et al., n.d.), a score in the mid-range (50 points) reflects neutrality or ambivalence. This study will gather data from the instrumentation as detailed previously and use LIWC-22 output data in four summary variables (see Table 7) to evaluate the correlation between psychometric scores and Zelenskyy's PD discourse.

Table 7

Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count: Psychometric Categories (Boyd et al., 2022)

Variable	Characteristics
Analytic	Metric of logical, formal thinking
Clout	Language of leadership, status
Authenticity	Perceived honesty, genuineness
Emotional Tone	Degree or positive (negative tone)

The Main Text Processing Module of LIWC-22 evaluated and identified Zelenskyy's speeches compatible with summary characteristics. LIWC-22 examined the speeches for target terms (Pennebaker et al., n.d.). Dictionary terms are the LIWC-22 file's words. The developers give extra advice by grouping related dictionary entries (such as negative emotion words) into "subdictionaries," "word categories," or "categories" (Boyd et al., 2022a; Pennebaker et al., n.d.).

LIWC-22 had not previously been used to analyze Zelenskyy, nor was any research of other linguistic inquiry into him found (Boyd et al., 2022a; Pennebaker et al., n.d.). LIWC-22 is the newest quantitative analytic software tool iteration that has been substantiated as an effective measure of sentiment. LIWC-22 developers used U.S. political leaders elected to Congress to create the kitchen corpus. For further details about the development of LIWC-22 and its most current iteration, see Boyd et al., 2022.

Profiler Plus - LTA. LTA was previously conducted through qualitative coding and intercoding, and then tested for frequency variables (Hermann 1999/2002; 2005). The computational analysis, LTA, was operationalized by Levine and Young (2014), as a standardized analytic tool. The measurement of leadership traits of Volodymyr Zelenskyy is done through a computational analysis of spoken language, based on research of Hermann (1999/2002; 2005) and programmed into an online software called Profiler Plus (Levine & Young, 2014). The LTA construct encompasses broader characteristics beyond just traits. Table 8 provides details on the cognitive abilities of leaders that LTA explores. The construct examines seven characteristics of leaders: belief in the ability to control events, need for power and influence, level of self-confidence, the ability for differentiation, referred to as "conceptual complexity, task orientation, distrust of others, and bias toward their own group, referred to as "in-group bias".

M. G. Hermann's (1999/2002) LTA is built to answer three questions:

1. How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment — do they respect or challenge such constraints?

2. How open are leaders to incoming information — do they selectively use information, or are they open to information directing their response?

3. What are the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions—are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves or by the relationships that can be formed with salient constituents?

In this trait study, the more frequently leaders use specific words and phrases in their interview answers, the more tightly correlated this content is to them. In application, the trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency counts.

M. G. Hermann's research shows that based on certain manifestations of these individual traits, eight distinct leadership styles can be inferred, such as *opportunistic, evangelistic*, or *actively independent* (M. G. Hermann, 2005). These characteristics, as well as different expressions of individual traits, are linked to particular behavioral standards. For example, leaders with low conceptual complexity may require greater stimuli to participate in foreign policy change and are less likely to shift their country's foreign policy than their counterparts with high conceptual complexity (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, 2005)

The need for power refers to the desire to establish, maintain, or restore one's power and influence over other individuals or groups. It is expressed through verb usage as a concern for controlling or having an impact on others (M. G. Hermann, 2005). In coding for the need for power, verbs are the focus. Profiler Plus LTA evaluates whether the speaker attempts to

establish, maintain, or restore their power through their proposed actions (Levine & Young, 2014).

Table 8

Leadership Traits from LTA (M. G. Hermann, 2005)

CODE	Trait	Trait Description
BACE	Belief in One's Ability to Control	*Perception of having control and influence over events situations and developments*
PWR	Need for Power and Influence	*Aspiration to control, influence, or impact other actors*
CC	Conceptual Complexity	*Ability to perceive nuances in one's political environment, differentiate things and people in one's environment*
SC	Self Confidence	*Sense of self-importance as well as perceived ability to cope with one's environment*
TASK	Task Focus/ Orientation	*Focus on problem-solving or group maintenance/relationships*
DST	General distrust or suspiciousness of others	*Tendency to suspect or doubt the motives and deeds of others*
IGB	In-group bias	*Tendency to value (socially, politically, etc.) defined group and place the group front and center*

Reliability and Validity of Instruments and Tools

Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC-22) has been used in over 20,000 studies (Boyd et al., 2020; Boyd et al., 2022a). On the software developer's recommendation, the researcher did a Google Scholar query search for "LIWC" OR "Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count" (Boyd et al., 2022a; Pennebaker et al., n.d.). When obtained on October 5, 2022, the search results for 2022 yielded almost 2,500 studies.

LTA is enduringly valid, reliable, and consistently upheld by an inter-coding agreement between scholars and practitioners. Google Scholar shows over 1,000,0000 studies that claim the use of LTA as a foundation for research. M. G. Hermann's (2005) study has 560 citations.

Reliability. The reliability of LIWC-22 as a psychometric analytics tool has been tested using two methods (Boyd et al., 2022a; Boyd et al., 2022b). As an algorithm is responsible for mining data, reliability can be assumed. LIWC-22 is a computer program that analyzes text based on a collection of linguistic categories, or "dictionaries." These categories or "dimensions" include emotions, cognitive processes, social behaviors, and additional linguistic characteristics, among others.

Before creating the LIWC-22 dictionaries, the developers compiled an inventory of terms they believed to be associated with each dimension. For instance, the "positive emotions" dimension may contain the terms "happy," "joyful," and "excited." Words such as "think," "believe," and "understand" may comprise the "cognitive processes" dimension.

Once the word lists for each dimension were compiled, the developers used two distinct approaches to quantify the presence of each dimension in a given text. The first method, Crohnbach's α, involves calculating the proportion of total words in the text that belong to each dimension. This is a measurement of the dimension's "reliability," or how consistently it is portrayed in the text. A high alpha value indicates that the dimension is adequately represented in the text, whereas a low alpha value suggests that the dimension is inconsistent or unreliable.

According to Pennebaker et al. (2022), the Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 was used to determine the presence or absence of specific words in a text. This approach examined the occurrence of the words in the text rather than their frequency and provided a binary indicator of their presence or absence. The LIWC-22 developers used frequency and presence/absence

techniques to produce text-applicable dictionaries for each measure. The LIWC-22 tool assessed the linguistic substance and structure of provided texts by calculating the proportion of words in each category and determining the existence or lack of specific words.

Hermann's (1984a, 1984b, 1987a, 1987b) research shows the test of the reliability of LTA in predicting leadership behaviors. Profiles were developed for global leaders and Heads-of-State using the LTA method. These profiles were used to predict leaders' behaviors in certain situations. Hermann's rankings were compared to ratings of inter-coded research from individuals with first-hand experience with the study subjects' leaders. The results showed a high correlation (average of .84) between the ratings based on LTA profiles and those made by the other raters. Subsequent studies utilizing LTA support these reliability findings (Brummer et al., 2020: Schafer & Lambert, 2022). This suggests that the LTA method can provide reliable information about leadership behaviors comparable to that obtained through firsthand observation or interaction.

Validity. The validity of the LIWC-22 is supported by a thorough evaluation of its content validity, criterion validity, and construct validity. It accurately predicts outcomes related to the underlying constructs it measures based on its correlations with relevant outcomes in the literature. In addition, the extensive corpus of research utilizing LIWC-22 and its precursors, as demonstrated by Boyd et al. (2020), Pennebaker et al. (2022), and Tausczik & Pennebaker (2010), provides additional evidence of its validity. These factors provide a solid foundation for establishing the overall validity of the instrument.

LTA's validity has been assessed through multiple methods, including factor analysis and comparison with well-established leadership instruments. The use of factor analysis has helped to identify the underlying dimensions of leadership that LTA evaluates, and the outcomes have consistently supported LTA's construct validity. Additionally, research studies have found that LTA measures a similar construct to other established leadership instruments, further

substantiating its validity (Hudson, 2005; Preston, 2000; Schafer & Lambert, 2022; Uminska-Woroniecka, 2022).

Data Collection

The aforementioned procedures were carried out using the suggested methodology, methodologies, and instruments. The data collection process was multi-step and multi-factor, incorporating the previously described procedures and equipment. The researcher meticulously followed the detailed instructions provided by Python, PyPi, BeautifulSoup, LIWC-22, and Profiler Plus-LTA to prepare for data collection.

The BeautifulSoup data collection process targeted two types of web pages: speech list pages and speech detail pages. The scraper extracted links to the speeches from speech list pages, each displaying up to 10 speech links. If there were more than 10 speeches, the webpage provided a navigation option to go to the next list. The first part of the scraper extracted links from the speech list page. The second type of page is the speech detail page, which includes the speech title, date, and text. The second part of the scraper extracted the required items from the speech detail page. The extracted data was saved to a comma-separated values file.

The process starts by opening a file to write the output file header and setting up the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) request header and parameters, including the start and end dates and page numbers. The HTTP request is generated, and a loop is used to iterate over multiple pages. For each page, a BeautifulSoup object is created to select different sections of the webpage for extraction. The links to the speeches are extracted and iterated over. For each speech link, the scraper generates an HTTP request, creates a BeautifulSoup object for that speech, and selects the speech's title, date, and text. The extracted items are written in the CSV file.

To check if there are more speech list pages, a condition is used to determine if the last pagination link contains the text 'javascript:void.' If it doesn't, the scraper generates an HTTP request for the next page, and the loop continues. If it does, the loop terminates, and the job is completed.

The data was mined, cleaned, and prepared for further processing using the established inclusion criteria as a guide. Inclusion criteria were that the speeches collected were in English, originated from Zelenskyy, and were delivered in the identified phases (Inaugural period, Mid-term, Pre-crisis, Crisis, and Kinetic). The research then extrapolated speech data into a Google spreadsheet in five segments (Inaugural period, Mid-term, Pre-crisis, Crisis, and Kinetic). Each speech period was kept on a separate sheet within the file. Exclusion criteria were speech in the Ukrainian or Russian language and speeches that did not fall within the identified dates. Data collection occurred in the following steps:

1. The data to be collected was identified, and its sources were determined.

2. A data storage and backup plan was created, incorporating data security measures and access controls.

3. Data processing and cleaning procedures were established, including how missing or inconsistent data was handled.

4. Exploratory data analysis was conducted to identify patterns, outliers, and potential errors in the data.

5. The data was cleaned and preprocessed to prepare it for analysis, including handling missing or inconsistent data and transforming variables if necessary.

6. Software such as LIWC-22, ProfilerPlus for LTA, and SPSS was used to analyze the data.

7. The results of the analysis were interpreted, and conclusions were drawn based on the data.

8. The data management process was documented, including any changes made to the original plan and the rationale for those changes.

Storage and Management of Data

The data collected for this study was extant, publicly available, archival data that did not contain confidential information, sensitive information, or involve human subjects. Therefore, the storage and management of the data can be done with cloud-based storage backed by Pepperdine University servers. The data was password protected, and the study's results will be archived for at least three years in a digital archive protected by numerous levels of encryption and accessible for secondary research. Data management steps are as follows:

1. Official Presidential Speeches from BeautifulSoup retrieval; cleaned, organized by time-wise phases, and saved in batches

2. LIWC-22 and LTA (primary and secondary) parameter outputs are saved to password-protected file

3. SPSS t-tests (primary and secondary) for LIWC-22 and Profiler Plus outputs data saved to a password-protected file

Data Analysis

The analysis for this study used three distinct software packages to generate, measure, and validate the empirical scores from the data. The English speech data from Zelenskyy's discourse events were analyzed using linguistic analysis as the first pass of measurement, scoring, and quantitative analysis. The spreadsheets containing the pulled, coded, and stored tweet data were uploaded to the LIWC-22 Software in five segments consistent with the dates

outlined in the research questions. The official speeches of President Volodomyr Zelenskyy were subsequently analyzed in the same manner using Profiler Plus-LTA.

Phase One. In phase one of the study, the researcher utilized the LIWC-22 software to analyze Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's official speeches. The speeches were downloaded from the official presidential website and sorted by specific time periods before being uploaded in batches to the LIWC-22 software for analysis. The LIWC-22 software is a validated natural language processing tool allowing researchers to analyze Zelenskyy's speeches for linguistic patterns, emotional tone, and leadership traits. The output data from each batch was saved in a password-protected file for security purposes.

To ensure the accuracy and validity of the results, the data was run a second time. The LIWC-22 software provided output data with psychometric measurements for scales and subscales, which correlated with the four principal psychometric attributes in the study: Analytic, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone. This data was exported to Google Sheets for use in SPSS. LIWC-22 produced output data with psychometric measurements for scales and subscales to correlate with the four principal psychometric attributes in this study Analytic, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone (see Table 7; Boyd et al., 2022b). This data was exported to Google Sheets for use in SPSS (IBM, n.d.).

Phase Two. Phase two of the study involved using Profiler Plus, a software specifically designed for LTA. This approach examines the frequency of certain keywords and phrases within a leader's discourse to identify various leadership attributes, such as task orientation, interpersonal skills, or assertiveness (Levine & Young, 2014). By applying LTA Profiler Plus to President Zelenskyy's speeches, the study aimed to gain insights into his leadership traits and how they influenced his foreign policy decisions and actions during the Russo-Ukrainian War.

The software allowed the researchers to identify patterns and trends in Zelenskyy's communication style, which provided valuable insights into his leadership abilities and decision-making processes.

The downloaded data, organized by phase in spreadsheets, was loaded into Profiler Plus-LTA. The analysis of Zelenskyy's discourse yielded aggregate scores for seven leadership trait categories. For Zelenskyy, this aggregation was done separately for each phase of his leadership. To ensure the accuracy and validity of the results, the data was run a second time. The LTA analyses were compared for consistency and deemed identical. Profiler Plus-LTA metrics were then exported to Google Sheets for use in SPSS (IBM, n.d.).

Phase Three. Phase three in the research study consists of hypothesis testing and statistical data analysis using IBM's SPSS statistical analysis computer program. In this study, SPSS was used to analyze the output scores of LIWC-22 and Profiler Plus-LTA. Specifically, SPSS was used to perform descriptive statistics on the data, such as calculating mean, median, and standard deviation scores. It was also used to conduct inferential statistics, such as t-tests and ANOVA, to analyze the relationships between different variables and determine the significance of the results.

For the LTA analyses, the data aggregation from the PsyCl dataset was compared to Zelenskyy's LTA scores. First, aggregate the data for each leader, including Zelenskyy, by combining the speech acts' raw counts of indicators for psychological variables. This created a cohort of 114 leaders (including Zelenskyy). The SPSS analysis was conducted on this newly aggregated data.

Plan for Reporting Findings

In Chapters 4 and 5, there is a report on the findings of this study. The testing and analysis are also reported, and discussions about the findings are included.

Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines the research methodology used to investigate Zelenskyy's leadership traits and psycholinguistic dimensions through PD. The chapter covers the research process, including research ethics, philosophy, strategy, design, and data analysis methodologies. Additionally, the appropriateness of the sampling approach for conducting a psychobiographical case study is explained. The research approach to measuring Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War and its implications for international relations is described. To analyze Zelenskyy's PD discourse, psychobiographical data from the official communications of the President of Ukraine was collected and analyzed using LIWC-22 and LTA via Profiler Plus. Using these tools provides greater reliability and validity to the study's outcomes.

Chapter 4: Presentation of Findings

Chapter Overview

This chapter presents the main findings of this study on how President Zelenskyy's PD discourse reflects his personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography. The data were analyzed using linguistic inquiry and discourse analysis methods through natural language processing (NLP). The findings reveal the major themes that target the research questions. Chapter Five will discuss these findings in relation to the existing literature and theoretical frameworks.

Context

The Russo-Ukrainian War significantly challenged Ukraine's foreign policy and national security, particularly under inexperienced President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Contrary to initial expectations, Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people demonstrated remarkable resilience and determination in the face of Russia's invasion. A crucial factor in this resistance was Zelenskyy's strategic use of PD through social media and public speeches, which galvanized the will of Ukrainians, world leaders, and international alliances. This study explored the correlation between Zelenskyy's personality, leadership, foreign policy, and discourse during the war and how these factors contributed to the unexpected outcomes. The following findings are the linguistic markers, leadership traits, and Zelenskyy's PD discourse.

Research Questions

- SQ1: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other global leaders through LTA?

  - H1: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy significantly differs from that of other global leaders when analyzed through LTA.

- SQ2: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other global leaders through LIWC-22 Analysis?

    o H2: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy notably diverges from other global leaders when analyzed through LIWC-22 Analysis.

- SQ3: What leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions are evident in Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse, and how do they reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style?

    o H3: Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse exhibits leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions that reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style.

Purpose Statement

This study explored how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War reflected his personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography. A mixed-methods approach was utilized, combining LTA, LI, and NLP techniques to analyze Zelenskyy's public speeches. The goal was to identify his rhetorical tactics, speech patterns, and semantic structures. Additionally, the study examined how Zelenskyy's discourse and behavior revealed his psychobiographical dimensions, values, and motivations.

Themes of the Study

This findings chapter presents the results of a mixed-methods study that employed three distinct analytical techniques to examine the PD discourse of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the Russo-Ukrainian War. The first guiding principle explores the use of LIWC-22 to identify patterns in Zelenskyy's speech and assess his messages' emotional tone and cognitive style. The second guiding principle involves the application of LTA to identify and

assess Zelenskyy's leadership traits and attributes as reflected in his PD discourse. Finally, the third guiding principle of the study utilizes qualitative coding of relevant literature to contextualize and interpret historiography, context, atmospherics, and risk based on a FPA approach. These themes provide a comprehensive analysis of Zelenskyy's PD discourse, shedding light on the complex interplay between personality, leadership, and foreign policy during a crisis.

Findings

This study employed two principal analytical methods: LIWC-22 and Profiler Plus-LTA. LIWC-22 assessed President Zelenskyy's speeches for linguistic patterns, emotional tone, and leadership characteristics. At the same time, Profiler Plus-LTA detected leadership attributes by analyzing the frequency of particular keywords and phrases in his discourse. Utilizing these approaches facilitated a thorough investigation of President Zelenskyy's PD discourse and leadership approach amid the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Principle 1: LIWC-22 and Public Diplomacy Discourse

The initial guiding concept of the study was to discover patterns in Zelenskyy's speech using LIWC-22. Furthermore, LIWC-22 enabled the researcher to determine his communications' emotional tone and cognitive style, which supplied more valuable data about his communication techniques. Table 9 compares the eight LIWC-22 summary variable scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the LIWC-22 scores from the United States Congressional speeches. The largest positive percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a higher mean score) was for clout ($M = 80.26$ versus $M = 55.10$, 45.6%). Those categories with the largest negative percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a lower score) were for words per sentence ($M = 10.91$ versus $M = 20.72$, -47.3%) and emotional tone ($M = 31.68$ versus $M = 47.63$, -33.5%).

Table 9

Comparison of LIWC-22 Summary Variables Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US

Congressional Speeches

	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		
Category	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	% Change
Word count	1100.80	442.38	950.09	1241.20	15.9%
Analytical thinking	69.24	14.88	75.93	17.70	-8.8%
Clout	80.26	12.33	55.10	21.54	45.6%
Authentic	35.55	12.81	29.97	17.90	18.6%
Emotional tone	31.68	21.64	47.63	25.46	-33.5%
Words per sentence	10.91	2.56	20.72	5.45	-47.3%
Big words	24.40	3.06	24.26	5.53	0.6%
Dictionary words	88.22	2.40	87.13	4.29	1.2%

Table 10 compares the four LIWC-22 drive scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the LIWC-22 scores from the United States Congressional speeches. The largest positive percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a higher mean score) was for power ($M = 5.05$ versus $M = 3.21$, 57.4%), affiliation ($M = 4.72$ versus $M = 3.22$, 46.7%), and the drive total score ($M = 11.01$ versus $M = 7.98$, 38.1%). For none of the four variables was Zelenskyy's score lower than the score obtained from the United States Congressional speeches.

Table 11 compares the four LIWC-22 culture scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the LIWC-22 scores from the United States Congressional speeches. The largest positive percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a higher mean score) was for ethnicity ($M = 1.12$ versus $M = 0.33$, 239.3%). Those categories with the largest negative percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy

had a lower score) were technology (*M* = 0.13 versus *M* = 0.19, -29.1%) and politics (*M* = 2.15

versus *M* = 2.55, -15.8%).

Table 10

Comparison of LIWC-22 Drive Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US Congressional

Speeches

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	
Drive Total	11.01	1.87	7.98	2.62	38.1%
Affiliation	4.72	1.44	3.22	1.75	46.7%
Achievement	1.53	0.56	1.53	1.08	0.0%
Power	5.05	1.17	3.21	1.86	57.4%

Table 11

Comparison of LIWC-22 Culture Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US Congressional

Speeches

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	
Culture Total	3.40	1.19	3.06	2.01	11.1%
Politics	2.15	0.94	2.55	1.80	-15.8%
Ethnicity	1.12	0.56	0.33	0.69	239.3%
Technology	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.46	-29.1%

Table 12 compares the four LIWC-22 motive scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the

LIWC-22 scores from the United States Congressional speeches (Pennebaker et al., n.d.). The

largest positive percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a higher mean score) was for reward

($M = 0.51$ versus $M = 0.27$, 84.7%). The category with the largest negative percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a lower score) was curiosity ($M = 0.18$ versus $M = 0.24$, -22.6%).

Table 12

Comparison of LIWC-22 Motive Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US Congressional Speeches

	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		
Category	M	SD	M	SD	% Change
Reward	0.51	0.35	0.27	0.39	84.7%
Risk	0.59	0.32	0.55	0.66	6.9%
Curiosity	0.18	0.21	0.24	0.43	-22.6%
Allure	5.63	1.21	4.94	1.95	13.8%

Table 13 compares the 12 LIWC-22 social processes scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the LIWC-22 scores from the United States Congressional speeches. The largest positive percent changes (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a higher mean score) were for interpersonal conflict ($M = 1.19$ versus $M = 0.34$, 249.8%), friends ($M = 0.08$ versus $M = 0.04$, 120.6%) and moralization ($M = 0.72$ versus $M = 0.40$, 77.7%). The categories with the largest negative percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a lower score) were for male references ($M = 0.36$ versus $M = 0.85$, -57.8%), female references ($M = 0.17$ versus $M = 0.33$, -48.5%), and family ($M = 0.22$ versus $M = 0.32$, -30.7%).

Table 14 compares the nine LIWC-22 physical scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the LIWC-22 scores from the United States Congressional speeches. The largest positive percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy had a higher mean score) was for death ($M = 0.36$ versus $M = 0.13$, 174.9%). The categories with the largest negative percent change (i.e., where Zelenskyy

had a lower score) were substances (*M* = 0.00 versus *M* = 0.03, -97.3%), mental health (*M* = 0.00

versus *M* = 0.03, -87.1%), and sexual (*M* = 0.01 versus *M* = 0.06, -83.8%).

Table 13

Comparison of LIWC-22 Social Processes Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US

Congressional Speeches

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	
Social processes total	14.56	2.38	11.06	3.56	31.7%
Social behavior total	4.81	1.01	4.43	1.81	8.4%
Prosocial behavior	1.12	0.58	1.13	0.95	-1.5%
Politeness	0.33	0.27	0.43	0.61	-21.8%
Interpersonal conflict	1.19	0.64	0.34	0.50	249.8%
Moralization	0.72	0.40	0.40	0.60	77.7%
Communication	1.25	0.51	1.40	1.09	-10.7%
Social referents total	9.30	2.08	6.52	3.01	42.7%
Family	0.22	0.35	0.32	0.69	-30.7%
Friends	0.08	0.10	0.04	0.12	120.6%
Female references	0.17	0.24	0.33	0.93	-48.5%
Male references	0.36	0.37	0.85	1.41	-57.8%

Table 15 compares all the LIWC-22 scores for Zelenskyy's speeches with the LIWC-22

scores from the United States Congressional speeches sorted by the largest absolute percentage

difference. The 10 largest percentage differences were for second person (*M* = 1.03 versus *M* =

0.26, 292.7%), interpersonal conflict (*M* = 1.19 versus *M* = 0.34, 249.8%), ethnicity (*M* = 1.12

versus *M* = 0.33, 239.3%), anger (*M* = 0.17 versus *M* = 0.05, 236.0%), memory (*M* = 0.18 versus

M = 0.06, 204.8%), death (*M* = 0.36 versus *M* = 0.13, 174.9%), swear words (*M* = 0.01 versus *M*

= 0.01, 169.3%), all-or-none (*M* = 1.95 versus *M* = 0.78, 148.8%), negative tone (*M* = 2.95

versus *M* = 1.20, 147.0%), and friends (*M* = 0.08 versus *M* = 0.04, 120.6%).

Table 14

Comparison of LIWC-22 Physical Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US Congressional

Speeches

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	
Physical total	1.11	0.66	1.19	1.71	-6.2%
Health total	0.31	0.41	0.66	1.37	-52.9%
Illness	0.13	0.24	0.14	0.55	-4.8%
Wellness	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.12	-35.5%
Mental health	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.25	-87.1%
Substances	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.24	-97.3%
Sexual	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.37	-83.8%
Food	0.09	0.15	0.10	0.37	-6.7%
Death	0.36	0.34	0.13	0.37	174.9%

Published guidelines for interpreting linear correlation strength state that weak

correlations have an absolute value of *r* = .10 (explaining 1% of the variance), moderate

correlations have an absolute value of *r* = .30 (explaining 9% of the variance). Strong

correlations have an absolute value of *r* = .50 (explaining 25% of the variance; J. Cohen, 1988).

Chapter Five will concentrate principally on correlations of at least moderate intensity to reduce

the possibility of Type I errors, which occur when an accurate null hypothesis is incorrectly

denied (J. Cohen, 1988). We will highlight important connections in the findings section to

minimize the possibility of drawing inferences based on erroneous positive findings and to guarantee a more accurate reading of our results.

Table 15

Comparison of All LIWC-22 Scores for Zelenskyy's Speeches with US Congressional Speeches

Sorted by Highest Absolute Percent Change

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
2nd person	1.03	1.01	0.26	0.51	292.7%	292.7%
Interpersonal conflict	1.19	0.64	0.34	0.50	249.8%	249.8%
Ethnicity	1.12	0.56	0.33	0.69	239.3%	239.3%
Anger	0.17	0.16	0.05	0.15	236.0%	236.0%
Memory	0.18	0.24	0.06	0.16	204.8%	204.8%
Death	0.36	0.34	0.13	0.37	174.9%	174.9%
Swear words	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.06	169.3%	169.3%
All-or-none	1.95	0.59	0.78	0.69	148.8%	148.8%
Negative tone	2.95	0.97	1.20	1.21	147.0%	147.0%
Friends	0.08	0.10	0.04	0.12	120.6%	120.6%
Netspeak	0.00	0.02	0.11	0.33	-98.2%	98.2%
Substances	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.24	-97.3%	97.3%
Anxiety	0.11	0.17	0.05	0.17	97.2%	97.2%
Mental health	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.25	-87.1%	87.1%
Non influences	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	-85.8%	85.8%
Reward	0.51	0.35	0.27	0.39	84.7%	84.7%
Sexual	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.37	-83.8%	83.8%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
1st person plural	3.51	1.22	1.95	1.44	80.0%	80.0%
Moralization	0.72	0.40	0.40	0.60	77.7%	77.7%
Money	0.48	0.46	1.66	1.77	-71.2%	71.2%
Conversational	0.05	0.08	0.18	0.37	-69.6%	69.6%
3rd person singular	0.21	0.33	0.69	1.28	-69.4%	69.4%
Negative emotion	0.46	0.31	0.27	0.43	67.0%	67.0%
Male references	0.36	0.37	0.85	1.41	-57.8%	57.8%
Power	5.05	1.17	3.21	1.86	57.4%	57.4%
Sadness	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.16	-56.2%	56.2%
Lifestyle	2.76	1.01	5.95	2.97	-53.6%	53.6%
Affect	6.56	1.31	4.27	2.00	53.6%	53.6%
Work	1.87	0.87	4.02	2.49	-53.6%	53.6%
Health	0.31	0.41	0.66	1.37	-52.9%	52.9%
1st person singular	1.09	0.60	2.25	1.37	-51.3%	51.3%
Female references	0.17	0.24	0.33	0.93	-48.5%	48.5%
Words per sentence	10.91	2.56	20.72	5.45	-47.3%	47.3%
Certitude	0.81	0.43	0.55	0.51	47.2%	47.2%
Affiliation	4.72	1.44	3.22	1.75	46.7%	46.7%
Visual	0.51	0.33	0.35	0.40	45.9%	45.9%
Clout	80.26	12.33	55.10	21.54	45.6%	45.6%
Social referents	9.30	2.08	6.52	3.01	42.7%	42.7%
Negations	1.39	0.59	1.00	0.81	38.3%	38.3%
Drives	11.01	1.87	7.98	2.62	38.1%	38.1%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
3rd person plural	1.32	0.67	0.96	0.92	37.6%	37.6%
Wellness	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.12	-35.5%	35.5%
Adverbs	4.57	0.99	3.38	1.45	35.4%	35.4%
Feeling	0.17	0.18	0.13	0.26	35.3%	35.3%
Emotional tone	31.68	21.64	47.63	25.46	-33.5%	33.5%
Numbers	1.64	0.77	2.44	3.18	-33.0%	33.0%
Social processes	14.56	2.38	11.06	3.56	31.7%	31.7%
Attention	0.27	0.21	0.39	0.46	-30.8%	30.8%
Family	0.22	0.35	0.32	0.69	-30.7%	30.7%
Leisure	0.13	0.20	0.19	0.53	-30.6%	30.6%
Technology	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.46	-29.1%	29.1%
Assent	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.20	-24.6%	24.6%
Motion	0.88	0.38	1.16	0.74	-24.2%	24.2%
Auditory	0.18	0.21	0.14	0.31	24.0%	24.0%
Religion	0.17	0.29	0.14	0.61	23.3%	23.3%
Curiosity	0.18	0.21	0.24	0.43	-22.6%	22.6%
Personal pronouns	7.84	1.95	6.42	2.57	22.1%	22.1%
Politeness	0.33	0.27	0.43	0.61	-21.8%	21.8%
Differentiation	3.32	0.86	2.74	1.33	21.4%	21.4%
Present focus	4.83	1.09	4.05	1.77	19.1%	19.1%
Emotion	1.01	0.41	0.85	0.74	18.9%	18.9%
Authentic	35.55	12.81	29.97	17.90	18.6%	18.6%
Positive tone	3.56	1.15	3.01	1.67	18.1%	18.1%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
Fatigue	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.12	-17.7%	17.7%
Space	6.65	1.08	5.65	1.76	17.5%	17.5%
Causation	1.22	0.42	1.47	0.80	-17.2%	17.2%
Word count	1101	442	950	1241	15.9%	15.9%
Politics	2.15	0.94	2.55	1.80	-15.8%	15.8%
Cognition	11.43	1.77	9.87	3.03	15.7%	15.7%
Acquire	0.39	0.24	0.46	0.45	-15.5%	15.5%
Past focus	3.22	1.01	2.82	1.61	14.2%	14.2%
Allure	5.63	1.21	4.94	1.95	13.8%	13.8%
Articles	7.54	1.20	8.58	1.98	-12.1%	12.1%
Time	3.88	1.04	3.47	1.70	11.9%	11.9%
Culture	3.40	1.19	3.06	2.01	11.1%	11.1%
Communication	1.25	0.51	1.40	1.09	-10.7%	10.7%
Perception	8.32	1.24	7.54	2.04	10.4%	10.4%
Home	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.41	-10.2%	10.2%
Tentative	1.17	0.56	1.30	0.87	-9.9%	9.9%
Total pronouns	12.85	2.24	11.75	3.66	9.4%	9.4%
Future focus	1.65	0.66	1.52	1.08	8.9%	8.9%
Analytical thinking	69.24	14.88	75.93	17.70	-8.8%	8.8%
Social behavior	4.81	1.01	4.43	1.81	8.4%	8.4%
Discrepancy	1.45	0.56	1.58	0.93	-8.2%	8.2%
Auxiliary verbs	7.86	1.26	7.33	2.50	7.2%	7.2%
Lack	0.16	0.20	0.17	0.30	-7.1%	7.1%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
Risk	0.59	0.32	0.55	0.66	6.9%	6.9%
Food	0.09	0.15	0.10	0.37	-6.7%	6.7%
Physical	1.11	0.66	1.19	1.71	-6.2%	6.2%
Impersonal pronouns	5.00	0.96	5.33	2.03	-6.0%	6.0%
Fulfilled	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.23	-5.7%	5.7%
Total function words	55.62	2.87	52.97	6.02	5.0%	5.0%
Illness	0.13	0.24	0.14	0.55	-4.8%	4.8%
Cognitive processes	9.35	1.73	9.00	2.87	3.9%	3.9%
Need	0.62	0.39	0.60	0.60	3.6%	3.6%
Quantities	4.34	1.08	4.18	2.93	3.6%	3.6%
Conjunctions	5.33	0.97	5.50	1.35	-3.1%	3.1%
Insight	1.79	0.64	1.74	0.99	2.9%	2.9%
Common adjectives	5.72	1.03	5.59	1.71	2.4%	2.4%
Linguistic Dimensions	66.63	3.21	65.16	6.53	2.3%	2.3%
Common verbs	13.25	1.77	13.55	3.83	-2.2%	2.2%
Determiners	16.34	1.30	16.70	2.72	-2.1%	2.1%
Prosocial behavior	1.12	0.58	1.13	0.95	-1.5%	1.5%
Dictionary words	88.22	2.40	87.13	4.29	1.2%	1.2%
Want	0.28	0.22	0.28	0.36	0.7%	0.7%
Big words	24.40	3.06	24.26	5.53	0.6%	0.6%
Positive emotion	0.51	0.30	0.51	0.59	0.4%	0.4%
Prepositions	15.16	1.48	15.13	2.01	0.2%	0.2%
Achievement	1.53	0.56	1.53	1.08	0.2%	0.2%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
Lifestyle	2.76	1.01	5.95	2.97	-53.6%	53.6%
Affect	6.56	1.31	4.27	2.00	53.6%	53.6%
Work	1.87	0.87	4.02	2.49	-53.6%	53.6%
Health	0.31	0.41	0.66	1.37	-52.9%	52.9%
1st person singular	1.09	0.60	2.25	1.37	-51.3%	51.3%
Female references	0.17	0.24	0.33	0.93	-48.5%	48.5%
Words per sentence	10.91	2.56	20.72	5.45	-47.3%	47.3%
Certitude	0.81	0.43	0.55	0.51	47.2%	47.2%
Affiliation	4.72	1.44	3.22	1.75	46.7%	46.7%
Visual	0.51	0.33	0.35	0.40	45.9%	45.9%
Clout	80.26	12.33	55.10	21.54	45.6%	45.6%
Social referents	9.30	2.08	6.52	3.01	42.7%	42.7%
Negations	1.39	0.59	1.00	0.81	38.3%	38.3%
Drives	11.01	1.87	7.98	2.62	38.1%	38.1%
3rd person plural	1.32	0.67	0.96	0.92	37.6%	37.6%
Wellness	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.12	-35.5%	35.5%
Adverbs	4.57	0.99	3.38	1.45	35.4%	35.4%
Feeling	0.17	0.18	0.13	0.26	35.3%	35.3%
Emotional tone	31.68	21.64	47.63	25.46	-33.5%	33.5%
Numbers	1.64	0.77	2.44	3.18	-33.0%	33.0%
Social processes	14.56	2.38	11.06	3.56	31.7%	31.7%
Attention	0.27	0.21	0.39	0.46	-30.8%	30.8%
Family	0.22	0.35	0.32	0.69	-30.7%	30.7%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	SD	M	SD		
Leisure	0.13	0.20	0.19	0.53	-30.6%	30.6%
Technology	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.46	-29.1%	29.1%
Assent	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.20	-24.6%	24.6%
Motion	0.88	0.38	1.16	0.74	-24.2%	24.2%
Auditory	0.18	0.21	0.14	0.31	24.0%	24.0%
Religion	0.17	0.29	0.14	0.61	23.3%	23.3%
Curiosity	0.18	0.21	0.24	0.43	-22.6%	22.6%
Personal pronouns	7.84	1.95	6.42	2.57	22.1%	22.1%
Politeness	0.33	0.27	0.43	0.61	-21.8%	21.8%
Differentiation	3.32	0.86	2.74	1.33	21.4%	21.4%
Present focus	4.83	1.09	4.05	1.77	19.1%	19.1%
Emotion	1.01	0.41	0.85	0.74	18.9%	18.9%
Authentic	35.55	12.81	29.97	17.90	18.6%	18.6%
Positive tone	3.56	1.15	3.01	1.67	18.1%	18.1%
Fatigue	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.12	-17.7%	17.7%
Space	6.65	1.08	5.65	1.76	17.5%	17.5%
Causation	1.22	0.42	1.47	0.80	-17.2%	17.2%
Word count	1101	442	950	1241	15.9%	15.9%
Politics	2.15	0.94	2.55	1.80	-15.8%	15.8%
Cognition	11.43	1.77	9.87	3.03	15.7%	15.7%
Acquire	0.39	0.24	0.46	0.45	-15.5%	15.5%
Past focus	3.22	1.01	2.82	1.61	14.2%	14.2%
Allure	5.63	1.21	4.94	1.95	13.8%	13.8%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
Articles	7.54	1.20	8.58	1.98	-12.1%	12.1%
Time	3.88	1.04	3.47	1.70	11.9%	11.9%
Culture	3.40	1.19	3.06	2.01	11.1%	11.1%
Communication	1.25	0.51	1.40	1.09	-10.7%	10.7%
Perception	8.32	1.24	7.54	2.04	10.4%	10.4%
Home	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.41	-10.2%	10.2%
Tentative	1.17	0.56	1.30	0.87	-9.9%	9.9%
Total pronouns	12.85	2.24	11.75	3.66	9.4%	9.4%
Future focus	1.65	0.66	1.52	1.08	8.9%	8.9%
Analytical thinking	69.24	14.88	75.93	17.70	-8.8%	8.8%
Social behavior	4.81	1.01	4.43	1.81	8.4%	8.4%
Discrepancy	1.45	0.56	1.58	0.93	-8.2%	8.2%
Auxiliary verbs	7.86	1.26	7.33	2.50	7.2%	7.2%
Lack	0.16	0.20	0.17	0.30	-7.1%	7.1%
Risk	0.59	0.32	0.55	0.66	6.9%	6.9%
Food	0.09	0.15	0.10	0.37	-6.7%	6.7%
Physical	1.11	0.66	1.19	1.71	-6.2%	6.2%
Impersonal pronouns	5.00	0.96	5.33	2.03	-6.0%	6.0%
Fulfilled	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.23	-5.7%	5.7%
Total function words	55.62	2.87	52.97	6.02	5.0%	5.0%
Illness	0.13	0.24	0.14	0.55	-4.8%	4.8%
Cognitive processes	9.35	1.73	9.00	2.87	3.9%	3.9%
Need	0.62	0.39	0.60	0.60	3.6%	3.6%

