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U.S. national identity enacted internationally: a response to the 2010 Chilean earthquake

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U.S. NATIONAL IDENTITY ENACTED INTERNATIONALLY: A RESPONSE TO THE 2010 CHILEAN EARTHQUAKE

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ABSTRACT

On February 28, 2010, at 3:34 am, residents of Concepción, Chile and its surrounding cities were awakened by a devastating 8.8-magnitude earthquake that left considerable damage that would take years to repair. The United States government was among the first to respond to this situation in the form of official phone calls, public statements and messages of condolences, a visit from the U.S. Secretary of State, and various forms of humanitarian assistance (US. Department of State, Embassy in Santiago, Chile, 2010a). This response is a recent example of a long history of interventions in Chilean national affairs, and said response provided much more than physical assistance and verbal support. As I illustrate in this thesis, the crisis also provided an opportunity for the U.S. government to enact its own national identity and project identity traits for the country of Chile.

Many scholars have claimed that identity construction – and even national identity construction – is a process that occurs through social interaction and more specifically, through discourse (Bruner, 2002, 2005; Burke, 1969; Charland,1987; Hixson, 2008). Analyzing the messages from the U.S. to Chile after the 2010 earthquake provides an example of this identity formation. Specifically, taking on a dramatic approach to rhetorical analysis, I illustrate how U.S. and Chilean leaders enacted for the U.S. an exceptionally strong and heroic identity – one with an uncharacteristic ability to help others, with technological expertise, one that was always prepared, and one that was guided by a desire to support those who uphold democratic ways of governing. Conversely, through these rhetorical interactions, Chile's identity was crafted as fallen, weak and unable to lift itself from its devastating situation alone. Between the two nations, a hierarchical relationship was enacted.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

At 3:34 a.m. on February 28, 2010, residents of Concepción, Chile and its surrounding cities were awakened by a devastating 8.8-magnitude earthquake. This natural disaster left more than 800,000 people displaced, caused an estimated $30 billion worth of damage, and killed at least 521 people (U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2010). Michelle Bachelet, president of Chile at the time, declared that the earthquake was "one of the worst tragedies in the last 50 years" and declared a "state of catastrophe" for the country of Chile (Barrionuevo & Robbins, 2010, para. 7). The United States government was among the first countries to respond to this situation in the form of official phone calls, public statements and messages of condolences, a visit from the U.S. Secretary of State, and various forms of humanitarian assistance (US. Department of State, Embassy in Santiago, Chile, 2010a). This response is a more recent example of a long history of interventions in Chilean national affairs (Sater, 1990). Congruent with this history of involvement, the 2010 response did much more than provide physical assistance and verbal support. As I will illustrate through this thesis, the crisis also provided an opportunity for the U.S. government to enact its own national identity and project identity traits onto the country of Chile.

Many scholars have claimed that identity construction is a process that occurs through social interaction and more specifically, through discourse. Building upon Burke's (1969) theories about identity creation, Charland (1987) offered a theoretical approach to the process of national identity formation that highlights the constitutive function of rhetoric – that national identity is called into being through discourse. Working from a similar perspective, Hixson

(2008) discussed the history of U.S. national identity creation in international diplomatic contexts. He asserted that there are themes that emerge throughout history as the U.S. government interacts with other nations and that these themes come together to create a certain "virulent" mythical national identity that is represented internationally (p. 318). Still, Bruner (2002; 2005) claimed that although many scholars have studied how U.S. national identity is created through internal discourse, scholarship focusing on how messages sent to other countries contribute to the U.S. identity is not as prevalent. Rhetorically analyzing these international messages will allow for a unique and comprehensive analysis of the implicit and explicit identity-forming arguments that are made in front of global audiences.

In this thesis, I examine the various responses of the U.S. government to the 2010 natural disaster in Chile in order to understand how these messages craft a national identity that is transmitted internationally. This disaster provided a unique opportunity for the U.S. to shape its identity not only because the U.S. reached out to a nation during one of the most difficult moments in its history but also because the nation that it sought to help had not been a clearly defined ally or enemy; instead, the U.S.-Chile relationship has historically been in a constant state of flux. Thus, in addition to understanding how the U.S. crafted its identity in these unique conditions, I explore the implications of this formed identity on the rhetorical relationship between the U.S. and Chilean governments.

Chile and the United States: A History of Intervention

Throughout its history as an organized nation, the U.S. has played such a controversial role in Chilean national affairs that former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated the U.S. intervention in Chile "is not a part of American history that we are proud of" (Kornbluh, 2003, p.

xi). Furthermore, former President Barack Obama stated that "the history of relations between the United States and Latin America have at times been extremely rocky and have at times been difficult" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, para. 39). Scholars have claimed that U.S. interventions in Chile have included covert operations and controversial actions, as well as arguably unethical interventions and even murder (Kornbluh, 2003; Uribe, 1974). This controversial relationship is due in part to the way that the U.S. has viewed the Chilean nation throughout history.

The relationship between the U.S. government and government of Chile has been divided by Sater (1990) into three broad periods. The first period, from 1891 to 1929, was marked by a growing enmity between Chile and the U.S. When a civil war broke out in Chile in 1891, the U.S. government publicly supported the Chilean President José Balmaceda. Balmaceda was defeated by the Chilean Congress that had been supported by the United Kingdom. Later that same year, the Baltimore Crisis was triggered when two U.S. sailors were killed during a violent brawl that broke out with some Chilean locals in Valparaiso, Chile. The U.S. was dissatisfied with the Chilean response to this incident and wanted Chile to admit its guilt, even though such a response would cause global public humiliation (Connell-Smith, 1974). As a result, the U.S. government threatened to use force if adequate reparations were not made. Although the U.S. did not find it necessary to use force to eventually resolve this issue, the threat sent a clear message to Chile: The U.S. would not allow for a country such as Chile to humiliate it internationally. In the early 1900s, an incident occurred over claims of mining concessions in which Chile was forced to give up what they claimed were their legal possessions. This episode, Connell-Smith (1974) argued, conveyed to Chile that the U.S. had no regard for their claims and rights. These

incidents added to a growing hostility between the two nations that would continue during the second period of relations between them.

Between 1929 and 1960, Chile's rancor toward the U.S. grew as its economy became more and more dependent on the U.S. economy. Throughout this period, Chile was in great debt to the U.S., and the U.S. owned many of Chile's resources, preventing it from benefitting economically from World War I or World War II (Sater, 1990). In fact, after World War II, the U.S. had so much control over the Chilean economy that Chile was unable to export its excess copper to other nations. As the Chilean economy continued to weaken, a growing group of Chileans saw a more socialistic government as a solution to their problems. The U.S. continued to oppose socialism and made every effort to ensure that practices that support a free market economy were adopted by the Chilean government instead.

The third broad period of U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs began in the early 1960s. At this time, the U.S. government viewed Chile as a potential model for all of Latin America; it would become a strong democratic nation that could be contrasted with other countries (e.g., Cuba) that did not uphold American ideals (Cottam, 1994). Nevertheless, Chile depended heavily on the U.S. government to perform that model democratic role. For example, because of Chile's copper exportations to the U.S., U.S. corporations controlled much of the affairs of the Chilean copper industry in the 1960s. As a result, "the United States saw Chile in a very favorable but patronizing light as an example of the success…of gradual economic reform and political democracy, U.S.-style" (Cottam, 1994, p. 55).

In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. involvement in Chilean political affairs also expanded to the world of academia and other tactics to influence Chilean ideals. Theodore Shultz, chairman of

the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago, worried that the U.S. was not doing enough to combat Marxism in South American nations. He stated to a colleague, "What we need to do is change the formation of the men, the influence the education, which is very bad" (Klein, 2007, p. 59). He and his colleagues came up with a plan of intellectual indoctrination, through which they hoped to drastically alter the state-centered nature of the Chilean economy. This plan consisted of sending 100 of Chile's most elite graduate-level students studying economics to the University of Chicago between 1956 and 1970. These students were taught that Chilean economic policies were inadequate and the cause of many of Chile's problems. Many of these students came to disdain non-capitalistic practices, such as the control of prices and socialist attempts to alleviate poverty. Some even went on to devote their doctoral dissertations to detecting and exposing the flaws of Latin American economic practices. These students came to be known throughout the Americas as "Los Chicago Boys."

Despite the fact that the Chicago Boys believed in the success of U.S. capitalistic policies and would themselves have put them into practice, scholars have claimed that their influence in the Chilean government was minimal (Klein, 2007). Much to the consternation of Shultz and his colleagues, "Los Chicago Boys" did not become the intellectual leaders of Chile, and most did not play a role in Chilean leadership at all. Because of this failure, the U.S. government took more direct approaches to intervening in Chilean political affairs throughout the presidential elections of the 1960s and 1970s. As Klein (2007) explained:

> It was Nixon who would give the Chicago Boys and their professors something they had long dreamed of: a chance to prove that their capitalist utopia was more than a theory in a

> basement workshop – a shot at remaking a country from scratch. Democracy had been inhospitable to the Chicago Boys in Chile; dictatorship would prove an easier fit. (p. 63)

In the 1964 Chilean presidential elections, the U.S. government continued to try to influence the Chilean government through its support of the Christian Democrat presidential candidate Eduardo Frei against Salvador Allende, who was supported by communist Russia and Cuba (Sater, 1990). Frei received both financial (approximately $3 million) and technical support from the U.S. government, which viewed him as the only candidate who could stop Allende. As president, Frei hoped to maintain an affable relationship with Washington while eventually becoming independent from it. Nevertheless, after he was elected, the U.S. continued to supply Chile with financial aid and continued to position itself as the biggest importer of Chilean copper (Cottam, 1994). For the United States, "a Christian Democratic-ruled Chile" was "an experiment" that would eventually illustrate the ability of the U.S. to help a nation implement liberal democratic practices and a capitalistic economy successfully (Sater, 1990, p. 141).

Much to the dismay of the U.S. government, Frei's six years as president were seen as a "failure" to both Chilean citizens and other nations because of his inability to produce economic change (Sater, 1990). The Nixon administration worried that other Latin American nations would take notice and reverse their own efforts to democratize, turning instead to more extreme forms of government to fix their economic problems. This fear seemed to become a reality in Latin American nations such as Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay. Similarly, towards the end of the 1960's, the "Unidad Popular" or alliance of liberal Chilean parties such as the Socialist Party, Communist Party, Radical Party, and the Social Democratic Party gained popularity in Chile. Together, this coalition of parties supported Marxist co-founder of the Chilean Socialist Party

Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election. Then President Richard Nixon, along with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, viewed Allende's potential rule as president as threatening to Chile, Latin America, and U.S. global power. He saw Chile as a "child" in great danger because of Allende, who to them was essentially an agent of the USSR (Hersh, 1983, p. 263).

With the help of the CIA, the U.S. launched a program in 1970 to manipulate public opinion of Allende (Cottam, 1994). This project failed, however, as Allende received more votes than any other candidate. Still, he did not receive a majority vote, and thus the Chilean Congress, in accordance with Chilean law, had to choose the president from the top two candidates. The U.S. government was heavily engaged in this process, and it tried to convince the Chilean Congress that Allende was a major threat to the nation and would ruin its economy. When Allende was selected, Nixon and the CIA tried to convince the Chilean military to participate in a coup. Nixon and Kissinger thought that military officials would readily agree to stage the coup because they were convinced that as a nation, Chile was "much simpler" than it was even though it had historically been very devoted to democratic constitutional practices (Cottam, 1994, p. 59). Nixon underestimated the Chilean people, and Allende took office later that year.

The appointment of Allende to the Chilean presidency marked the first time in world history that a Marxist candidate had become head of state through free elections (Connell-Smith, 1974). Allende was quick to end economic relations with the U.S. by increasing its trade with other Latin American nations and criticizing American copper companies (Sater, 1990). Nixon responded by drastically limiting American loans made to Chile and instituting an economic embargo in 1972. These measures did not affect the Chilean economy at first but severely

restricted it over time. Additionally, Nixon and Kissinger exacerbated Allende's unstable time in office by encouraging industrial freezes that halted the production and distribution of basic goods like milk and flour as part of a complex plot to bring down a legally elected foreign president who disagreed with U.S. political ideology. As a result, Allende was unsuccessful in his attempts to improve years of economic and social inequality. Subsequently, the Chilean military rebelled against the government on September 11, 1973, taking over a port in Valparaiso and killing Allende in the rebellion. Although the exact cause of his death is unclear, many believe that he was killed when the Chilean army and air force attacked his palace (Bonnefoy, 2011). The Chilean military officially took over Chile under the control of General Augusto Pinochet, who began a government of laissez-faire capitalism and totalitarianism (Sater, 1990).

The degree of U.S. involvement in Pinochet's military takeover is highly debated, and several confidential CIA documents have been made public over the course of the past 20 years. In *The Pinochet File,* Kornbluh (2003) has provided primary documents of this involvement and has stated that "for all of Chile's importance and notoriety in the ongoing debate over U.S. foreign policy, the historical record has remained largely hidden from public scrutiny" (p. xv). Kornbluh concluded, however, that the U.S. government was much more involved in the 1973 Chilean military coup than was made known to the public for many years. This is an especially controversial topic for American political history as the years of Chilean military power (1973-1990) were marked by violence and fear. By the 1980s, an estimated 300,000 Chileans lived in political exile, at least 1,000 fled for economic reasons, and others were incarcerated while many others were murdered or disappeared (Sater, 1990). Under Pinochet's military rule, the Chilean

government tried earnestly to restore traditional Chilean values and establish social and economic order, but it struggled to do so.

Though the extent of its support is debated, under presidents Nixon and Ford, the U.S. supported General Pinochet and his military junta (Sater, 1990). However, when Jimmy Carter became president in 1976, he condemned Pinochet's military government for violating human rights and democratic practices. Under Reagan's administration, the U.S. government initially supported the traditional values of the military regime but eventually condemned it for its anti-democratic governing. As the threat of the Soviet Union declined worldwide, the U.S. government no longer found it necessary to support Chile's extreme anti-communistic form of government. By the end of the 1980s, the U.S. openly denounced Pinochet's regime and supported its opposition as well as a democratic electoral method for choosing government leadership. Ironically, Pinochet compared the U.S. and its condemnation of his military junta to the actions of the leaders of the USSR, "chastening both nations for trying to impose their political system upon the world by selectively invoking human rights" (Sater, 1990, p. 195).

Pinochet's military rule of Chile outlasted four U.S. presidents and ended in 1990 when he was replaced by Patricio Aylwin. Aylwin, who had been supported by a coalition of liberal democratic parties called the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (or Concertación), entered office as the result of elections that Pinochet himself allowed to take place (Sater, 1990). Although Pinochet made every attempt to ensure that he would become the Chilean Head of State via the electoral process, he was ultimately unsuccessful in his attempts to gauge the wishes of the Chilean citizens. The U.S. government also played a significant role in the 1990 elections, threatening Pinochet for his potential vote tampering and sending officials to observe the entire

process. When 55% of Chilean citizens voted against Pinochet's junta, he accepted the results. For the next 20 years, Chile's transition to democracy was led by the Concertación.

In 1993, Concertación presidential candidate Eduardo Frei ran a campaign that utilized American-style personality political tactics and won the elections with a 58% of the vote. His election "reflected a belief that democracy was not simply a preferable alternative to authoritarianism, but that it was a widely accepted and successful political formula for Chile" (Angell, 2007, p. 82). The 1999-2000 presidential elections were the first elections that were not overshadowed by the legacy of Pinochet and his regime. In this election, Concertación candidate Ricardo Lagos was elected after two very close rounds of voting. Whereas presidential candidates in previous elections focused on issues that would support democracy against a history of authoritarian rule, candidates in the 1999-2000 election utilized popular polls and focus groups to determine the issues that were important to the people such as poverty, employment, crime, health care, and education. In this way, this election took a political turn as it adopted "more normal" democratic practices (Angell, 2007, p. 110).

The 2005-2006 presidential election in Chile "confirmed an impressive record of electoral stability and continuity" (Angell, 2007, p. 132). Its most notable distinction, however, was that a woman was elected to the presidency for the first time in Chile's history. Concertación candidate Michelle Bachelet was elected in part because of her party's ties to economic improvements and stability in Chile between 1990 and 2005. Those years marked a noteworthy increase in GDP per capita, minimum salary, and infrastructural improvements, as well as significant decrease in unemployment. Indeed, the performance of Chile's government was so successful that it was ranked as the most successful government in Latin America, comparable to

many developed countries (Angell, 2007). Under Bachelet's leadership, Chile's government became known as efficient, independent, and stable. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Chile has seen so many significant improvements, not all Chilean citizens are satisfied with their government. In fact, some polls have revealed "low levels of confidence in politicians, in politics, and in the overall democratic system" (Angell, 2007, p. 198). While scholars debate why this might be the case, many claim that it is due to lingering effects from Pinochet's military regime. Angell (2007) claimed that there exists a surprisingly strong "Pinochet/anti-Pinochet cleavage in Chilean society" even though "Pinochet himself is now a marginal figure" (p. 115). Further, a 2013 survey conducted to mark the 40th anniversary of his military coup revealed that "Gen Pinochet still has a small but ardent group of right-wing supporters who regard him as a hero," (Long, 2013, para. 4). Although Chilean citizens are silenced about their lingering feelings about Pinochet, they have not forgotten about his time as dictator. Instead, they illustrate divisive feelings about what he did and an overall feeling of social mistrust.

The 2009 presidential elections marked the end of the 20 years of Concertación presidents (Beittel & Margesson, 2010). On January 17, 2010, Sebastian Piñera, the center-right leader of the electoral Coalition for Change, defeated Concertación candidate and former President Eduardo Frei. A mere 12 days after the earthquake, Piñera's inauguration on March 11, 2010 ended 20 years of Concertación governance. However, he worked closely with the Concertación party due to its large, enduring influence over both houses of Congress. Piñera's victory signified a shift to the political right in Chilean government, but this shift was short lived as Socialist party candidate Michelle Bachelet was once again elected president four years later after a runoff election.