Category	Zelenskyy's Speeches		Congressional Speeches		% Change	% Absolute Change
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*		
Quantities	4.34	1.08	4.18	2.93	3.6%	3.6%
Conjunctions	5.33	0.97	5.50	1.35	-3.1%	3.1%
Insight	1.79	0.64	1.74	0.99	2.9%	2.9%
Common adjectives	5.72	1.03	5.59	1.71	2.4%	2.4%
Linguistic Dimensions	66.63	3.21	65.16	6.53	2.3%	2.3%
Common verbs	13.25	1.77	13.55	3.83	-2.2%	2.2%
Determiners	16.34	1.30	16.70	2.72	-2.1%	2.1%
Prosocial behavior	1.12	0.58	1.13	0.95	-1.5%	1.5%
Dictionary words	88.22	2.40	87.13	4.29	1.2%	1.2%
Want	0.28	0.22	0.28	0.36	0.7%	0.7%
Big words	24.40	3.06	24.26	5.53	0.6%	0.6%
Positive emotion	0.51	0.30	0.51	0.59	0.4%	0.4%
Prepositions	15.16	1.48	15.13	2.01	0.2%	0.2%
Achievement	1.53	0.56	1.53	1.08	0.2%	0.2%

Table 16 displays the *t-tests* comparisons for selected LIWC-22 scores based on time-period (pre-crisis versus kinetic). The six *t-tests* were selected in Table 15 because they were all significant at the *p* <.001 level and had a moderate effect size using the J. Cohen (1988) guidelines. The 39 pre-crisis speeches had significantly LIWC-22 higher scores (*p* < .001) for clout, social processes, social referents, all punctuation, and use of periods. In contrast, the 162 kinetic speeches had significantly higher LIWC-22 scores for words per sentence.

Table 16

t-Test Comparisons for Selected Zelenskyy LIWC-22 Scores Based on Time Period

Category	Time	*n*	*M*	*SD*	r_{pb}	*t*	*p*
Clout	Pre-Crisis	39	88.90	7.16	.34	5.06	.001
	Kinetic	162	78.73	12.04			
Words per sentence	Pre-Crisis	39	9.00	1.49	.36	5.43	.001
	Kinetic	162	11.23	2.46			
Social processes	Pre-Crisis	39	16.28	1.92	.34	5.12	.001
	Kinetic	162	14.26	2.28			
Social referents	Pre-Crisis	39	10.83	1.67	.35	5.27	.001
	Kinetic	162	9.00	2.01			
All punctuation	Pre-Crisis	39	17.95	1.97	.32	4.84	.001
	Kinetic	162	15.75	2.67			
Use of periods	Pre-Crisis	39	10.67	1.91	.34	5.15	.001
	Kinetic	162	8.69	2.20			

Principle 2: LTA and Public Diplomacy Discourse

Principle two is LTA of Zelenskyy's PD discourse, as examined through LTA via

ProfilerPlus (Levine & Young, 2014).

Table 17 displays the independent *t-tests* comparing the PsyCl Leaders' aggregated data

scores with Zelenskyy's speech scores. Significant differences were found for five of the seven *t-tests*. Specifically, the PsyCl Leaders scores had significantly higher scores ($p < .001$) for task

focus, belief can control events, and conceptual complexity. Zelenskyy had significantly higher

scores ($p < .001$) for ingroup bias and need for power.

Table 18 displays the LTA rankings of Zelenskyy compared to the 113 global leaders

analyzed for the PsyCl research (Schafer & Lambert, 2022). Zelenskyy's speeches were ranked

higher against the other 113 leaders for need for power (20th of 114) and ingroup bias (30th of

114). For two dimensions (task focus and conceptual complexity), Zelenskyy's speeches rated

lowest compared to the other 113 leaders (114th of 114). Using a categorical approach to

comparing him to the PsyCL Leader data set (Schafer & Lambert, 2022), Zelenskyy was in the

higher category for need for power, the lower category for task focus, belief can control events

and conceptual complexity plus the similar category for distrust of others, ingroup bias, and self-

confidence.

Table 17

One-Sample t-Tests Comparing LTA Scores Between the PsyCl Leaders Speeches and the

Zelenskyy Speeches

LTA Dimension	Leaders			Zelenskyy		
	n	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*t*	*p*
Distrust of Others	113	0.19	0.07	0.19	0.60	.550
Task Focus	113	0.64	0.07	0.28	52.28	.001
Belief Can Control Events	113	0.32	0.07	0.24	12.35	.001
Ingroup Bias	113	0.14	0.04	0.16	5.40	.001
Self-Confidence	113	0.35	0.09	0.35	0.53	.597
Conceptual Complexity	113	0.58	0.05	0.37	47.33	.001
Need for Power	113	0.28	0.04	0.31	7.86	.001

Figure 6 presents a graph comparing the seven dimensions of LTA (M. G. Hermann,

2005) between President Zelenskyy's speeches and the speeches of the Leader cohort (Schafer &

Lambert, 2022). The graph shows that Zelenskyy scores lower against the Leader cohort for

belief can control events, *task focus,* and *conceptual complexity*. The scores for *distrust of others*

and *ingroup bias* are similar between the two groups.

Table 18

LTA Comparisons for Leaders' Speeches and the Zelenskyy Speeches

Dimension	Leaders' *M*	Zelenskyy *M*	Rank [a]	Category [b]
Distrust of Others	0.19	0.19	48	Similar
Task Focus	0.64	0.28	114	Lower
Belief Can Control Events	0.32	0.24	94	Lower
Ingroup Bias	0.14	0.16	30	Higher
Self-Confidence	0.35	0.35	62	Similar
Conceptual Complexity	0.58	0.37	114	Lower
Need for Power	0.28	0.31	20	Higher

[a] The rank represents Zelenskyy's position in comparison to the 113 leaders; [b] The category was created by placing the ranking into three levels: lower (20 lowest rankings), similar (middle 74 rankings), and higher (20 highest rankings).

Figure 6

Comparison of the LTA Dimensions for Leaders the Zelenskyy Speeches

Principle 3: Final Coding of Literature

The findings of this research reveal 31 qualitative codes were utilized to organize the research, including the literature review and the contextual data of foreign policy, leadership, and international relations (see Figure 7). Using qualitative coding in the literature analysis allowed for the organization, ranking, and evaluation of the data collected from the numerous references consulted. Qualitative coding involved assigning codes to individual data points based on the themes and patterns identified in the collected data, which included interview transcripts, news reports, and other forms of text-based data. The codes were generated from the conceptual framework of the study, FPA. This framework, described in Chapter 1, consists of six tenets of analysis: multi-factorial, multi-level, multi-/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specificity (Hudson & Day, 2019). Using qualitative coding in the literature analysis provided a systematic and rigorous approach to organizing and analyzing the data, allowing for identifying key themes and patterns relevant to the research questions.

Key Findings

In Chapter 5 of this research, five key findings from the data analysis will be presented in detail. However, here is a brief list of these findings:

- FI: Zelenskyy's Linguistic Style: The Language of Leadership
- F2: Transition to War Time Leader
- F3: Ukraine for Ukrainians
- F4: The Evolution of Zelenskyy's Diplomacy
- F5: FPA Coding

Figure 7

Qualitative Codes of Literature Review

Chapter Summary

This chapter presented a comparison between the LIWC-22 scores of President Zelenskyy's speeches and those of United States Congressional speeches. The analysis identified significant differences in various linguistic categories. Zelenskyy had higher mean scores in clout, power, affiliation, drive total score, and ethnicity, among others. Further analysis compared Zelenskyy's pre-crisis and kinetic speeches, revealing significant differences in selected LIWC-22 scores. The pre-crisis speeches had higher scores in clout, social processes, social referents, all punctuation, and use of periods, while the kinetic speeches had higher scores for words per sentence.

Comparing Zelenskyy's speeches with the LTA speech scores from the PsyCL aggregated Leaders' data set revealed significant differences. Zelenskyy scored higher in ingroup bias and need for power, while the Leaders cohort scored higher in task focus, belief in controlling events, and conceptual complexity. Among 114 leaders, Zelenskyy ranked high for need for power and ingroup bias but ranked the lowest in task focus and conceptual complexity.

Qualitative coding involves identifying themes and patterns in the collected data and assigning codes to individual data points. The study was grounded in the FPA framework, which consists of six tenets of analysis—using qualitative coding allowed for a systematic and rigorous approach to organizing and analyzing the data, which led to identifying key themes and patterns relevant to the research questions.

The findings of this study offer valuable insights into various aspects of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's language and leadership style, such as his shift toward wartime leadership, emphasis on Ukrainian identity and nationalism, diplomacy evolution, and use of the FPA coding method. By shedding light on these areas, this study better comprehends Zelenskyy's decision-making processes, leadership approach, and the broader context of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings

Chapter Overview

Chapter 5 of this research study presents a comprehensive examination of the primary findings and their interpretations, as well as an in-depth discussion of the central research question and sub-questions within the context of the study's conceptual and theoretical framework. It is divided into sections: Introduction, Discussion of Findings, Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations for Further Research, Evaluation, Summary, and Final Thoughts. The chapter offers a complete and cohesive analysis of the research results and their importance by incorporating these components.

Introduction

This study explored how Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War reflects his personality, leadership, and foreign policy aims. Using a mixed-methods approach that combined LTA, LI, and NLP, the study analyzed Zelenskyy's public speeches to identify his rhetorical tactics, speech patterns, and semantic structures. The study also examined how his discourse and behavior reveal Zelenskyy's psychobiographical dimensions, values, and motivations. The study compared the findings with relevant literature on leadership theory, psychobiography, and international relations. This study will contribute to leadership and conflict resolution knowledge by applying novel research methods based on natural language processing and related fields.

This study used an overarching research question to structure its inquiry and direction. The central research question was: What is the relationship between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's discourse, personality traits, leadership style, and foreign policy during the Russo-Ukrainian War, and how do these factors influence his leadership outcomes in navigating the

challenges to Ukraine's foreign policy and national security? This central question was then

broken down into the following research questions and hypotheses:

- SQ1: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other

    global leaders through LTA?

    - o H1: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy significantly differs from that

        of other global leaders when analyzed through LTA.

The research findings indicate that when analyzed through LTA, Zelenskyy's public

diplomacy discourse is distinct from other global leaders. This result supports hypothesis H1,

suggesting his unique leadership style is evident in his public diplomacy discourse.

- SQ2: To what extent, if at all, is Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse similar to other

    global leaders through LIWC-22 Analysis?

    - o H2: The public diplomacy discourse of Zelenskyy notably diverges from other

        global leaders when analyzed through LIWC-22 Analysis.

The research results show that Zelenskyy's public diplomacy discourse significantly

differs from other global leaders in LIWC-22 Analysis. This finding confirms hypothesis H2,

highlighting the distinct linguistic style in Zelenskyy's speeches compared to other global

leaders.

- SQ3: What leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions are evident in

    Zelenskyy's PD discourse, and how do they reflect his personality, cognition, and

    communication style?

    - o H3: Zelenskyy's PD discourse exhibits leadership traits and psychobiographical

        dimensions that reflect his personality, cognition, and communication style.

In his PD discourse, President Zelenskyy demonstrates an impressive array of leadership traits, psychobiographical dimensions, and communication styles that reflect his personality and beliefs. His speeches, in particular indicate the President's distinct approach to PD, defined by his cognitive abilities, self-awareness, and genuine willingness to engage with the public.

Discussion of Findings

This study aimed to explore the relationship between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War and various factors, such as his personality, leadership style, foreign policy, and psychobiography. A mixed-methods approach was employed, utilizing qualitative and quantitative techniques such as Linguistic Text Analysis, Leadership Index (LI), and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to gain a deeper understanding of President Zelenskyy's rhetoric and behavior.

Specifically, the study comprehensively examined President Zelenskyy's PD discourse in comparison to that of other global leaders using LTA with Profiler Plus (Levine & Young, 2014) and LIWC-22 analysis (Pennebaker et al., n.d.). The research incorporated specific questions and hypotheses to determine the similarities or differences in President Zelenskyy's discourse compared to other global leaders and identify the leadership traits and psychobiographical dimensions present in his PD.

The data analysis yielded clear findings, providing insights into President Zelenskyy's unique leadership style, linguistic characteristics, and the factors influencing his personality, cognition, and communication style. By considering both Zelenskyy's PD discourse and psychobiographical features, the study aimed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the Ukrainian President's rhetoric and behavior.

There are five key findings from the data listed in Chapter Four. These findings showed that President Zelenskyy's linguistic style underwent a significant change following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Secondly, as a wartime leader, his speeches and public statements became more forceful and assertive, reflecting his role as the commander-in-chief of Ukraine's armed forces. Thirdly, Zelenskyy frequently used language emphasizing Ukraine's national sovereignty and the importance of protecting its territory. The President's rhetoric also strongly emphasized the idea of "Ukraine for Ukrainians," highlighting the importance of national unity and inclusivity.

The fourth finding demonstrates that Zelenskyy's diplomatic strategy changed as he sought to garner international support for Ukraine's position in the conflict, thereby enhancing the country's security through alliances. Coding analysis of foreign policy suggests that Zelenskyy's diplomacy may be pragmatic and strategic, emphasizing forming alliances and coalitions to counter Russian aggression. The linguistic manner and diplomatic approach of Zelenskyy reflect his dedication to defending Ukrainian sovereignty and pursuing a proactive foreign policy in response to Russian aggression.

According to the fifth finding of this study, FPA is beneficial for classifying literature and data following its principles. Therefore, FPA provides a framework for analyzing and interpreting international relations and foreign policy data. Researchers can gain a contextualized understanding of the factors that influence decisions and actions in foreign policy by employing the principles of FPA in the coding procedure. This finding highlights the importance of utilizing established frameworks and theories to guide FPA research.

FI: Zelenskyy's Linguistic Style: The Language of Leadership

The analysis of President Zelenskyy's speeches, compared to speeches by other political leaders, revealed significant differences in various linguistic categories (SQ1). Zelenskyy's speeches had higher mean scores in *clout, power, affiliation, drive total score,* and *ethnicity* while exhibiting lower scores in the following: *technology, politics, curiosity, male* and *female references, family, substances, mental health,* and *sexual categories* (see Tables 9 to 18).

These linguistic differences suggest a distinctive leadership style in Zelenskyy's approach to governing, with a preference for action-oriented language over emotional appeals. The higher scores in ethnicity and affiliation emphasize his intense focus on Ukrainian identity and nationalism (SQ3). Conversely, Zelenskyy's speeches displayed lower scores in multiple categories, including emotional tone, technology, politics, curiosity, male and female references, family, substances, and mental health. The politics category consisted of words commonly found in political and legal discourse, such as congress, president, court, and law. The technology category encompasses scientific and technological devices and inventions, from everyday devices to groundbreaking innovations with significant societal impacts (Boyd et al., 2022a).

The findings indicate that Zelenskyy's discourse is not limited to domestic or international politics but focuses on existential threats. In the Crisis and Kinetic phases, Zelenskyy's communications were designed to rally, support, and comfort Ukrainians while presenting strong opposition to the Russian invasion. This strategy contrasts the collection of speeches by other political leaders used for comparative linguistic analysis, underscoring the distinctive linguistic style of Zelenskyy's speeches (Pennebaker et al., n.d.). Furthermore, this approach shows that Zelenskyy effectively utilized language to inspire and motivate the Ukrainian people in the face of existential threats, demonstrating Zelenskyy's superb communication skills.

Researchers can discover what factors limit or enable their decision-making by comparing a leader's stated goals with their actions. Examining how a leader's political principles influence their actions and strategies can assist in understanding recurring themes and agendas throughout their career. Political psychology has consistently emphasized the importance of leaders in shaping history, with significant contributions from scholars such as Lasswell (1930), George (1969), Jervis (1976), and many others. Although these studies may not explicitly focus on psychological aspects, they reveal a clear interest in understanding the role of individuals in historical events.

The recognition of Carlyle's (1899) early work, which investigated the influence of "heroes" and "great men," further underscores the significance of leadership in the field of political psychology. Burns' leadership theory stresses the value of purposeful leadership and the connection between leader and follower. The theory highlights the importance of statesmanship and recognizes the significance of incorporating psychobiographical information in comprehending leadership decision-making. Burns also investigated the concept of a "hero in history," arguing that the personalities and beliefs of exceptionally charismatic leaders have changed the course of history (Burns, 1978/2012). Burns' transformational leadership theory contradicts this by emphasizing that leaders should not impose claims on their followers, which can lead to a weak association between the two.

It is Not Charisma. The findings show that Zelenskyy has many leadership traits which align with the *charisma* leadership style from the Hermann taxonomy (See Appendix P). Leaders with moderate levels of these traits can adapt their behavior based on the context and other qualities. President Zelenskyy's score for *need for powe*r (0.31) is higher than the Leader cohort's score (.28), but it is lower than the standard scoring (< .37), as indicated by M. G. Hermann.

Therefore, using the data scores and M. G. Hermann's leadership research, it is concluded that Zelenskyy is *closed to new information* and *respects constraints*. The evidence suggests that Zelenskyy is a pragmatic leader, one who considers context and atmospherics. Conclusion one, mapped with the data findings and extended LTA research (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002), suggests that Zelenskyy can be categorized as a consultative leader rather than a charismatic one, based on his operational style and scores. This finding sheds light on Zelenskyy's leadership approach and may inform future studies on his effectiveness.

A review of the literature shows a mismatch in the findings. The extant data about Zelenskyy's role as president and communicator-in-chief has identified him as a powerful public speaker and credited him with charismatic attributes (Adami, 2022; D. Petraeus, personal communication, June 15, 2022; Urban & McLeod, 2022). The literature has widely discussed and supported charisma as a leadership trait. Charismatic leaders can uniquely engage and persuade others to work towards a common goal, attracting a loyal following through their dynamic and engaging personalities (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002; 2001). Hermann (2005) suggests that these leaders can effectively balance task completion and relationship-building, a crucial trait that enables them to guide groups toward task completion while maintaining group morale.

Bass and Riggio (2005) assert that charismatic-inspirational leadership, which involves a combination of idealized influence and motivational inspiration, can be likened to the behaviors described in charismatic leadership theory. This leadership style encourages individuals to strive for a better future and encourages self-expression, self-evaluation, and self-consistency. Uminska-Woroniecka (2022) further argues that transformational leaders who leverage charisma, inspiration, and creativity must consider the current political regime to achieve innovation and fame. In addition, Engels and Saas (2013) emphasize the importance of charisma in office, which

requires the transfer of extraordinary political power between charismatically-inflected leaders. This element is especially pertinent during times of war. Moreover, Baysha (2018) contends that charismatic leaders in geopolitical leadership can significantly influence societal discourses through signifying practices. In order to achieve this, societal contexts and the practices of other subjects and institutions must be considered for discourse to become more widely accepted and dominant.

F2: Discourse in War

The analysis of Zelenskyy's speeches demonstrates a significant shift in his linguistic style over time, as evidenced by notable differences in selected LIWC-22 scores between his pre-crisis and kinetic speeches (Table 16). Pre-crisis speeches display a more formal and structured style, characterized by higher scores in clout, social processes, social referents, all punctuation, and the use of periods. In contrast, kinetic speeches exhibit a more fluid and expressive style, indicated by higher scores for words per sentence. The analysis also reveals that diplomatic events increased by several magnitudes over the phases, from four events in pre-crisis to several hundred speeches during the kinetic phase.

The results of linguistic analysis over time-specific phases follow the evolution of Zelenskyy's discourse events. His PD focus was initially limited in quantity and tone and evolved to be increasingly direct, less formal, and structured, and focused principally on the Ukrainian cause. The analysis of diplomacy phases revealed the transformation of Zelenskyy's discourse from pre-crisis through crisis to the most prolonged and kinetic phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

A Hero in History. The literature cited in the analysis underscores the importance of practical communication skills and strategic decision-making for leaders during crises,

particularly in wartime situations. Burns (1978/2012), Cosans and Reina (2018), M.G. Hermann et al. (2001), Hermann and Hagan (1998), Kotelenets and Barabash (2019), and Machiavelli (1513/2014) emphasize the significance of rhetoric and public communication in shaping national morale and international relations, with M.G. Hermann (1980b) explicitly addressing the impact of crises on leadership. However, a research gap exists regarding contemporary diplomacy during a crisis, necessitating the adaptation of theoretical approaches to examine decision-making and leadership motivation for heads of state during a war (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Mearsheimer, 2001; Menaldo, 2013; Neustadt, 1990; Neustadt & May, 1988).

Churchill's leadership during WWII exemplifies the value of persuasive communication in inspiring confidence and garnering support from the public during times of crisis (Engels & Saas, 2013; Menaldo, 2013; Zug, 2018). Contrarily, Rolfe (2016) challenges the idea of Churchill as a larger-than-life figure, contending that he was a shrewd political operative with a mastery of leadership rhetoric. Nonetheless, Allen (1992) suggests that the public appreciates genuine statesmanship rather than the role of merely elected officials.

Zelenskyy's transformation in leadership style during the Russo-Ukrainian War, particularly throughout the crisis and kinetic phases of the conflict, exemplifies his strategic communication skills and statesmanship. His messaging consistently focused on themes of Ukrainian unity and defiance against Russia's hybrid war, effectively utilizing OSNs to disseminate his messages (Adler, 2022). Zelenskyy's actions and words during the conflict demonstrated his willingness to risk his own life for his country, inspiring further unity among the citizenry (Friedersdorf, 2022). The literature cited supports that crises impact leadership and that effective communication and sound decision-making are crucial elements of effective leadership in challenging times.

In keeping with Clausewitz's theory, the Russo-Ukrainian War proved a national resistance or liberation war. The PD discourse of Zelenskyy continuously prompts the Ukrainian citizenry to resist. Those citizens took up weapons, and feelings of resentment and hostility played a tactical role. Defense is regarded as superior in such warfare because a country defends itself to survive—a morally superior goal compared to the invader's goal of subjugation. If their regular forces are defeated, Ukrainians have vowed to continue their resistance through their insurgency. Clausewitz's analysis of war emphasizes that even if an army is defeated and a government is overthrown, the people may still resist. This idea is mirrored in contemporary occupation conflicts, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ukraine's successful appeal to the global free world in the early phases of the invasion drew significant economic and military aid (Appendix X). Ukrainians resisted the invasion through innovative, unified, and steadfast means. (Ackerman, 2022; Adler, 2022; Echevarria II, 2022; McTague, 2022a; Olearchyk & Reed, 2022; Zelenskyy, 2022b, 2022d).

F3: Slava Ukraini! Glory to Ukraine!

Analyzing Zelenskyy's PD discourse using LTA with Profiler Plus and LIWC-22 revealed consistent data demonstrating strong emotions and displays of loyalty and purpose. With higher scores in in-group bias, culture, and social processes, the data revealed that Zelenskyy focuses on the leadership of Ukraine. The literature identifies identity, nationalism, and Ukrainian purpose as the underlying motivations for the Ukrainian resistance to Russia, which supports these findings (research subquestions one, SQ1; and two, SQ2).

In addition, five of seven t-tests comparing Zelenskyy's speeches to the LTA speech scores in the Psychological Characteristics of Leaders (Schafer & Lambert, 2022) aggregated leaders dataset revealed statistically significant differences (Table 17). Compared to other

leaders, Zelenskyy scored higher on need for power and ingroup bias but lower on task focus and conceptual complexity (Table 18). Despite ranking 20th out of 114 for need for power and 30th for ingroup bias, his speeches ranked 114th for task focus and conceptual complexity (see Appendix S for the complete data set). Examples of situations in which Zelenskyy's need for power would be evaluated include forceful actions, attempting to persuade or dispute without reaching an agreement, and being concerned with one's reputation or position. The emphasis is on Zelenskyy's actions or his concentration on Ukraine.

In response to the second research question, the LIWC-22 results show that Zelenskyy's speeches give an intense emotionality to Ukrainian national survival and identity. For the Culture sub-variable, Zelenskyy gets 239.3% higher than the mean. (Table 11). The LIWC-22 sub-variables for language are organized under Reward in Table 12, with Zelenskyy's most significant positive shift being 84.7%. His most significant percentage changes are (a) second person (292.7%), (b) interpersonal dispute (249.8%), (c) ethnicity (239.3%), (d) anger (236.0%), (e) memory (204.8%), and (f) death (174.9%; see Table 15).

These results and the specific words found in LIWC-22 (see Appendix Q) show that Zelenskyy's PD discourse is mainly motivated by a single goal and motivation: Ukraine's victory over Russia. During the crisis period of the war, Zelenskyy famously adopted the phrase "Slava Ukraini" or "Glory to Ukraine." This finding corresponds to a rise in the frequency of discourse events and shifts in leadership indicators such as authority, affiliation, culture, and ethnicity.

Russian Power and Ukrainian Challenge. The literature was reviewed to investigate causal factors for Russia's actions during the war and Putin's strategic strategy (Fivecoat Consulting Group, 2022; Fridman, 2022; GeoConfirmed, 2022; Lamonthe, 2022; Mações, 2022; Statista, 2022; Yermak, 2022). The literature was also reviewed for axiomatic connections to

Russian expansionism and its historical claims to Ukraine (Kotkin, 2017; Ploky, 2015). The postwar Yalta Conference and the United Nations charter, which suppressed Ukraine's right to self-determination, were at the basis of the Russo-Ukrainian War. (Brzezinski, 1984; Manchester & Reid, 2012; Office of the Historian, n.d.; Mearsheimer, 2001; Yale Law School, 2008; YES, n.d.). Russian aggression and past imperial policies, such as the Holodomor and collectivization policies, must be factored into the conflict (Burns, 1978/2012; Hryenevych, 2021; Mearsheimer, 2001; Rolfe, 2016; Sherr, 2013).

The literature shows the Ukrainian resistance to power structures, Russian dominance, and civil society development show a nuanced perspective of Ukrainian identity. Ukraine's resistance can be characterized as an anti-colonial campaign propelled by political, economic, and social factors. (Caldararo, 2014; Frydenborg, 2022; Huntington, 1993; Kushnir, 2018; Plokhy, 2015; Saari, 2014; Wanner, 2014). Zelenskyy's actions and assertive demeanor can be seen as a defense of Ukraine's sovereignty and interests, but multiple factors influence these actions and operate on multiple levels.

Ukraine showed exceptional military performance and commitment during the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, with solid support for President Zelenskyy. (Cochrane et al., 2022b; Ochkina, 2019; Rating Group UA, 2022a, 2022b). The literature highlights the impact of colonialism on Ukraine and the role of Russian propaganda, specifically through its hybrid warfare, in generating opposition in the West (Boyko, 2021; Caldararo, 2014; Kuzio, 2019; McDougal, 2015; McGlynn, 2017; Morell, 2022a; O'Brien, 1990; Plokhy, 2015; Saari, 2014; Wanner, 2014).

The historical record contradicts the idea that NATO expansion or Western encroachment is the casus belli for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russian imperialism and Soviet expansionism predate NATO, according to Ukrainian history (Götz & Merlen, 2019; Kotkin, 2017; 2022;

Larson, 2020; Plohky, 2015). According to the results, it is more suitable to consider historical and cultural factors as predicates for Russian actions and unity of resistance in Ukraine to invasion. The literature on socioeconomic theories reveals a research gap regarding how capital and economics can predict foreign policy decision-making, particularly in the context of Ukraine's defiance of Russian aggression. Waltz (1979) contends that imperialism was a capitalist endeavor, seeking new capital and trade for the imperialist state. In the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia's neocolonialism manifested as economic and political domination over neighboring countries. Russian disinformation and hybrid malign activities have exploited socioeconomic disparities in Ukraine for decades, aiming to increase Russia's power, particularly in undermining Ukraine's sovereignty efforts.

Realist IR theories have only sporadically explored neo-imperialism, as demonstrated by Waltz's work (Waltz, 1979, 1988). Mearsheimer (2001, 2014, 2022), a leading realist scholar, has consistently argued that imperialism is not a driving force in international relations, despite his vocal criticism of Russia's actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War (Mearsheimer, 2022).