With few exceptions, the relationship between the U.S. and Chile has been consistently amicable since its transition back to democracy. Former President George H. W. Bush was supportive of the new democracy established in Chile and supported its turn to free market policies, declaring publicly that Chile was once again an example for the entire western hemisphere (Mares & Aravena, 2001). Although the U.S. does not have the same hold on Chile's trade relations as it once did, both the H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations expressed a desire to establish a free trade agreement with Chile. In 2004, the two countries entered into a bilateral free trade agreement that strengthened the commercial ties between the two nations (Beittel & Margesson, 2010). Furthermore, over the course of the past 20 years, the U.S. has been concerned with investigating and exposing their involvement in Chilean presidential elections from the late 20th century. In 1999, for example, the U.S. Department of State launched their "Chile Declassification Project" wherein they uncovered CIA records of their controversial intervention in Chilean affairs throughout the 1960s and 70s and made them public (U.S. Department of State, 1999). This was seen by some as an overdue attempt by the U.S. government to take responsibility for their arguably unethical role in Chilean affairs whereas others saw it as "an accounting – but without a full acceptance of accountability" (Kornbluh, 2003, p. 489). In a 2011 meeting with Chilean President Sebastián Piñera, then-President Obama reiterated that the U.S. was willing to conduct further investigations in order to obtain information about the history of U.S. involvement in Chile. Still, he stated that while it is important for every nation to understand its own history, "it's important ... that we're not trapped by our history" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, para. 40). He reminded

his international audience that the progress made by Chile in recent decades has been supported by the U.S.

Today, the U.S.-Chilean relationship reflects a "pursuit of cooperative relations even in the face of setbacks on specific issues" (Mares & Aravena, 2001, p. 94). The relationship is built on shared values and a mutual desire to spread democracy and free market policies (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Santiago, Chile, n.d.). Pleased with their democratic ways of governing, "U.S. officials have expressed appreciation for Chile's leadership and moderating influence in a region increasingly characterized by political unrest and anti-American populism" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 10). When Obama met with Piñera in 2011 - the first time in over 20 years that a U.S. president had visited Chile - he labeled Chile as one of the strongest partners of the U.S., in part because the two nations share values, principles, and visions. He also commended the Chilean government for taking a leadership role across all of the Americas, especially across Latin America. Obama has since been quoted as labeling Chile as "an example" for both its region and for the world "of how you can and should make the most of today's opportunities" ("President Obama: Chile", 2011, para. 4).

When Bachelet was elected in 2014, the White House issued a statement in support of her government and made former President Obama's "desire to continue strengthening the relationship between the United States and Chile" clear – an example of the cooperative tone that marks the relationship between the two nations today (Jackson, 2013, para. 4-5). Furthermore, Chile was designated a member of the Visa Waiver Program in March 2014, allowing Chilean citizens to travel to the U.S. for up to 90 days for any reason and without obtaining a visa. This growing congeniality is underscored by statements that the two countries "consult frequently on

issues of mutual concern, including in the areas of international commerce, multilateral diplomacy, security, academic exchanges, military cooperation, and science" and "have frequent high-level interaction" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 2017, para. 1). This tone was reflected in the 2010 U.S. response to one of Chile's biggest natural disasters, which provided the U.S. government with an opportunity to publicly support the young democratic nation in a real time of need. Additionally, it created a particularly interesting arena to analyze relative to how foreign relations craft a specific U.S. identity.

The 2010 Chilean Earthquake

The 8.8 magnitude earthquake that occurred on Saturday, February 27, 2010 on Offshore Maule, Chile was tied for the fifth-strongest earthquake in the world since 1990 and lasted for over 90 seconds (Barrionuevo & Robbins, 2010). Paul E. Simons, the U.S. ambassador to Chile said the shake "felt like five minutes ... it was definitely an emotional experience" (Barrionuevo & Robbins, 2010, para. 15). The geological consequences of the earthquake were also devastating to the Chilean nation – it led to hundreds of aftershocks that were felt throughout the Maule region for months and to tsunami waves that severely damaged the cities of Concepción, Constitución, Dichato, and Pichilemú, as well as their surrounding areas (U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2010).

Though national and international governmental services differ in their findings of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami's human toll, according to the U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey (2010), it left "at least 521 people killed, 56 missing, about 12,000 injured, 800,000 displaced and at least 370,000 houses, 4,013 schools, 79 hospitals and 4,200 boats damaged or destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami in the Valparaiso-Concepcion-

Temuco area" (para. 1). The disaster also led to days of "social tension" in cities like Concepción which were severely affected by the quake ("Chile Troops Tackle Earthquake Looters," 2010). Throughout the week following the earthquake, 160 looters were arrested in Concepción for stealing from local stores and homes. Additionally, at least 200 inmates escaped from a prison in Chillan, Chile after one of the prison's walls crumbled ("Call for Calm in Wake of Chile Quake," 2010). On March 2, 2010, a small plane carrying cargo to assist victims in Concepción crashed and killed the six people onboard ("6 Killed in Chile Aid Plane Crash," 2010).

As a result of this unrest, the Chilean military sent out thousands of soldiers to cities throughout Chile in an attempt to maintain order ("Chile Troops Tackle Earthquake Looters," 2010). Overall, Chile was reported to have lost an estimated $30 billion as a result of damage caused by the earthquake. For this reason, many outside governments lent their support the country of Chile in their time of need.

The U.S. Response

Though the earthquake in Chile appeared to require "far less assistance from the international community than in Haiti" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 13), the U.S. did not hesitate to respond to the significant physical devastation throughout the country. On the day of the earthquake, former President Barack Obama offered condolences to Chile in a public address made from the White House in which he claimed that the U.S. would be a source of support for the Chilean people in their time of need (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). Additionally, on the day of the earthquake, both former President Obama and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called President Bachelet personally to express support and offer assistance (Kaufman, 2010a). Clinton had been planning a tour of Latin America in an effort to

gain support from nations all over the western hemisphere on a variety of issues, and she changed her itinerary in order to adequately respond to the disaster (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a). Although she stated that she would cancel her trip to Chile if her visit would be an interference to the nation's reconstruction process, she said that she was asked by the Chilean government to come in order to "assess whatever else they might need and immediately to begin the process of providing it" (Kaufman, 2010a, para. 5). She arrived in Chile on March 2, 2010 and spent the day with President Bachelet and President-elect Sebastian Piñera (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, 2010b). These meetings were translated into Spanish and televised widely to Chilean audiences. In her meetings with Chilean leaders, Clinton congratulated the Chilean government for its response to the destruction, reestablished ties of friendship and values shared between the nations, offered help, and expressed confidence in Chile's ability to rebuild itself (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, 2010b). She stated that the U.S. would offer support when other nations had ceased support because the U.S. was committed to being a supporter of Chile. She also brought 25 satellite phones with her and publicly gave one of them to President Bachelet, promising that more humanitarian assistance was on its way.

Humanitarian Assistance

In her meeting with President Michelle Bachelet, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S. would aid Chile in any way that was needed (Kaufman, 2010b). She assured the Chilean people that the U.S. government was thoroughly monitoring the situation and closely assessing their needs. Additionally, she claimed that the details of U.S. assistance were very well planned. With regards to the humanitarian assistance that would be provided to

Chile, she stated publicly that the U.S. was "coordinating closely with senior Chilean officials on content and timing" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs, 2010b, para. 8). A list of the official U.S. Government humanitarian assistance provided in response to the 2010 earthquake in Chile can be found in the Appendix. This list was provided by the U.S. Department of State's Embassy in Santiago and includes all aid provided between February 27, 2010 and June 8, 2010.

Argument Overview

In my analysis, I argue that each of the elements of the United States' response to the 2010 earthquake in Chile came together to create a social drama that is a reflection of the current status of the relationship between the two nations. Consistent with their history of intervention, the U.S. continued to find it necessary to play a major role in Chilean affairs. This intervention reflected more than a simple desire to assuage an international crisis or to pursue strategic national interests in another area of the world. From a symbolic perspective, it also enacted a crucial element of U.S. national identity that is often unacknowledged and almost always unchallenged. Nevertheless, it can have profound international implications for the U.S. government and its international policy (Hixson, 2008). In the ensuing analysis, I look critically at a specific set of interactions between the U.S. and Chile in 2010 and adopt a dramatic perspective on identity formation to examine how national identity themes are created through the U.S. government's rhetorical intervention in a Chilean national disaster and how these themes enact a unique relationship between the two nations.

Specifically, I undertake a close analysis of four transcripts, two press releases, and two U.S. Government reports – each an important component of the U.S. response to the 2010

earthquake not only because of the assistance they pledged but also because of the identities they enacted for both countries. In these interactions, some of the most powerful U.S. leaders and (albeit to a lesser extent) some of the most powerful Chilean leaders enacted an exceptionally strong and heroic identity for the U.S. – one with an uncharacteristic ability to help others, one with technological expertise, one that was always prepared, and one that was guided by a desire to support those who uphold democratic ways of governing. Conversely, through these rhetorical interactions, Chile's identity was crafted as fallen, weak, and unable to lift itself from its devastating situation alone. Between the two nations, a hierarchical relationship was enacted. The U.S. took on the role of teacher, parent, and evaluator whereas, congruent with historical interactions between the two nations as indicated earlier in this chapter, Chile was a student, child, and subject. As such, while a surface reading of these documents might indicate that the rhetorical interactions they detail were largely unremarkable, a deeper reading underscores their ability to portray powerful identity themes. The next chapter presents theory that explains how rhetoric performs this function.

CHAPTER 2

Review of Literature and Research Methodology

Scholars who study the creation of identity argue that while identity construction is always related to material conditions, it is in fact created through symbolic social processes. Specifically, rhetorical discourse has been upheld as one of the most important of these social processes as it defines and shapes the ideology that underlies constituted identity. Of course, scholars who study national identity and the rhetoric involved in international relations often disagree about the relationship of rhetoric and identity, and these disagreements often center on whether U.S. policies and messages aimed at international actors create and recreate international identity or are merely a reflection of a national identity that already exists. Perhaps William Bloom (1990) came closest to capturing the complex nature of that relationship in his assertion that foreign relations both affect and are affected by national identity. The ensuing study examines how this dynamic process occurs and explores the implications that it has for a specific international relationship. In order to provide a theoretical context for this analysis, I will provide a brief summary of the existing theory related to the concepts of identity, collective identity, national identity, and the interrelatedness of foreign relations and national identity. I will also offer a basic description of key ideological themes that scholars attribute to the United States' current and historical national identity that will ground my analysis.

Identity Formation

The creation of identity has been an important source of study among scholars and theorists across many different disciplines (Althusser, 1971; Black, 1970; Booth, 1961; Foucault, 1969). These scholars pointed to various aspects of culture as the sources of identity creation.

For example, Althusser (1971) identified "ideological state apparatuses" or public social structures as the most important sources for the creation and maintenance of ideology and identity (p. 127). Consistent with this claim, Hall (1996) asserted that it is only through the *representation* of culture and state apparatuses that we experience the world. In other words, identity is not only created cognitively but also as it is acted out socially. Bruner (2005) supported this view when he claimed that anything that a human consciously experiences is mediated through discourse and that identity in particular is constituted through discursive messages. Discourse is thus a key site for identity formation since it is used to craft representations and articulate ideologies.

Booth (1961) was among the earliest to examine the relationship of identity and communication and described how the "implied author" of discourse is represented rhetorically through "a core of norms and choices" presented in a speech act (p. 74). These norms and choices may or may not accurately represent the real identity of the author who exists empirically and historically outside of the work. Booth claimed that to some degree, the "implied author" is always different from the real identity of a text which creates a certain sense of "drama" within the speech act. He compared the author to a "stage manager" or a "puppeteer" who "stands behind the scenes ... silently pairing his fingernails" as he or she uses speech to create a sense of identity (p. 151). The author's dramatic use of language can be analyzed critically in order to reveal how he or she creates an "implied" personal identity.

Edwin Black (1970) extended Booth's claim that a rhetorical act creates an identity for its author. He stated that the characteristics of a rhetor communicated through discourse represent a "persona," an artificial creation of the author that "figures importantly in rhetorical transactions"

(p. 111). This persona is not characterized by its physical characteristics or attitudes, but it instead reflects the author's ideological self-definition. Black (1970) described this ideology as "the network of interconnected convictions that functions in a man epistemically and that shapes his identity by determining how he views the world" (p. 112). Thus, a rhetor's convictions determine his or her worldview (or ideology), which essentially comprises his or her persona (or identity). This ideological persona is made apparent through an analysis of the language, metaphors, and style that a rhetor employs through discourse.

In addition to the construction of this first persona, Black (1970) claimed that a rhetor also crafts the identity of his or her audience, a concept that he labeled "the second persona." The second persona represents "a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become" (Black, 1970, p. 113). Therefore, although this persona represents the "image" of a person that may never become embodied by a real person or group of people, a critic can analyze the ideological character of the second persona in order to better understand the ideology of the first persona. This would not be possible if the ideological identity of a "persona" were not rhetorically created and represented through discourse.

Since Black (1970) presented his theory of the "second persona" represented in rhetoric, other scholars have highlighted additional ideological entities that are implied through the discourse of a rhetor. Extending Black's research, Wander (1984) claimed that the "third persona" is the auditor that is not implied through discourse. Like the second persona, the third persona represents a type of audience. However, unlike the second persona, this audience is hidden and even excluded from receiving messages directed at primary audiences. Essentially, this third persona is the neglected or rejected "it" that is only acknowledged as an "objectified"

being and not as an audience member (Wander, 1984, p. 209). A rhetorical critic can recognize and analyze this ignored social group in order to better understand how it is oppressed and silenced by other dominant groups. Such an analysis will reveal much about the identity of the rhetor by exposing what that persona finds to be "unacceptable, undesirable, [and] insignificant" (Wander, 1984, p. 209).

Morris (2002) claimed that there is yet another persona represented through rhetoric called the "fourth persona." Like the second and third personas, the fourth persona is also a type of audience implied through discourse and "constituted by the textual wink" (Morris, 2002, p. 230). This persona understands the discourse in a particular way based on their adherence to a particular ideology represented through the symbols used in rhetorical discourse. However, that meaning is hidden from those who are not adherents to that ideology and thus would not understand the subtleties of its meaning. Here, a certain identity is presented through intentional messages that are only made apparent to this implied "fourth" auditor. This auditor then is a "silent, savvy but discreet audience constituted as collaborator in making duplicitous utterances appear legitimate before an audience of dupes" (Morris, 2002, p. 241). The second persona is "duped" in that he or she is unaware of the collaborative messages sent and acknowledged by the fourth persona. Morris (2002) provided the example of a person who is sexually marginalized and desires to remain silent about the truth of his or her sexually identity. The person may appear to be "normal" to everyone else, but members of this marginalized group will be able to communicate their true identity to those with comparable experiences through implicit messages that are hidden to the outside world. Since this fourth persona is a "stealth partner who quietly

affirms" the ideological messages of the first persona, an analysis of its identity will also reveal much about the ideology of the rhetor (Morris, 2002, p. 241).

Understanding how these personas apply to the rhetorical interactions in the present thesis will serve to both demonstrate how the ideas related to persona of Black (1970), Wander (1984), and Morris (2002) help rhetorical critics examine messages more thoroughly and will provide a richer understanding of my analysis and conclusions in chapters three, four, and five. Applying the theory on these personas to the present analysis, I undertook a close examination of a series of messages sent by the U.S. in response to the 2010 earthquake in Chile. In these interactions, the U.S. government was the rhetor and took on the role of the first persona and the identity that was enacted within its messages largely reflects U.S. leaders' ideological self-definition. For the most part, these messages were delivered directly to Chilean officials and the Chilean government, who took on the role of the second persona per to Black's definition. As Black (1970) indicated, an analysis of the identity of Chile as it was presented through the words of the U.S. as the first persona illustrates "a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become" (p. 113). In this interaction, the third persona – the group largely ignored and excluded from these global messages – included any group that did not share the ideology of the rhetor (U.S. leaders) and its audience (Chilean leaders). As my analysis will indicate, this shared ideology is a commitment to a democratic way of governing. Therefore, in this situation, those who play the role of the third persona might be nations who do not uphold democracy. The fourth persona, a group that understands the values of the first persona but is not the direct audience, might be other powerful allies of the U.S. who work to promote democracy internationally or even U.S. citizens themselves – groups that stood in silent agreement with and

approval of the words and actions of the U.S. leaders in this interaction. These personas will be revisited in the analysis of this thesis.

Consistent with this work on the ideological creation of a rhetor and its audiences, foreign relations scholars who study identity and international affairs have similar understandings about how this identity assumes the existence of an "other" (Hixson, 2008). Campbell (1998), for example, claimed that "the constitution of identity is achieved through inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside,' a 'self' from an 'other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign'" (p. 9). In other words, since the identity of an entity is formed by prescribing to certain characteristics and making certain discursive choices, there also must be a group (or groups) of others who do not make the same decisions and do not share what is characteristic of that identity or the group to which it subscribes. This other can be its audience (such as Black's idea of the "second persona"), or simply other unidentified groups of people who do not come from the same cultural and ideological group (such as Wander's idea of the "third persona").

Numerous scholars have used Black's (1970) original work on the ideology of the rhetor in discourse. One strand of this research examines how the speech of individuals constitutes their identity and ultimately affects their behavior. Cohen (1997), for example, utilized Black's theory on the ideology of the first persona to understand how the guests at one soup kitchen in New York used talk to present themselves and other impoverished guests. Implied in this analysis is the assumption that the constructed identity of an individual and the ideological group to which the individual belongs can have a real influence on the perception and treatment of that group. Other extensions of Black's work analyzed the construction of a second persona in order to

understand how identity is formed in social movements. For example, Hope (1975) analyzed the rhetorical differences between women's liberation movements and black liberation movements and concluded that women's rights activists had to first rhetorically create their second persona before they could effectively influence it. These findings illustrate how the discursive creation of identity has a real impact on social action and how a rhetor may craft the identity of his or her audiences in order to fulfill unique ideological purposes.

Collective Identity Formation

One strand of research that developed Black's (1970) idea of the ideological "persona" illustrates how a group of people constitute a singular persona or identity Radwan (2006) and Chambers (2008) argued that the idea of the "persona" and its audience(s) defines the identity of groups of people as well. For the purpose of my study on the national identity of the United States and Chile in a specific international context, I will provide a brief description of the development of group identity research.

McGee (1975) argued that rhetoric as a method of critical inquiry provides the most appropriate form of analyzing and understanding group identity formation. In analyzing the existence of "the people," an entity that is often referred to in public rhetoric, McGee argued that groups often use myths (or symbolic stories that are shared and referred to among members of a shared ideological group) to construct their identity. These myths affect that group's worldview and the way that the group makes decisions and can be analyzed to understand how that group functions. In order to theorize about myth and group identity, McGee also extended Bormann's (1972) understanding of the role of fantasy themes. Bormann claimed that certain "themes" are utilized in public discourse in a way that legitimizes collective fantasy and then translates into an

essential element of that group's existence. Operating under this claim, McGee claimed that a rhetor can use both accurate and inaccurate historical facts in conjunction with fantasy themes in order to present a social group in realistic and fantastic ways simultaneously. Thus, as the rhetor creatively combines previously held beliefs with emerging social themes, he or she has the ability to transform a group's identity. McGee concluded that after listening to a speech from a rhetor who belongs to their own identity group, other group members will often change their behavior in order to enact the identity that the rhetor modified. Thus, the rhetorical decisions that are made and then enacted through discourse potentially have very profound implications for a group's identity.