The Western governments' coalition against Russia was primarily motivated by economic imperatives in reaction to Russia's hostile actions and revanchist beliefs, which included a full-scale conflict with a democratic bordering state. The Western-aligned alliance used economic pressure to offset Russia's irredentist posturing and incursion.

Sartre (1956, 1964/2001) and Yu (2020) investigate the idea of new imperialism, which refers to former colonial powers' continued exploitation and control mechanisms. Further research on the interlinkages of economic theories and foreign policy decision-making is necessary to understand better how capital and economics can predict foreign policy choices and Ukraine's resistance to Russian aggression (Sartre, 1956, 1964/2001; Yu, 2020).

Russia employs military interventions, economic sanctions, trade treaties, and energy resources to exert influence and retain control over the former Soviet Union countries. Russia's actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War can be characterized as neo-imperialism and neocolonialism, with economic dominance creating a reliance on the imperialist country (Baysha, 2018; Hryenevych, 2021; Rolfe, 2016; Saari, 2014; Yu, 2020). #Russiancolonialism, noted in Chapter Two (Baysha, 2018; Hrynevych, 2021; Rolfe, 2016), is a topic of Zelenskyy's PD and, thus, a salient consideration.

The results are theoretically consistent with the current complexities and challenges of geopolitical risk, especially in Ukraine and other former Soviet countries. The geopolitical risks posed by military conflicts or economic instability are highlighted, stressing the importance of countries adapting their foreign policy objectives appropriately. Kissinger's (2020) argument about balancing strategic security and safety margins is recognized. However, his unpopularity in Ukraine due to his opposition to international support is also mentioned because of Zelenskyy's pro-Ukrainian messaging and sentiment and unified public diplomatic endeavors. In international relations, realism and liberalism are examined as opposing viewpoints. While realism is chastised for undermining the concept of a shared European home, liberalism is chastised for failing to unite nations and cultures. The study alludes to D'Anieri's (2019) argument that realism-based justifications are too deterministic and that the fluidity of the international system allows for multiple views on Russia's motivations.

Systems and Large Powers. Most of the literature has a lens on systems and large powers as the loci of international relations. The Russo-Ukrainian War and the emergence of Zelenskyy have challenged traditional theories about the international system and state power, balancing several scholars in the field of IR (Romaniuk, 2011; Waltz, 1988; Weber, 2001). The conflict intensified on February 24, 2022, and its rarity can be attributed to states' adherence to

global norms and conventions following WWII (Baysha, 2018; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Hazony, 2022; Ikenberry, 2018; 2020).

The measured sentiment and linguistic traits of Zelenksyy's discourse are supported by Götz and Merlen's (2019) study, which suggests that the best defense is a potent offense. As president, his PD demonstrates high degrees of affiliation, ethnicity, in-group bias, and culture, as well as conflict and moralization references. All of these factors contribute to a picture of Zelenskyy's pro-Ukrainian orientation. Bass's (1990) transformational leadership theory is also addressed, emphasizing the impact of the environment because of leaders and their ability to change the culture of those they lead.

Overall, the findings offer an examination of multiple perspectives on geopolitical risk, international relations theories, and leadership. It recognizes the complexities and challenges inherent in the geopolitical landscape, especially for countries like Ukraine. A nuanced understanding of these dynamics must address the associated risks and create appropriate foreign policy responses.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of the few great-power-vs.-minor-power fights in history (Mearsheimer, 2001; Shirkey, 2019). This conflict has disrupted the Western liberal order, prompting IR thinkers to explain it (Götz & Merlen, 2019). According to scholars (Blank, 2020; Franklin & Waddis, 2004; Götz & McFaul, 2021; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Klvaňová, 2019; McGlynn, 2017; Saari, 2014; Sherr, 2013), Russia is trying to distance itself from the West while keeping coercive control over its former satellites. Russia sees itself as the Third Rome, defending traditional morality against Western decadence. (Galeotti, 2022b; Morrell, 2022b). However, current IR literature lacks empirical evidence to explain the Russo-Ukrainian War, and scholars have criticized the great-power balancing theory. (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2022; Nichols,

2022; Pouliot, 2010). Kleinschmidt (2019), Mearsheimer (2001; 2014), Morgenthau (1948), and D'Anieri (2019) examine the war's consequences from a realist viewpoint (2019).

Realism Is the Only Answer. The research findings illustrated a fundamental mismatch between the findings and the existing literature. Whereas the realist viewpoint argued that military threats, arms buildups, and hardline policies would be an ongoing feature of international relations, other theories and perspectives suggested other factors in Russia's aggression. Mezrich (2015) argued that Russia's behavior was driven by internal issues, such as a desire to weaken the liberal order and boost its credibility domestically. In contrast to the realist framework, which posited that Russia was driven by geopolitical pressure to prevent neighboring states from aligning with external powers (Mearsheimer, 2001), the research findings offer an alternative perspective on the realist framework and a fresh take on Russia's motivations. The findings also reveal that additional factors may be influencing states' behaviors and the strategies they adopt. Consequently, the research supplies evidence that other important factors should be considered when analyzing states' behaviors.

According to the findings, identity was essential in Zelenskyy's diplomacy, guiding his leadership discourse and promoting Ukrainian resistance. The linguistic findings of identification, nationalism, and other emotions were incompatible with realist tenets, which focused purely on power paradigms and were unaffected by diplomacy. The theoretical disagreement arose from the differences in international relations between realism and liberalism. Both liberalism and realism have been chastised for their failure to unite nations and cultures. D'Anieri (2019) argued that realism-based justifications were too deterministic and that the international system's fluidity allowed for numerous perspectives on Russia's motivations.

Realist scholars emphasized the international system's anarchy, states' inability to understand each other's intentions, and the focus on state survival. (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Waltz, 1979, 1988). Waltz (1979) concentrated on structural factors in his later work, particularly "Theory of International Politics," while ignoring the individual level of analysis. This omission prompted calls for an agent-oriented international relations approach that recognized leadership and decision-making. (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018).

The research highlighted military conflicts and economic insecurity as geopolitical risks, emphasizing the need for nations to adjust their foreign policy objectives. Kissinger's (2020) argument about balancing strategic security and safety margins was acknowledged, but his unpopularity in Ukraine was also noticed due to his opposition to international support. This finding was particularly significant given Zelenskyy's pro-Ukrainian messaging and coordinated PD efforts.

Sartre's (1956, 1964/2001) and Yu's (2020) findings on new imperialism, which included former colonial powers' continued exploitation and control, were pertinent to the Russo-Ukrainian War. Russia's use of military interventions, economic sanctions, trade treaties, and energy resources to maintain control over former Soviet Union countries exemplified neo-imperialism and neocolonialism. Economic dominance led to reliance on imperialist countries. (Baysha, 2018; Hryenevych, 2021; Rolfe, 2016; Saari, 2014; Yu, 2020). As discussed in Chapter 2 (Baysha, 2018; Hrynevych, 2021; Rolfe, 2016), Zelenskyy's PD efforts emphasized #Russiancolonialism.

F4: The Evolution of Zelenskyy's Diplomacy

The trajectory of Zelenskyy's diplomacy starts with a background as a media executive, actor, and comedian with extensive experience engaging with audiences. Nevertheless, the

findings indicate that Zelenskyy's operational style, shaped by his media experiences, underwent a significant transformation from November 2021 (the beginning of the Pre-crisis phase) to November 2022 (the end of the Kinetic phase).

During this period, Zelenskyy's utilization of direct PD intensified, with near-daily or multiple daily speeches aimed at disseminating infopolitik to Ukrainian and international audiences and conveying the more emotional, raw, and raw, and harrowing aspects of the war. Table 16 shows that the *increase in words per sentence* over the date-wise speech analysis peaked in the Kinetic phase. *More words per sentence* in LIWC-22 refers to an increase in the average number of words in each sentence within a given text sample. This metric is one of several linguistic features examined by LIWC-22 to investigate the psychological and emotional elements of a person's language use. A higher average number of words per sentence may indicate a more complicated or formal writing style. In contrast, a lower average may suggest a more straightforward or casual communication style. To better understand Zelenskyy's linguistic patterns and their psychological implications, considering this metric in conjunction with other LIWC-22 variables is necessary.

Further findings reveal several key trends in Zelenskyy's discourse events: an increase in the use of PD (refer to Appendix Q for speech counts) and changes in LIWC-22 variables, such as clout, social processes, social referents, and punctuation. The decrease in these variables reflects the evolution of Zelenskyy's diplomatic discourse as he refined his messaging, adopting a more purposeful language style in later phases. The decline in punctuation usage, particularly periods, demonstrates Zelenskyy's reliance on OSNs to disseminate his speeches. Typically delivered via video, the transcriptions of his addresses are available on the official website of the President of Ukraine. The speeches are presented unedited and in their original format, which

allows for a more accurate portrayal of Zelenskyy's personality traits than a curated collection might offer. Table 16 shows the decrease in *clout, social processes, social referents, all punctuation, and use of periods.*

Where Leadership Theory Fails. Anker (2007) contends that voluntary obedience to a state system is rooted in the belief in the political system's legitimacy, irrespective of whether it is based on a charismatic leader, legal procedures, or ancient traditions. While transformational leadership has demonstrated positive contributions, Avolio et al. (2009) highlight the need for further investigation to comprehend the factors predicting or determining such leadership and why some leaders exhibit this behavior while others do not.

Despite the considerable existing research, the call for more research into leadership traits in political science persists. One reason for this call is the dynamic nature of individual innovation and its influence on innovative behavior within political contexts (Afshar & Umrani, 2019). Current knowledge may only partially capture charismatic leadership's complexity and evolving nature and its impact on innovation within political organizations and institutions.

Interactions between governments are an important aspect of world politics, with two or more states attempting to decipher the reasoning behind each other's actions and predict their next moves. The critical problem is how leaders evaluate their counterparts' intentions and attitudes. This research showed the importance of going beyond traditional state-level analysis to better understand these interactions by considering the agency of the individual actors, as well as their psychological traits, communication styles, and decision-making processes. The study has given valuable insights into how individual players can shape foreign policy decisions and contribute to the complex dynamics of world politics by examining the interplay of domestic and international variables that influence leadership behavior. The research emphasized the

significance of "unpacking the state" by recognizing the internal complexities and variations that can influence foreign policy decisions. The framework for FPA offered a holistic approach to analysis, stressing the interplay of domestic and international factors that influence leadership behavior while allowing individual actors to exercise agency within the larger system. NLP and psycholinguistic modeling were also used to analyze decision-makers' language and comprehend the underlying psychological processes that drive foreign policy decisions.

Applying FPA in incorporating psychology and social psychological theories to decision-making in international politics focused on leadership psychometrics rather than policy outcomes. When FPA was combined with leadership theory and LTA (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002), the agent-actor level became the research focus. FPA was used in this research to investigate how leaders manage and influence the political environment and its constraints. This study's analysis of PD discourse employed a variety of subgenres of analysis, including linguistic and psychobiographical investigation.

This method provides a more thorough and contextualized knowledge of a global leader's discourse. The agent-actor level of the analysis showed a leader's sensitivity to information in their environment, which aided in understanding the actions and policies they were likely to advocate for their governments to implement. (Hermann et al., 2001).

Why IR Ignores Leadership. The LTA technique emphasizes that trait reliability is the low variability of qualities and behaviors. A subset of leadership traits is subordinated to crisis responses (M. G. Hermann, 1980a). The PsyCL data set provides a large-n data set of psychological characteristics of foreign policy actors, drawing on LTA and other psychological research programs (Schafer & Lambert, 2022). However, the data set is not delimited by crisis or peace indicators. There is an opportunity to investigate LTA further in the PsyCL data set

compared with Zelenskyy using crisis, conflict, or war as a filter. Hermann (1999/2002, 2005) indicates that a crisis impacts LTA and that different scores may be obtained from a leader under duress. Researchers can discover what factors limit or enable their decision-making by comparing a leader's stated goals with their actions. Examining how a leader's political principles influence their actions and strategies can assist in understanding recurring themes and agendas throughout their career.

As shown by the Russo-Ukrainian War, Francis Fukuyama's (1992; Kiçmari, 2018) prediction of the end of bravery, valor, and heroism due to men's hearts failing did not predict Zelenskyy's rise. Fukuyama's thesis was that liberal democracy would prevail, resulting in a more peaceful and stable world. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy's guidance during the Russo-Ukrainian War showed that bravery, courage, and heroism are still crucial in times of trouble. Zelenskyy's perseverance in the face of tremendous odds has inspired Ukrainians and others worldwide. Fukuyama was wrong—he rallied the people and resisted the invasion. Zelenskyy's rise as a leader and the Russo-Ukrainian War show that these traits still matter in modern politics and wars, disproving Fukuyama's thesis. Geopolitical tensions and new threats to global peace and security emphasize the need for strong leadership, courage, and heroism in a complex world.

Avolio et al. (2009) and Bass (1990, 1999) have conducted little research on leadership attributes outside of private sector contexts, highlighting the need for more scholarship on modern leadership and PD. The Russo-Ukrainian War highlighted a head-of-state's national security, foreign relations, and international affairs duties. Zelenskyy's leadership should be steady, predictable, and long-lasting in a democracy like Ukraine. (Avolio et al., 2009; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Byman & Pollack, 2001; M. G. Hermann, 1980a; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989; McDermott, 2004; Taylor, 1991). However, IR literature needs to explain Zelenskyy's world leadership, and hegemony does not explain Russia's lack of drive for global

leadership (Glaser, 2010; Götz, 2017; Götz & Merlen, 2019). It neither advances economic stability nor classical liberalism. Russia has not used soft power, which is more effective for global leadership. (Nye, 1990; 2017). Transnational dangers and geopolitical risks are subjective, according to Anderson (1983) and Götz and Merlen (2019).

Realism ignores the multivariable environment because the system-level analysis can explain the stability of the international political system but ignores the effect of human decision-making within a state, which can disrupt it. (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018).

F5: Systematic Analysis of Literature Data Using FPA Principles

The researcher systematically analyzed the literature data by generating codes through a manual reading, identifying emergent themes and patterns. As literature analysis advanced, additional sub-codes were created. These sub-codes were subsequently organized and rank-ordered under ten codes derived from FPA principles: history, international, socio-political, technological, open-source, risk, intercultural, capital and economics, and legal.

Blackboxing the State. Individual leaders' importance in foreign policy decision-making has been reviewed in the literature on international relations. While traditional approaches to FPA concentrate on state-level activity (Jervis, 1976; Waltz, 1979), a few scholars emphasize the significance of looking into individual actors in shaping policy decisions. Lasswell (1930, 1948a) pioneered the study of personality and politics by proposing that individuals project their internal conflicts onto the political sphere. George (1969) refined the theory and introduced the concept of the operational code, which includes the leader's fundamental political ideas about conflict, their assessment of their ability to influence events, and the method of achieving objectives (Hudson & Day, 2019).

According to McDermott (2004), personality theory helps explain pathological or idealized behavior in psychobiography, but experts should instead study the factors that cause behavior patterns. Leadership theories rely on traits and organizational development, ignoring psycholinguistics and other deep analyses. Psychobiography has helped explain the relationship between opinion and personality by systematically analyzing a subject's political views and their effects. (McDermott, 2004). Psychobiographical analysis of world leaders has helped intelligence agencies and governments solve foreign policy and statecraft problems. (Boyd et al., 2020; Kasser, 2017; McDermott, 2004; Wendt, 2012). Psychobiography could bridge the conjecture-data gap in leadership theory.

Interactions between governments are an important aspect of world politics, with two or more states attempting to decipher the reasoning behind each other's actions and predict their next moves. The critical problem is how leaders evaluate their counterparts' intentions and attitudes. This research showed the importance of going beyond traditional state-level analysis to better understand these interactions by considering the agency of the individual actors, as well as their psychological traits, communication styles, and decision-making processes. The study has given valuable insights into how individual players can shape foreign policy decisions and contribute to the complex dynamics of world politics by examining the interplay of domestic and international variables that influence leadership behavior. The research emphasized the significance of "unpacking the state" by recognizing the internal complexities and variations that can influence foreign policy decisions. The framework for FPA offered a holistic approach to analysis, stressing the interplay of domestic and international factors that influence leadership behavior while allowing individual actors to exercise agency within the more extensive system.

NLP and psycholinguistic modeling were also used to analyze decision-makers' language and comprehend the underlying psychological processes that drive foreign policy decisions.

FPA challenges the statist views of IR, as it was used to examine international political decision-making using psychological and social psychological theories in this study. Its focus on leadership psychometrics rather than policy results (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002) unboxes the state, which is central in IR and foreign policy literature (Kleinschmidt, 2019). FPA, leadership theory, and LTA stressed agent-actor analysis. Linguistic and psychobiographical analyses were used to contextualize a global leader's speech. The agent-actor level showed leaders' awareness of their environment, helping them to understand the actions and policies they would likely recommend to their governments. (Hermann et al., 2001).

New Hypothesis for FPA in Leadership Studies. The analysis of President Zelenskyy's discourse events revealed a distinct leadership style emphasizing action-oriented language, Ukrainian identity, and nationalism. These findings suggest that hypotheses about new leadership can be tested through mixed-methods research, including computational discourse analysis. The linguistic inquiry and LTA of Zelenskyy, which used two software programs, LIWC-22 (Pennebaker et al., n.d.) and Profiler Plus (Levine & Young, 2014), is a template for further research and generalization about leadership analysis.

The study's findings show that psychobiographical research has intrinsic value in FPA and, more generally, in IR fields. Findings 1, 2, and 3 show that a mixed-methods approach utilizing linguistic analysis and leadership trait assessment software is necessary to understand a leader's communication style and its implications for foreign policy decisions.

The IR literature has debated the importance of individual leaders in shaping foreign policy decision-making. While traditional approaches to FPA focus on state-level activity, some

scholars emphasize the importance of investigating individual actors in shaping policy choices. Lasswell (1930, 1948a) initiated research on personality and politics, proposing that individuals transfer their internal struggles onto the political realm. George (1969) refined the theory; he developed the concept of the operational code, which encompasses the leader's fundamental political ideas on conflict, their judgment of their capacity to influence events, and the chosen means of achieving goals. Additionally, the psychobiographical approach helps understand a leader's character and values, shaping their country's foreign policy decisions, as emphasized by M. G. Hermann's (1980a, 2001) work. While economic constraints and geopolitical realities shape foreign policy decisions, human decision-makers, and their psychological characteristics play a role (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002; McDermott, 2004). Understanding a leader's psychobiographical profile is crucial in comprehending foreign policy decisions in a larger sense (Josselson & Hopkins, 2015; Lasswell, 1930, 1948a; McDermott, 2004). It is important to recognize the influence of individual leaders on foreign policy decision-making. This necessitates rethinking current views of state-as-actor and foreign policy decision-making. To better understand a leader's foreign policy choices, consider their psychobiographical character and the interplay between people and their political, social, and cultural settings.

These variables allow a more nuanced and comprehensive grasp of foreign policy decision-making. FPA is a valuable technique for examining international relations and foreign policy from the perspective of specific actors, emphasizing the interplay of material and ideational factors. Researchers can understand recurring themes and agendas throughout their careers by comparing a leader's stated goals with their actions and examining how their political principles influence their decisions. The Russo-Ukrainian War emphasized the crucial role of a head of state in national security and foreign relations and their significance in international

affairs. As a primary decision-maker in a democratic state, Zelenskyy's assumed leadership skills are expected to be stable, predictable, and long-lasting (Avolio et al., 2009; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Byman & Pollack, 2001; M. G. Hermann, 1980a; M. G. Hermann & C. F. Hermann, 1989; McDermott, 2004; Taylor, 1991). However, the absence of a sufficient explanation in international relations literature for Zelenskyy's emergence as a global leader indicates the need for other explanations.

Despite Russia's desire to be a hegemonic power, it has no resolve for global leadership (Glaser, 2010; Götz, 2017; Götz & Merlen, 2019). It does not promote economic stability or support classical liberal ideals. Soft power is a more effective means of achieving global leadership, but Russia has not utilized this approach (Nye, 1990; 2017). According to Anderson (1983) and Götz and Merlen (2019), transnational threats and geopolitical risk perceptions are subjective and dependent on an observer's position within the global status quo. While system-level analysis can explain the stability of the international political system, it fails to account for the impact of human decision-making within a state, which can disrupt the system (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018).

Psychobiographical research in political psychology has become essential for connecting human decision-making with theoretical underpinnings, providing valuable insights into leadership case studies (Byman & Pollack, 2001; George, 1969; M. G. Hermann, 1980a; 1980b; 1999/2002; 2001; Hudson, 2005; Waltz, 1959). This approach falls within the parameters of FPA and helps explain leaders like Zelenskyy as agent actors (Alden & Aran, 2017; Hudson & Day, 2019; Jervis, 2018; Rosenau, 1966). Researchers have examined different linguistic and multidisciplinary methods in the literature to objectively evaluate leadership components such as language qualities. Discourse Analysis, Political Discourse Analysis, and Linguistic Inquiry are

three methods. (Carta, 2019; Carta & Narminio, 2021; Gough, 2001; Oddo, 2011; Yanovets & Smal, 2020).

Psychobiography has contributed to understanding the connection between opinion and personality by systematically examining the specific character and implications of a subject's political attitudes and views (McDermott, 2004). Psychobiographical analysis of world leaders has been used to develop frameworks and predictive abilities to aid intelligence services and governments in addressing foreign policy and statecraft challenges (Boyd et al., 2020; Kasser, 2017; McDermott, 2004; Wendt, 2012). Psychobiography is a methodology in political psychology that utilizes a psychological lens and case study method based on historical data and facts to gain insight into individuals' past or present lives (Ferrer & Ponterrotto, 2020; Van Niekerk et al., 2019). The approach involves applying psychological concepts, principles, or theories to understand the behavior and decision-making of leaders (Kasser, 2017; Mayer & Kovary, 2019; McDermott, 2004; Tackman et al., 2019; Van Niekerk et al., 2019). Psychobiographies often explore the reflexive relationship between individuals and their political, social, and cultural contexts and promote a more rigorous scientific approach (Ferrer & Ponterotto, 2020; Kasser, 2017; Schultz & Lawrence, 2017).

Psychobiographical research has been used to better understand leadership techniques and principles and connect personality with an opinion by examining the character and implications of a subject's political attitudes and views (Houghton, 2007; McDermott, 2004; Preston, 2000). This methodology allows researchers to uncover the factors that limit or enable a leader's decision-making by comparing their stated goals with their actions. Examining how a leader's political principles influence their actions and strategies can assist in understanding recurring themes and agendas throughout their career.

In Figure 8, the conceptual approach to analysis for this study which resulted in the findings, is detailed.

Figure 8

FPA Coding Matrix for Chapter Two Literature Review

The research has demonstrated that individual leaders' psychological characteristics, economic constraints, and geopolitical realities contribute to forming foreign policy decisions. As a result of the study results, state-as-actor and foreign policy decision-making theories must incorporate the part of individual leaders. The study establishes a foundation for individual leaders' psychological characteristics, foreign policy, and international relations.

Conclusions

A literature review for agreement and disagreement with the study's findings is included in the following sections. A second review of the literature was conducted for alignment with the conclusions of this study.

C1: Zelenskyy, Ukraine, and the War the World Watched

Conclusion 1 is the summation of findings that uncovered a constellation of psychometric traits and leadership style traits of Zelenskyy. The purpose of Herman's (1999/2002) LTA is

ultimately the determination of a leadership style. It is not simply to understand a leader's self-confidence level or whether they harbor a distrust of others. LTA has been proven valid and reliable (see Chapter 4) for at-a-distance psychological evaluations of political leadership. Hermann's extensive research on political leaders and heads of state resulted in a formulary for determining leadership style.

Using data from the research findings, specifically from the Profile Plus-LTA, Zelenskyy is a consultative leader under Hermann's paradigm (2005). When Zelenskyy's traits of a high *need for power* and a lower *belief in one's own ability to control events* are combined, this presents a leader who will *respect constraints* (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002*)*. Subsequently, Zelenskyy's LTA scores show that his *conceptual complexity* and *self-confidence* scores show a leader who is *closed to information* or is considered "generally strategic" (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 95). The complete codex for Hermann's leadership style framework is found in Appendix P. This literature analysis explored the importance of history in understanding the present. While existing literature has established a consistent but changing relationship between history and current events, none of it covers the full scope of the phenomenon that emerged in the Russo-Ukrainian War, specifically the leadership of Zelenskyy. However, existing historical narratives can be used to create a foundational map of analogues and parallels in war, imperialistic ambition, great powers versus small countries, and the rise of nationalism as a unifying power.

Despite the existing literature on leadership, primarily transformational or charismatic, the emergence of Zelenskyy as a global leader with impactful discourse lacks sufficient explanation (Götz & Merlen, 2019; Zug, 2018). To better understand Zelenskyy's leadership and foreign policy decisions, scholars have suggested the use of psychobiographical analysis (M. G. Hermann, 1980a, 2001; M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998), the LTA technique (Schafer & Lambert, 2022), and FPA (Hudson, 2005). These approaches provide valuable insights into

leadership decision-making and the interplay of material and ideational factors in international relations. By examining leaders' personality traits, language patterns, and psychometric dimensions, we can understand their decision-making processes and recurring themes throughout their careers (McDermott, 2004; Preston, 2000).

Psychobiographies of political leaders typically utilize a psychological lens and case study method based on longitudinal data and historical facts (Ferrer & Ponterrotto, 2020; Van Niekerk et al., 2019). Applying psychological concepts, principles, or theories to gain insight into individuals' past or present lives is psychobiography (Kasser, 2017; Mayer & Kovary, 2019; McDermott, 2004; Tackman et al., 2019; Van Niekerk et al., 2019). Such biographies usually emphasize the reflexive relationship between individuals and their political, social, and cultural contexts and promote a more rigorous scientific approach (Ferrer & Ponterotto, 2020; Kasser, 2017; Schultz & Lawrence, 2017).

The concept of soft power is centered around the notion that desired outcomes can be achieved through attraction and not by force or financial incentives. In other words, by providing people with something they are naturally drawn to, it is possible to influence and shape their opinions and preferences in a specific direction (Nye, 2017). Previous research has suggested that psychobiography can aid in understanding leadership techniques and principles and contribute to the link between opinion and personality by systematically examining the character and effects of a subject's political attitudes and views (Houghton, 2007; McDermott, 2004; Preston, 2000). Soft power, or Zelenskyy's ability to captivate others through his style.

Zelenskyy's dedicated strategy to obtain international assistance aided his achievement. (Appendix U). He went overseas several times to speak with foreign officials and try to build solid ties with them. Improved reputation and integrity facilitated the acquisition of foreign aid

for Ukraine, with President Zelenskyy's soft power, leadership abilities, and demeanor playing a critical role in the nation's success. The President's anti-corruption stance, assertive approach, and personal qualities influenced the views of foreign countries, rendering them more inclined to assist Ukraine.

Leadership in Crisis: Clausewitz's Trinity. During the war, Zelenskyy's PD changed quantitative metrics, indicating two key aspects: first, PD discourse in crises is not a leader's typical modus operandi but instead should be viewed as a reflection of personality traits and psychometrics under pressure; and second, the Russo-Ukrainian War can be attributed to Zelenskyy's evolution of traits, discourse, and linguistic evolution.

Over time, a notable decrease in clout attributes within LIWC-22 has been observed for Zelenskyy. In LIWC-22, clout refers to language that conveys social standing, power, and authority. Zelenskyy's loss of clout attributes could result from a deliberate decision to use a more casual and approachable language style in his PD efforts to connect with the public and present himself as a relatable leader during times of crisis or increased PD efforts. Clausewitz (1832/2017) delves into the concept of arming the nation and its incremental effect on undermining the enemy's army. This excerpt also broadens the discussion to encompass an international perspective by examining foreign policy and its various components, such as traditional and PD. Over time, PD has evolved considerably due to technological advancements, giving rise to modernized statecraft highlighting the significance of transparency, accountability, and citizen engagement in government policies. The spread of policy ideas facilitates this modernization through digital channels and global media coverage. These shifts hold substantial implications for international relations and foreign policymaking.

Zelenskyy's frequent speeches, which have increased the intensity of his PD efforts, may use more emotional language to communicate positive or negative feelings. LIWC-22 analysis reveals a change in Zelenskyy's linguistic style over time, from a formal and structured approach to a more expressive and dynamic approach, most likely in response to a crisis or increased PD efforts. The Trinity of Clausewitz (Figure 3) offers a conceptual framework for the paradoxical aspects of conflict (Clausewitz, 1832/2017). The findings show that correlational links between enmity and strategic dominance are apparent in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Ukraine's reaction to the invasion and its perceived superiority demonstrated through creative and collaborative efforts emphasize the significance of human emotions and leadership rhetoric (Cochrane et al., 2022e; E. A. Cohen, 2022; Echevarria II, 2022; Foer, 2022; Lister, 2022; Marson, 2022).

The evaluation of Zelenskyy's speeches shows significant shifts in his linguistic style over time, with significant differences in selected LIWC-22 scores between his pre-crisis and kinetic speeches. Pre-crisis speeches are more formal and structured, with better ratings in clout, social processes, social referents, all punctuation, and period use. In comparison, kinetic speeches are more fluid and expressive, with higher word-per-sentence scores. However, due to the scarcity of speeches made during Zelenskyy's inaugural and mid-term phases, this research is limited by the need for more data from those periods.

The data collected provides insights into Zelenskyy's diplomatic style and leadership traits without requiring a quantity-to-quantity match. Zelenskyy's expanded use of PD and discourse events as the war progressed showed leadership traits and style indicative of engagement and outreach. He scored higher than other leaders needing power and ingroup bias but lower in task concentration and conceptual complexity. These results suggest that

Zelenskyy's linguistic style and leadership traits may have consequences for his political objectives and persona, and future studies could look into these implications in different contexts.

In the pre-crisis phase, Zelenskyy exhibited more social processes. Language analysis of social behaviors includes a wide range of social actions or references to them. Previously, studies used a broad "social processes" variable, but the "social behaviors" category now contains several subcategories. (Table 15). The referents identified in the analysis are divided into several categories: prosocial behaviors that reflect helping or caring for others, primarily on an interpersonal level; politeness markers that conform to social norms and manners, such as "please" and "thank you"; interpersonal conflict words that denote concepts related to conflict, such as "fight," "kill," and "argue"; and moralization words that involve judgmental language in evaluating others' behavior or character, either positively or negatively (Boyd et al., 2022a). These categories provide a thorough knowledge of social behaviors conveyed through language and insights into various communication and social interaction aspects (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).

Leaders' scores may vary during crises from those in non-crisis situations, and the subjects addressed in their speeches may highlight these differences. Crisis-related topics, such as "aggression from another country" or "threats to ethnic group," are more likely to exhibit crisis behavior than other topics, such as the economy or education. It is critical to distinguish between crises and non-crises because leaders prefer to emphasize their high-scoring traits during difficult times.

For example, leaders with a strong need for power are more apt to emphasize this trait during a crisis. This underscored characteristic is evident in leaders with relatively consistent scores across situations, suggesting they are less susceptible to their environments. On the other

hand, leaders with highly variable ratings across situations are more likely to become indecisive and reactive during emergencies, relying more on the aid and support of others (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002).

C2: Slava Ukraini

Conclusion 2, **Slava Ukraini,** focuses on the Ukrainian identity and purpose in the War. The analysis showed Zelenskyy's psychometric scores and leadership traits to uphold a pro-Ukrainian sentiment and focus on purpose consistently. This section will explain the findings, the conclusion, and the literature review of sources that agree with an individual level of impact in IR and those that remain dogmatically entrenched in the power of realism.

Leaders with a high ingroup bias frequently prioritize maintaining their group's distinct identity and are sensitive to outside interference. (Franklin & Waddis, 2004; Langdon & Tismaneanu, 2020; Sofiienko, 2020). History is vital for examining past events and comprehending their relevance to modern society. Numerous authors contribute valuable historical context for the Russo-Ukrainian War and the historiography of Ukraine, Russia, and modern European nation-states (Allison & Ferguson, 2016; Anker, 2007; 2014; D'Anieri, 2019; Dumbarton Oaks Archives, 2017; Fukuyama, 1992; Hazony, 2022; Kotkin, 2017; 2022; Neustadt, 1990; Office of the Historian, n.d.; Preston, 2000; Rolfe, 2016; Waltz, 1979; Yale Law School, 2008).

Despite its complexities, nationalism remains a potent mechanism for forging connections and identities beyond traditional characteristics. Leadership with strong nationalistic connections has a more participatory foreign policy approach. (M. G. Hermann, 1980a; Solomon, 2015). Zelenskyy's use of ethnicity, culture, power, in-group base, drive, achievement, and anger are consistent with the findings of the Russo-Ukrainian War and Ukraine's pursuit of self-determination. These aspects are critical in promoting national unity, instilling a strong sense

of nationalism, and encouraging a collective commitment to the country's strategic and vital interests.

Ethnicity and Culture. By emphasizing Ukraine's distinct ethnic and cultural identities, Zelenskyy has fostered unity among Ukrainians and strengthened their determination to face external threats. This emphasis on shared history and values is consistent with research on nationalism as a force for emancipation and civil rights. (Burns, 1978/2012; Josselson & Hopkins, 2015; Lasswell, 1930, 1948a; Lowry, 2018; Syed, 1963).

Power and In-Group Bias. Zelenskyy's leadership style shows an ability to mobilize and empower the in-group, the Ukrainian population. Zelenskyy has strengthened the nation's resolve to protect its sovereignty and resist foreign aggression by uniting Ukrainians around their shared identity and common interests.