McGee (1975) described the rhetorical acts that lead to a process of social group identity formation as occurring in successive stages. Social group identities "are conjured into objective reality, remain so long as the rhetoric which defined them has force, and in the end wilt away becoming once again merely a collection of individuals" (McGee, 1975, p. 242). Although he claimed that rhetoric gives meaning to the identity of this group throughout each stage of its existence, his second stage is particularly relevant to my analysis on international identity formation. In this stage, the speaker utilizes pre-established cultural values of a social group to create fictional identity traits or themes in order to achieve his or her political purposes. Thus, McGee assigned even more power to the rhetor as he or she facilitates in the creation of the identity of social groups.

Many rhetorical scholars have built upon McGee's (1975) idea of a collective identity, exploring the ways that members of a group can enact or change their identity through discourse. Indeed, Witteborn (2006) contended that collective identity has become a highly popular topic

among communication scholars who have studied its formation among people with a shared ethnicity, culture, gender, or within a particular nation. She concluded, however, that diverse members of a group who do not share a common ethnicity or culture can also form a collective identity which is expressed strategically through discourse and should be studied rhetorically. Other researchers have analyzed shared cultural and political organizations as important sites of group identity formation. For example, Kiss (1998) expanded collective identity research to include the realm of politics. She analyzed the various rhetorical responses of an evolving political group and concluded that both social and political identity are shaped by the collective identity that these messages create.

"The Nation" and National Identity Formation

Theory on political identity formation can also be extended to include the idea of a "nation" as a collective ideological group. Anderson (1991) defined "the nation" as "an imagined political community" that is "both inherently limited and sovereign" (p. 6). It is created in the minds of the people, independent and powerful, yet at the same time it is limited because there are many that are excluded from a national group (see also Schlesinger, 1991). Anderson (1991) claimed that a nation is finite; however, it is also *imagined* "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members ... yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 6). Because he defined a nation as a group that exists subjectively and has limits, Anderson's definition is congruent with the aforementioned definitions of identity. Since many aspects of a national identity are imagined and unreal, one cannot examine its creation only by determining the historical accuracy of its remembered

events. Instead, its identity should also be examined through analyses of the style in which it is imagined and communicated to others.

McGee (1975) came to comparable conclusions about the idea of "the nation" stating that "contrary to conventional wisdom, historical 'facts' do not speak for themselves in defining 'the people' of a nation" (p. 248). He provided the example of the English class struggle portrayed in Marxist literature, arguing that it was not the historical and economic conditions of the time that caused that struggle to take place but rather the human response to these conditions that created the struggle. As McGee (1975) stated, "These human responses (rhetoric) constitute a filter for 'facts' which translates them into *beliefs*. If such filters are ignored ... the result is ... imposing on the past one's own conviction and perception of what human responses to conditions ought to have been" (p. 248). In other words, as humans interpret the facts and events that surround them, they make their own interpretations of their conditions and experiences, and these interpretations have a strong impact on their beliefs and will affect future group action. Thus, it is important to understand and analyze how members of a group rhetorically construct their own social and political conditions.

Scholars from outside the disciplines of rhetoric and communication who study the concept of "the nation" define it as a physical place where a group of people live with certain distinct shared characteristics (Smith, 1996). The members of this group share a unique "history and culture, collective memories, a sense of ancestry, customs, sacred texts, language, religion, economy, mass education, and legal structure" (Smith, 1996, pp. 106-107). As Anderson (1991) emphasized in his studies, many of these shared characteristics are not tangible or even visible and therefore, in order to exist, they must be represented symbolically through rhetorical

discourse. Therefore, even the definitions of a nation that confine it to its physical location and to physical characteristics must acknowledge the important role that discourse plays in its creation and maintenance.

Charland (1987) took the idea of a created "nation" a step further as he discussed the unique role that rhetoric plays in the formation of an imagined national community. He claimed that discourse serves as a constitutive agent; as rhetorical messages of a nation are shared, the identity of that group is simultaneously formed. This idea is based on Burke's (1966) theory of identification which states that as two groups interact with one another, together they create and share an ideology (see also Bloom, 1990). The rhetor will call upon this shared ideology to persuade and in doing so simultaneously reconstructs and formalizes ideological identity. Often this process occurs through the strategic use of narrative, or the retelling of a people's struggles which highlights the unifying nature of a group's historical identity. Therefore, Charland (1987) claimed, though much of the identity of a group exists prior to a discursive act, it can also be altered or formed through rhetoric. This process has the ability to provoke social action of that newly formed group or to achieve shared political goals. Additionally, it often repeats itself as new discourses build upon previously constituted rhetorics (Charland, 1987).

Rhetorical scholars who have extended Charland's (1987) theory regarding constituted national identity claim that it is formed as a nation's discourse transcends the differences of individual group members especially when a group's identity is threatened by another. Hasian and Flores (1997), for example, claimed that national identities are constituted as fragments of their collective traditions and histories are transformed into a coherent whole that overcomes individual differences. Through an analysis of some rhetorical texts that were written and shared

during a time of uprising in Palestine, these scholars claimed that certain poems that were written and circulated publicly built upon historical traditions to construct an identity of that nation. This collective identity served as a persuasive agent in supporting national uprising. Sklar (1999) developed Charland's work in a similar way by discussing the role of the "other" in constitutive national identity formation. She argued that a group's identity is defined in relation to an opposing group since a threatened group will unify in order to protect itself in threatening situations. As such, the process of national identity formation occurs as much outside of a nation as it does within it. Bruner (2002, 2005), commented on the construction of identity as it occurs within a nation, stating that national leaders and other advocates play a critical role in the process of its creation. Although the messages that these leaders create almost always maintain hegemonic identities, as they are distributed to mass audiences, the members of those audiences still have the ability to affect national identity and sometimes alter it critically. This dynamic process then becomes a "never-ending struggle" between a group of people and their advocates (Bruner, 2005, p. 312).

Together, each of these studies emphasizes the role that members of a national group play in altering their nation's collective identity through discourse. Though history, politics, sociology, and culture are integral parts of a national ideology, rhetoric plays a fundamental constitutive role in the creation of national identity. Bruner (2002) explained:

> Each nation's ever-unfolding identity is composed of some unique combination of … economic, cultural, civic, and ethnic elements," nevertheless, "all are based on discursive accounts of who 'the people' are ... It is here that the rhetorical theories related to the construction of publics ... are helpful" (p. 6).

National identity is indeed a dynamic product of several public rhetorical struggles, and for that reason, rhetorical criticism provides an important method for understanding its creation. Still, Bruner (2002, 2005) claimed that while it can be a very effective tool, rhetorical criticism is also an underutilized and undervalued method for generating valuable insight in the study of national identity formation.

U.S. National Identity

Analyzing the specific constituted characteristics that comprise the identity of the United States as a nation is not a new topic for study among scholars (Campbell, 1998; Heiss, 2002; Hill Collins, 2001; Hixson, 2008; Huntington, 2004; Hutchinson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, & Garland, 2004). It is, however a difficult task, and scholars have claimed that it would be impossible to condense the complex and dynamic characteristics of the U.S. identity into one singular permanent whole (Calabrese & Burke, 1992; Hutchinson et al., 2004). According to Smith (1997), there is no single set of national ideals that the United States has historically created and perpetuated. Instead, they change consistently as different political leaders emphasize different themes throughout history. Still, Stuckey (2005) claimed that there are specific national identity themes that a scholar can recognize as being consistently acted and reenacted over time, such as toleration, equality, and superiority.

Scholars who have analyzed U.S. national identity formation have argued that although it is created socially through discourse, it has the ability to affect the behavior of U.S. citizens. In his survey of studies that analyze U.S. national identity in the twentieth century, Jasinski (2000) claimed that historians from the latter half of that century "view public discourse and other social practices as a generative force capable of constituting and reconstituting individual and collective

identities, communal norms and values, and our political and conceptual vocabulary" (p. 73). Zagacki (2007) also argued that national identity affects behavior as he studied the rhetoric of present-day American political leaders. He claimed that President George W. Bush presumed and constituted a national "we" through his speeches in a way that altered the fundamental identity of that "we." Thus, a critic can analyze American political rhetoric in order to enter into the ongoing conversation on how American identity is presently constructed.

Like Zagacki (2007), some U.S. national identity researchers have pointed to political leaders as major contributors to American ideology. Stuckey and Hoffman (2006) claimed that although national leaders often have short-term goals when they speak publicly, their discourse also has long term, identity-forming implications. In fact, the rhetoric of U.S. presidents in particular shapes the context that affects national decision making. Beasley (2004) also discussed the important role of presidential rhetoric in national identity formation, stating that political leaders utilize similar rhetorical strategies to create a unified national identity in the face of diversity. She claimed that analyzing their messages rhetorically allows a critic to isolate the identity themes or ideals that are developed by specific U.S. governmental actors and then communicated to wide audiences.

Some scholars have maintained that many of the current characteristics attributed to U.S. national identity were created uniquely through the conscious efforts of early national leaders because if its unique historical origins (Campbell, 1998; Beasley, 2004; Hixson, 2008). For example, in order to differentiate itself as one nation that is independent and ideologically different from European nations, the U.S. consciously and actively became attached to certain ideals such as the "American dream," or becoming successful despite one's underprivileged

background. Consequently, the identity of the U.S. has been especially self-made and continues to be the product of active government policy enacted through discourse (Campbell, 1998). Furthermore, throughout history, U.S. national leaders have used discourse strategically to emphasize certain national identity themes in order to gain support. As a result, today, the U.S. identity is even more ideological in nature than those of other nations (Beasley, 2004). As Hartshorne (1983) claimed, "Americans are more concerned with their national identity and spend more time trying to explain themselves to themselves than people of other nations" (p. 307). These explanations can be critically analyzed in order to recognize identity-producing themes that dominate American ideology.

Bruner (2002) highlighted the implications of these rhetorical constructions. Beginning after World War I, the U.S. illustrated enacted a "declared need to protect ... historically oppressed people" or people who are found in crisis both within its borders and without (Bruner, 2002, p. 5). Bruner (2002) explained that when the U.S. classifies a group of people as "oppressed," this is in fact a rhetorical decision with dire consequences because the symbolic use of the term creates situations of exigency to which the U.S. feels a need to respond. Thus, Bruner's analysis illustrated how the rhetorical use of a single word calls for significant action that affects many. Likewise, the analysis of the term "crisis" as it has been used by U.S. government leaders also illustrates the great influence that rhetorical choices can have on U.S. actions. Bostdorff (1994) and Kuypers (1997) claimed that when the President and his administration have labeled an international dilemma as a "crisis" it shapes the way that the government and the public respond. Though the use of this term can almost always be predicted because it is triggered by similar situations, Bostdorff (1994) asserted that "foreign crises are not

objective, independent entities, but are instead linguistic constructions" (p. 205). In other words, when political international events take place publicly, those events are given meaning through the discourse that the president uses to interpret them. These are a few examples of many that illustrate the fundamental role that rhetoric plays in national identity construction. These examples also illustrate the role that rhetorical criticism can play in deconstructing political acts in a way that elucidates the national identity they create.

One of the themes apparent in national rhetoric that has been identified as historically attributed to the national identity of the U.S. is power, legitimacy, and superiority. According to Campbell (1998), U.S. leaders have consistently used discourse that reflects themes of authority and superiority to portray its legitimacy and independence. As Campbell (1998) stated, "America has constantly confronted the dilemma of securing legitimacy and establishing authority in a culture that renders ontological guarantees suspect" (p. 131). Poole (1999) came to similar conclusions, claiming that U.S. policy has often been used to assert the U.S. as a leader with economic, military, and cultural power. Campbell (1998) claimed that the U.S. also enacts this value of power through its investment in social resources and stated, "There have been few countries that have either desired or been able to fashion a form of life in which both the discursive and political economies – even in a period of (relative) decline–have been so deeply implicated in each other and so global in their ramifications" (p. 198). The use of social and economic resources to establish itself as a powerful independent nation has historically been a consistent rhetorical method employed by U.S. national leaders. It is just one of many American identity themes that are created, supported, and altered through national discourse.

Similarly, throughout its evolution as a nation, U.S. identity has regularly been associated with the themes of progress and evolution. Sweet & McCue-Enser (2010) pointed to President Obama's rhetoric as an illustration of this evolution stating that Obama positioned the U.S. people as "accomplishers" with agency; they decide their future as well as the nature of their identity (p. 618). This is a continuous process as the people constantly aim for perfection but are never really able to reach it. For Obama, the identity of the U.S. people reflects the identity of the U.S. as a nation in that the U.S. is also flawed by nature but is fully aware of its imperfect nature. Accordingly, it is fluid and always in the process of improving its status.

Another national identity theme that has consistently been attributed to the rhetoric of President Obama is the theme of unity – unity among a diverse group of people who come together as one in support of the common good. Reifowitz (2012) claimed:

> President Obama's definition of our national identity reflects the core of his intellectual worldview as well as his approach to policy, both of which flow from his belief in the importance of empathy, of the people's ability to feel a sense of community with someone different from themselves. He has argued that a strong sense of unity among Americans facilitates a willingness on the part of everyone ... to sacrifice narrow group or individual interests for the common good, to share resources ... (p. 2)

Here, Reifowitz wrote specifically about the U.S. national identity as one that demonstrates empathy for those with different backgrounds within the U.S. However, Reifowitz also claimed that this identity has often been extended in front of international audiences as well as a result of Obama's words about a common humanity.

International Relations and U.S. National Identity

Despite the extensive amount of rhetorical scholarship that studies national identity formation, the study of how national identity is projected internationally has not received the same amount of attention. Still, some rhetorical scholars have studied the topic and come to informative conclusions. Bloom (1990) claimed that political leaders have historically played the role of redefining national identity even though the publics that they represent have little to do with this process as their function is merely to respond to the definitions that their leaders create. As a result, the purpose of Bloom's work was to propose a theory that gives a voice to the public in international policy making. Other scholars who study national identity and international relations have had differing viewpoints on whether international relations are constructive aspects of national identity or merely reflections of its pre-established contextual existence (Campbell, 1998; Hall, 1999; Hixson, 2008; Smith, 1996). Campbell (1998) is among the scholars who emphasize the role policy plays in the creation of a nation's identity stating that foreign relations should be "understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of ... political identity" (p. 8). In this way, international identity is not pre-established or secure by nature. It exists only insofar as a government involves itself in global relationships. Campbell recognized that it is not only the action but also the discourse involved in foreign relations that constitute a nation's identity since national governments create international messages in a unique stylized manner. This style calls for a specific identity that excludes other groups of people and is recognized globally.

Other scholars emphasize the role that national identity plays in constructing international policies and global relationships. Smith (1996) claimed that the interactions that one nation will have with another depend on the sense of nationalism that that nation has developed. Similarly,

Hall (1999) proposed that nations enact their identities through the construct of "systems" that serve to fulfill their needs nationally and internationally. As Hall (1999) stated, "Change in the international system occurs with changes in the collective identity of crucial social actors who collectively constitute the units from which the system is comprised" (p. 28). For example, he claimed that behavioral differences among nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are a result of transforming national identities. Thus, as specific national identities are uniquely formed, they have real material consequences on international policy.

Hixson (2008) recognized the complex nature of the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and national identity asserting that U.S. international relations flow from their distinct national ideology. He claimed that though the socioeconomic status and technological advancements of the U.S. have changed drastically throughout its history, its foreign policy has remained constant. He stated that this is because there are certain aspects of national identity that are deeply entrenched and unwavering. Furthermore, Hixson (2008) claimed that national identity "is rooted in representation" in that U.S. national identity exists as it does because of the way that it represents itself to other countries (p. 307). He went on to assert that national and foreign policies are mutually reinforcing aspects of identity because they include a unique discourse that "has served to create, affirm, and maintain cultural hegemony" (Hixson, 2008, p. 9). This hegemony includes a series of myths and themes which should be analyzed rhetorically in order to deconstruct and better understand national identity.

Scholars who study international relations and U.S. identity have asserted that throughout history, American interaction with other nations has shaped its purpose and defined its identity as a collective culture. Zagacki (2007) claimed that U.S. national leaders often encounter

difficulties in creating national identity in international contexts because they are unable to account for all of the ideological differences between the U.S. and other nations. Nevertheless, through his analysis, Zagacki illustrated how speeches from recent national leaders do include a type of rhetoric that attempts to form and reshape national identity. Similarly, Zietsma (2008) claimed that there has been a recent growth in the amount of scholarly attention drawn to "the constitutive national identity effect of foreign relations" (p. 180). He claimed that the cultural identity patterns established within U.S. boundaries greatly affect the way that the U.S. interacts with the world and that American political leaders are the actors who reflect national identity narratives to other nations. Johnston (2005) also asserted that the U.S. is a performer that lives out its identity through foreign relations, highlighting the use of military power in particular as an instigator of culture wars and identity creation. He claimed that understanding the cultural aspects of national identity will lead to a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy.

Zaharna (2010) was concerned with the interdependent relationship between culture and international relations and recognized that there are rich cultural overtones inherent in the international communication patterns of the U.S. government, claiming that these overtones are "integral to communication between nations and foreign publics" (p. 132). Specifically, one feature of U.S. culture is its emphasis on individuality and independence, which makes for diplomatic communicative practices that value truth, accuracy, and objectivity. Additionally, the U.S. tends to adopt a transmission-style of communicating which focuses on message content to persuade and to "tell ... our story" to other nations (Zaharna, 2010, p. 126). Although U.S. officials often think that their commitments to objectivity and their focus on message content make their communication style neutral, the truth is that it is heavily laden with cultural values

and often viewed as negative to other nations. Ultimately, Zaharna claimed that the U.S. government should not only be sensitive to the diverse cultural communication patterns of other nations but that it should also adopt some of these patterns itself. As Zaharna (2010) explained, "Because public diplomacy shares ... the power of constructing, maintaining, and representing identities among the actors in the international political arena, developing a multicultural approach to public diplomacy may help guard against unintended identity challenges with culturally diverse publics" (p. 133).

The uniquely American communication patterns adopted in U.S. foreign affairs reflect themes that work to create a specific national identity. Scholars who are interested in U.S. international relations have identified some of these national identity themes as they are directly tied to diplomatic foreign activity (Beasley, 2004; Campbell, 1998; Heiss, 2002; Hixson, 2008; Zagacki, 2007; Zietsma 2008). These themes date back to the inception of the U.S. as a nation and are still rhetorically enacted today. While not exhaustive, the following summary highlights some of the U.S. national identity themes as they are analyzed by researchers who study American foreign relations.