Zelenskyy's resolve and dedication to Ukraine's strategic and vital interests and his pursuit of self-determination exemplify his drive and achievement orientation. These characteristics leveraged Ukrainian resilience, which has faced numerous challenges, including Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, the ongoing war in the Donbas, and the recognition of separatist regions. (Boyko, 2021; Cochrane et al., 2022b; Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2021; Kleinschmidt, 2019; Ochkina, 2019; Shveda & Park, 2016; Way, 2014).

Anger. Using anger in Zelenskyy's speeches and rhetoric motivates Ukrainians and strengthens their dedication to resisting the invasion. This is consistent with Clausewitz's Trinity of Paradoxes, which recognizes passion as an essential component of conflict (Clausewitz, 1832/2017; E. A. Cohen, 2022; Coker, 2017; Echevarria II, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2001; Smith, 2016; Waltz, 1988). Zelenskyy rallied the Ukrainian people behind the country's defense plan, eventually contributing to its resilience and determination in the face of adversity.

C3: The Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model

Conclusion 3 from this study is the *Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model © 2022.* Its development directly results from the research study, literature coding, and findings. The research utilized qualitative coding in the literature analysis to organize, categorize, and assess the data from the numerous references consulted, providing a comprehensive overview of the available information. The researcher employed qualitative coding to categorize the individual data based on the themes and patterns identified during the study. The study was based on a conceptual approach from FPA, which encompasses six principles of analysis: multi-factorial, multi-level, multi-/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-focused, and actor-specific (Hudson & Day, 2019). As the literature analysis progressed, additional sub-codes were created. See Figure 8 in Chapter 4 for the model of 31 sub-codes.

These sub-codes were then organized and rank-ordered under the ten codes derived from FPA principles: history, international, socio-political, technological, open-source, risk, intercultural, capital and economics, and legal. This process allowed for a systematic and rigorous approach to organizing and analyzing the literature data and provided valuable insights into the cultural, historical, and political factors that shaped or accompanied PD, foreign policy decisions, and leadership actions.

The researcher used ten codes from FPA principles to organize and categorize the qualitative data into categories such as history, international, socio-political, technological, open-source, risk, intercultural, capital and economics, and legal (HISTORICAL, see Figure 9). The researcher also utilized other environmental assessment tools and analysis methods to support the literature coding process. Environmental scanning involves collecting, analyzing, and utilizing information about a state's domestic and international context to identify opportunities and

threats, global trends, and lessons that can impact its foreign policy and strategy. By incorporating FPA, applied history, and environmental scanning as analytical perspectives, the researcher developed an assessment tool for psychobiographical research, organizational behavior, and analysis of global leadership (K. S. Albright, 2004; Allison, 1999; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Boyd et al., 2022a; Bronfenbrenner, 1993; Ferrer & Ponterotto, 2020; Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019; Lasswell, 1930, 1948a, 1948b; Schmieder-Ramirez & Mallette, 2007; Snyder et al., 1954, 1962, 2002; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).

Figure 9

Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model

HISTORICAL emerged as the researcher's heuristic framework for coding historical data, event data, strategic risks, systemic variations, and atmospherics. This framework contributed to the development of a model for FPA. Coding entailed carefully reviewing the data and assigning codes based on themes and patterns that appeared during the research (Saldaña &

Mallette, 2017). Additional sub-codes were generated as the literature inquiry proceeded—

Figure 10 depicts the literature review's sub-codes, which provide insights into the cultural,

historical, and political variables that affected Zelenskyy's PD, foreign policy choices, and

leadership actions. See Appendix R for literature codes and subcodes.

HISTORICAL. The definitions of each component of the Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy

Analysis Model are the author's, with credit given to the sources that inspired the final version.

History. A phenomenon or the study of those phenomena and analogous circumstances or

variables found in past events or narratives. Historical analysis will examine parallels, policies,

and respective successes and failures (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Armitage & Guldi, 2014; G. W.

Brown et al., 2018; Neustadt & May, 1988; Walton et al., 2016). History categorically includes

applied history, psychobiographical data, precedential and base-case analysis.

International Relations. An examination of factors beyond the national borders of an

organization or nation. The international system category considers an explanation and analysis

of actors, countries, and transnational and multinational factors (Hudson & Day, 2019).

Socio-Political: A combination of social and political factors for observation and analysis

related to people or society in general, activities, movements, cooperative and independent

relationships, rank, or status. Actions, ideals, and currents in society have a relationship with

governmental actors, policies, politics, or systems (Lasswell, 1930, 1948a, 1948b).

Technological. Identified information, machines, methods, capabilities, science,

engineering, innovations, or advancements applied explicitly to a particular area, industry,

problem set, or natural setting.

Open-Source. OSINT is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic

form, including all forms of media: newspapers, magazines, books, journals, editorials,

television, radio, the Internet, video sharing services, file-share, cloud-based messaging, social

networking platforms, commercial databases, trade magazines, graphics, drawings, speeches

(Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.).

Risk. Understanding and identifying probabilities that loss, damage, threat, vulnerability,

or peril will reach, impact, affect or make susceptible a business, organization, policy, society, or

country (K. S. Albright, 2004; Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

Intercultural. Description and awareness of events and phenomena that impact two or

more cultures. These can be within a single nation or can encompass a multinational range of

issues. The emphasis is on differences in ways of thinking, practices of life, belief systems, or

cultural priorities (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

Capital and Economics. Principles of assets, earnings, equities, stock, advantages,

possessions, goods, or accumulations in relation to actors and externalities of an organization.

Analysis of the significance of goods' production, consumption, and distribution. Considerations

of impact on capital and economic functions of an organization, entity, or country.

Analytics. Analysis of data or information for predictive, cognitive, and optimized

decision-making. Statistical evidence is used to discover and interpret patterns for better, more

informed policy creation (Researcher definition).

Legal. Consideration for actions, statutes, rulings, laws, regulations, or oversights related

to people, states, countries, industries, and institutions with derived authority from a legal body;

judge, government, legislature, governor, or mandate (Schmieder-Ramirez & Mallette, 2007).

The Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model. The researcher's Brittain-Hale

Foreign Policy Analysis Model (Figure 9), as explained in the previous section, was an iterative

data collection and coding process, literature review, and identification of patterns and themes in

the data. These patterns and themes informed the development and refinement of a theoretical framework to explain the data. The model offers a conceptual approach to examining foreign policy, drawing on FPA, Applied History, and environmental scanning as analytical lenses. Ten codes were derived from FPA principles to guide the organization and evaluation of the literature review, and other environmental assessment tools were consulted to support the coding process. The data were qualitatively coded by combining FPA and environmental scanning, creating an acronym, HISTORICAL. See Figure 9.

Figure 10

Fully Coded Literature Review Matrix

Implications

The implications of this study challenge traditional IR theory about state power and the international system. The emergence of the Russo-Ukrainian War and Zelenskyy's leadership during the conflict disrupted the Western liberal order and led to a search for explanations among IR theorists. The conflict has also highlighted a gap in the literature on great-power vs. minor-power battles. The current explanations based on great-power balancing have been criticized for needing more empirical evidence. Therefore, this study's empirical evidence on Zelenskyy's communication strategies during the conflict provides valuable insights for scholars to understand the complex dynamics of the war and its implications. Furthermore, the study's use of mixed-methods analysis, including LTA, LIWC-22, and SPSS, provides a framework for future research on leadership, discourse, and psychobiography in crises. Overall, this study has implications for understanding the Russo-Ukrainian War and future research on crisis leadership and the international system.

The Russo-Ukrainian War and the emergence of Zelenskyy have challenged traditional theory about the international system and state power, balancing several scholars in the field of IR (Romaniuk, 2011; Waltz, 1988; Weber, 2001). The conflict intensified on February 24, 2022, and its rarity can be attributed to states' adherence to global norms and conventions following WWII (Baysha, 2018; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Hazony, 2022; Ikenberry, 2018; 2020). While there are a limited number of great-power vs. minor-power battles in the literature (Glaser, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2001; Shirkey, 2019), the emergence of the Russo-Ukrainian War is rare. The conflict has shaken the Western liberal order, prompting IR theorists to seek an explanation (Götz & Merlen, 2019). Researchers propose that Russia's actions represent an effort to distance itself from the West while maintaining coercive control over its former satellite states (Blank,

2020; Franklin & Waddis, 2004; Götz & McFaul, 2021; Götz & Merlen, 2019; Klvaňová, 2019; McGlynn, 2017; Saari, 2014; Sherr, 2013).

Russia perceives itself as the antithesis of Western decadence and views itself as the keeper of conservative moral values, positioning itself as the Third Rome (Galeotti, 2022b; Morrell, 2022b). However, the current literature on IR lacks sufficient empirical evidence to explain the Russo-Ukrainian War, and scholars have criticized the explanation of great-power balancing (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2022; Nichols, 2022; Pouliot, 2010). Realist perspectives on the war and its implications are explored through the works of Kleinschmidt (2019), Mearsheimer (2001, 2014), Morgenthau (1948), and D'Anieri (2019).

The Realist Disagreement

Mearsheimer's assertion that every state aims to maximize its relative power to achieve hegemony has been challenged by the shortcomings of realist theories in explaining the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022 (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018). Realist theories in international relations focus mainly on systemic-level actors and state variables, which inadequately account for Putin's rationale and Zelenskyy's response to the conflict (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Waltz, 1959, 1979). These theories center on power competition among states but fail to consider the impact of leadership within those states (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1959, 1979).

According to Waltz (1979), while anarchic systems share fundamental principles, the configuration of such systems can vary based on the number of major powers involved and how they share power. On the other hand, structural theories focusing on the constraints imposed by the international system's design on the behavior of dominant powers fall short of explaining the

Russo-Ukrainian War (Hudson, 2005; Hudson & Day, 2019). As a result, it is essential to recognize behavioral patterns among major powers operating within anarchic systems.

Realist scholars often dispute three central ideas: the anarchic nature of the international system, the inability of states to ascertain each other's intentions, and the goal of states to survive (Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Waltz, 1979, 1988). This section highlights the limitations of international relations in explaining leadership behaviors and decision-making and calls for a more comprehensive understanding of leadership by exploring the motivations and behaviors of leaders. Waltz's framework of the Three Images of International Relations presents three distinctive levels of analysis: the first image concentrates on the individual level, the second revolves around the state level, and the third scrutinizes the global system level. Back in 1959, Waltz emphasized the importance of studying individual-level variables such as human nature and psychology to understand the processes of international relations.

However, in his later work, particularly in his 1979 book "Theory of International Politics," he focused more on structural factors and largely ignored the role of individuals and their decisions. This neglect of the individual level of analysis created gaps in Waltz's theory, leading to calls for an agent-oriented perspective that recognizes the importance of leadership and decision-making in shaping international relations (Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018; Walt, 1999).

Recommendations

Examining President Zelenskyy's language, leadership, and foreign policy during the Russo-Ukrainian War has opened new paths for further research and study. The findings of this study indicate that more research should examine the role of language in shaping foreign policy choices, dispute resolution, and global leadership. Other methodologies could be utilized for

increased understanding and perspectives of PD, Zelenskyy, and crisis leadership. Those recommendations are included in the following section. Recommendations for policy and practitioner disciplines and future research are included in the following section.

The researcher intends to continue the exploration of FPA applied to the study of leadership through discourse analysis. The findings and conclusions of this study validate that FPA can provide a valuable perspective on the influence of individual decision-makers' personalities, language patterns, and psychometric dimensions on policy outcomes. By evaluating global leaders' worldviews, narratives, and objectives, FPA can anticipate policy shifts and assess the level of collaboration or conflict between leaders, considering domestic and international contexts. Through its focus on the interplay of material and ideational factors and human agency, FPA offers unique insights into the processes that shape and change interdisciplinary relationships, business, and policy, providing a valuable framework for understanding state behavior in the context of international relations.

Recommendations for Methodology

To further explore Zelenskyy, leadership traits, and PD within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, alternative methodological approaches that could be utilized encompass the following.

Content Analysis: A systematic examination of textual or visual content to identify patterns, themes, and trends. This approach can analyze documents such as policy papers, media coverage, and diplomatic communiqués.

Case Study Comparison: Comparative analysis of multiple cases to explore similarities and differences in leadership styles and PD strategies in different conflict situations or regions.

Digital Ethnography: A qualitative approach that involves in-depth observation and immersion in a specific social setting to understand the cultural context and the behavior of individuals and groups, which can provide insights into how leaders interact with their followers and other stakeholders via digital/online social networks.

Interviews and Focus Groups: Conduct interviews or focus groups with key stakeholders, such as policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and academics, to gain insights into their perceptions of the leadership traits and PD tactics under investigation.

Social Network Analysis: A quantitative approach that investigates the relationships and interactions among individuals, groups, or organizations to understand the influence of social networks on decision-making processes and the diffusion of information.

Experimental Research: Designing and conducting experiments to test hypotheses related to leadership traits and PD strategies, which can help establish causal relationships between variables and provide a more rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of specific tactics.

Recommendations for Policy and Practitioners

This study's findings have applications in disciplines such as conflict resolution and diplomatic negotiations. Understanding the impact of identity and nationalism on President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's discourse, for instance, could inform effective engagement strategies with other leaders who place a premium on these concepts. In addition, the knowledge of leadership characteristics and linguistic patterns gained from this study may aid in predicting and managing global leaders' behavior in high-stakes situations.

FPA. Based on the findings demonstrating the value of FPA and psychobiographical analysis in leadership studies, a mixed-methods approach combining linguistic analysis and leadership trait assessment software is recommended for foreign policy practitioners. Governments and international organizations should invest in these research methods to

effectively interpret leaders' communication styles and decision-making processes, identifying

potential conflicts or opportunities for collaboration (Allison & Ferguson, 2016; D'Anieri, 2019;

Götz & Merlen, 2019).

Incorporating psychobiographical analysis into FPA can help us better understand how

individual leaders interact with their political, social, and cultural environments. (M. G.

Hermann, 2005). This integrated strategy may result in a more comprehensive knowledge of

foreign policy decision-making, allowing policymakers to devise more informed and

contextually relevant strategies for navigating complex international relations.

LTA. A policy recommendation based on these pieces of information is that LTA should

be used in understanding the decision-making process of heads of state during times of crisis.

Researchers can gain insight into recurring themes and agendas throughout their careers by

examining how a leader's political principles influence their actions and strategies. Furthermore,

the lack of a sufficient explanation in IR literature for Zelenskyy's emergence as a global leader

highlights the need for other explanations, including psychobiographical analysis.

Strategic Communications. The concept of strategic communication is a subject of

debate, and its definition has evolved over time. It encompasses the use of communication to

coordinate various elements of national influence, particularly in the military sphere. The

distinction between strategic communication and propaganda in politics is a matter of contention,

as both seek to influence the thoughts and actions of individuals. Strategic communication

professionals can play a variety of roles, ranging from overseeing national communication

strategies to producing individual messages and products. The power of strategic communication

professionals is dynamic and shaped by conflicting visions, practices, and understandings that

influence the way states approach and implement strategic communication (Izhutova, 2019;

Michelsen & Colley, 2019). Further research is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the role of strategic communication in international affairs, as it has the potential to shape international communications.

Recommendations for Future Research

Future research could explore machine learning and artificial intelligence in analyzing global leaders' language. These tools allow for more advanced analysis of linguistic patterns and semantic structures, providing a deeper understanding of how language conveys meaning and shapes perceptions. Overall, there is a wealth of opportunities for future research in the study of global leaders' language in their foreign policy statements, speeches, and other forms of communication, with the potential to uncover new insights and advance our understanding of international politics.

Zelenskyy as a Transformational Leader. Although touched on the theoretical framework of this study, the question of Zelenskyy as a transformational leader still needs to be answered. One possible future study subject would be determining whether Volodymyr Zelenskyy's leadership approach can be classified as transformational. This form of leadership entails meeting the deeper requirements of followers and involving them on all levels, which may result in a change in awareness and ethical desire in both the leader and the led. Researchers could evaluate whether Zelenskyy possesses the qualities of a transformational leader and add to our knowledge of leadership in conflict circumstances by analyzing his PD efforts and leadership strategies.

Zelenskyy and Social Media. There are several promising directions for future research on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's use of social media and PD. One avenue for analysis is LIWC-22 and LTA via Profiler Plus to better understand his public statements'

language and leadership style. Another potential study area is a comprehensive PsychCL analysis of Zelenskyy's PD, including LTA and Operational Code Analysis.

Zelenskyy's Languages: Russian, Ukrainian, and English. A future research opportunity would be to conduct a comparative analysis of Zelenskyy's speeches in Ukrainian and Russian using LIWC-22 to understand how he uses language differently depending on his audience and political context. LTA could also reveal whether Zelenskyy adopts different tones or emphasizes different themes depending on his language.

Evaluation

The researchers' assessment that using two computational analysis methods for linguistic inquiry offered a more comprehensive grasp of the impacts of linguistics on leadership is acknowledged in this dissertation evaluation. A contextualized study was provided by comparing Zelenskyy's discourse to the speeches of U.S. Congressional Leaders using LIWC-22. Recent LIWC-22 developments include Ukrainian and Russian dictionaries, which could have aided in a multilingual study of Zelenskyy and previous Ukrainian leaders. The researcher, however, was unable to investigate these additional sources and study approaches due to time constraints and the demands of doctoral research. Furthermore, the speech corpus used to develop LIWC-22 is centered on American leadership.

At the same time, Zelenskyy was included in a group of 113 global leaders analyzed by M. G. Hermann (1980a, 1999/2002, 2001, 2005), which informed the development of the PsyCL leadership assessment tool by Schafer & Lambert (2022). The study drew sophisticated insights from natural language processing analytics produced by Profiler Plus's LTA (Levine & Young, 2014) and LIWC-22, made possible by the accessible open dataset (Pennebaker et al., n.d.). Despite diligent attempts to identify theoretical or conceptual explanations for Zelenskyy's

position as a one-of-a-kind and successful Ukrainian leader, certain limitations remained. Language and psychobiographical analysis of previous Ukrainian leaders could have aided the study. Neither Schafer & Lambert (2022) nor Hermann's (1999/2002) study included Ukrainian political figures.

Summary

This study introduced the background and context of the study, conceptual and theoretical frameworks underpinning the study, a complete literature review, a case study approach, quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and various software analysis tools. The study produced significant results, which were explained, and the resulting conclusions are also included.

Zelenskyy's Public Diplomacy

During the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rose to the moment and demonstrated excellent command, notably in his approach to PD. Zelenskyy's successful use of social media and public statements helped shape international and domestic perceptions of the war. This study examined how Zelenskyy's language, leadership qualities, and foreign policy influenced his leadership results during the conflict. Zelenskyy's public speeches were read, and his rhetorical methods, speech patterns, and semantic structures were determined. In his PD approach, Zelenskyy demonstrated a strong sense of agency, adaptability, and collaboration, according to the study. His linguistic patterns were often optimistic, implying self-assurance and optimism.

Furthermore, the study discovered a complex interplay of material and conceptual factors in shaping state behavior. It emphasized internal political needs and foreign political realities influenced Zelenskyy's judgments. This research adds to leadership and conflict resolution

knowledge by giving insights into a global leader's psychobiographical aspects, values, and motives during a crisis.

The FPA Framework and NLP

This study used a framework from FPA to investigate the PD of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine, focusing on PD discourse and the psychobiography of political leadership demonstrated through PD. The study aimed to understand President Zelenskyy's leadership qualities by analyzing his diplomatic efforts in the Ukraine conflict. The FPA framework considered domestic and international variables influencing leadership conduct (Snyder et al., 2002). It combined Hudson's actor-specific theory (2005), which focused on individual players who influenced foreign policy and analyzed psychobiographical variables such as personality traits, cognitive biases, and emotional states. Additionally, natural language processing psycholinguistic modeling was used to understand decision-makers' language and the psychological processes that influenced foreign policy choices.

The study emphasized the significance of "unboxing the state," recognizing the internal complexities and variations that could impact foreign policy decisions. The FPA framework offered a comprehensive analysis method, stressing the interplay of domestic and international variables that influence leadership conduct, allowing for the agency of individual players within the broader system. Furthermore, NLP psycholinguistic modeling analyzed decision-makers' language and comprehended the underlying psychological processes influencing foreign policy choices.

The use of FPA to apply psychology and social psychological theory to decision-making in international politics did not examine the outcome. Instead, it was an examination of leadership communication psychometrics. The agent-actor level became the new focal point of

the investigation when FPA was utilized with leadership theory and LTA (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). This study employed FPA to examine how leaders controlled and influenced the political atmosphere and environmental constraints. This study's analysis of PD discourse utilized several subgenres of analysis, including linguistic and psychobiographical examination.

Employing such a method facilitated a deeper and more contextualized understanding of a global leader's discourse. The agent-actor level of analysis highlighted how sensitive a prominent leader was to information in their surroundings, which aided in deciphering the actions and policies they were likely to advocate for within their governments (Hermann et al., 2001).

LTA and Public Diplomacy

This study utilized LTA to analyze leadership behavior in foreign policy decision-making (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002). LTA identifies seven traits that are useful in assessing leadership style. This framework has been applied in various contexts, including analyses of presidential decision-making in the United States and international negotiations. The traits analyzed include the need for power, conceptual complexity, task versus interpersonal focus, self-confidence, locus of control, distrust of others, and in-group bias (M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, 2005).

Transformational leadership theory was also considered as a peripheral augmentation to LTA. By taking into account the main components of transformational leadership, namely individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and idealized influence, researchers can obtain a deeper understanding of effective leadership (Burns, 1978/2012). PD is a leadership strategy for Zelenskyy that incorporates these ideals. The morality of leadership is not required. However, moral leadership emerges at the climax of the

process when transformational leadership raises the bar for human behavior and ethical desire among both the leader and the led (Burns, 1978/2012).

This study's findings provide valuable insights into the leadership characteristics that can impact foreign policy decisions. By analyzing these traits, policymakers and academics can better understand leaders' decision-making behavior and assess the potential impact of leadership changes on foreign policy outcomes. Incorporating transformational leadership theory into LTA can assist researchers in gaining a more nuanced understanding of the qualities that make leaders effective and how these qualities can be utilized to create solid and productive relationships with followers.

Key Findings

The present research undertook a comprehensive analysis of the PD discourse of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Employing Linguistic Text Analysis and LIWC-22 methods, the study examined five phases of President Zelenskyy's speeches, spanning from May 1, 2019 to November 25, 2022, as stored on the official presidential website.

The study's results show discernible patterns in President Zelenskyy's diplomatic discourse, including external requests for assistance, displays of determination, calls to action, and statements of appreciation. Moreover, by comparing the LIWC-22 scores of President Zelenskyy's speeches with those of other political leaders' speeches, the study identified significant differences in various linguistic categories. Additionally, the analysis compared President Zelenskyy's pre-crisis and kinetic speeches, revealing significant differences in selected LIWC-22 scores.

Further, the study compared President Zelenskyy's speeches with the LTA speech scores from the Psychological Characteristics of Leaders (PsyCL) aggregated leaders data set. The findings indicated significant differences in scores, with President Zelenskyy scoring higher in ingroup bias and need for power, while the Leaders cohort scored higher in task focus, belief in controlling events, and conceptual complexity. The study employed qualitative coding to identify themes and patterns in the collected data, and its framework was grounded in the FPA paradigm.

In sum, the study provides a deeper understanding of the linguistic and leadership characteristics inherent in President Zelenskyy's PD during his presidential tenure and the Russo-Ukrainian War. The practical implications of these findings extend to fields such as conflict resolution and diplomatic negotiations.

Key Conclusions

C1: Who is Zelenskyy? Examining Zelenskyy's communication style and leadership traits reveals a new type of global leader. Analyzing his discourse and psychobiographical profiles provides a deeper understanding of his views on the conflict, his perception of his ability to influence events, and his strategies for achieving goals. This understanding offers new possibilities for foreign policy engagement and gives a more comprehensive view of Zelenskyy as a leader. The evolution of his diplomacy led to changes in his PD during the war, which was reflected in his leadership language and traits and his diplomatic discourse in 2022. The study showed that in times of crisis, a leader's PD should not be considered as their typical behavior but rather as a reflection of their personality traits and psychometrics under stress. Furthermore, the Russo-Ukrainian War impacted Zelenskyy's traits, discourse, and language development. The findings of this study support Clausewitz's theory of the relationship between leadership and citizens during a crisis.

C2: Slava Ukraini. Conclusion two, *Slava Ukraini*, is based on the findings centered on Ukrainian culture and the reasons for the war. The psychometric scores and leadership qualities of Zelenskyy support the idea of Ukrainian resistance, victory, and bravery. His dedication to Ukraine and the measurable language dimensions demonstrate his goal to ultimately ensure that the glory and triumph of the war belong to Ukraine.

C3: The Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model. Conclusion three was the HISTORICAL framework, a heuristic framework for coding historical data, event data, strategic risks, systemic variations, and atmospherics. This framework helped to create a model for FPA. During the research, the data was analyzed, and codes were assigned based on themes and patterns. As the investigation progressed, additional sub-codes were created to reveal the cultural, historical, and political factors that influenced Zelenskyy's PD, foreign policy decisions, and leadership actions. The final coding framework is the *Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model © 2022.*

Final Thoughts

This mixed-methods research sought to gain insight into Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's personality, leadership, foreign policy, and psychobiography by analyzing his PD discourse during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Three research methods were used to assess Zelenskyy's speeches, identify his rhetorical strategies, speech patterns, and semantic structures, and examine how his language and behavior reveal his values and intentions. LTA, LIWC-22, and SPSS were among the methods used.

Zelenskyy's leadership traits were identified and compared to those of other political leaders using the LTA technique. To identify Zelenskyy's ethnic, cultural, and political focus, the LIWC-22 method was used to evaluate the language patterns in his speeches. Finally, SPSS was

used for secondary quantitative analysis to determine whether Zelenskyy's speech ratings differed significantly from those of other leaders.

According to the LIWC-22 analysis, Zelenskyy's language patterns were predominantly positive, indicating optimism and confidence in his approach, whereas the LTA analysis indicated high scores on different leadership traits. Furthermore, the study discovered that Zelenskyy's discourse mirrored the complex interplay of material and conceptual factors in molding state behavior, with domestic and international political realities influencing his decisions. The study found opportunities and challenges in foreign policy using the FPA framework. It also considers the cultural, historical, and political influences on Zelenskyy's PD, foreign policy choices, and leadership actions.

Researcher's Thoughts

This study presents the groundbreaking Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model and its accompanying heuristic, HISTORICAL. This innovative approach to examining foreign policy is a valuable contribution to the field, seamlessly integrating various analytical perspectives. The model was meticulously developed through data collection and classification, literature review, and identifying patterns and themes. The resulting theoretical framework accurately and comprehensively represents the relevant information.

This research has far-reaching implications, as it challenges traditional International Relations theory and offers valuable insights into the complex dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Additionally, the study addresses a gap in the literature concerning conflicts between great and minor powers, which piqued my interest. My research has enhanced my comprehension of leadership's role during crises and its influence on the global system. I take pride in contributing this study to the continued examination of foreign policy and its worldwide consequences. The

Brittain-Hale Foreign Policy Analysis Model and its accompanying tool, HISTORICAL, offer a

thorough and distinct method for analyzing foreign policy.

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ПРИБІЧНИКАМИ ТА ОПОНЕНТАМИ МИРНИХ ІНІЦІАТИВ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА

УКРАЇНИ ВОЛОДИМИРА ЗЕЛЕНСЬКОГО [Linguistic axiological modeling of

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APPENDIX A

NATO Members and Year Admitted (*NATO Library, n.d.)*

Country	Status	Year Admitted or Applied
Albania	Admitted	2009
Belgium	Admitted	1949
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Applied	2010
Bulgaria	Admitted	2004
Canada	Admitted	1949
Croatia	Admitted	2009
Czech Republic	Admitted	1999
Denmark	Admitted	1949
Estonia	Admitted	2004
Finland	Applied	2022
France	Admitted	1949
Georgia	Applied	2008
Germany	Admitted	1955
Greece	Admitted	1952

Country	Status	Year Admitted or Applied
Hungary	Admitted	1999
Iceland	Admitted	1949
Italy	Admitted	1949
Latvia	Admitted	2004
Lithuania	Admitted	2004
Luxembourg	Admitted	1949
Montenegro	Admitted	2017
Netherlands	Admitted	1949
North Macedonia	Admitted	2020
Norway	Admitted	1949
Poland	Admitted	1999
Portugal	Admitted	1949
Romania	Admitted	2004
Slovakia	Admitted	2004
Slovenia	Admitted	2004

Country	Status	Year Admitted or Applied
Spain	Admitted	1982
Sweden	Applied	2022
Turkey	Admitted	1952
Ukraine	Admitted	2008
United Kingdom	Admitted	1949
United States	Admitted	1949

APPENDIX B

European Union Members and Year Admitted (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

Country	Status	Year Admitted or Applied
Albania	Applied	2009
Austria	Admitted	1995
Belgium	Admitted	1957
Bulgaria	Admitted	2007
Croatia	Admitted	2013
Cyprus	Admitted	2004
Czech Republic	Admitted	2004
Denmark	Admitted	1973
Estonia	Admitted	2004
Finland	Admitted	1995
France	Admitted	1957
Germany	Admitted	1957
Greece	Admitted	1981
Hungary	Admitted	2004

Country	Status	Year Admitted or Applied
Ireland	Admitted	1973
Italy	Admitted	1957
Latvia	Admitted	2004
Lithuania	Admitted	2004
Luxembourg	Admitted	1957
Malta	Admitted	2004
Moldova	Applied	2022
Montenegro	Applied	2008
Netherlands	Admitted	1957
North Macedonia	Applied	2004
Poland	Admitted	2004
Portugal	Admitted	1986
Romania	Admitted	2007
Serbia	Applied	2009
Slovakia	Admitted	2004

Country	Status	Year Admitted or Applied
Slovenia	Admitted	2004
Spain	Admitted	1986
Sweden	Admitted	1995
Turkey	Applied	1987
Ukraine	Applied	2022

APPENDIX C

Glossary

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
1991 Referendum	March 1991 vote held in Soviet Union for returning sovereignty to republics, passed with about 80% approval (Ukraine also voted for independence)	CSCE, 1992
Andrzej Duda	President of Poland from 2015-present, Law and Justice Party, helped establish Bucharest Nine against Russian expansionism	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Angela Merkel	Chancellor of Germany from 2005-2021, Christian Democratic Union party, first woman to hold office.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Antony Blinken	US Secretary of State from 2021-present, Democratic Party, nominated by President Biden.	U.S. Department of State (n.d.)
Boris Johnson	Prime Minister of UK from 2019-present, Conservative Party, mayor of London 2008-2016.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Boris Yeltsin	President of Russia from 1990-1999, Communist Party of Soviet Union, won first popular election in Russian history.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Bucha	City in Kyiv province of Ukraine, location of Battle of Bucha during Russian invasion of Ukraine, reported site of Russian war crimes known as Bucha massacre	Researcher's Definition
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances	Denuclearization pact where Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan give up nuclear weapons in exchange for agreements with Russian Federation, USA, and UK not using military or economic force, under UN security council	Researcher's Definition

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Constructivism	IR theory that historical and social collective beliefs affect international relations separately from material power	Researcher's Definition
Crimea	Crimea, Ukrainian Krym, also spelled Krim, autonomous republic, southern Ukraine. The republic is coterminous with the Crimean Peninsula, lying between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In 2014 Russia covertly invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, a move that was denounced by the international community. Area 10,400 square miles (27,000 square km). Pop. (2001) 2,033,736; (2013 est.) 1,965,177	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Crisis	An unstable or crucial time or state of affairs whose outcome will make a decisive difference for better or worse (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary)	Researcher's Definition
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)	Post-Soviet military alliance originally between Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with current members Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus.	Researcher's Definition

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Diplomacy	Art of conducting relationships for gain without conflict. It is the chief instrument of foreign policy. Its methods include secret negotiation by accredited envoys (though political leaders also negotiate) and international agreements and laws. Its use predates recorded history. The goal of diplomacy is to further the state's interests as dictated by geography, history, and economics. Safeguarding the state's independence, security, and integrity is of prime importance; preserving the widest possible freedom of action for the state is nearly as important. Beyond that, diplomacy seeks maximum national advantage without using force and preferably without causing resentment.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Discourse	In linguistics, discourse refers to a unit of language longer than a single sentence. The word discourse is derived from the Latin prefix dis- meaning "away" and the root word currere meaning "to run". Discourse, therefore, translates to "run away" and refers to the way that conversations flow. To study discourse is to analyze the use of spoken or written language in a social context	Nordquist (2020, January 30)
Discursive	Moving from topic to topic without order; rambling gave a discursive lecture discursive prose. 2) proceeding coherently from topic to topic	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)
Donald Trump	US President from 2017-2021, Republican Party, lost re-election to Joseph Biden in 2020 by over 7 million popular votes	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Donbas	Donbas, in full Donets Basin, Ukrainian Donetskyy Baseyn, Russian Donetsky Basseyn, large mining and industrial region of southeastern Europe, notable for its sizable coal reserves. The industrial area of the Donbas includes much of the Ukrainian oblasti (provinces) of Donetsk and Luhansk.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Emmanuel Macron	President of France from 2017-present, En Marche! Party, re-elected in 2022	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
European Union	International organization comprising 27 European countries and governing common economic, social, and security policies, comprised of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
European Union Strategic Communication Plan	European Commission performance management framework	European Commission (2020)
EU Secretary General	Highest bureaucratic position in Council of EU, top civil servant	Researcher's Definition
Foreign Policy	General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Leopold von Ranke emphasized the primacy of geography and external threats in shaping foreign policy, but later writers emphasized domestic factors	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Franklin Roosevelt	President of the US 1933-1945, Democratic Party, elected four times, only US President to serve more than two terms	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Geopolitics	Politics, especially international relations, as influenced by geographical factors.	Lexico (n.d.)
Geopolitical Risk	The risk associated with wars, terrorist acts, and tensions between states that affect the normal and peaceful course of international relations. Geopolitical risk captures both the risk that these events materialize and the new risks associated with an escalation of existing events (Cakdari & Iacoviello, 2018, p.6)	Caldaro & Iacoviello, 2018
German Chancellor	German head of state and military during wartime	Researcher's Definition
Georgian-Russian War	2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia, sparked by Russian support of separatist regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Great Man Theory	Theory of leadership that attributes responsibility for decisive historical events to heroes, or people with exceptional qualities	Carlyle (1840, 1841)
Hero in History	A leader whose personage alone inspires belief, equipped with rare gifts of compassion, competence, dynamic, resourceful, responsive. Usually found in a society with profound crisis.Replaces legitimations and customary leadership.	Burns (1978/2012, p.403-404)
Holodomor	1932-33 famine in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia caused by Stalin nationalizing farms	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Hybrid-warfare	Combining conventional warfare with political, cyber, and other means of warfare	Researcher's Definition

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Imperialism	Domination or control by one country or a group over others	Brown et al. (2018)
Infopolitik	The communicative ability of third-party communicators, institutions, or states which entails "informational soft power" through proactive international communication. The communication is comprised of accurated and impartial information. It is relective of state or supra-state ideals, and be free of "unbiased information"	de Gouveia & Plumridge (2005, p. 9)
Information Warfare	a class of techniques, including collection, transport, protection, denial, disturbance, and degradation of information, by which one maintains an advantage over one's adversaries	Burns (1999)
International Relations	The study of the relations of states with each other and with international organizations and certain subnational entities (e.g., bureaucracies, political parties, and interest groups). It is related to a number of other academic disciplines, including political science, geography, history, economics, law, sociology, psychology, and philosophy.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Joseph Biden	US President from 2021-present, Democratic Party, US Vice President under President Obama 2009-2017.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Joseph Stalin	Russian ruler, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, original name (Georgian) Ioseb Dzhugashvili, (born December 18 [December 6, Old Style], 1878, Gori, Georgia, Russian Empire [see Researcher's Note] —died March 5, 1953, Moscow, Russia, U.S.S.R.), secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1922–53) and premier of the Soviet state (1941–53), who for a quarter of a century dictatorially ruled the Soviet Union and transformed it into a major world power.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Just War	The resort to armed force (jus ad Bellum) is justified under certain conditions; also, the notion that the use of such force (jus in bello) should be limited in certain ways.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Kyiv	Kyiv, also spelled Kiev, Kyyiv, or Russian Kiyev, chief city and capital of Ukraine. A port on the Dnieper (Dnipro) River and a large railroad junction, it is a city with an ancient and proud history. As the center of Kyivan (Kievan) Rus, the first eastern Slavic state, 1,000 years ago, it acquired the title "Mother of Rus Cities." It was severely damaged during World War II, but by the mid-1950s it had been restored, and in the second half of the 20th century it enjoyed a well-developed economic and cultural life. The independence of Ukraine from the Soviet Union in 1991 renewed Kyiv's status as a major European capital. Pop. (2001) 2,611,327; (2021 est.) 2,962,180.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Linguistics	The study of human speech including the units, nature, structure, and modification of language	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Maidan Revolution	2013 mass protest movement over Yanukovych decision to reject agreement with EU in favor of closer Russian ties	Researcher's Definition
Mariupol	City in Ukraine that was attacked in 2014 Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea, and again in 2022 with Russian forces targeting civilians	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Marshall Plan	US-sponsored plan to provide economic aid to Europe after World War II through grants and loans.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Microblogging	Blogging done with severe space or size constraints typically by posting frequent brief messages about personal activities	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)
Mikhail Gorbechev	Final president of Soviet Union from 1990-1991, Communist Party of Soviet Union, reformed Soviet Union with elections and improved relations with the US	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Minsk II	2015 agreement to end the fighting between Ukraine and Russia following the 2014 Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Munich Crisis	1938 German annexation of part of Czechoslovakia despite defense agreements with France and Soviet Union.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Munich Security Conference	Forum for debating international security policy and diplomatic initiatives to address international security.	Munich Security Conference (n.d.)
Naftali Bennett	Prime minister of Israel from 2021-22, Haifa Party, former director of organization representing Israeli settlements on the West Bank	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Narrative	A spoken or written account of connected events; a story.	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Nehendra Modi	Current prime minister of India as of 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party, further opened up India for direct foreign investment	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Neocolonial	The control of less-developed countries by developed countries through indirect means. The term neocolonialism was first used after World War II to refer to the continuing dependence of former colonies on foreign countries; its meaning soon broadened to apply, more generally, to places where the power of developed countries was used to produce a colonial-like exploitation	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.), Sartre (1964/2001)
Neoimperial	Neoimperialism is a nation's dominance and hegemony over another, principally exercised through legal, economic, and cultural influence or pressures. Also considered to be imperialism without empire.	Adapted from Sartre (1956, 1964/2001).
Non-Proliferation Treaty	Agreement among nuclear-armed and nonnuclear states to forgo development of nuclear weapons and provide no help to obtain or produce them	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance established to create a counterweight to Soviet armies stationed in central and eastern Europe after World War II. When the Cold War ended, NATO was reconceived as a "cooperative-security" organization. The current member states of NATO are Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.	Researcher's Definition

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Offensive Realism	IR theory from Mearsheimer that states are always on offensive, rather than defensive, to maximize their power for security and survival	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)	Using data from publicly available sources for intelligence	Researcher's Definition
Orange Revolution	Mass protest movement in Ukraine 2004 caused by election fraud in favor of Russian-backed Prime Minister Yanukovych	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	Organization of representatives of virtually all the states of Europe, as well as the United States and Canada, committed to formalizing decisions on important questions affecting the security and stability of the European continent as a whole	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Petro Poroshenko	President of Ukraine from 2014–2019, Our Ukraine Party, elected shortly after Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Potsdam (Conference)	Conference between Churchill, Stalin, and Truman in 1945 for peace settlements in Europe following World War II	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Propaganda	Dissemination of information—facts, arguments, rumors, half-truths, or lies—to influence public opinion. Propaganda is the more or less systematic effort to manipulate other people's beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols (words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, designs on coins and postage stamps, and so forth). Deliberateness and a relatively heavy emphasis on manipulation distinguish propaganda from casual conversation or the free and easy exchange of ideas.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Public Diplomacy	A communicative capability of the state which is managed by a specialized institution and implemented by the government, scientific, academic and cultural communities as well as by ordinary citizens and aimed at a foreign or global audience. The purpose of public diplomacy is to promote national interests and foreign policies of a country, to create a positive image, and achieve mutual understanding by communicating ideas, ideals, and values of nation as well as general information about the country, culture, and society through all communication channels, including but not limited to the media, interpersonal communication, public relations". (Sobolieva, 2021, p. 166)	Sobolieva, 2021
Rational Actor	Theory states that people choose actions that are in line with their own personal preferences or act in their own self-interest	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Realism	States have national interest in maintaining power in world politics.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Revolution of Dignity	2014 revolution in Ukraine that ousted President Yanukovych caused by mounting protests since 2013 over his decision to reject agreement with EU in favor of closer Russian ties	Researcher's Definition
Rhetoric	The art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing, especially the use of figures of speech and other compositional techniques	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)
Rome Statute	Established International Criminal Court in 1998 to investigate and prosecute individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Rose Revolution	2003 popular movement in Georgia led by future President Mikheil Saakashvili that ousted President Shevardnadze	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty	1997 agreement between Ukraine and Russia against invasion or declaring war, expired in 2019 after multiple Russian violations	Researcher's Definition
Security Sector Reform	The goal of creating effective and efficient state security forces capable of providing security for the state and its people, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights"	Schröder and Chappuis (2014, 133)
Social Media	Forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)
South Ossetia	Autonomous republic in northern Georgia with Russian military presence, declared independence in 2008.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Statesmanship	Being well-versed in the principles or art of government	Merriam-Webster (n.d.)
Strategic Communication	The activities of disciplines including public relations, management communication, and advertising for engaging in purposeful communication	Thorson (2018, July 25)
Strategic Risk	Acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, and cataclysmic natural disasters, as well as other incidents that pose a threat to national security. National security assessments aim to uncover risk factors, heighten awareness of national risk and safety considerations, and foster defensive coordination.	Researchers Definition
Tehran (Conference)	Conference between Churchill, Stalin, and Truman in Tehran in 1943 for military and political cooperation in World War II	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
The European Union (EU)	European Union (EU), Organization of European countries, was formed in 1993 to oversee their economic and political integration. It was created by the Maastricht Treaty and ratified by all members of the European Community (EC), out of which the EU developed. The successful EC had made its members more receptive to greater integration and provided a framework for unified action by member countries in security and foreign policy and for cooperation in police and justice matters. In pursuit of its major goal to create a common monetary system, the EU established the euro, which replaced the national currencies of 12 of the 15 EU members in 2002. Originally confined to western Europe, the EU enlarged to include several central and eastern European countries in the early 21st century. The EU's principal institutions are the European Community, the Council of Ministers (a forum for individual ministries), the European Commission (an administrative bureaucracy), the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Transformational Leadership	Emphasizing intrinsic motivation and positive development of followers: raising awareness of moral standards; highlighting important priorities; fostering higher moral maturity in followers; creating an ethical climate (shared values, high ethical standards); encouraging followers to look beyond self-interest to the common good; promoting cooperation and harmony; using authentic, consistent means; using persuasive appeals based on reason; providing individual coaching and mentoring for followers; appealing to the ideals of followers; allowing freedom of choice for followers (Bass, 1999).	(Bass, 1990, 1999)
Transformational Statesmanship	A statesman who employs governance traits and style, foreign policy initiatives, and domestic strategies which align with the transformational leadership paradigm.	Researcher's Definition
Twitter	An online microblogging service for distributing short messages among groups of recipients via personal computer or mobile telephone. Twitter incorporates aspects of social networking websites with instant messaging technologies to create networks of users who can communicate throughout the day with brief messages or "tweets."	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Ukraine	Country located in eastern Europe, the second largest on the continent after Russia. The capital is Kyiv (Kiev), located on the Dnieper River in north-central Ukraine.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
United Nations	International organization founded in 1945 after World War II to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations in equal terms, and encourage international cooperation in solving problems.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
United Nations Secretary-General	Highest bureaucratic position in UN, top civil servant in charge of UN Secretariat	Researcher's Definition
Vladimir Putin	Russian ruler, in full Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, (born October 7, 1952, Leningrad, Russia, U.S.S.R. [now St. Petersburg, Russia]), Russian intelligence officer and politician who served as president (1999–2008, 2012–) of Russia and also was the country's prime minister (1999, 2008–12).	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Victor Yanukovich	President of Ukraine from 2010-2014, prime minister from 2002-2005 and 2006-2007, supported by Putin and Kremlin, ultimately impeached and exiled to Russia after 2014 Revolution of Dignity caused by pulling out of treaty with EU in 2013	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Victor Yushchenko	President of Ukraine from 2005-2010, Our Ukraine Party, survived assassination attempt in 2004; elected after Orange Revolution led to runoff after fraudulent election was invalidated by Supreme Court	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Volodymyr Zelenskyy	President of Ukraine from 2019-present, Servant of the People party, actor and comedian turned politician, target of attempted extortion by US President Donald Trump to announce investigation into future President Biden's family in exchange for releasing 400 million in military aid, received global acclaim for leadership during 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
War of Aggression	The act or policy of expansion carried out by one state at the expense of another by means of an unprovoked military attack.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)

Term/Individual	Definition	Source
Warsaw Pact	1955-1991 mutual defense treaty between Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, in direct response to West Germany joining NATO	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
War Crime	Serious violation of the laws or customs of war as defined by international customary law and international treaties.	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Winston Churchill	British Prime Minister, in full Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, (born November 30, 1874, Blenheim Palace, Oxfordshire, England—died January 24, 1965, London), British statesman, orator, and author who, as prime minister (1940–45, 1951–55) rallied the British people during World War II and led his country from the brink of defeat to victory	Encyclopedia Britannica (n.d.)
Yalta (Conference)	The Yalta Conference, or Crimea Conference was held in February 1945. Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin met for what would be their final time to discuss war strategy, the peace process, and post-war objectives. This definition is derived from a synthesis of the literature and documentation of the event.	Researcher's Definition

APPENDIX D

Chronology of Definitions of Public Diplomacy (Sobolieva, 2021)

Source	Definition
Senator John W. Fulbright - 1961	- Increase mutual understanding between people from different nations - Facilitate educational cultural exchange - Strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations - Demonstrate educational and cultural interests - Share developments and achievements of the different nationalities - contribute toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world (Public Law 87-256, 1961, p. 527)
E.R. Murrow, Director USAID- 1963	- Interaction not only with governments but primarily with nongovernmental individuals and organizations - Present many differing views represented by private American individuals and organizations in addition to official government views (Leonard et al., 2002, p.1)
E.R. Murrow, Director USAID- 1965	- Deal with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies - Encompass dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy - Cultivated by governments of public opinion in other countries. the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another - Report of foreign affairs and its impact on policy - Communicate between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications (Cull, 2008, pp. 39-43)

Source	Definition
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1975)	- International information, education, cultural relations. - Responsible for articulating and advocating as well as formulating U.S. foreign policy is vested in the President and the Secretary of State - Give wider resonance abroad to authoritative definitions and interpretations of U.S. policy under proper State Department guidance. - Advise policymakers on foreign public opinion through cultural contacts and the media. - Responsible for domestic and international aspects of general information about the United States, educational and cultural programs (United States General Accounting Office, 1977, pp. ii-16)
Voice of America – 1975	- Foreign policy as reported and advocated - In mass media - In foreign countries (United States. General Accounting Office, 1977, para. X)
Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of Representatives- 1977	- Policy information - Cultural communication - Shortwave radio broadcasting (United States. General Accounting Office, 1977, para. X)
(U.S. House Committee on International Relations, 1977)	- Bring foreign people in touch with American culture - Transmit information about culture - Aspects of our domestic life as a nation and people - Information about the arts, letters, education and science - Information about the American economy, governmental system, and even the views of our citizens on international affairs (United States. General Accounting Office, 1977, para. X)

Source	Definition
P.A. Woodring, "Public Diplomacy and the Future" – 1977	- Attitude and a process that shape the very nature of government conduct in its international affairs - Influence given and and received by publics abroad and at home in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy - Education on international issues; basic information programs; public relations activities; policy explanations - Exchange which brings people together in a mutual learning experience - Develop cross cultural appreciation - Consider public views in official actions (United States Congress House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations, 1977, p. 132)
(U.S. Department of State, 1987)	- Government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries. - Publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, and radio and television - Cultural programs abroad (United States Department of State Library, 1987, p. 85)
(Tuch, 1990)	- Communication process of the government of a country with foreign audiences - Explain ideas and ideals of respective nation, its institutions and its culture - Explain national interests and policies (Tuch, 1990, p. 244)
(Nye, 1990)	- A Nation's ability to attract and persuade - Attractiveness of its culture, political ideals, and policies - Convey information and sell a positive image - Building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies (Nye, 2004, p. 208)
B. Signitzer and T. Coombs, 1992	- Exert an influence on attitudes of foreign audiences using persuasion and propaganda - Create a climate of mutual understanding (Snow & Taylor, 2008)

Source	Definition
J. Duffey, US News Agency -1995	- It is not public relations - It is not flakking for a Government agency or even flakking for a country - It is to relate beyond government-to-government relationships the private institutions, the individuals, the long-term contact - Understanding, the full range of perceptions from the rest of the world (Snow & Taylor, 2008)
USIA Integration Planning Group- 1997	- Promote national interest and the national security - Increase understanding abroad - inform and influence foreign publics - Broaden dialogue between domestic publics and institutions and their counterparts abroad (Trent, 2016, p. 312)
D. Welch, University of Kent- 1999	- Attempt to influence the opinions of an audience - Transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters - Directly or indirectly (E. J. Brown et al., 2009)
(U.S. House Committee on International Relations, 2001)	- Enlist the populations of the world into a common cause - Convince them that the goals that they seek for themselves – freedom, security and prosperity are shared abroad (Hyde, 2001)
C. Powell, Secretary of State, 2001	- Selling a product - That product we are selling is democracy (Brand U.S.A, 2001)
United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) - 2001	- Communication of U.S. interests and ideals beyond governments to foreign publics - Directed at publics abroad (ACPD, 2001)

Source	Definition
M. Butler, former U.K. Representative to the EU - 2002	• Influence opinion in target countries for benefit of home government to achieve aims • Prioritize overall image of the respective country • Prioritize actual policies of the respective government,the terms in which they are announced and explained • (Leonard et al., 2002, p. 185)
(Leonard, 2002)	• Public face of traditional diplomacy • Seeks to support traditional diplomacy by addressing non-governmental audiences, in addition to governmental audiences, both mass and elite. • Works in coordination with and in parallel to the traditional diplomatic effort • (Leonard et al., 2002, p. 185)
(Leonard et al., 2002)	• Increase people's familiarity with one's country • Increase people's appreciation of one's country • Engage people with one's country • (Leonard et al., 2002, p. 185)
(Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003)	• Promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people • Public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror (PD20-USA-2003/ U.S. Adv.Group on PD for Arab and Muslim World) • (Djerejian, 2003, p. 81)
(U.S. General Accountability Office, 2003)	• Inform, engage, and influence global audiences • Reachout beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation abroad, • Gain greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics • Sustain access and influence in important sectors of foreign societies • Carried out through a wide range of programs • person-to-person contacts • print, broadcast, and electronic media • other means • (United States General Accounting Office, 2003)

Source	Definition
(Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2003)	• Influence in a positive way • Through the creation of relationships and partnerships, • The perceptions of individuals and organisations overseas • Engage in support of respective governments overseas objectives • (United States General Accounting Office, 2003)
(Berridge & James, 2003)	• Do not confuse with open or parliamentary diplomacy, • A late twentieth-century term for propaganda conducted by diplomats • (Berridge & James, 2003)
(van Ham, 2003)	• Key element of public diplomacy • Building personal and institutional relationships • Dialogue with foreign audiences with focus on values • which sets the activity apart from • Classical diplomacy, which primary deals with issues • (van Ham, 2003)
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003)	• Overt international public information activities a government • Promote foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers • Broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad • (Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 2003)
New York Times-October, 1993	• Public diplomacy is neither public nor diplomatic • Government – not the broader public – has been the main messenger to a world • World is suspicious • Government does treat as a conversation, • One-sided exercise. • Simple and offensive propaganda • (Holtzman, 2003)
(Ross, 2002)	• Not traditional diplomacy • Engages carefully targeted sectors of foreign publics in order to develop support for strategic goals • (Ross, 2002, pp.75-83)
P. Sharp - 2005	• Advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented • (Melissen, 2005, p. 246)

Source	Definition
(Melissen, 2005)	• Communicate of information and ideas to foreign publics with a view to changing their attitudes towards the originating country or reinforcing existing beliefs" • The relationship between governments and foreign public opinion has traditionally been a hierarchical process focused on the dissemination of positive information • (Melissen, 2005, p. 246)
(Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2006)	• To inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence • (House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Eighth Report, 2006)
(E. J. Brown et al., 2009)	• New Public Diplomacy not for the exclusive domain of professional diplomats • Formal and informal encounters between ordinary citizens • Cultural relations • Influence a global public opinion • Understand and communicating with people from other countries and cultures • Public are ambassadors • (E. J. Brown et al., 2009)
P.B. Floyd, former Chief Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States-2005	• Influencing foreign publics • Broadening dialogue between publics and institutions and their counterparts abroad • Not about selling a particular policy • (Snow & Taylor, 2008)
(Berridge, 2010)	• Modern name for white propaganda directed chiefly at foreign publics • (Berridge, 2010, p. 283).
(J. Brown, 2008)	• Provide a truthful, factual exposition and explication of a nation's foreign policy and way of life to overseas audiences • Encourages international understanding; • Listens and engage in dialogue • Objectively displays national achievements • Achieve goals through careful presentation of facts and argumentation • (J. Brown, 2008)

Source	Definition
Department of Foreign and Commonwealth of Nations of Great Britain, "Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World-2008	• Listen • Message with connection to policy • Not a performance for domestic consumption • Be credible and allow that in others • Not always about respective nation • Public diplomacy is everyone's business • (Welsh, 2008, p. 172)
(Gregory, 2011)	• State Based instrument used by foreign ministries and other government agencies • engage and persuade foreign publics for the purpose of influencing their governments. • An instrument used by states, associations of states, and some substate and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour • Build and manage relationships • Influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values • (Gregory, 2011, p. 351-372)
(Melissen, 2013)	• a metaphor for the democratization of diplomacy, with multiple actors playing a role in what was once an area restricted to a few • (Cooper et al., 2013, p. 766)
(Ross, 2014)	• Ensure that foreign audiences understand foreign policies accurately Providing reasons, Rationale, and context • International messages must be consistent, truthful, and credible • Tailor messages for specific audience • Leverage our messages through all the communications channels at nation's command • Use strength of international alliances and private-sector partners • global corporations • humanitarian organizations • expatriate communities abroad <…> 7) • build the foundations of trust and mutual understanding • genuine commitment to dialogue • (Ross, 2014)

Source	Definition
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016)	- Promote foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers - Broaden dialogue between public and institutions and their counterparts abroad. - In peacebuilding use civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2016, p. 192)
(Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)	- Public diplomacy, also called people's diplomacy, any of various government – sponsored efforts aimed at communicating directly with foreign publics. Public diplomacy includes all official efforts to convince targeted sectors of foreign opinion to support or tolerate a government's strategic objectives. Methods include statements by decision makers, purposeful campaigns conducted by government organizations dedicated to public diplomacy, and efforts to persuade international media to portray official policies favourably to foreign audiences (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

APPENDIX E

Infopolitik: Ukraine's Official Social Media

Figure E1

Example from Ukraine's Official Website

From *Official website of Ukraine,* by Government of Ukraine, n.d., (https://ukraine.ua/). In

public domain.

Figure E2

Tweet from Ukraine's Official Twitter Account (March 6, 2022)

From *Twitter*, by Ukraine / Україна, 2022a,

(https://twitter.com/Ukraine/status/1500603169868595202?s=20&t=DteTmcfielIvq72mX6AcFw

). In public domain.

Figure E3

Example from Ukraine's Official LinkedIn (Ukraine.ua, n.d.b)

From *LinkedIn*, by Ukraine.ua, n.d.b, (https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ukraineua_ukraine-is-a-modern-country-with-a-thousand-year-activity-6978294954628427776-INIF). In public domain.

APPENDIX F

Speech by the President of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (Zelenskyy, 2022b)

Citizens of Ukraine:

What do we hear today? It's not just rocket explosions, battles, the roar of aircraft. It is the sound of a new Iron Curtain lowering and closing Russia away from the civilized world. Our national task is to make this curtain pass not through our Ukrainian territory, but at the home of Russians.

The Ukrainian army, our border guards, police and special services stopped the enemy's attacks. In the language of conflict, this can be called an operational pause.

In Donbas, our Armed Forces are doing great, the Kharkiv direction is very difficult, the forces for the defense of the city are working, they are reliable, they are our men. The most problematic situation today is in the south. Our troops are fighting fierce battles in the suburbs of Kherson. The enemy is pushing out of the occupied Crimea, trying to advance towards Melitopol.

In the north of the country, the enemy is slowly advancing in the Chernihiv region, but there are forces to hold it. Reliable defense is built in the Zhytomyr region. Enemy paratroopers in Hostomel are blocked, troops are ordered to destroy them.

Yes, we, unfortunately, have losses, losses of our heroes. Yes, we have captured Russian soldiers. Our doctors are helping some of them - those who have surrendered. Many Russian aircraft and many armored vehicles were destroyed.

Yes, we see that many Russians are shocked by what is happening. Some Russians are already calling on social media that they are against the war. We see it. But the leadership of the Russian Federation is unlikely to see it.

So please.

If you hear us, if you understand us, if you understand that you are attacking an independent country, please go out to the squares and address the President of your country.

We are Ukrainians. We are on our land. You are Russians. Now your military has started a war. The war in our state. I would very much like you to speak on Red Square or somewhere else on the streets of your capital, in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities in Russia. Not only on Instagram - it is very important.

What do we see at this hour? For the world community, Russia is becoming an analogue of the so-called DPR - this is complete isolation.

I am in constant contact with the leaders of partner countries and international organizations. Russia has already begun receiving the first sanctions from a large package of sanctions, the most powerful in world history.

No one will be able to convince or force us, Ukrainians, to give up our freedom, our independence, our sovereignty. But it seems that the Russian leadership is trying to do this by destroying the potential of their country. Everything that Russia has done since 2000 can now be burned live in front of the world.

We emphasize that Ukraine did not choose the path of war. But Ukraine offers to return to peace.

What can Ukrainians do? Help the national defense. Join the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and territorial defense units. Any citizen with combat experience will now be useful. It is up to you and all of us whether the enemy will be able to advance further into the territory of our independent state. Please help the volunteer community and the medical system, for example by donating blood.

Politicians and community leaders - help people, ensure normal life on the ground as much as possible. Everyone should take care of their loved ones and take care of those neighbors or acquaintances who need it. The duty of journalists, an important duty, is to defend democracy and freedom in Ukraine.

I spoke today with many leaders - the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, Germany, the EU, the United States, Sweden, Romania, Poland, Austria and others.

If you, dear European leaders, dear world leaders, leaders of the free world, do not help us today, then tomorrow the war will knock on your door.

Glory to the Armed Forces of Ukraine!

Glory to Ukraine!

APPENDIX G

Speech by the President of Ukraine at the 58th Munich Security Conference (Zelenskyy, 2022a)

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Two days ago, I was in Donbas, on the delimitation line. Legally - between Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories. In fact, the delimitation line between peace and war. Where on the one side there is a kindergarten, and on the other side there is a projectile that hit it. On the one side there is a school, on the other side there is a projectile hitting the school yard.

And next to it there are 30 children who go… no, not to NATO, but to school. Someone has physics classes. Knowing its basic laws, even children understand how absurd the statements that the shelling is carried out by Ukraine sound. Someone has math classes. Children can calculate the difference between the number of shelling occasions in these three days and the occasions of mentioning Ukraine in this year's Munich Security Report without a calculator.

And someone has history classes. And when a bomb crater appears in the school yard, children have a question: has the world forgotten its mistakes of the XX century?

What do attempts at appeasement lead to? As the question "Why die for Danzig?" turned into the need to die for Dunkirk and dozens of other cities in Europe and the world. At the cost of tens of millions of lives.

These are terrible lessons of history. I just want to make sure you and I read the same books. Hence, we have the same understanding of the answer to the main question: how did it happen that in the XXI century, Europe is at war again and people are dying? Why does it last longer than World War II? How did we get to the biggest security crisis since the Cold War? For me, as the President of a country that has lost part of the territory, thousands of people and on whose borders there are now 150,000 Russian troops, equipment and heavy weapons, the answer is obvious.

The architecture of world security is fragile and needs to be updated. The rules that the world agreed on decades ago no longer work. They do not keep up with new threats. They are not effective for overcoming them. This is a cough syrup when you need a coronavirus vaccine. The

security system is slow. It crashes again. Because of different things: selfishness, self-confidence, irresponsibility of states at the global level. As a result, we have crimes of some and indifference of others. Indifference that makes you an accomplice. It is symbolic that I am talking about this right here. It was here 15 years ago that Russia announced its intention to challenge global security. What did the world say? Appeasement. Result? At least - the annexation of Crimea and aggression against my state.

The UN, which is supposed to defend peace and world security, cannot defend itself. When its Charter is violated. When one of the members of the UN Security Council annexes the territory of one of the founding members of the UN. And the UN itself ignores the Crimea Platform, the goal of which is to de-occupy Crimea peacefully and protect the rights of Crimeans.

Three years ago, it was here that Angela Merkel said: "Who will pick up the wreckage of the world order? Only all of us, together." The audience gave a standing ovation. But, unfortunately, the collective applause did not grow into collective action. And now, when the world is talking about the threat of a great war, the question arises: is there anything left to pick up? The security architecture in Europe and the world is almost destroyed. It's too late to think about repairs, it's time to build a new system. Mankind has done this twice, paying too high a price - two world wars. We have a chance to break this trend until it becomes a consistent pattern. And start building a new system before millions of victims. Having the old lessons of the First and Second World Wars, not our own experience of the possible third, God forbid.

I talked about it here. And on the rostrum of the UN. That in the XXI century there are no more foreign wars. That the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas affects the whole world. And this is not a war in Ukraine, but a war in Europe. I said this at summits and forums. In 2019, 2020, 2021. Will the world be able to hear me in 2022?

This is no longer a hypothesis, but not an axiom yet. Why? Evidence is needed. More important than words on Twitter or statements in the media. Action is required. It is the world that needs it, not just us.

We will defend our land with or without the support of partners. Whether they give us hundreds of modern weapons or five thousand helmets. We appreciate any help, but everyone should understand that these are not charitable contributions that Ukraine should ask for or remind of.

These are not noble gestures for which Ukraine should bow low. This is your contribution to the security of Europe and the world. Where Ukraine has been a reliable shield for eight years. And for eight years it has been rebuffing one of the world's biggest armies. Which stands along our borders, not the borders of the EU.

And Grad rockets hit Mariupol, not European cities. And after almost six months of fighting, the airport in Donetsk was destroyed, not in Frankfurt. And it's always hot in the Avdiivka industrial zone - it was hot there in the last days, not in Montmartre. And no European country knows what military burials every day in all regions are. And no European leader knows what regular meetings with the families of the deceased are.

Be that as it may, we will defend our beautiful land no matter if we have 50,000, 150 or one million soldiers of any army on the border. To really help Ukraine, it is not necessary to say how many servicemen and military equipment are on the border. Say what numbers we have.

To really help Ukraine, it is not necessary to constantly talk only about the dates of the probable invasion. We will defend our land on February 16, March 1 and December 31. We need other dates much more. And everyone understands perfectly well which ones.

Tomorrow in Ukraine is the Day of the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred. Eight years ago, Ukrainians made their choice, and many gave their lives for that choice. Eight years later, should Ukraine constantly call for recognition of the European perspective? Since 2014, Russia has been convincing that we have chosen the wrong path, that no one is waiting for us in Europe. Shouldn't Europe constantly say and prove by action that this is not true? Shouldn't the EU say today that its citizens are positive about Ukraine's accession to the Union? Why do we avoid this question? Doesn't Ukraine deserve direct and honest answers?

This also applies to NATO. We are told: the door is open. But so far authorized access only. If not all members of the Alliance want to see us or all members of the Alliance do not want to see us, be honest. Open doors are good, but we need open answers, not open questions for years.

Isn't the right to the truth one of our enhanced opportunities? The best time for it is the next summit in Madrid.

Russia says Ukraine seeks to join the Alliance to return Crimea by force. It is gratifying that the words "return Crimea" appear in their rhetoric. But they inattentively read Article 5 of the NATO Charter: collective action is for protection, not offensive. Crimea and the occupied regions of Donbas will certainly return to Ukraine, but only peacefully.

Ukraine consistently implements the Normandy agreements and the Minsk agreements. Their foundation is the unquestionable recognition of the territorial integrity and independence of our state. We seek a diplomatic settlement of the armed conflict. Note: solely on the basis of international law.

So what is really going on in the peace process? Two years ago, we agreed with the Presidents of France, the Russian Federation, the Chancellor of Germany on a full-scale ceasefire. And Ukraine is scrupulously adhering to these agreements. We are as restrained as possible against the background of constant provocations. We are constantly making proposals in the framework of the Normandy Four and the Trilateral Contact Group. And what do we see? Shells and bullets from the other side. Our soldiers and civilians are being killed and wounded, and civilian infrastructure is being destroyed.

The last days have become especially illustrative. Hundreds of massive shelling occasions with weapons prohibited by the Minsk agreements. It is also important to stop restricting the admission of OSCE observers to Ukraine's TOT. They are threatened. They are intimidated. All humanitarian issues are blocked.

Two years ago, I signed a law on the unconditional admission of representatives of humanitarian organizations to detainees. But they are simply not admitted to the temporarily occupied territories. After two exchanges of captives, the process was blocked, although Ukraine provided agreed lists. Inhuman torture at the infamous Isolation Prison in Donetsk has become a symbol of human rights abuses.

The two new checkpoints we opened in November 2020 in the Luhansk region still do not function - and here we see outright obstruction under contrived pretexts. Ukraine is doing

everything possible to reach progress in discussions and political issues. In the TCG, in the Minsk process, we've put forward proposals - draft laws, but everything is blocked - no one talks about them. Ukraine demands to unblock the negotiation process immediately. But this does not mean that the search for peace is limited to it alone.

We are ready to look for the key to the end of the war in all possible formats and platforms: Paris, Berlin, Minsk. Istanbul, Geneva, Brussels, New York, Beijing - I don't care where in the world to negotiate peace in Ukraine.

It does not matter if four countries, seven or a hundred participate, the main thing is that Ukraine and Russia are among them. What is really important is the understanding that peace is needed not only by us, the world needs peace in Ukraine. Peace and restoration of territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders. This is the only way. And I hope no one thinks of Ukraine as a convenient and eternal buffer zone between the West and Russia. This will never happen. Nobody will allow that.

Otherwise - who's next? Will NATO countries have to defend each other? I want to believe that the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 5 will be more effective than the Budapest Memorandum.