Political scholars like Eliassen Restad (2015) have claimed that "there are unquestionable analytical benefits to taking identity seriously in a study on foreign policy" as it helps understand the role that our collective worldview plays in the policy we employ internationally (p. 13). To Eliassen Restad, one of the most prominent identity traits that is enacted through international relations is American exceptionalism. In Eliassen Restad's (2015) view, this exceptionalism involves three traits – it entails "viewing the United States as *better* than all other nations," viewing the United States as a mission-driven leader that others follow, and viewing the

powerful position of the United States as eternal (p. 3). This trait affects our foreign policy because while we have always been engaged in the affairs of other nations, as an "exceptional" nation, we have always done so from one unilateral ideology. In other words, "The United States does not play by any other rules than its own, and will certainly not be seen as being led by others," (Eliassen Restad, 2015, p. 3).

Another important U.S. national identity theme is manifest destiny. This theme is enacted through foreign relations and is attributed to the historical American myth of conquering new lands and extending U.S. borders (Campbell, 1998). Hixson (2008) identified this myth and connected it with other similar myths such as "taming the frontier, advancing civilization, leading the free world, ridding the world of terror" (p. 10). Ultimately, he claimed that these identity themes have led to violently aggressive action and unilateral behavior that reinforces ideological hegemony. He stated that "U.S. foreign policy is a lethal, pathological force emanating from a self-serving national mythology" and that it is important to deconstruct the formation of our hegemony and take responsibility for it in order to transcend it (p. 307). In other words, U.S. hegemonic identity is susceptible to change, but not without deconstructing its basis.

Heiss (2002) studied imperialism as another important theme related to international relations that has played a part in U.S. national identity formation. She claimed that for the majority of its existence as a nation, the U.S. has refrained from enacting imperialistic policies. However, it is a practical nation that strives to accomplish its own goals. Thus, as the U.S. gained more power and a reputable global identity in the wake of World War II, it began to enact imperialistic policies which altered its identity. Focusing particularly on U.S. imperialistic policies enacted in Latin America, Martí (1997) asserted that the U.S. has historically presented

itself as a neighbor from the north that is madly driven by ambition to conquer southern foreign nations. In fact, he claimed that Latin America was so dependent on the United States throughout history that in reality, Latin countries underwent two waves of independence; one from Spain and the other a century later from the United States. This is due in part to the strategic use of American discourse that makes other nations seem inferior such that the U.S. itself seems superior and with the exclusive ability to help other nations in their times of need (Campbell, 1998). Zietsma (2008) made comparable claims about U.S. imperialistic beliefs stating that the U.S. Government has used foreign policy to perform the mythical identity as "God's Chosen Nation." As it continues to enact Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good neighbor" policy, it also spreads the widely held national belief that it has been selected by God to expand, develop and help other nations. In doing so, it also upholds its historic belief in "manifest destiny," which illustrates historically established "expansionist" longings (Beasley, 2004, p. 31).

Related to the theme of imperialism, Hixson (2008) claimed that the U.S. government takes on a masculine role when creating and conveying foreign policy (see also Jarvis, 2004; Jeffords, 1989). This occurs because its international discourse reflects the themes of "conception of honor, get tough ... manly intervention, upholding credibility, drawing lines in the sand, and vowing to never cut and run" (Hixson, 2008, p.12). Interestingly, Hixson (2008) also claimed that this masculine identity is expressed through the demonstration of "technological know-how" (p. 12). As the U.S. advances technologically and flaunts these advancements to other nations, it puts itself in the position of being able to provide for other, less advanced groups of people. Campbell (1998) extended this theme of masculinity by claiming that many themes involved in U.S. policy are chauvinistic. He claimed that because U.S. international discourse

reflects a puritanical belief that its success is due to a higher, spiritual force, it conveys a type of chauvinism that is almost "iconic" by nature (p. 198). This chauvinism is illustrated, for example, in the U.S. belief that its own national goals are universal ideals that should be globally upheld.

Another theme that highlights the masculine nature of U.S. identity portrayed internationally is the American need to help and protect others who may be especially vulnerable (Hixson, 2008). Bruner (2002) claimed that beginning in the early twentieth century, the U.S. has often felt a "need to protect a historically oppressed people" (p. 5). In the same way, Berg (2010) claimed that the U.S. has historically enacted the identity of "protector" of other nations (p. 41). As illustrated in policy such as the Monroe Doctrine and its involvement in World War II, Berg (2010) explained that the U.S. often illustrates a responsibility to help other nations and defend them "against oppression, tyranny, and evil" (p. 41).

Zagacki (2007) came to similar conclusions about American identity through his study of the international discourse of former President George W. Bush. Specifically, he analyzed Bush's construction of the identity of the Iraqi people altered American national identity. He concluded that through rhetorical use of "prophetic dualism," Bush defined the U.S. as a world force that is the source of all that is good whereas its enemies are the source of all that is evil (Zagacki, 2007, p. 272). In this way, America is constructed as morally and spiritually better than other nations with a special international obligation to spread "good." Specifically, the U.S. must spread democracy and freedom to other nations whose only responsibility is to receive these ideals. Often, this means that the U.S. is more concerned with spreading its idea of what is good than it is with concerning itself with the unique cultural traditions and needs of other nations.

Each of the aforementioned U.S. identity themes (exceptionalism, "the myth of the frontier," imperialism, "God's chosen nation," prophetic dualism, and "helping the oppressed") is created and altered through national discourse that is communicated internationally. As U.S. government leaders enact policy abroad, the rhetorical choices that they make profoundly influence not only how American citizens view themselves as a nation, but also how other nations view and interact with the U.S. As Johnston (2005) and Zietsma (2008) illustrated, this process occurs in a dramatic way wherein the U.S. is really a performer that enacts its national identity on a world stage. Thus, a researcher who studies how national identity is discursively created can generate insightful conclusions through an analysis of the dramatic nature of this process.

Methodology: A Dramatic Identity Enacted

As illustrated through a description of American identity themes presented in international discourse, national identity is constructed both rhetorically and dramatically. Booth (1961) stated that the construction of an implied author in rhetoric adds a dramatic element to its study because the identity of the implied author is different than the identity of the true narrator or presenter of discourse. In other words, dramatic dimensions arise because of the inevitable distinctions between the identity of the implied author of a rhetorical act and the true identity of each individual narrator. Therefore, when the U.S. engages in foreign policy through discourse and strategic action, it is enacting a particular role as part of a drama that is unfolding for global audiences. For this reason, the identity-forming discourse of American national leaders invites an analysis from a dramatistic perspective of rhetoric.

Burke (1966, 1969, 1972) presented an important theoretical perspective on drama as a valuable method for understanding social interaction. Burke built on Meade's (1934) idea that the self is created through interaction with others and is not inherent or inborn. As individuals become aware of themselves as independent beings, they also become aware of the perception that others develop about them based on their actions. As a result, this awareness affects the identity that is created by that individual. Similarly, Burke's (1966, 1969, 1972) idea of identification acknowledged the important role of the other in creating meaning. He believed that persuasion occurs as speakers draw upon the common ground between themselves and their audiences (e.g., shared values and beliefs). Like Black's "second persona" and Charland's constituted audience, for Burke, the creation of identity is a rhetorical process that occurs in conjunction with the recipients of discursive message. Additionally, it is a dramatic process in that it induces that other to "act symbolically" in sympathy with its motives (Burke, 1972, p. 449).

Burke's (1972) approach to social interaction defined life as drama. Using his definition, humans are actors who engage in "symbolic action" instead of simple "motion," which means that their behavior is motivated by their own needs and desires and is not merely a reaction to external stimuli. As such, since language is often employed as an intentional form of action, it is to a certain degree dramatic. This perspective on dramatic action leads to several different approaches to analyzing a text. One of these approaches focuses on analyzing the dramatic motives embedded within discrete instances of human discourse. This type of study includes an analysis of the dramatic pentad, which consists of five terms that a rhetor uses to reflect their version of reality in a dramatic way. These elements include "act" (the deed that took place),

"agent" (the person or people who performed), "agency" (the means they used to do so), "scene" (the context or situation in which it occurred), and "purpose." Analyzing these terms as they relate to one another reveals much about the persuasive potential of rhetorical discourse.

In addition to the body of research that is based on Burke's ideas (1972) on the dramatic pentad, his work also led to other approaches to the study of drama and discourse. Burke believed that discursive texts are not the only sites of dramatic action and that scholars can also analyze the broader social processes in which these texts are imbedded in order to better understand how identity-forming myths are enacted to preserve social unity and order. Turner (1979, 1980) expressed similar views about the dramatic nature of social processes claiming that they "occur within groups of persons who share values and interests and who have a real or alleged common history" and that "the main actors are persons for whom the group has high value or priority," (Turner, 1980, p. 149). As an anthropologist who studied the dramatic processes played out by small village societies and complex nations alike, Turner saw social processes as occurring in dramatic stages. He stated that these stages involve scripts that reflect values, beliefs, and unique interpretations of the world. These values are reflective of larger group identities.

Building upon the work of Burke (1969) and Turner (1980), Stone (1992) examined one 20th century American controversy as a dramatic social process complete with actors, audiences, performances, and scripts. Extending Turner's findings to the analysis of a twentieth century religious controversy, he argued that in social conflicts, those involved are actors who play out scripts that reflect their beliefs and values. As actors interact with others (including their audiences), together they fashion narratives that "reconstruct histories" and ultimately create

meaning (Stone, 1992, p. 4). Stone concluded that the specific social actors he analyzed went through dramatic stages which resulted in an overall shift in religious beliefs and values as well as the attitudes that this group had towards its relationships with outside groups. For Stone (1992), a dramaturgical perspective on social processes allowed him to be able to "interpret the evolution of ... messages" as they advanced "from act to act" (p. 113). Thus, Stone could analyze not only how social dramas affect the messages that are sent by its actors but also how these messages affect broader dramatic processes at play. For Stone (1992), throughout each stage of a social drama, social actors often play out "a rhetorical and symbolic realignment" in their "struggle to persuade" that can have a real effect on identity (p. 113).