Ukraine has received security guarantees for abandoning the world's third nuclear capability. We don't have that weapon. We also have no security. We also do not have part of the territory of our state that is larger in area than Switzerland, the Netherlands or Belgium. And most importantly - we don't have millions of our citizens. We don't have all this. Therefore, we have something. The right to demand a shift from a policy of appeasement to ensuring security and peace guarantees.

Since 2014, Ukraine has tried three times to convene consultations with the guarantor states of the Budapest Memorandum. Three times without success. Today Ukraine will do it for the fourth time. I, as President, will do this for the first time. But both Ukraine and I are doing this for the last time. I am initiating consultations in the framework of the Budapest Memorandum. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was commissioned to convene them. If they do not happen again or their results do not guarantee security for our country, Ukraine will have every right to believe

that the Budapest Memorandum is not working and all the package decisions of 1994 are in doubt.

I also propose to convene a summit of permanent members of the UN Security Council in the coming weeks with the participation of Ukraine, Germany and Turkey in order to address security challenges in Europe. And elaborate new, effective security guarantees for Ukraine. Guarantees today, as long as we are not a member of the Alliance and in fact are in the gray zone - in a security vacuum.

What else can we do now? Continue to effectively support Ukraine and its defense capabilities. Provide Ukraine with a clear European perspective, the tools of support available to candidate countries, and clear and comprehensive timeframes for joining the Alliance.

Support the transformation in our country. Establish a Stability and Reconstruction Fund for Ukraine, a land-lease program, the supply of the latest weapons, machinery and equipment for our army - an army that protects the whole of Europe.

Develop an effective package of preventive sanctions to deter aggression. Guarantee Ukraine's energy security, ensure its integration into the EU energy market when Nord Stream 2 is used as a weapon.

All these questions need answers.

So far we have silence instead of them. And as long as there is silence, there will be no silence in the east of our state. That is - in Europe. That is - in the whole world. I hope the whole world finally understands this, Europe understands.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I thank all the states that supported Ukraine today.

In words, in declarations, in concrete help. Those who are on our side today. On the side of truth and international law. I'm not calling you by name - I don't want some other countries to be ashamed. But this is their business, this is their karma. And this is on their conscience. However,

I do not know how they will be able to explain their actions to the two soldiers killed and three wounded in Ukraine today.

And most importantly - to three girls from Kyiv. One is ten years old, the second is six, and the third is only one. Today they were left without a father. At 6 o'clock in the morning Central European Time. When the Ukrainian intelligence officer, Captain Anton Sydorov was killed as a result of artillery fire prohibited by the Minsk agreements. I don't know what he thought at the last moment of his life. He definitely didn't know what agenda someone needs to meet to end the war.

But he knows exactly the answer to the question I asked at the beginning. He knows exactly who of us is lying.

May his memory live forever. May the memory of all those who died today and during the war in the east of our state live forever.

Thank you.

APPENDIX H

Speech by the President of Ukraine to U.S. Congress (Zelenskyy, 2022c)

Mrs. Speaker,

Members of Congress,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Americans! Friends!

I am proud to greet you from Ukraine, from our capital - Kyiv. From a city that is under missile and air strikes by Russian troops. Daily. But it does not give up. And it didn't even think to give up for a single minute! Just as dozens of other cities and communities in our country, which found themselves in the worst war since World War II.

I have the honor to greet you on behalf of the Ukrainian people, brave and freedom-loving people. For eight years they have been resisting the aggression of the Russian Federation. They sacrifice the best children - sons and daughters to stop the full-scale Russian invasion.

Now the fate of our state is being decided. The fate of our people. It is being decided whether Ukrainians will be free. Whether they will preserve their democracy.

Russia has attacked more than just our land and our cities. It went on a brutal offensive against our values. Basic human values. It threw tanks and planes against our freedom. Against our right to live freely in our country, choosing our own future. Against our desire for happiness. Against our national dreams. Just like yours, ordinary people of America. Just like those of everyone in the United States.

I remember your Rushmore National Memorial. The faces of your prominent presidents. Those who laid the foundations of America. As it is today. Democracy, independence, freedom and care for everyone. Everyone who works diligently. Who lives honestly. Who respects the law?

We in Ukraine want the same for ourselves. All that is a normal part of life for you.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Americans!

In your great history you have pages that will allow you to understand Ukrainians. Understand us now. When it is needed most.

Remember Pearl Harbor. Terrible morning of December 7, 1941. When your sky was black from the planes attacking you. Just remember that.

Remember September 11th. A terrible day in 2001, when evil tried to turn your cities into a battlefield. When innocent people were attacked. Attacked from the air. In a way no one expected.

In a way you could not stop it. Our state experiences this every day! Every night! For three weeks now! Different Ukrainian cities... Odesa and Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Sumy, Zhytomyr and Lviv, Mariupol and Dnipro. Russia has turned the Ukrainian sky into a source of death. For thousands of people.

Russian troops have already fired nearly a thousand missiles at Ukraine. Countless bombs. They use drones to kill more precisely. This is a terror Europe has not seen for 80 years!

And we ask for a response. For the response from the world. For the response to terror. Is this too much of a request?

To establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine is to save people. Humanitarian no-fly zone. Conditions under which Russia will no longer be able to terrorize our peaceful cities every day and night. If that's too much, we offer an alternative.

You know what defense systems we need. C-300 and other similar systems.

You know how much depends on the battlefield on the ability to use aircraft. Powerful, strong aircraft. To protect your people. Your freedom. Your land. Aircraft that can help Ukraine. That can help Europe.

And you also know that they are available. But on land. Not in the Ukrainian sky. They do not protect our people.

"I have a dream" - these words are known to each of you. Today I can say: I have a necessity. The necessity to protect our sky. The necessity for your decision. Your help. And it will mean exactly the same thing. The same thing you feel. When you hear: I have a dream.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Friends!

Ukraine is grateful to the United States for its overwhelming support. For all that your state and your people have already done for our freedom. For weapons and ammunition, for training and funding, for leadership in the free world, which helps put pressure on the aggressor economically.

I am grateful to President Biden for his personal involvement, for his sincere commitment to the defense of Ukraine and democracy around the world.

I am grateful to you for the resolution, which recognizes all those who commit crimes against the Ukrainian people as war criminals.

However, now, in the darkest time for our country, for the whole of Europe, I urge you to do more! New packages of sanctions are needed every week. Until the Russian military machine stops. Restrictions are needed as regards everyone on whom this unjust regime is based.

We offer the United States to impose sanctions against all politicians in the Russian Federation who remain in office and do not sever ties with those responsible for the aggression against Ukraine. From State Duma deputies to the last official who lacks the morale to sever ties with state terror. All American companies must leave Russia, their market. Leave this market flooded with our blood.

Ladies and Gentlemen.

Members of Congress!

Take the lead! If you have companies in the constituencies that sponsor the Russian military machine, keeping their business in Russia... You have to put pressure. So that the Russian state

does not receive a single dollar, which it spends on the destruction of Ukraine. On the destruction of Europe.

All American ports must be closed to Russian goods and ships. Peace is more important than profit. And we must defend this principle throughout the world together.

We have already become part of the anti-war coalition. The great anti-war coalition, which unites many states, dozens of states. Those who reacted in a principled manner to President Putin's decision - to Russia's invasion of our state.

But we have to move on. We have to create new tools. To respond quickly! And stop the war. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24. And it would be fair if it ended in a day. In 24 hours. So that evil is punished immediately. Today the world does not have such tools.

The wars of the past have prompted our predecessors to create institutions that were supposed to protect us from war. But... They don't work. We see it. You see it. So, we need new ones. New institutions. New alliances.

And we offer them.

We offer to create an association - U-24. United for peace. A union of responsible states that have the strength and conscience to stop conflicts. Immediately. Provide all necessary assistance in 24 hours. If necessary - weapons. If necessary - sanctions. Humanitarian support. Political support. Funding. Everything necessary to preserve peace quickly. To save lives.

In addition, such an association could provide assistance to those who are experiencing natural disasters, man-made disasters. Who fell victim to a humanitarian crisis or epidemic.

Remember how difficult it was for the world to do the simplest thing - to give everyone vaccines. Vaccines against Covid. To save lives. To prevent new strains. The world spent months and years doing things that could have been done much faster. So that there were no human losses.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Americans!

If such an alliance, the U-24, had already been formed, I believe it would have saved thousands of lives. In our country, many other countries that need peace so crucially, that suffered inhuman destruction... I ask you to watch one video now. Video of what Russian troops did on our land. We have to stop this. We must prevent such things. Preventively destroy every aggressor who seeks to conquer another nation.

Please watch...

And in the end to sum it up.

Today it is not enough to be the leader of the nation.

Today it takes to be the Leader of the world. Being the Leader of the world means to be the Leader of Peace.

Peace in your country does not depend anymore only on you and your people.

It depends on those next to you, on those who are strong.

Strong does not mean big. Strong is brave and ready to fight for the life of his citizens and citizens of the world.

For human rights, for freedom, for the right to live decently and to die when your time comes, not when it is wanted by someone else, by your neighbor.

Today the Ukrainian people are defending not only Ukraine, we are fighting for the values of Europe and the world, sacrificing our lives in the name of the Future.

That's why today the American people are helping not just Ukraine, but Europe and the world to keep the planet alive, to keep justice in history.

Now I am almost 45 years old. Today my age stopped when the hearts of more than 100 children stopped beating. I see no sense in life if it cannot stop death. And this is my main mission as the Leader of my people – great Ukrainians.

And as the Leader of my nation I am addressing President Biden.

You are the Leader of the nation, of your great nation.

I wish you to be the Leader of the world. Being the Leader of the world means to be the Leader of Peace.

Thank you.

Glory to Ukraine!

APPENDIX I

Sample Tweet from Department of Defence, Ukraine

From *Twitter*, by Defense of Ukraine.ua, 2022,

(https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1576248108690079745). In public domain.

APPENDIX J

Tweet Definitions (Twitter, n.d.c)

Term	Definition
(hashtag)	See "hashtag"
@	The @ sign is used to call out usernames in Tweets. Users include @ to mention other usernames in Tweets, send a direct message, or link to a profile.
Bio	A bio is the short (up to 160 characters) personal description that appears in a user's profile that serves to characterize a persona on Twitter
Follow	Subscribing to a Twitter account is called "following"
Follow Count	This count reflects how many people follow a user and how many that user follows
Geolocation, Geotagging	Adding a location to your Tweet (geolocation or geotag) tells those who see your tweet where you were when you posted a tweet
Hashtag	A hashtag is any word or phrase immediately preceded by the # symbol. A hashtag aggregates Tweets with the same topic or words
Like	A like is when the heart icon on a Tweet is tapped. It acknowledges that you appreciate it
Mentions	A tweet that mentions or acknowledges another twitterer in a tweet, distinguished by the @username in the message
News	A tweet that contains a link to a news website, not by a journalist or news organization that tweets its own content. Includes the headline or a version of it

Term	Definition
Online Information	A tweet that contains a link to online information (i.e., blogs, websites, social networking sites) that is not from a news website
Quote Tweet	When a user adds their own comments to a Tweet before Retweeting
Retweet	The act of sharing another account's Tweet to all followers by clicking or tapping on Retweet button.
Thread	A series of connected Tweets from one person. Additional context, updates, or an extended point can be joined by connecting multiple Tweets together
Timeline	A real-time stream of Tweets. A Home timeline is where a user sees all Tweets shared by friends and people followed
Trends	A Trend is a topic or hashtag determined algorithmically to be one of the most popular on Twitter at that moment
Tweet (n.)	A Tweet (up to 280 characters) may contain photos, GIFs, videos, and text
Tweet (v.)	The act of sending a Tweet.
Twitter	An global information network made up of short messages (including photos, videos, and links)
Twitter emoji	A Twitter emoji is a specific series of letters immediately preceded by the # sign, which generates an icon on Twitter, such as a national flag or another small image
Username	A username (or handle) is how a user is identified on Twitter and is always preceded immediately by the @ symbol.

Term	Definition
Verified Account	A verified Twitter account receives a blue check icon to indicate that the creator of these Tweets is a legitimate source

APPENDIX K

Global Leaders' Twitter Handles (Twitter, 2022)

Nation	Name	Handle	Followers
Australia	Anthony Albanese (Prime Minister)	@AlboMP	574.9K
Austria	Karl Nehammer	@karlnehammer	64K
Belgium	Alexander De Croo	@alexanderdecroo	223.9K
Bulgaria	Kiril Petkov	@KirilPetkov	32.8K
Canada	Justin Trudeau	@JustinTrudeau	6.3M
Croatia	Andrej Plenković	@AndrejPlenkovic	64.2K
Czech Republic	Petr Fiala	@P_Fiala	271K
Denmark	Mette Frederiksen	@Statsmin	87.6K
Estonia	Alar Karis	@AlarKaris	45.4K
European Union	Ursula von der Leyen (Council President)	@EUcouncil	716.6K
Finland	Sanna Marin	@MarinSanna	603K
France	Emmanuel Macron	@EmmanuelMacron	8.6M
Georgia	Salome Zourabichvili	@Zourabichvili_S	72K
Germany	Olaf Scholz	@OlafScholz	597.8K
Greece	Katerina Sakellaropoulouis	@PresidencyGR	91.2K
Hungary	Viktor Orbán	@PM_ViktorOrban	70.6K
Iceland	Guðni Th. Jóhannesson,	@PresidentISL	13.6K
India	Narendra Modi	@narendramodi	83.3M
Ireland	Micheál Martin	@MichealMartinTD	178.3K

Nation	Name	Handle	Followers
Israel	Yair Lapid	@IsraeliPM	977.3K
Italy	Mario Draghi	@Palazzo_Chigi	929.3K
Italy	Georgia Meloni	@Palazzo_Chigi	929.3K
Japan	Fumio Kishida	@kishida230	604.3K
Latvia	Arturs Krišjānis Kariņš	@krisjaniskarins	48.3K
Lithuania	Gitanas Nausėda	@GitanasNauseda	118.7K
Luxembourg	Xavier Bettel	@Xavier_Bettel	112.9K
Malta	Robert Abela	@MaltaGov	39K
Moldova	Maia Sandu	@sandumaiamd	109K
Munich Security Conference		@MunSceConf	76.9K
NATO	Jens Stoltenberg (Secretary)	@jensstoltenberg	756.6K
NATO	North American Treaty Organization	@NATO	1.5M
Netherlands	Mark Rutte	@MinPres	1.3M
New Zealand	Jacinda Ardern	@jacindaardern	809.6K
Norway	Jonas Gahr Støre	@jonasgahrstore	189.6K
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)		@OSCE	157.6K
Poland	Andrzej Duda	@AndrzejDuda	1.7 M
Portugal	António Costa	@antoniocostapm	279.8K
Romania	Nicolae Ciucă	@NicolaeCiuca	9,345
Russia	Vladimir Putin	@KremlinRussia_E	1.7M

Nation	Name	Handle	Followers
Slovakia	Eduard Heger	@eduardheger	26.8K
Slovenia	Janez Janša	@JJansaSDS	109K
Spain	Pedro Sánchez	@sanchezcastejon	1.7M
Sweden	Magdalena Andersson	@SwedishPM	173.K
Switzerland	Ignazio Cassis	@ignaziocassis	61.4K
Turkey	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	@RTErdogan	19.4M
Ukraine	Volodyrmr Zelenskyy	@ZelenskyyUA	6.7M
Ukraine	Ukraine	@Ukraine	2.2M
Ukraine	Defense of Ukraine	@DefenceU	1.5M
Ukraine	Crimea	@Crimea	38.6K
Ukraine	Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine	@CinC_AFU	181.1K
Ukraine	-Dmytro Kuleba - Foreign Minister of Ukraine	@DmytroKuleba	1M
Ukraine	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	@MFA_Ukraine	436.4K
Ukraine	Olena Zelenska- The First Lady of Ukraine	@ZelenskaUA	97.9K
Ukraine	Petro Poroshenko (Former President)	@poroshenko	1.3M
United Kingdom	Boris Johnson (Former Prime Minister)	@BorisJohnson	4.6 M
United Kingdom	Liz Truss (Prime Minister)	@trussliz	683K

Nation	Name	Handle	Followers
United Kingdom	Official Prime Minister Account	@10DowningStreet	5.9M
United Nations		@UN	15.9M
United Nations	Antonio Guterres (Secretary General)	@antonioguterres	1.9M
United States	Donald Trump (Former President)	@realDonaldTrump	88.9M
United States	Joseph Biden (President)	@JoeBiden	31.6M
Vatican City	Pope Francis	@Pontifex	19.3M

APPENDIX L

Selected Quotes from Volodymyr Zelenskyy from Official Speeches, Tweets, and Instagram

(Zelenskyy, n.d.a, n.d.b)

"Faith is something we never discuss at the dinner table in my family, but I do believe in God."

"I would never want Ukraine to be a piece on the map, on the chessboard of big global players, so that someone could toss us around, use us as cover, as part of some bargain."

"To all the countries of the former Soviet Union: look at us; everything is possible."

"People don't believe in words. Or rather, people believe in words only for some time. Then they start to look for action."

"It's a victory when the weapons fall silent, and people speak up."

We are different from Russians, but that is not a reason to be enemies. We want to determine, build our future ourselves, peacefully, calmly and honestly."

"We are all here, defending our independence, our country. And it will stay that way. Glory to the men and women defending us. Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the heroes."

"There can be no strong army in a place where the authorities do not respect the people who every day sacrifice their life for the country."

"All the money I have, I made with my talent."

"All my life I tried to do all I could so that Ukrainians laughed. That was my mission. Now I will do all I can so that Ukrainians at least do not cry anymore."

"Our weapons are our truth, and our truth lies in the fact that this is our land, this is our country, our children, and we are going to defend all of this… Glory to Ukraine!"

"The president can't change the country on his own. But what can he do? He can give an example."

"People don't really believe in words. Or rather, people believe in words only for a stretch of time. Then they start to look for action."

"We do not hold out, we fight, and our nation will fight to the end. This is our home, we are protecting our land, our homes. For the sake of our children's future."

"You can't think of the global and close your eyes to the details."

"I'm not hiding. And I'm not afraid of anyone."

"No panic. We're strong. We're ready for anything."

"We Ukrainians are a peaceful nation. But if we remain silent today, we will be gone tomorrow."

"We are different, but that is not a reason to be enemies. We want to determine, build our future ourselves, peacefully, calmly and honestly."

APPENDIX M

Dubious and Debunked Claims from Bellingcat Investigative Team (2022)

Reported date of incident	Reported Incident Narrative	Original Source	Fact-Checked Narrative	Fact Check Source
18/02/2022	LPR & DPR declared an emergency evacuation of civilians from separatist-held areas on 18th Feb due to escalation of fighting.	1. DPR: https://t.me/pushilindenis/1999 2. LPR: https://t.me/LIC_LPR/17431	Metadata of the videos published by the LPR & DNR demonstrate they were filmed on the 16th of February before fighting had significantly escalated in Ukraine. Additionally, DNR head, Pushilin, states: "Today, on February 18th" indicating the exact date of this event was pre-planned.	1. (Basu, 2022) 2. (Toler, 2022)
18/02/2022	Polish-speaking saboteurs attacked a sewage facility in an attempt to place a tank of chlorine for a false flag attack. Video was recovered from the body of one of the attackers.	https://t.me/nm_dnr/6192	Metadata shows the video was filmed on the Feb 8th, days earlier than the stated date of the incident. The video has also been manipulated by adding the sound of explosions from a YouTube video from a Finnish military exercise.	(Higgins, 2022)

Reported date of incident	Reported Incident Narrative	Original Source	Fact-Checked Narrative	Fact Check Source
18/02/2022	Car bomb targeted the head of the DNR militia	https://t.me/DNR_SCKK/5994	The UAZ destroyed in the explosions appears to have the same number plates as a UAZ Patriot, a much newer vehicle, photographed months before. This has not been independently verified.	1. (Giczan, 2022) 2. (Pustovalov, 2022)
20/02/2022	Video of civilian with amputated leg after shelling. Includes footage immediately after the attack and with the casualty in hospital.	https://t.me/millnr/7172	The base for a prosthetic leg is clearly visible in the first video suggesting the individual had already lost leg prior to alleged incident.	1. (CIT, 2022) 2. (Waters, 2022)
21/02/2022	Shelling of border post by Ukrainian forces	(РБК, 2022, February 21)	Filmed in the same location as Incident 6. Appears to have been directly hit with a single shell, which is an unlikely outcome for conventional artillery. There is the possibility it was a guided shell, but this seems unlikely considering the context. Taking into account the fact it was filmed at the same location as Incident 6, this incident is considered unlikely to be genuine.	1. (Higgins, 2022) 2. (Waters, 2022) 3. (Oryx, 2022)

Reported date of incident	Reported Incident Narrative	Original Source	Fact-Checked Narrative	Fact Check Source
21/02/2022	Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory with infantry and armor.	https://t.co/sgbFFJW1M7	Filmed at the same location as Incident 5. This is well within separatist territory and therefore extremely unlikely to be Ukrainian forces. The fact it was filmed at the same location as incident 5, reportedly on the same day, further reduces its credibility. Vehicle seen (BTR 70M) is reportedly not used by the Ukrainian armed forces.	(Rogers, 2022)
21/02/2022	Russian President, Vladimir Putin, scheduled an emergency Security Council meeting after the leaders of the LPR & DNR requested Russia to recognize their independence. After the meeting, Putin addressed the nation and then signed into law the official recognition of the LPR & DNR as independent states.	1. (Вести.Ru, 2022, February 22) 2. (Lancaster, 2022, February 22)	Despite the Security Council reportedly taking place at 1700 local time, watches on the participants indicated it took place several hours earlier, at around 1200.	(van Wagtendonk & Paladino, 2022)

APPENDIX N

LIWC-22 Additional Psychometric Properties (Boyd et al., 2022)

Psychological Processes	
Drives	Achievement
Affiliation	Power
Cognition	
All-or-none	Discrepancy
Cognitive processes	Tentative
Insight	Certitude
Causation	Differentiation
Memory	
Affect	
Positive tone	Negative emotion
Negative tone	Anxiety
Emotion	Anger
Positive emotion	Sadness
Swear words	
Social Processes	
Social behavior	Communication
Prosocial behavior	Social referents
Politeness	Family
Interpersonal conflict	Friends
Moralization	Female references
Male references	

Culture	
Politics	Ethnicity
Technology	

Lifestyle	
Leisure	Work
Home	Money

Physical	
Health	Substances
Illness	Sexual
Wellness	Food
Mental Health	Death
Substances	

States	
Need	Lack
Want	Fulfilled
Acquire	Fatigue

Motives	
Reward	Curiosity
Risk	Allure

Perception	
Attention	Visual
Motion	Auditory
Space	Feeling

Time Orientation	
Time	Present focus
Past focus	Future focus
Conversational	
Netspeak	Nonfluencies
Assent	Fillers

APPENDIX O

Partial Sample of BeautifulSoup Source Code for Zelenskyy Speeches

```
TP request for each speech link
sts.get(url,headers=headers)
 object for each speech
ifulSoup(response2.text,'lxml')
le of speech and Extracting its text
ect_one('h1').text
e of speech and Extracting its text
ct_one('.article .date').text
t of speech and Extracting its text while removing blank li
ct_one('.article_content').text.replace('\n\n','')
to wite extracted items
.csv','a', encoding='utf-8', newline='') as f:
f).writerow([date,title,text.replace('\n','',1)])
k weather speech list page has next page or not. If next pa
next page and previous steps will repeat (Under While loop)
' not in soup.select('.pag')[-1].get('href'):
t('.pag')[-1].get('href')

ts.get(next, headers=headers)

does not exist, loop will terminate and job is completed.
leted')
```

APPENDIX P

Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and

Motivation

Responsiveness to constraints	Openness to information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	**Relationship Focus**
Challenges constraints **(Becomes a crusader)**	**Closed to information**	**Expansionistic (Focus is on expanding one's power and influence)**	**Evangelistic (Focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause)**
Challenges constraints **(Is generally strategic)**	**Open to information**	**Incremental (Focus is on maintaining one's maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both)**	**Charismatic (Focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them)**
Respects constraints **(Inclined toward pragmatism)**	**Closed to information**	**Directive (Focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's own views while still working within the norms and rules of one's current position)**	**Consultative (Focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a particular situation)**

Responsiveness to constraints	Openness to information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Respects constraints	Open to information	Reactive (Focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow)	Accommodative (Focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others and sharing accountability in the process)
(Is usually opportunistic)			

Adapted from *Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis*, by M. G. Hermann, 1999/2002, Social Science Automation. (https://socialscience.net/docs/LTA.pdf). Copyright 2002 by Social Science Automation, Inc.

APPENDIX Q

LIWC-22 Results Word Frequencies

Table Q1

Pre-Crisis

Word	Frequency
Ukraine	88
time	60
years	47
people	35
country	30
state	28
Ukrainian	24
today	24
security	23
Crimea	20
day	19
war	19
support	19
Europe	17
year	16
children	16
army	15
independence	14
Ukrainians	14
independent	13
peace	13

Word	Frequency
European	12
building	12
citizens	12
important	12
energy	11
international	11
thank	10
law	10

Table Q2

Crisis

Word	Frequency
Ukraine	205
support	111
Russia	96
discussed	94
Russian	74
aggression	64
sanctions	53
stop	51
president	50
grateful	49
people	48
defense	46
thanked	46
conversation	41
informed	39
EU	36
war	35
talked	35
aggressor	35
minister	34
prime	34
peace	33
united	32

Word	Frequency
assistance	32
security	32
Ukraine's	31
European	31
humanitarian	31
talks	31

Table Q3

Kinetic

Word	Frequency
Ukraine	1715
people	1285
Russian	1199
war	974
Russia	922
state	729
today	513
Ukrainian	412
Ukrainians	410
country	377
cities	376
support	358
peace	352
Europe	350
day	343
freedom	334
European	324
military	309
life	306
grateful	304
Mariupol	294
occupiers	287
time	281

Word	Frequency
sanctions	268
land	262
region	243
defense	239
important	239
city	237
glory	236

APPENDIX R

Coded References

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
History	Applied History	*Graham Allison, director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*	(Allison & Dillon, 2014)
History	Applied History	*Why the U.S. President Needs a Council of Historians*	(Allison & Ferguson, 2016)
History	Applied History	*From the Director: Graham Allison*	(Allison, 2017)
History	Applied History	*The history manifesto*	(Armitage & Guldi, 2014)
History	Applied History	*Strange Defeat*	(Bloch, 1949)
History	Applied History	*The Strange Defeat*	(Bloch, 1949)
History	Applied History	*On War*	(Clausewitz, 1832/2017)
History	Applied History	*Rebooting Clausewitz*	(Coker, 2017)
History	Applied History	*The Leadership Ethics of Machiavelli's Prince*	(Cosans & Reina, 2018)
History	Applied History	*#289 - Stephen Kotkin: Putin, Zelenskyy, and War in Ukraine / Lex Fridman Podcast*	(Fridman, 2022)
History	Applied History	*The End of History*	(Fukuyama, 1989)
History	Applied History	*Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order*	(Ikenberry, 2009)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
History	Applied History	*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*	(Kennedy, 1987)
History	Applied History	*The History Continues: Reflections About the Theory of the End of History From Francis Fukuyama*	(Kiçmari, 2018)
History	Applied History	*The Prince*	(Machiavelli, 1513/2014)
History	Applied History	*Once Upon a Time in Russia*	(Mezrich, 2015)
History	Applied History	*Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*	(Morgenthau, 1948)
History	Applied History	*Thinking in time: The uses of history for decision-maker*	(Neustadt & May 1988)
History	Applied History	*The Things They Carried*	(O'Brien, 1990)
History	Applied History	*The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*	(Plokhy, 2015)
History	Applied History	*Graham Allison Discusses the Russia-Ukraine War, the US-China Rivalry and Thucydides's Trap \ Russia Matters*	(Russia Matters, 2022)
History	Applied History	*Britain's Retreat from Kabul 1842.*	(Stewart, n.d.)
History	Applied History	*The Guns of August*	(Tuchman, 1962)
History	Applied History	*Applied history project*	(Walton et al., 2016)
History	Churchill	*Never Give In! Winston Churchill's Speeches*	(Churchill, 2007)
History	Churchill	*Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Man*	(E. A. Cohen, 2022)
History	Churchill	*Words as Weapons of Mass Persuasion*	(Crespo-Fernandez, 2013)
History	Churchill	*Splendid and the Vile*	(Larson, 2020)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
History	Churchill	*The Last Lion: Winston Churchill: Defender of the Realm 1940-1965*	(Manchester & Reid, 2012)
History	Churchill	*Rhetoric and Political Intervention — Churchill's World War II Speeches in Context*	(Toye, 2014)
History	Yalta	*The Dumbarton Oaks conversations, 1944*	(Dumbarton Oaks Archives, 2017)
History	Yalta	*The Future of Yalta*	(Brzezinski, 1984)
History	Yalta	*Diplomatic papers, conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945—Office of the historian.*	(Office of the Historian, n.d.)
History	Yalta	*From Tehran to Yalta: Reflections on FDR's foreign policy*	(Warner, 1967)
History	Yalta	*The Avalon Project: The Yalta (Crimea) Conference*	(Yale Law School, 2008)
History	New History	*Winter on Fire*	(Afineevsky, 2015)
History	New History	*Miscommunicating social change: Lessons from Russia and Ukraine*	(Baysha, 2018)
History	New History	*What Happens When We Back Putin Into a Corner. The Atlantic.*	(Friedersdorf, 2022)
History	New History	*A Comedian, A President, and A Prime Minister: the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine. In LSE Dahrendorf Forum: 1-2.*	(Korosteleva & Samokhvalov 2019)
History	New History	*The 2019 Presidential Election in Ukraine: Populism, the Influence of the Media, and the Victory of the Virtual Candidate.*	(Mashtaler, 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
History	New History	*Revolution without Regime Change: The Evidence from the Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 51(4): 349–59.*	(Matsiyevsky, 2018)
History	New History	*Zelensky will struggle to meet Ukrainians' hopes*	(Oxford Analytica, 2019)
History	New History	*The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine. Problems of Post-Communism, 58(6): 3–20.*	(Ryabinska, 2011).
History	New History	*Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 7(1): 85–91.*	(Shveda & Park, 2016)
History	New History	*Number of civilian casualties during the war in Ukraine 2022. Retrieved June 13, 2022, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/*	(Statista, 2022)
History	New History	*About yes—Yalta European strategy (YES).*	(YES, n.d.)
International	International Relations	*The End of History and the Last Man*	(Fukuyama, 1992)
International	International Relations	*GoodFellows: Conversations from the Hoover Institution: Vlad the Impaler? on Apple Podcasts*	(Cochrane et al., 2022a)
International	International Relations	*Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation*	(Glaser, 2010)
International	International Relations	*Neo-Marxist cancel culture has now merged seamlessly with liberal-internationalist utopianism and neocon regime-change fever. What are we gonna call it?*	(Hazony, 2022)
International	International Relations	*The Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century: the Eastern Partnership, Russian Expansionism and the War in Ukraine*	(Herbut & Kunert-Milcarz, 2018)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
International	International Relations	*The Clash of Civilization*	(Huntington, 1993)
International	International Relations	*The end of liberal international order*	(Ikenberry, 2018)
International	International Relations	*A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order*	(Ikenberry, 2020)
International	International Relations	*Perception and misperception in international politics*	(Jervis, 1976)
International	International Relations	*Political Psychology in International Relations*	(McDermott, 2004)
International	International Relations	*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*	(Mearsheimer, 2001)
International	International Relations	*Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power*	(Nye, 1990)
International	International Relations	*International Relations Theory*	(Romaniuk, 2011)
International	International Relations	*Leadership in International Relations: The Balance of Power and the Origins of World War II*	(Roth, 2010)
International	International Relations	*Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*	(Shirkey, 2019)
International	International Relations	*Philosophy of International Politics*	(Syed, 1963)
International	International Relations	*Man, the State, and War*	(Waltz, 1959)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	International Relations	*Theory of International Politics*	(Waltz, 1979)
International	International Relations	*The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory*	(Waltz, 1988)
International	International Relations	*International relations theory: A critical introduction*	(Weber, 2001)
International	International Relations	The concise Oxford dictionary of politics and international relations	(G. W. Brown et al., 2018)
International	Foreign Policy	*The Fifth Act*	(Ackerman, 2022)
International	Foreign Policy	*International Decision Making: Leadership Matters*	(Hermann & Hagan, 1998)
International	Foreign Policy	*Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry*	(Hermann & Hermann, 1989)
International	Foreign Policy	*Effects of personal characteristics of leaders on foreign policy*	(Hermann, 1978)
International	Foreign Policy	*Who becomes a political leader? Some societal and regime influences on selection of a head of government*	(Hermann, 1979)
International	Foreign Policy	*Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders*	(Hermann, 1980a)
International	Foreign Policy	*Comments: On "Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews.*	(Hermann, 1980b)
International	Foreign Policy	*A Study of 53 heads of government*	(Hermann, 1984a)
International	Foreign Policy	*Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making*	(Hermann, 1984b)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Foreign Policy	*Foreign policy role orientations and the quality of foreign policy decisions*	(Hermann, 1987)
International	Foreign Policy	*Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making*	(Hermann, 1993)
International	Foreign Policy	*Assessing the Foreign Policy Role Orientations of Sub-Saharan African Leaders*	(Hermann, 1987b
International	Foreign Policy	*Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis*	(Hermann, 1999/2002)
International	Foreign Policy	*How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework*	(Hermann, 2001)
International	Foreign Policy	*When Things Go Wrong: Foreign Policy Decision Making under Adverse Feedback*	(Hermann, 2012)
International	Foreign Policy	*Leader's and Foreign Policy Making*	(Hermann, 2019)
International	Foreign Policy	*Resolve, accept, or avoid: Effects of group conflict on foreign policy decisions*	(Hermann et al., 2001)
International	Foreign Policy	*Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*	(Hobbes, 1668/1994)
International	Foreign Policy	*Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach*	(Houghton, 2007)
International	Foreign Policy	*"Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations." Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1): 1–30.*	(Hudson, 2005)
International	Foreign Policy	*Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations*	(Hudson & Day, 2019)
International	Foreign Policy	*"Trump Norm Violations Don't Make Him a Despot."*	(Lowry, 2018)
International	Foreign Policy	*The Weakness of the Despot*	(Remnick, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Foreign Policy	*Foreign policy decision-making : an approach to the study of international politics*	(Snyder et.al, 1954)
International	Foreign Policy	*Policy discourses and security issues: US foreign policy toward India during the Clinton administration.*	(van de Wetering, 2016)
International	Foreign Policy	*Rethinking and reconceptualizing risk in foreign policy decision-making: a sociocognitive approach*	(Vertzberger, 1995)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*	(Allison & Zelikow, 1999)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Forum: Coding in Tongues: Developing Non-English Coding Schemes for Leadership Profiling*	(Brummer et al., 2020)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Narrative Psychology and Life Stories*	(Josselson & Hopkins, 2015)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Psychology and Politics*	(Lasswell, 1930)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Power and Personality.*	(Lasswell, 1948a)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*The Personality Panorama: Conceptualizing Personality Through Big Behavioral Data*	(Boyd et al., 2020)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Exploring the final years of the life of John F. Kennedy Jr.: A mixed methods psychobiographical case study*	(Ferrer, & Ponterotto 2020)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Bringing psychobiography into psychology's mainstream*	(Kasser, 2017)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*New trends in psychobiography*	(Mayer & Kovary, 2019)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Psychobiography: Theory and method*	(Schultz & Lawrence, 2017)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Depression, negative emotionality, and self-referential language: A multi-lab, multi-measure, and multi-language-task research synthesis*	(Tackman et al., 2019)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*Doing psychobiography: The case of Christian Barnard.*	(Van Niekerk et al., 2019)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*At-a-distance analysis*	(Schafer, 2014)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*The ecology of cognitive development: Research models and fugitive findings.*	(Bronfenbrenner, 1993)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*We were taken on the ride. Leadership traits analysis in the circumstances of international crisis – the decision of Aleksander Kwaśniewski in the context of intervention in Iraq*	(Umińska-Woroniecka, 2022)
International	Psychobiographical Study	*We were taken on the ride. Leadership traits analysis in the circumstances of international crisis – the decision of Aleksander Kwaśniewski in the context of intervention in Iraq*	(Umińska-Woroniecka, 2022)
International	Transformational Leadership	*PM statement to the House of Commons on Ukraine.*	(B. Johnson, 2022b)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Transformational leadership and innovative work behavior: The role of motivation to learn, task complexity and innovation climate*	(Afsar & Umrani, 2019)
International	Transformational Leadership	*The high impact leader: Moments matter in accelerating authentic leadership development.*	(Avolio & Luthans, 2006)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Leadership: Current theories, research, and future directions.*	(Avolio et al., 2009)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Transformational Leadership	*Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational Leadership*	(Bass, 1990)
International	Transformational Leadership	*From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the vision.*	(Bass, 1999)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Transformational Leadership*	(Bass & Riggio, 2006)
International	Transformational Leadership	*100 speeches in 100 days of war: Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky rallies his country*	(Berry, 2022)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Leadership*	(Burns, 1978)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Two sides of the same coin? An analysis of the authentic and charismatic leadership during crisis*	(Cortellazzo & Bruni, 2021)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Transformational Diplomacy as a Form Of Contemporary Public Diplomacy*	(Haluga & Keuric, 2021)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Transformational Leadership Theory: Why Military Leaders Are More Charismatic and Transformational?*	(Hamad, 2015)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Leadership and personality: Trait perspectives and "great man" theory*	(Haslam, n.d.)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals*	(Hermann et al., 2001)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Authentic and ethical leadership during a crisis.*	(Keselman & Saxe-Braithwaite, 2020)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Politics: Who gets what, when, how*	(Lasswell, 1936)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Leadership and Transformative Ambition in International Relations*	(Menaldo, 2013)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Transformational Leadership	*Leadership: Theory and Practice (2ⁿᵈ ed.)*	(Northouse, 2021)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Global Leadership Research: Where Do We Go From Here?*	(Reiche et al., 2019)
International	Transformational Leadership	*Speech by the President of Ukraine at the 58th Munich Security Conference*	(Zelenskyy, 2022a)
International	Actor-Agent	*Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*	(Alden & Aran, 2017)
International	Actor-Agent	*Heroes and Hero-Worship*	(Carlyle, 1899)
International	Actor-Agent	*From Brexit to Trump: Social Media's Role in Democracy*	(Hall et al., 2018)
International	Actor-Agent	*President Trump and International Relations Theory*	(Jervis, 2018)
International	Actor-Agent	*IR Theory after Trump: A First Image Renaissance? Part I*	(Parajon et al, 2019a)
International	Actor-Agent	*IR Theory after Trump: A First Image Renaissance? Part II*	(Parajon et al, 2019b)
International	Actor-Agent	*Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy." In Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*	(Rosenau, 1966)
International	Actor-Agent	*Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach To The Study Of International Politics*	(Snyder et al., 1962)
International	Actor-Agent	*Foreign policy decision-making (revisited)*	(Snyder et al., 2002)
International	Actor-Agent	*Social Theory of International Politics*	(Wendt, 2012)
International	Zelenskyy	ми тут. Ми в києві. Ми захищаємо українуUA.	(Zelenskyy, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	Private Communication	(D. Petraeus, personal communication, June 15, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Zelenskyy	*'shame On You': How President Zelensky Uses Speeches To Get What He Needs*	(Adami, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin And United The World*	(Urban et al., 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Ukraine's Zelenskyy: A Wartime Statesman For The Social Media Age*	(Adler, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky Invokes Judaism To Rally Support For Ukrainian Cause*	(Agence France-Presse, 2022b)
International	Zelenskyy	*We won't put down weapons': Zelenskyy vows to fight on in Kyiv*	(Al Jazeera, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Democratization Of Political Institutions Under President V. Zelensky: From Toronto To Vilnius*	(Amirov, 2021)
International	Zelenskyy	*Macron Displays Stubble, Jeans And Hoodie In Zelensky Style Pics*	(Averre, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Watch The Emotional Video Ukraine's President Showed Congress In A Plea For More Help*	(Britzky, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelenskyy Opens Cannes Film Festival, Links War And Cinema*	(Coyle, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Volodymyr Zelensky Is Winning Support Using A Crucial American World War Ii Tactic*	(Daly, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*A Prayer for Volodymyr Zelensky*	(Foer, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*"Without Gas or Without You? Without you": Zelensky delivers pointed message to Russia.*	(Haq & Nechyporenko, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Zelenskyy	*This @jaketapper interview with President Zelenskyy on @cnn is riveting. A superb example & reflection of Thomas Carlisle's Great Man Influence on History Theory.*	(Hertling, 2022b)
International	Zelenskyy	*Who Is Volodymyr Zelensky? What to Know About Ukraine's President*	(Hookway, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky Unchained What Ukraine's New Political Order Means For Its Future*	(Hosa & Wilson, 2019)
International	Zelenskyy	*The Architecture and the Pace of the Press-Marathon of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky*	(Hrubych, 2020)
International	Zelenskyy	*Act or dissolve, Zelensky challenges UN, but Ukraine atrocities already pile pressure on Russia*	(Jacinto, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Waging War, Wielding Words: Zelensky's Speeches Have Made Him A Folk Hero*	(King, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Inspirational Zelensky Echoes Churchill In Historic Commons Speech*	(Lister, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Volodymyr Zelensky: What Has Been Done In The Past Year? What's Next?*	(Łukasz, 2020)
International	Zelenskyy	*Seven Takeaways From Zelensky's Marathon Press Conference (And One Surprise) - Ukraineworld*	(Matviyishyn, 2019)
International	Zelenskyy	*What Volodymyr Zelensky's Courage Says About The West*	(McTague, 2022a)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky In Paris: Ukraine Knocks On Doors Of Eu, Nato*	(Mikhailov, 2021)
International	Zelenskyy	*Ukraine. The First Year Of President Zelensky*	(Mironenko, 2020)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky Goes To The Front*	(Musafirova, 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky Urges Ukrainians To Resist As Russian Forces Battle For Kyiv*	(Olearchyk & Reed, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Ukraine Says Russia Is Retaliating By Hitting Critical Infrastructure, Causing Blackouts.*	(Olson, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Ukraine's Zelensky Survives Crises And Setbacks*	(Oxford Analytica, 2020)
International	Zelenskyy	*Opinion: What Health Care Leaders Can Learn From Volodymyr Zelensky*	(Paterson & Sniderman, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Marathon At The Equator. Fact-Checking The Statements Zelensky Made At His Regular Press Conference*	(Perevoshchykov & Dudka, 2021)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky and Servant of the People: New Party, Old Problems – An Examination of Volodymyr Zelensky's Ideology and Progress*	(Place, 2020)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelenskyy Inspires Widespread Confidence From U.S. Public As Views Of Putin Hit New Low*	(Poushter & Connaughton, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*The Approaches of Presidents P. Poroshenko and V. Zelensky to the Settlement of the Conflict in the Donbass: Comparative Analysis*	(Semenov, 2021)
International	Zelenskyy	*"Your banks are where the money of the people who unleashed this war lies," Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky told Swiss protesters gathered in Bern. The embattled leader also took aim @Nestle, which has scaled down but not stopped business in Russia. https://t.co/WhGQ90CjDU*	(Soguel, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*Zelensky Holds 5-Hour Press Marathon With Handpicked Media*	(The Kyiv Independent, 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
International	Zelenskyy	*A couple years ago when my best friend told me he was profiling a comedian running for president in Ukraine for the New Yorker, I kind laughed at the idea. Jokes on me—Zelensky is the most physically courageous and inspiring national leader of this era.*	(Williams, 2022)
International	Zelenskyy	*The President Speaks! New Year's Speeches Of The Presidents Of Ukraine: Political Pr, Ritual, Rational Discourse (Part 2: V. Yanukovych, P. Poroshenko, V. Zelensky)*	(Yakovlev et al., 2020)
International	Zelenskyy	*Address of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy*	(Zelenskyy, 2022b)
International	Zelenskyy	*Address of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy to 58th Munich Security Conference*	(Zelenskyy, 2022a)
International	Zelenskyy	*Address of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy to U.S. Congress*	(Zelenskyy, 2022e)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*On Rhetoric*	(Aristotle, 2017)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rhetorical Presidency Meets The Unitary Executive: Implications For Presidential Rhetoric On Public Policy*	(Beasley, 2010)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rise Of The Rhetorical Presidency*	(Caesar et al., 1981)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Analysing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse And Metaphor.*	(Charteris-Black, 2013)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*History Of Rhetoric, Volume I: The Art Of Persuasion In Greece*	(G. A. Kennedy, 1963/2015)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Narrative And Storytelling*	(Krizek, 2017)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rhetorical Presidency Today: How Does It Stand Up?*	(Laracey, 2009)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Liberty And The News*	(Lippmann, 1920)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Houston, We Have A Narrative*	(McCrackin, 2016)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Visualizing The Rhetorical Presidency: Barack Obama In The Situation Room*	(McFarlane, 2016)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Evolution Of Popular Presidential Communication*	(Pluta, 2013)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Reassessing The Assumptions Behind The Evolution Of Popular Presidential Communication*	(Pluta, 2015)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Presidents In Culture: The Meaning Of Presidential Communication*	(Ryfe, 2005)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Agency Of Journalists In Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Case Of Ukraine During Yanukovich's Presidency*	(Somfalvy & Pleines, 2021)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*Rethinking The Rhetorical Presidency And Presidential Rhetoric 1*	(Stuckey, 2010)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Evolutionary Rhetorical Presidency: Tracing The Changes In Presidential Address And Power*	(Teten, 2011)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rhetorical Presidency*	(Tulis, 1987)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rhetorical Presidency In Retrospect*	(Tulis, 2007)
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rhetorical Presidency, New Ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.*	(Tulis, 2017)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Socio-Political	Narrative	*The Rhetorical Presidency Made Flesh: A Political Science Classic In The Age Of Donald Trump*	(Zug, 2018)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*The Anatomy Of Russian Information Warfare. The Crimean Operation, A Case Study. Osw Point Of View Number 42, May 2014*	(Darczewska, 2014)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Current Issues Of Information Support Of Russian Foreign Policy In The New Political Environment*	(Menshikov & Neymatova, 2020)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*National Defense And Public Speaking*	(Merry, 1918)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Disinformation Under A Networked Authoritarian State: Saudi Trolls' Credibility Attacks Against Jamal Khashoggi*	(Al-Rawi, 2021)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*The Venomous Eye: Melodrama And The Making Of National Identity And State Power*	(Anker, 2016)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Techniques Of Persuasion: From Propaganda To Brainwashing*	(J. A. C. Brown, 1963)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Transformational Public Diplomacy: Rethinking Advocacy For The Globalisation Age*	(Copeland, 2009)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*On Acquiescence And Ends-Less War: An Inquiry Into The New War Rhetoric*	(Engels & Saas, 2013)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Towards A Reconstruction Of Historical Materialism. Iv. What Does The "Crisis" Mean Today?*	(Habermas, 2017)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Ukrainian Strategic Communications And Martial Law*	(Izhutova, 2019)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Propaganda Technique In The World War*	(Lasswell, 1938)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Words That Won The War*	(Mock & Larson, 1939)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*The Powers To Lead*	(Nye, 2008)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Soft Power: The Origins And Political Progress Of A Concept*	(Nye, 2017)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*The Heroic Framing Of Us Foreign Policy*	(Shaw, 2010)
Socio-Political	Infopolitik	*Persuasive Way Of Communicational Propaganda*	(Vlăduţescu, 2014)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Leadership In The 21st Century*	(Allen, 1992)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Orgies Of Feeling: Melodrama And The Politics Of Freedom*	(Anker, 2007)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Changing Minds Winning Peace*	(Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*The Peacemakers: Leadership Lessons From Twentieth-Century Statesmanship*	(Bellamy, 2019)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Diplomacy: Theory And Practice*	(Berridge, 2010)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*A Dictionary Of Diplomacy*	(Berridge & James, 2003)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing The Statesman Back In*	(Byman & Pollack, 2001)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Education, Citizenship And New Public Diplomacy In The Uk: What Is Their Relationship?*	(E. J. Brown et al., 2009)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy & Propaganda: Their Differences*	(J. Brown, 2008)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach To The Study Of Political Leaders And Decision-Making*	(George, 1969)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation.*	(Gregory, 2011)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Rethinking Public Appeals: Experimental Evidence On Presidential Performances*	(Howell et al., 2020)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Going Public: New Strategies Of Presidential Leadership*	(Kernell, 1986)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy*	(Leonard et al., 2002)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*King Of The Mountain: The Nature Of Political Leadership*	(Ludwig, 2002)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Leadership At War*	(MacMillan, 2022)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Constant Communication For Community Engagement Through Responsible Leadership To Manage The Pandemic*	(Mehta & Chandani, 2022)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*The New Public Diplomacy*	(Melissen, 2005)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy*	(Melissen, 2013)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Presidential Power*	(Neustadt, 1990)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*The President's Inner Circle: Personality And Leadership Style In Foreign Policy Decision-Making*	(Preston, 2000)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy Comes Of Age*	(Ross, 2002)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Pillars Of Public Diplomacy*	(Ross, 2014)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Rethinking Presidential Responsiveness: The Public Presidency And Rhetorical Congruence, 1953–2001*	(Rottinghaus, 2006)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*The Ubiquitous Presidency: Toward A New Paradigm For Studying Presidential Communication*	(Scacco & Coe, 2016)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Presidential Communication In Tumultuous Times: Insights Into Key Shifts, Normative Implications, And Research Opportunities*	(Scacco et al., 2018)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy Third Report*	(Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2003)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy Eighth Report*	(Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2006)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Philological Science And Education: Transformation And Development Vector*	(Sobolieva, 2021)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Eu Public Diplomacy Transformation: From The Crisis Of Narrative Towards External Threat*	(Sutyrin, 2021)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Communicating With The World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*	(Tuch, 1990)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy In The Years Ahead - An Assessment Of Proposals For Reorganization*	(U. S. General Accounting Office, 1977)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts But Faces Significant Challenges*	(U. S. General Accounting Office, 2003)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Public Diplomacy And The Future: Hearings Before The Subcommittee On International Operations Of The Committee On International Relations, House Of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session*	(U. S. House Committee on International Relations, 1977)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*The Message Is America: Rethinking Us Public Diplomacy*	(U. S. House Committee on International Relations, 2001)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Department Of Defense Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms*	(U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*Doctrine For Joint Psychological Operations*	(U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003)
Socio-Political	Public Diplomacy	*War, Lies, And Videotape: Public Diplomacy And The Usa's War On Terrorism*	(van Ham, 2003)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Diplomatic Chameleons: Language Style Matching Agreement In International Diplomatic Negotiations*	(Bayram & Ta, 2019)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Mapping The Political Twitterverse: Finding Connections Between Political Elites*	(Bode et al., 2011)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Twiplomacy – New Form Of Contemporary Public Diplomacy?*	(Gurskas, 2016)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*To Personalize Or Depersonalize? When And How Politicians' Personalized Tweets Affect The Public's Reactions*	(Lee & Oh, 2012)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Tweeting In Defeat: How Candidates Concede And Claim Victory In 140 Characters*	(Mirer & Bode, 2015)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*The Agenda-Building Function Of Political Tweets*	(Parmelee, 2014)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Beyond Normalization And Equalization On Twitter: Politicians' Twitter Use During Non-Election Times And Influences Of Media Attention*	(Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2020)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Transnational News Sharing On Social Media: Measuring And Analysing Twitter News Media Repertoires Of Domestic And Foreign Audience Communities*	(Rauchfleisch et al., 2020)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*Ready for the World? Measuring the (Trans-)National Quality of Political Issue Publics on Twitter*	(Schünemann, 2020)
Socio-Political	Twiplomacy	*About government and state-affiliated media account labels on Twitter.*	(Twitter, n.d.a)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Insights From Bellingcat On Russia's Ukraine Ambitions*	(Adami, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Documenting and Debunking Dubious Footage from Ukraines Front Lines*	(Bellingcat, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and 'Trust' as the Antidote*	(Bilal, 2021)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*	(Chadwick, 2013)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*The Press And Foreign Policy*	(B. C. Cohen, 1957)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*'No, we don't know where Tupac is': critical intelligence studies and the CIA on social media*	(Crilley & Pears,2021)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Ukraine's Decentralized Cyber Army*	(Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*GeoConfirmed: The Bucha Massacre. Because of the different war crimes in different videos in different locations (in Bucha), we decided to put this in a thread. If we get more GeoLocated videos about these war crimes we will add them to this thread. 01/13*	(GeoConfirmed, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Ukraine Is Scanning Faces Of Dead Russians, Then Contacting The Mothers*	(Harwell, 2022b)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*When conducting "targeting," there are three important elements to consider: 1). The collection of important intelligence 2). The "boarding" of the target (how to hit, where to hit, when to hit, defenses, etc.) 3). The enemy's ability to avoid being hit. 2/*	(Hertling, 2022c)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*The Ambiguity Of Hybrid-Warfare: A Qualitative Content Analysis Of The United Kingdom's Political–Military Discourse On Russia's Hostile Activities*	(Janičatová & Mlejnková, 2021)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine*	(Johnson, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*InfoSwarms: Drone Swarms and Information Warfare*	(Kallenborn, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*A Closer Look at Russia's' Hybrid War'. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, (7): 1–8.*	(Kofman & Rojansky, 2015)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Propaganda and information warfare in contemporary world: Definition problems, instruments and historical context*	(Kotelenets & Barabash, 2019)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Ukraine's Lessons for the Future of Hybrid Warfare*	(Kong & Marler, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Tomorrow's Wars and the Media*	(Lovelace, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Using a New Cyber Tool, Westerners Have Been Texting Russians About the War in Ukraine*	(Pancevski, 2022)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*The Evolution Of Hybrid-Warfare. Case Study – The Conflict In Ukraine.*	(Popa, 2021)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*The Ultimate Goal: A Former R&AW Chief Deconstructs How Nations Construct Narratives*	(Sood, 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	🧵*My translation of an excerpt of the June 5th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin (http://gulagu.net). Appears that Emmanuel Macron & Olaf Scholz were Wind of Change intended audience for a large portion of this one.*	(Sushko, 2022c)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	*Genuine question for @Twitter - with all the processing power & analytics competency you have, why can't you provide your users an option to block the entire list of Kremlin-associated troll accounts? You do realize we are at war, an integral part of which is information warfare?*	(Sushko, 2022a)
Technological	Hybrid-warfare	🧵*KREMLIN INFORMATION WARFARE: How the "Z Troll Factory" works - "Those who wish to work in the Z cyber forces find themselves in the office within a half-an-hour of waiting in line.*	(Sushko, 2022b)
Technological	Social Media	*Journalists, User Generated Content And Digital Divides.*	(Brake, 2013)
Technological	Social Media	*Osint In The Age Of Disinformation Warfare*	(Barrett, 2022)
Technological	Social Media	*The Causes And Consequences Of Covid-19 Misperceptions: Understanding The Role Of News And Social Media*	(Bridgeman et al., 2020)
Technological	Social Media	*The Rise Of Twitter In The Political Campaign: Searching For Intermedia Agenda-Setting Effects In The Presidential Primary*	(Conway et al., 2015)
Technological	Social Media	*Tweeting To Power: The Social Media Revolution In American Politics*	(Gainous & Wagner, 2013)
Technological	Social Media	*What Matters Most In The Responses To Political Campaign Posts On Social Media: The Candidate, Message Frame, Or Message Format?*	(Lam et al., 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Technological	Social Media	*The Age Of Twitter: Donald J. Trump And The Politics Of Debasement*	(Ott, 2017)
Technological	Social Media	*How Social Media Facilitates The Knowledge Management Process: A Systematic Review*	(Panahi et al., 2021)
Technological	Social Media	*War In 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict In The Twenty-First Century*	(Patrikarakos, 2017)
Technological	Social Media	*Social Media Usage: 2005–2015.*	(Perrin, 2015)
Technological	Social Media	*The Internet And Generalized Functions Of The Public Sphere: Transformative Potentials From A Comparative Perspective*	(Rauchfleisch & Kovic, 2016)
Technological	Social Media	*Digital Media And Social Movements: Obstacles To Building A Global Media Ethic*	(Rohlinger & DeLucchi, 2021)
Technological	Social Media	*A Survey Of Text Mining In Social Media Facebook And Twitter Perspectives*	(Salloum et al., 2017)
Technological	Social Media	*Instagram As A Platform For Forming The Image Of The Country (On The Example Of The Account Of The Office Of The President Of Ukraine And Of The President Of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky Personal Profile)*	(Semen, 2021)
Technological	Social Media	*Instagram As A Platform For Forming The Image Of The Country (On The Example Of The Account Of The Office Of The President Of Ukraine And Of The President Of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky Personal Profile)*	(Semen, 2021)
Technological	Social Media	*How Osint Has Shaped The War In Ukraine. American Security Project.*	(Smith-Boyle, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Technological	Social Media	*Likewar: The Weaponization Of Social Media.*	(Singer & Brooking, 2018)
Technological	Social Media	*What The Hashtag*	(Small, 2011)
Technological	Social Media	*@IAPonomarenko Never forget! https://t.co/bYPhlfnkGj*	(The Tories Out, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*On this day of horror and pain throughout Ukraine…these men I met in Bucha with the @WCKitchen team give me some hope. They told me: "As our President says, light will beat dark! Life will beat death!" Let's make sure the world doesn't let them down… #SlavaUkraini* ᴜᴀ *https://t.co/dEuvaqpUj2*	(Andrés, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*The Digital Divide Among Twitter Users And Its Implications For Social Research.*	(Blank, 2017)
Technological	Twitter	*The most powerful feature that Twitter has: Advanced search Until recently I hadn't even heard of it, but now I use it all the time. Here are 6 twitter advanced search features that will revolutionise the way you search for what to read:* 🧵👇	(T. Davis, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*Using Twitter Data in Research*	(Gold, 2020)
Technological	Twitter	*Twitter Dataset for 2022 Russo-Ukrainian Crisis*	(Haq et al., 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*Never before in centuries of parliamentary history has the House of Commons listened to an address like that given by President @ZelenskyyUa today. We will employ every method we can for however long it takes to ensure Putin's invasion fails and Ukraine is free once more.*	(Johnson, B., 2022a)
Technological	Twitter	*Twitter in Politics*	(Jungherr, 2014a)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Technological	Twitter	*The Logic of Political Coverage on Twitter: Temporal Dynamics and Content*	(Jungherr, 2014b)
Technological	Twitter	*The Use of Twitter during the 2009 German National Election*	(Jürgens & Jungherr, 2015)
Technological	Twitter	*Twitter and Research: A Systemic Literature Review Through Text Mining*	(Karami et al., 2020)
Technological	Twitter	*Quantifying Moral Foundations from Various Topics on Twitter Conversations*	(Kaur & Sasahara, 2016)
Technological	Twitter	*Rising Tides Or Rising Stars?: Dynamics Of Shared Attention On Twitter During Media Events*	(Lin et al., 2014)
Technological	Twitter	*Putin seems interested in killing as many Ukrainians as possible, the rest is either murky or secondary. In his mind Russia can never be all that it can be while Ukraine exists. If you are familiar with Nazi writings on Germany and the "Jewish question," the parallel is obvious…*	(Maçães, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*Upcoming 🧵 ideas (all related to the UA-RU war): - Why the UN Security Council is useless...and that's okay. - Is Article 5 really THAT important? - Despite/because of the sanctions, the $ will remain dominant. - The war demonstrates the "western bias" in discussing war.*	(Poast, 2022a)
Technological	Twitter	*Analysing Twitter semantic networks: The case of 2018 Italian elections.*	(Radicioni et al., 2021)
Technological	Twitter	*@christogrozev Time to dust off the old USSR jokes: A man goes into the gulag library and passes the librarian a note asking, "Do you have this book?" "No," replies the librarian, "but we have the author."*	(J. F. Reynolds, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*World leaders' usage of Twitter in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: a content analysis*	(Rufai & Bunce, 2020)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Technological	Twitter	*Refugees and Network Publics on Twitter: Networked Framing, Affect, and Capture:*	(Siapera et al., 2018)
Technological	Twitter	*Public attention to extreme weather as reflected by social media activity*	(Silver & Andrey, 2019)
Technological	Twitter	*Twitter as Data*	(Steinert-Threlkeld, 2018)
Technological	Twitter	*Twitter Language Use Reflects Psychological Differences between Democrats and Republicans*	(Sylwester & Purver, 2015)
Technological	Twitter	*Maybe, I don't know, try reading my articles? https://t.co/s4FwNV4JY5*	(Taibbi, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*Tweepy -Frequently Asked Questions*	(Tweepy, 2022)
Technological	Twitter	*Public-interest exceptions to enforcement of Twitter rules*	(Twitter, n.d.b)
Technological	Twitter	*Twitter Glossary*	(Twitter, n.d.c)
Technological	Twitter	*Social media messages in an emerging health crisis: Tweeting bird flu.*	(Vos & Buckner, 2016)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Environmental scanning: Radar for success. The Information Management Journal, 38(May/June), 34-44.*	(Albright 2004)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Zelensky's Image in the Russian and Ukrainian News: Presidential Campaign 2019 in Ukraine*	(Dkhair & Klocko, 2021)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Speech By President Von Der Leyen At The European Parliament Plenary On The Russian Aggression Against Ukraine*	(EU Commission, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Open Source	Mass Media	*How Soviet Game Shows Explain the Popularity of Ukraine's New President (May 13). The Washington Post. Retrieved March 1, 2021 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/13/how-soviet-game-shows-explain-popularity-ukraines-new-president*	(Evans, 2019)
Open Source	Mass Media	*How Zelensky's Approval Rating Have Surged*	(Fitri, 2022)
Open Source	Mass Media	*When Ted Talks, Does Anyone Listen? A New Dataset On Political Leadership*	(Flores et al., 2022)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Fact-Checking Disinformation About Ukraine's Invasion By The Ifcn Signatories*	(IFCN, n.d.)
Open Source	Mass Media	*The Agenda-Setting Function Of Mass Media*	(McCombs & Shaw, 1972)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Dictionary. The Merriam-Webster.Com Dictionary.*	(Merriam-Webster, n.d)
Open Source	Mass Media	*A favorite activity in my "Quantitative Security" class is to reproduce the true "closest thing to an empirical law in international relations": Richardson's power law for war fatalities. Left graph:from his 1948 paper. Right graph: what we produced (using updated COW data) https://t.co/VjGL6JgAyS*	(Poast, 2022b)
Open Source	Mass Media	*The Agency Of Journalists In Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Case Of Ukraine During Yanukovich's Presidency*	(Somfalvy & Pleines, 2021)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Powerful Photos That Will Go Down In History. I'd Add That Besides Poland, Lithuania, Latvia & Estonia, Ukraine Is Also Very Grateful For The Support Provided By The Czech Republic, Slovakia And The U.K. Https://T.Co/Jukz0zji7r*	(Sorokin, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Open Source	Mass Media	*Broadcasting Agitainment: A New Media Strategy Of Putin's Third Presidency*	(Tolz & Teper, 2018)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Open Source*	(Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d).
Open Source	Mass Media	*Jeg skrev 'Slava Ukraini!' fordi jeg ikke kunne la være*	(Paus, 2022)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Satellite Images Show Russian Military Buildup Along Ukraine Border*	(Reuters, 2021b)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Russian Force On Ukraine Border Larger Than Any Time Since 2014, U.S. Says.*	(Reuters, 2021a)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Environmental Coding.*	(Saldana & Mallette 2017)
Open Source	Mass Media	*The Spelit Power Matrix: Untangling The Organizational Environment With The Spelit Leadership Tool.*	(Schmieder-Ramirez & Mallete, 2007),
Open Source	Mass Media	*How Osint Has Shaped The War In Ukraine*	(Smith-Boyle, 2022)
Open Source	Mass Media	*Fact-Checking Disinformation About Ukraine's Invasion By The Ifcn Signatories*	(#UkraineFacts, n.d.)
Open Source	LIWC	*Liwc-22: Descriptive Statistics And Norms.*	(Boyd et al, 2022b)
Open Source	LIWC	*The Development And Psychometric Properties Of Liwc-22.*	(Boyd et al., 2022a)
Open Source	LIWC	*Words Of Wisdom: Language Use Over The Life Span*	(Pennebaker & Stone, 2003)
Open Source	LIWC	*Liwc-22- Https://Www.Liwc.App*	(Pennebaker et al., n.d.)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Open Source	LIWC	*The Psychological Meaning Of Words: Liwc And Computerized Text Analysis Methods*	(Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010)
Open Source	LIWC	*Download BeautifulSoup*	(Crummy, n.d.)
Open Source	LIWC	*A repository of software for the Python programming language: BeautifulSoup 4*	(PyPi, 2023)
Open Source	LIWC	*BeautifulSoup 4*	(Tidelift, 2021)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*GoodFellows: Conversations from the Hoover Institution: A Soviet Reunion: Michael McFaul On What Putin Wants on Apple Podcasts*	(Cochrane et al., 2022b)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Ukraine and The Art of Limited War*	(Freedman, 2014)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Foreign policy aspects of the national liberation struggle and the geostrategic place of the Ukrainian state in the concept of the OUN-B*	(Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2021)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals*	(Karagiannis, 2014)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*	(Kissinger, 2020)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Offensive realism, differentiation theory, and the war in Ukraine*	(Kleinschmidt, 2019)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Russian Troop Movements and Talk of Intervention Cause Jitters in Ukraine"*	(Kramer, 2021)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*A background briefing with a senior defense official at the Pentagon about the war in Ukraine just concluded. It's Day 42 of the war, and here are some takeaways:*	(Lamothe, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Biden Can't Paper Over the West's Disunity*	(McTague, 2022b)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War \ Russia Matters*	(Mearsheimer, 2022)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Graham Allison Discusses the Russia-Ukraine War, the US-China Rivalry and Thucydides's Trap \textbar Russia Matters*	(Russia Matters, 2022)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*The Trap of Geopolitics: Rethinking EU Strategic Communication*	(Valenza, 2021)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Opinion	The West underestimated Ukraine's bravery. Now, it's underestimating Russia's brutality.*	(Yermak, 2022)
Risk	Geopolitical Risk	*Clausewitz's Divisions: Analysis by Twos and Threes,*	(Smith, 2016)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Foreign Policy*	(Bentley, 2014)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Russia Issues Subtle Threats More Far-Reaching Than A Ukraine Invasion*	(Troianovski & Sanger, 2022)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Ukrainians shocked by 'crazy' scene at Chernobyl after Russian pullout reveals radioactive contamination*	(Cotovio et al., 2022)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Putin's Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies*	(Echevarria II, 2022)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Invasion of Ukraine, D+22, SITREP (#202)*	(Fivecoat Consulting Group, 2022)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*In Moscow's Shadows: In Moscow's Shadows 63: Terrible Crimes, Terrible Rulers, Terrible Dilemmas on Apple Podcasts*	(Galeotti, 2022b)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*In Moscow's Shadows: In Moscow's Shadows 60: Ukraine: Nuclear Options, National Morale, and How Kyiv Can Save Moscow on Apple Podcasts*	(Galeotti, 2022a)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Why Ukraine Surrendered Security: A Methodological Individualist Approach to Nuclear Disarmament*	(Gibbs, 2012)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Russia and the question of world order*	(Götz & Merlen, 2019)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*It's Geopolitics Stupid; Explaining Russia's Ukraine Policy*	(Götz, 2015)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Russia, The West, And The Ukraine Crisis: Three Contending Perspectives*	(Götz, 2016a)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Neorealism And Russia's Ukraine Policy; 1991 - Present*	(Götz, 2016b)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Putin, The State, And War: The Causes Of Russia's Near Abroad Assertion Revisited*	(Götz, 2017)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Ukraine And Russia: Two States, One Crisis*	(Kagarlitsky, 2016)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*The Cold War Never Ended; Ukraine, The China Challenge, And The Revival Of The West*	(Kotkin, 2022)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Russia's Strategy For Influence Through Public Diplomacy And Active Measures: The Swedish Case*	(Kragh & Åsberg, 2017)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Russian Force On Ukraine Border Larger Than Any Time Since 2014, U.S. Says*	(Reuters, 2021a)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Ukraine's 'muddling Through': National Identity And Postcommunist Transition*	(Riabchuk, 2012)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Ukrainian-Russian Conflict In The Donbas From The Point Of View Of Western Historiography: Character, Origins, Reasons*	(Semenenko et al., 2020)
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Russia Likely To Seize Control Of Eastern Ukrainian Region Within Weeks, Us Official Says*	(Shamas et al., 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Risk	Strategic Threat	*Europe's Trains Take Fighters To Ukraine, And Bring Back Refugees"*	(Stevis-Gridneff, 2022)
Intercultural	Discourse	*How To Do Things With Words*	(Austin, 1962)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Analyzing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse, And Metaphor*	(Budd, 2016)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Exploring The Relationship Between Information And Communication Technology Collective Behaviors And Sense Of Community: An Urban Refugee Analysis.*	(Canevez et al., 2021)
Intercultural	Discourse	*The Human Factor: Accounting For Texts And Contexts In The Analysis Of Foreign Policy And International Relations*	(Carta & Naminio, 2021)
Intercultural	Discourse	*"A Rose By Any Other Name": On Ways Of Approaching Discourse Analysis*	(Carta, 2019)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Linguistic Axiological Modeling Of Conflict Between Proponents And Opponents Of The Peace Initiatives By President Of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky*	(Chernenko, 2020)
Intercultural	Discourse	*The Specialist In Athenian Written Rhetoric During The Classical Period: A Reconsideration Of Technical Rhetoric And Rhetorical Iconography*	(Enos, 2021)
Intercultural	Discourse	*The Differences Between Opinion And Argumentation*	(Gough, 2001)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Computer-mediated Discourse 2.0*	(Herring & Androutsopoulos, 2015)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Political Discourse Analysis*	(Kampf, 2015)
Intercultural	Discourse	*The Concise Oxford Dictionary Of Politics And International Relations*	(Kendell, 2018)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Intercultural	Discourse	*Hegemony And Socialist Strategy: Towards A Radical Democratic Politics*	(Laclau & Mouffe, 2001)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Discursive Double-Legitimation Of (Avoiding) Another War In Obama's 2013 Address On Syria*	(Mirhosseini, 2017)
Intercultural	Discourse	*War Legitimation Discourse: Representing Us And Them In Four Presidential Addresses*	(Oddo, 2011)
Intercultural	Discourse	*If Crisis or War Comes: A Study of Risk Communication of Eight European Union Member States*	(Petridou et al., 2019)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Lexical analysis of US political speeches. Journal of Quantitative Linguistics*	(Savoy, 2010)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Speeches: A Case Study of Obama's and Rouhani's Speeches at UN*	(Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Policy Discourses and Security Issues: US Foreign Policy toward India during Clinton Administration*	(van der Wetering, 2016)
Intercultural	Discourse	*Political Discourse Content Analysis: A Critical Overview of a Computerized Text Analysis Program Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count*	(Yanovets & Smal, 2020)
Intercultural	Nationalism	*Living the Brand': Nationality, Globality, and the Identity Strategies of Nation Branding Consultants*	(Aronczyk, 2008)
Intercultural	Nationalism	*The Ecology Of Cognitive Development: Research Models And Fugitive Findings.*	(Bronfenbrenner, 1993)
Intercultural	Nationalism	*Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy*	(Canovan, 1999)
Intercultural	Nationalism	*An American Crisis*	(Paine, 1775/2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Intercultural	Nationalism	*The Reinvention of Populist Rhetoric in The Digital Age*	(Rolfe, 2016)
Intercultural	Nationalism	*Desire, Identification, and the Politics of Hegemony*	(Solomon, 2015)
Intercultural	Nationalism	*Glory to Ukraine!": Who and when was the slogan created?*	(Yuzych, 2018)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Glory to Ukraine': hundreds of thousands march against Russian invasion*	(Agence France-Presse, 2022a)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*The Theory and Practice of Precedent in International Adjudication: A View from Ukraine*	(Boyko, 2021)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Ukraine Neither a State Nor a Country*	(Caldararo, 2014)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Ukraine, China, And Gun Violence, With Condoleezza Rice on Apple Podcasts*	(Cochrane et al., 2022d)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*"Ukraine Is Going To End Up Winning"*	(Cochrane et al., 2022b)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Live From Kviv: The War, The Queen, and Europe's Winter(s) of Discontent*	(Cochrane et al., 2022e)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Magical realism: assumptions, evidence and prescriptions in the Ukraine conflict*	(D'Anieri, 2019)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Brief History of Russian and Soviet Genocides, Mass Deportations, and Other Atrocities in Ukraine.*	(Frydenborg, 2022)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Yesterday on @cnn, I was asked several times about Ukraine "morale." A difficult quality to define. It's something commanders (& all leaders) struggle to ensure. There's tons of research on the subject. Even Clausewitz discusses it. So here's a thread of some thoughts. 1/16*	(Hertling, 2022a)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Stalin's Faminogenic Policies in Ukraine: The Imperial Discourse*	(Hrynevych, 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Slava Ukraini": Zelenskyy becomes Congress' great unifier*	(Jalonek, 2022)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Russia-Ukraine War: Five Famous Ukrainians Fighting The Russian Army.*	(Kiek, 2022)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?*	(Kramer, 2014)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*The Ragtag Army That Won The Battle Of Kyiv And Saved Ukraine*	(Marson, 2022)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Intelligence Matters: Reporting From Ukraine's Front Line: CBS News Correspondent Holly Williams on Apple Podcasts*	(Morell, 2022a)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Theses on Ukraine: Dialogue with an Emerging Leadership*	(Ochkina, 2019)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*The language context of Ukraine can be a tricky topic for any outsider. In this long and personal thread, I'll illustrate the relationship between UA and RU languages in Ukraine using my family's history. I'm a bilingual Ukrainian raised in a Russian-speaking family in Kyiv. https://t.co/WtXCSr8ti8*	(Olenchenko, 2022)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Ukraine's Old School Answers to Russia's Modern Electronic Warfare Weapons*	(Peterson, 2022)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan*	(Shevda & Park, 2016)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Three days, they said. Ukraine will fall, they said... https://t.co/lKhCiwfB4X*	(Ukraine, 2022b)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Fraternal" Nations And Challenges To Sovereignty In Ukraine: The Politics Of Linguistic And Religious Ties*	(Wanner, 2014)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	Title	Citation
Intercultural	Ukraine	*The Maidan And Beyond: Civil Society And Democratization*	(Way, 2014)
Intercultural	Ukraine	*Zelenskyy Wants Ukraine To Be 'a Big Israel.*	(Shapiro, 2022)
Intercultural	Russia	*Putin's People: How The Kgb Took Back Russia And Then Took On The West: By Catherine Belton (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2020), 624 Pages*	(Blank, 2020)
Intercultural	Russia	*Putin Vows To Rid Russia Of 'traitors' While Waging Ukraine War*	(Bloomberg News, 2022)
Intercultural	Russia	*Conceptions Of Security: History, Identity And Russian Foreign Policy In The Twenty-First Century*	(Chatterie-Doody, 2015)
Intercultural	Russia	*Overextending and Unbalancing Russia: Assessing the Impact of Cost-Imposing Options*	(Dobbins et al., 2019)
Intercultural	Russia	*National Identity In Russian Culture: Contrastive Identities: 'us' And 'them'*	(Franklin & Widdis, 2004)
Intercultural	Russia	*Correspondence: The Power of Putin in Foreign Policy*	(Götz & McFaul, 2021)
Intercultural	Russia	*'The Russians are back': Symbolic boundaries and cultural trauma in immigration from the former Soviet Union to the Czech Republic*	(Klvaňová, 2019)
Intercultural	Russia	*Stalin: Waiting for Hitler. 1928-1941*	(Kotkin, 2017)
Intercultural	Russia	*Russian Foreign Policy: Freedom for Whom, to Do What?*	(Langdon & Tismaneanu, 2020)
Intercultural	Russia	*Rewriting The Past: How The Russian Government And Media Framed The Ukraine Crisis Through The Great Patriotic War*	(McGlynn, 2017)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Intercultural	Russia	*A Diagnosis Of Russia's Military Capability In A Situation Of An Escalation Of Hostility In Ukraine And Possible Implications For The Safety Of The Eastern Nato Flank*	(Michalski & Adam, 2021)
Intercultural	Russia	*Yes, He Would': Fiona Hill On Putin And Nukes*	(M. Reynolds, 2022)
Intercultural	Russia	*Why Does Joseph Stalin Matter?*	(Robinson, 2018)
Intercultural	Russia	*Russia's Post-Orange Revolution Strategies To Increase Its Influence In Former Soviet Republics: Public Diplomacy Po Russkii*	(Saari, 2014)
Intercultural	Russia	*How Russia Took Over Ukraine's Internet In Occupied Territories*	(Satariano & Reinhard, 2022)
Intercultural	Russia	*Hard Diplomacy And Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*	(Sherr, 2013)
Intercultural	Russia	*Stalin: The Man And His Era*	(Ulam, 1973)
Intercultural	Russia	*Address by President of the Russian Federation,"*	(Putin, 2014)
Intercultural	Russia	*What if Russia's Army Fails in Ukraine?*	(Wilson & Courtney, 2022)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism. The Divergent Break*	(Kushnir, 2018)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*A New Imperialism? Evaluating Russia's Acquisition of Crimea in the Context of National and International Law*	(McDougal, 2015)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Expert Heather Conley on Russia's Strategic Conservatism*	(Morrell, 2022b)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Putin echoes Stalin in 'very, very scary' speech*	(Nazaryan, 2022)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Economic Statecraft and US-Russian Policy*	(Orsini, 2022)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Items reportedly found on a captured Russian lieutenant https://t.co/k1DuEU8Eb6*	(OSINTtechnical, 2022)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: Adventures in Modern Russia*	(Pomerantsev, 2014)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Opening in times of crisis? Examining NATO and the EU's support to security sector reform in post-Maidan Ukraine*	(Shea & Jaroszewicz, 2021)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Is Russia's Invasion a Case of Coercive Diplomacy Gone Wrong?*	(Siebens, 2022)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*The Nature Of Imperialism In Russian Foreign Policy And Its Influence On Ukraine*	(Sofiienko, 2020)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*"La Mystification néo-colonialiste"*	(Sartre, 1956)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Colonialism And Neocolonialism*	(Sartre, 1964/2001)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*What Should Russia Do With Ukraine?*	(The Ukrainian Post, 2022)
Capital and Economics	New Imperialism	*Ukraine And Putin's Post-Soviet Imperialism*	(Woolley, 2022)
Analytics	Algorithms	*The Invisible Hand Of The Unaccountable Algorithm: How Google, Facebook And Other Tech Companies Are Changing Journalism*	(Brake, 2017)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Analytics	Algorithms	*The Web Of Politics: The Internet's Impact On The American Political System*	(R. Davis, 1999)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Multiple-Platform News Use And Political Participation Across Age Groups: Toward A Valid Metric Of Platform Diversity And Its Effects*	(Diehl et al, 2019)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Inferring Topics Within Social Networking Big Data, Towards An Alternative For Socio-Political Measurement*	(Hadi et al., 2020)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Private Traits And Attributes Are Predictable From Digital Records Of Human Behavior*	(Kosinski et al., 2013)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Politics As Usual: The Cyberspace `Revolution'*	(Margolis & Resnick, 2000)
Analytics	Algorithms	*The Future Of The Mass Audience*	(Neuman, 1991)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Hashtags For Gatekeeping Of Information On Social Media*	(Potnis & Tahamtan, 2021)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Beyond Social Media News Use Algorithms: How Political Discussion And Network Heterogeneity Clarify Incidental News Exposure*	(Scheffauer et al., 2021)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Normalization 2.0: A Longitudinal Analysis Of German Online Campaigns In The National Elections 2002-2009*	(Schweitzer, 2011)
Analytics	Algorithms	*The Comprehensive Approach to Analyzing Multivariate Constructs*	(Sherman & Serfass, 2015)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Wired To Seek, Comment And Share? Examining The Relationship Between Personality, News Consumption And Misinformation Engagement*	(Xiao & Su, in press)
Analytics	Algorithms	*Searchable Talk: The Linguistic Functions Of Hashtags*	(Zappavigna, 2015)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Politics In 140 Characters Or Less: Campaign Communication, Network Interaction, And Political Participation On Twitter*	(Bode & Dalrymple, 2016)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*The Causes And Consequences Of Covid-19 Misperceptions: Understanding The Role Of News And Social Media*	(Bridgeman et al., 2020)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*A Semantic Network Approach To Measuring Sentiment*	(Danowski et al., 2021)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Multi-Platform News Use And Political Participation Across Age Groups: Toward A Valid Metric Of Platform Diversity And Its Effects*	(Diehl et al., 2019)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies And Public Policy*	(Gandy, 1982)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Public Sentiment And Critical Framing In Social Media Content During The 2012 U.S. Presidential Campaign*	(Groshek and Al-Rawi, 2013)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*We Face, I Tweet: How Different Social Media Influence Political Participation Through Collective And Internal Efficacy*	(Halpern et al., 2017)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Public Opinion*	(Lippmann, 1922)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*The Role Of Engagement In Learning From Active And Incidental News Exposure On Social Media*	(Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Zelenskyy Inspires Widespread Confidence From U.S. Public As Views Of Putin Hit New Low*	(Poushter & Connaughton, 2022)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*How Journalists Verify User Generated Content During Terrorist Crises. Analyzing Twitter Communication During The Brussels Attacks*	(Rauchfleisch et al., 2017)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*News Use Across Social Media Platforms In 2020*	(Shearer & Mitchell, 2021)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers In The U.S. As A News Source*	(Shearer, 2018)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*More Than Eight-In-Ten Americans Get News From Digital Devices*	(Shearer, 2021)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Sentiment Analysis On Covid-19 Twitter Data Streams Using Deep Belief Neural Networks*	(Srikanth et al., 2022)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Interacting Effects Of Political Social Media Use, Political Discussion And Political Trust On Civic Engagement: Extending The Differential Gains Model*	(Su & Xiao, 2021)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*It Doesn't Take A Village To Fall For Misinformation: Social Media Use, Discussion Heterogeneity Preference, Worry Of The Virus, Faith In Scientists, And Covid-19-Related Misinformation Beliefs*	(Su, 2021)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*The Handbook Of Discourse Analysis: Tannen/Discourse*	(Tannen et al., 2015)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Asymmetrical Effects Of Positive And Negative Events: The Mobilization And Minimization Hypothesis*	(Taylor, 1991)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*News Consumption Across Social Media In 2021*	(Walker & Matsa, 2021)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Ukraine Today: Challenges And Prospects*	(Rating Group UA, 2019)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*Seventeenth National Survey: Identity. Patriotism. Values (August 17-18, 2022)*	(Rating Group UA, 2022b)
Analytics	Public Sentiment	*National Poll: Ukraine During The War (February 26-27, 2022)*	(Rating Group UA, 2022a)
Legal	Alliances	*The Coming Democratic Revival*	(Albright, 2021)
Legal	Alliances	*Ukraine 2014 – The End of the Second European Belle Époque*	(Grajewski, 2016)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Legal	Alliances	*United Nations Advises Staff Against Using 'war' Or 'invasion' Regarding Ukraine*	(O'Leary, 2022)
Legal	Alliances	*Is @NATO membership really THAT valuable? Is Article 5 actually worth it? It's definitely PERCEIVED as worth it....which is probably good enough. [THREAD] https://t.co/5aeAyEciFz*	(Poast, 2022c)
Legal	Alliances	*International Security In Practice: The Politics Of Nato-Russia Diplomacy*	(Pouliot, 2010)
Legal	Alliances	*Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped The Twentieth Century*	(D. Reynolds, 2009)
Legal	Alliances	*Silences And Hierarchies In European Union Public Diplomacy*	(Sandrin & Hoffmann, 2018)
Legal	Alliances	*Trust In The Balance: Asymmetric Information, Commitment Problems And Balancing Behavior*	(Savic & Shirkey, 2009)
Legal	Alliances	Developing Eu Public Diplomacy Strategy	(de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005)
Legal	International Law	*Ukraine: Minsk Agreement Five Years Later. European Parliamentary Research Service*	(Bentzen, 2020)
Legal	International Law	*The Minsk Accords: Should Britain Declare Them Dead?*	(Galeotti, 2021)
Legal	International Law	*Twelve Eu Countries On The Eastern Flank Of Nato: What About Ukraine?*	(Grajewski, 2021)
Legal	International Law	*Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy*	(Honig, 2009)
Legal	International Law	*War Crimes In Ukraine: The Pursuit Of International Justice*	(Hoover Institution, 2022)
Legal	International Law	*Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*	(International Criminal Court, 2011)

HISTORICAL	Sub-Themes	*Title*	**Citation**
Legal	International Law	*Why Ukraine's Security Chief Says Russia's War Is Breaking All The Rules*	(Mackinnon, 2022)
Legal	International Law	*Serious question. I am not an expert. In international law, why is the Al Qaeda killing of innocents in NY and DC on September 11, 2001, considered an act of terrorism, but Putin's slaughter of innocents in Bucha, Kramatorsk, Chernihiv, or Mariupol is not terrorism?*	(McFaul, 2022b)
Legal	International Law	*Я не знаю, как долго это займёт, но уверен в своём прогнозе, что это злостное вторжение Путина в Украину означает начало конца диктатуры Путина и путинизма в России. Ни один нравственный человек не может поддержать эту отвратительную войну, а в России миллионы нравственных людей.*	(McFaul, 2022a)
Legal	International Law	*Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault*	(Mearsheimer, 2014)
Legal	International Law	*The Case Against the Russian Federation*	(Radynski, 2022)
Legal	International Law	*Russian MP Yevgeny Fedorov says that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is "100% legal" as Ukraine did not exist in 1945 As Ukraine "illegally withdrew from the USSR" and is an "illegal separatist state formation," Fedorov says Russia has the right to invade*	(Ramani, 2022)
Legal	International Law	*Council Conclusions On Ukraine*	(Council of the European Union, 2012)

APPENDIX S

Global Leader Trait Analysis Scores (Schafer & Lambert, 2022)

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Tansu Ciller	0.17	0.58	0.39	0.18	0.28	0.59	0.39
Mahinda Rajapaska	0.13	0.68	0.35	0.23	0.28	0.47	0.39
James Madison	0.57	0.61	0.23	0.18	0.27	0.63	0.38
Husak Gustav	0.11	0.78	0.35	0.13	0.19	0.48	0.38
Josip Tito	0.15	0.65	0.37	0.20	0.50	0.60	0.38
Nakita Krushchev	0.21	0.70	0.48	0.16	0.58	0.57	0.37
John Adams	0.23	0.47	0.24	0.19	0.32	0.64	0.36
William Harrison	0.30	0.54	0.22	0.21	0.24	0.59	0.36
Donald Trump	0.22	0.50	0.39	0.16	0.30	0.45	0.36
Erich Honeker	0.12	0.61	0.35	0.19	0.08	0.55	0.36
Yhya Khan	0.38	0.68	0.33	0.25	0.38	0.52	0.35
Patrice Lubumba	0.22	0.53	0.41	0.27	0.11	0.42	0.34
Corazon Aquino	0.20	0.62	0.35	0.20	0.23	0.56	0.33
Nicolae Ceausescu	0.06	0.52	0.37	0.15	0.46	0.49	0.33
Yurii Andropov	0.17	0.67	0.38	0.14	0.33	0.59	0.33
Anwar Sadat	0.22	0.61	0.34	0.20	0.29	0.49	0.32

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Woodrow Wilson	0.31	0.57	0.32	0.15	0.37	0.54	0.32
John Quincy Adams	0.14	0.64	0.15	0.16	0.25	0.65	0.32
James Polk	0.19	0.69	0.23	0.17	0.33	0.60	0.31
Thomas Jefferson	0.27	0.42	0.28	0.20	0.29	0.58	0.31
Boleslaw Bierut	0.35	0.89	0.36	0.12	0.33	0.55	0.31
Gloria Arroyo	0.28	0.61	0.40	0.15	0.20	0.54	0.31
Millard Fillmore	0.28	0.67	0.18	0.16	0.30	0.60	0.31
James Monroe	0.21	0.73	0.21	0.18	0.38	0.57	0.31
Theodore Roosevelt	0.33	0.71	0.31	0.13	0.33	0.54	0.30
Leonid Brezhnev	0.13	0.66	0.41	0.15	0.40	0.55	0.30
Slobodan Milosevic	0.18	0.57	0.33	0.15	0.48	0.50	0.30
Rajiv Gandhi	0.16	0.67	0.36	0.13	0.42	0.55	0.30
Ferdinand Marcos	0.22	0.73	0.31	0.11	0.49	0.59	0.29
Andrew Johnson	0.22	0.64	0.24	0.14	0.41	0.56	0.29
Chandrinka Kumaratunga	0.20	0.67	0.29	0.16	0.27	0.54	0.29
Gaafar Nimeiry	0.17	0.63	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.53	0.29

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Joseph Estrada	0.22	0.59	0.35	0.11	0.17	0.61	0.29
Vladimir Lenin	0.28	0.59	0.37	0.17	0.21	0.48	0.29
Franklin Pierce	0.25	0.67	0.20	0.09	0.31	0.59	0.29
Edgard Faure	0.18	0.64	0.46	0.09	0.46	0.67	0.29
David Steel	0.19	0.63	0.36	0.14	0.39	0.57	0.29
Bashar al-Assad	0.24	0.59	0.32	0.18	0.40	0.59	0.29
Fidel Ramos	0.16	0.69	0.34	0.13	0.32	0.49	0.29
Junius Jayewardene	0.18	0.64	0.33	0.15	0.29	0.59	0.29
Barack Obama	0.15	0.58	0.40	0.13	0.39	0.60	0.29
Mobutu Sese Seko	0.12	0.63	0.25	0.13	0.43	0.56	0.29
Morarji Desai	0.18	0.68	0.36	0.13	0.43	0.59	0.29
U Nu	0.28	0.60	0.35	0.16	0.30	0.58	0.29
William McKinley	0.18	0.71	0.20	0.11	0.26	0.56	0.29
Jimmy Carter	0.07	0.57	0.34	0.17	0.43	0.60	0.29
Wojciech Jaruzelski	0.17	0.65	0.25	0.20	0.33	0.52	0.28
Ulysses Grant	0.20	0.72	0.21	0.14	0.40	0.62	0.28
Ariel Sharon	0.14	0.64	0.34	0.15	0.30	0.47	0.28

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Benjamin Netanyahu	0.18	0.50	0.38	0.17	0.37	0.55	0.28
Muammar Gaddafi	0.16	0.53	0.39	0.09	0.32	0.61	0.28
Mikhail Gorbachev	0.16	0.71	0.44	0.11	0.43	0.58	0.28
Pierre Mendes	0.14	0.66	0.37	0.14	0.36	0.56	0.28
Richard Nixon	0.15	0.59	0.37	0.16	0.43	0.61	0.28
William Taft	0.14	0.74	0.21	0.13	0.37	0.60	0.28
George W Bush	0.19	0.52	0.34	0.16	0.34	0.58	0.27
Indira Gandhi	0.21	0.64	0.37	0.15	0.34	0.62	0.27
William Clinton	0.11	0.55	0.38	0.11	0.46	0.60	0.27
Margaret Thatcher	0.12	0.63	0.31	0.13	0.25	0.56	0.27
Rutherford Hayes	0.18	0.71	0.19	0.17	0.25	0.59	0.27
Tony Blair	0.20	0.63	0.40	0.12	0.42	0.55	0.27
Harry Truman	0.12	0.61	0.35	0.18	0.43	0.53	0.27
George H.W. Bush	0.11	0.52	0.34	0.16	0.40	0.57	0.27
Gerald Ford	0.09	0.59	0.32	0.19	0.41	0.59	0.27
Zachary Taylor	0.19	0.72	0.20	0.12	0.37	0.56	0.27
Calvin Coolidge	0.18	0.66	0.29	0.16	0.41	0.56	0.27

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Mao Zedong	0.21	0.61	0.39	0.10	0.43	0.67	0.26
Lyndon Johnson	0.09	0.55	0.36	0.14	0.43	0.57	0.26
Grover Cleveland	0.28	0.71	0.21	0.11	0.31	0.59	0.26
Chester Arthur	0.18	0.72	0.19	0.12	0.28	0.66	0.26
Warren Harding	0.23	0.58	0.28	0.11	0.38	0.54	0.26
John Major	0.10	0.62	0.33	0.13	0.26	0.54	0.26
Charan Singh	0.15	0.67	0.30	0.13	0.25	0.59	0.26
Bihary Vajpayee	0.13	0.66	0.30	0.18	0.22	0.59	0.26
John Kennedy	0.11	0.61	0.32	0.13	0.57	0.61	0.26
Che Guevara	0.22	0.64	0.36	0.10	0.21	0.60	0.26
Ronald Reagan	0.15	0.53	0.37	0.14	0.43	0.56	0.26
Robert Cecil	0.25	0.64	0.30	0.12	0.38	0.62	0.26
Vladimir Putin	0.13	0.75	0.33	0.15	0.35	0.56	0.26
Ehud Olmert	0.16	0.55	0.35	0.14	0.32	0.53	0.25
Herbert Hoover	0.14	0.69	0.33	0.11	0.49	0.62	0.25
Fidel Castro	0.29	0.68	0.37	0.14	0.44	0.59	0.25
Saddam Hussein	0.29	0.62	0.34	0.11	0.34	0.63	0.25
Franklin Roosevelt	0.20	0.61	0.36	0.12	0.42	0.55	0.25

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Abraham Lincoln	0.28	0.68	0.24	0.15	0.35	0.63	0.25
James Callaghan	0.11	0.67	0.30	0.10	0.37	0.60	0.25
Andrew Jackson	0.23	0.67	0.22	0.14	0.29	0.60	0.24
Benjamin Harris	0.23	0.74	0.22	0.12	0.41	0.60	0.24
Neville Chamberlain	0.13	0.67	0.36	0.11	0.43	0.60	0.24
Edward Heath	0.10	0.74	0.35	0.10	0.41	0.56	0.24
Dwight Eisenhower	0.16	0.54	0.34	0.16	0.47	0.54	0.24
Zulfikar Bhutto	0.10	0.51	0.45	0.14	0.30	0.66	0.24
John Tyler	0.24	0.69	0.25	0.19	0.23	0.58	0.24
Ramsay MacDonald	0.11	0.71	0.37	0.08	0.37	0.61	0.24
David George	0.20	0.64	0.35	0.12	0.38	0.56	0.24
James Buchanan	0.25	0.70	0.18	0.16	0.29	0.58	0.23
Clement Attlee	0.11	0.69	0.33	0.11	0.45	0.57	0.23
William Gladstone	0.23	0.61	0.31	0.08	0.32	0.61	0.23
Stanley Baldwin	0.10	0.69	0.32	0.09	0.43	0.61	0.23
Benjamin Disraeli	0.17	0.65	0.32	0.10	0.40	0.62	0.22

Name	Distrust Mean	Task Mean	Bace Mean	IGB Mean	SC Mean	CC mean	Power Mean
Harold MacMillan	0.11	0.69	0.32	0.12	0.47	0.59	0.22
Herbert Asquith	0.15	0.66	0.36	0.09	0.40	0.60	0.22
Anthony Eden	0.09	0.63	0.38	0.09	0.48	0.55	0.22
Winston Churchill	0.12	0.65	0.31	0.12	0.43	0.58	0.22
Henry Campbell	0.18	0.70	0.30	0.10	0.39	0.62	0.22
Walter Ulbricht	0.12	0.67	0.39	0.14	0.13	0.55	0.22
Harold Wilson	0.19	0.66	0.36	0.09	0.39	0.56	0.21
Alec Douglas-Home	0.11	0.61	0.34	0.11	0.49	0.57	0.21
Hugo Chavez	0.25	0.44	0.38	0.13	0.33	0.58	0.21
Bonar Law	0.09	0.73	0.31	0.05	0.45	0.63	0.20
Aliija Izetbegovic	0.16	0.62	0.29	0.06	0.38	0.66	0.20
Martin Van Buren	0.25	0.65	0.20	0.14	0.31	0.58	0.20
John Russell	0.21	0.62	0.29	0.09	0.42	0.66	0.19
Volodomyr Zelenskyy	0.19	0.28	0.24	0.16	0.35	0.37	0.31

APPENDIX T

USSR and Aligned States (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.)

Modern Day Country	Name Under USSR	Date Joined	Date Gained Independence
Armenia	Armenian SSR	1922	1991
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan SSR	1922	1991
Belarus	Byelorussian SSR	1922	1991
Georgia	Georgian SSR	1922	1991
Russia	Russian SSR	1922	1991
Ukraine	Ukrainian SSR	1922	1991
Turkmenistan	Turkmen SSR	1924	1991
Uzbekistan	Uzbek SSR	1924	1991
Tajikistan	Tajik SSR	1929	1991
Kazakhstan	Kazakh SSR	1936	1991
Kyrgyzstan	Kirghiz SSR	1936	1991
Estonia	Estonian SSR	1940	1991
Latvia	Latvian SSR	1940	1990
Lithuania	Lithuanian SSR	1940	1990
Moldova	Moldavian SSR	1940	1991

APPENDIX U

Aid to Ukraine by Country (with Leader) and Month

State	Leader	Feb(in €B)	March (in €B)	April (in €B)	May (in €B)	Total (in €B)	Total (in €M)	Total (in $M)
Australia	Scott Morrison	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	232.8	253.5
Austria	Alexander Van der Bellen	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	51.0	55.5
Belgium	Alexander De Croo	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	192.4	209.5
Bulgaria	Kiril Petkov	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	4.7
Canada	Justin Trudeau	0.4	0.1	1.2	0.2	1.9	1912.2	2081.9
China	Xi Jinping	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.3
Croatia	Zoran Milanović	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.9	24.9
Cyprus	Nicos Anastasiades	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	2.1
Czech Republic	Petr Fiala	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	214.7	233.8
Denmark	Mette Frederiksen	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	161.1	175.4
Estonia	Kaja Kallas	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.9	8.6

State	Leader	Feb(in €B)	March (in €B)	April (in €B)	May (in €B)	Total (in €B)	Total (in €M)	Total (in $M)
EU (Commiss-ion and Council)	Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel	1.2	0.4	0.7	9.2	11.5	11535.0	12558.2
Finland	Sanna Marin	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	109.8	119.5
France	Emmanuel Macron	1.5	0.1	0.1	0.3	2.0	1980.3	2156.0
Germany	Olaf Scholz	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.3	2.9	2915.0	3173.6
Greece	Kyriakos Mitsotakis	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	233.0	253.7
Hungary	Viktor Orbán	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	38.0	41.4
Ireland	Micheál Martin	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	63.6	69.3
Italy	Mario Draghi	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.5	490.7	534.2
Japan	Fumio Kishida	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.6	571.9	622.7
Latvia	Arturs Krišjānis Kariņš	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.4	17.8
Lithuania	Gitanas Nausėda	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	38.3	41.7
Luxem-bourg	Xavier Bettel	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	51.0	55.5
Malta	Robert Abela	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.3
Nether-lands	Mark Rutte	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	176.8	192.4

State	Leader	Feb(in €B)	March (in €B)	April (in €B)	May (in €B)	Total (in €B)	Total (in €M)	Total (in $M)
New Zealand	Jacinda Ardern	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.5	11.4
Norway	Jonas Gahr Støre	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	258.6	281.6
Poland	Andrzej Duda	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.1	1056.3	1150.0
Portugal	António Costa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	259.9	283.0
South Korea	Moon Jae-in, Yoon Suk-yeol	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	41.3	44.9
Romania	Nicolae Ciucă	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.6	10.5
Slovakia	Eduard Heger	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	118.8	129.3
Slovenia	Janez Janša	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.3
Spain	Pedro Sánchez	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	68.0	74.0
Sweden	Magdalena Andersson	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	210.7	229.3
Switzer-land	Ignazio Cassis	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	58.6	63.8
Taiwan	Tsai Ing-wen	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.6	8.2
Turkey	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2

State	Leader	Feb(in €B)	March (in €B)	April (in €B)	May (in €B)	Total (in €B)	Total (in €M)	Total (in $M)
United Kingdom	Boris Johnson	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.6	4.7	4719.9	5138.5
United States	Joseph Biden	4.1	5.1	6.7	12.4	28.4	28410.0	30930.0