One strand of research that utilizes Burkean theory highlights the dramatic nature of political discourse. Burke (1969) himself viewed political rhetoric as particularly important site of drama, claiming that it is often used to "sharpen up the pointless and blunt the too sharply pointed" (p. 393). In other words, political leaders can build upon national and cultural myths in order to gain support for their actions. Edelman (1971, 1988) agreed with Burke's claim, stating that political leaders utilize dramaturgic methods through their words and actions. He wrote, "The term 'leader' evokes an ideal type which high public officials try to construct themselves to fit in. In this sense, leadership is dramaturgy" (Edelman, 1988, p. 40). As political leader plays the role of innovator, savior, or victim, he or she contributes to the dramatic nature of political discourse. Therefore, a dramatic analysis of the symbolic discourse enacted by political leaders is a particularly appropriate method for criticism.

One way to analyze the dramatic nature of political and national discourse is through an examination of the processes of guilt and redemption that are embedded in discourse. Burke

(1970) claimed that because society is comprised of ordered systems that rank people into classes, people compete for perfection and strive to meet standards that they can never reach. Accordingly, the orderly nature of social systems "leads to guilt (for who can keep commandments!)" which creates a need for "redemption (for who would not be cleansed!)" which needs a "redeemer (which is to say, a Victim!)" (Burke, 1970, pp. 4-5). This connection between order, guilt, and victimage is a type of collective drama which can be analyzed to better understand how social processes work. Oldenburg (2007) analyzed the process of guilt and redemption embedded within one anti-Vietnam War resistance movement as a drama in which the actors resolved to self-mortification, which is a type of self-blame or sacrifice, in order to absolve themselves of the guilt caused by war. In this way, these actors demonstrated a privileging of peace over the desire for profit or property. A similar example from Lacy (2009) examined the presidential campaign rhetoric of Barack Obama as a redemption drama. Lacy argued that Obama's campaign defined him as the favorable choice for presidency because his election would serve to purge Americans from the guilt that is tied to a history of racism, the Iraq war, as well as to the neoliberalism attached to Clinton's administration. Thus, Obama's rhetoric was dramatic in that he portrayed his potential presidency as the solution to a history of guilt-laden dramatic conflict.

Scholars who analyze the dramatic nature of social processes have also extended it to the study of identity formation (Carlsen, 2007; Crable, 2006; Goffman, 1959). Goffman (1959) presented a dramaturgical perspective on personal identity formation claiming that it occurs as an individual takes the role of an "actor" who enacts a "part" or identity. The part that this actor plays is greatly influenced by the actor's recognition and understanding of his or her audience.

Crable (2006) extended Goffman's (1959) and Burke's research (1966, 1969, 1972) presenting a dramaturgical definition of identity rhetoric. Crable (2006) defined identity rhetoric as "discourse aimed at gaining another's cooperation in the creation or defense of the rhetor's desired identity" and wrote that it results from rhetorical performances as they are directed to an audience. Carlsen (2007) also emphasized the dramatic nature of identity creation claiming that there are specific drama types that people enact in order to organize experience. Carlsen (2007) concluded, "Identity production is far from being only stability-oriented ... rather [it] is charged with dramatic intensity, amplified by its inherent other-focus, and oriented towards the stories of what could be" (p. 73). Thus, identity creation is dramatic and an analysis of its dramatic elements will produce particularly revealing findings.

In my ensuing analysis, I examine how American identity is enacted by the U.S. government through its response to the 2010 earthquake in Chile. Specifically, I undertake a close analysis of four transcripts, two press releases, and two U.S. Government reports. The transcripts that I analyzed are former President Obama's public remarks on the earthquake made from the White House on February 27, 2010, former Secretary of State Clinton's Public remarks from the same day, the public conversation between Clinton and Chilean President Michelle Bachelet from March 2, 2010, and the public conversation that took place between Clinton and the Chilean president-elect Sebastian Piñera. The press releases that I analyze the phone call that took place between Obama and Bachelet on February 27, 2010 and the phone call that took place between Clinton and Bachelet on the same day. The reports I examine are an analysis prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) that summarizes the effects of the quake and explain what Chile, the U.S., and other nations did to provide relief for Chile, as well as a U.S.

Geological Survey (USGS) Open-File Report created in partnership with the American Red Cross which documents the analysis of 20 earthquake experts sent to Chile in July, 2010. I chose these documents because they contain official and public rhetorical interactions between the Chilean nation and U.S. national leaders. Although there are other sources from within the United States that responded to this earthquake, the rhetoric of official government leaders is a particularly important site for the enactment of national identity themes (Zietsma, 2008).

In order to understand how a unique national identity is maintained and formed through a specific international event, I reconstruct and analyze the drama that was embedded as the U.S. gave to Chile in its hour of need. This involves close analyses of the texts and transcripts from the event in order to better understand how the textual and stylistic choices made by the U.S. government comprised an identity for both the U.S. and its relationship with Chile. Using aforementioned theory on U.S. identity themes to inform my analysis, I undertake a close reading of each transcript, looking for dramatic elements that do more than simply convey sympathy or information about physical assistance that would be provided. I then look for and discovered patterns among these elements that taken together enacted dramatic roles for the U.S. and Chile with unique character traits. These patterns inform my conclusions about the hierarchical relationships that were enacted between the two roles.

For example, in her meeting with President Bachelet, Clinton claimed that while other external aid sent to Chile might not continue "for the long term" the U.S. would "be there to be of help when others leave because we are committed to this partnership and friendship with Chile" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 27). This remark not only affirmed a commitment to assist Chile in its time of need but also communicated that that

assistance was unlike the assistance that would be offered by other nations. Consistent with this isolated remark, a close reading of the complete conversation between Clinton and President Bachelet illustrates how U.S. national discourse framed its actions in such a way that it upholds an identity of "exceptionalism" or helping in a way that no other nation could. This "exceptional" identity trait enacted throughout these interactions worked to present a hierarchy between the U.S. and Chile as the U.S. exceptional methods for disaster response were compared to less successful methods of the Chilean government itself.

As demonstrated in this example, I examine the actions of the U.S. officials themselves as one symbolic gesture that created a broad social drama. This dramatic gesture essentially occurred in three phases or acts. The first act is comprised of public statements made by U.S. officials on the day of the quake in which the U.S. set the stage of the drama and enacted the role of a superior hero to a devastated Chile. The second act includes former Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Chile on March 2, 2010, in which she met with Chilean officials, promised aid and support, and very publicly gave the president of Chile satellite phones that she had brought with her. This action continued the hierarchical role of the two characters – with the U.S. performing the role of teacher and evaluator to Chile as a "moral" act, given Chile shared the democratic ideals of the U.S. The third act includes documentation and assessment of Chile's response to the quake as well as the aid sent by the U.S. and other nations – reports that may, upon an initial reading, appear objective but ultimately esteem the United States' culture of disaster response as superior to Chile's. Viewing this international social event as a three-act drama allows me to examine national identity themes that are engrained in government discourse and represented internationally.

Analysis Outline

My thesis analyzes a specific international act of the U.S. government as a dramatic social process that is embedded with national themes. Specifically, I analyze identity themes associated with the U.S. and Chile through press releases, public discourse, and reports. These themes include exceptionalism, hierarchy, moral obligation, and preparedness. In doing so, I examine the rhetoric of the U.S. not only as the messenger but also as a rhetorical performer involved in enacting a uniquely American ideological identity. As such, I reconstruct the overall U.S. response to the 2010 earthquake in Chile as a drama that occurs in three acts:

Act I: Performing

The first act includes the initial public remarks made by former President Obama and former Secretary of State Clinton on the day of the earthquake. Within these remarks, I discover consistent themes associated with the U.S., Chile, and the relationship between them. For the U.S., an identity of exceptional heroism was enacted as well as an unquestioned responsibility to assist internationally. For the U.S.-Chile relationship, a hierarchical relationship was enacted, with the U.S. playing the role of the superior figure and Chile playing the subordinate.

Act II: Responding

The second act includes the public conversations that Clinton had with President Bachelet and President-elect Piñera in her visit to Chile a few days after the earthquake. A close look at these messages reveal identity themes of proactivity, moral obligation, exceptionalism, and technological expertise for the U.S., and they also reveal a hierarchical relationship between the U.S. and Chile in which the U.S. enacted the role of teacher and evaluator towards its pupil (Chile).

Act III: Assessing

The third act includes two reports written by U.S. government bodies that document the effects of the quake and the international assistance provided as a result and assess the success of the Chilean government in responding to the earthquake. Through these reports, the U.S. enacted identity themes of preparedness, leadership, and authority. Furthermore, the U.S. highlighted cultural differences between the U.S. and Chile – the U.S. as a culture that esteems protocol and data and Chile a culture that esteems intuition.

This study illustrates how the words of U.S. leaders in various settings create a social drama that is embedded with identity themes that are then communicated in an international arena. As many scholars from several disciplines assert, identity is not fixed or inherent to the nature of a persona or collective group. Instead, it is a construction that is both presented and created through rhetoric. Nevertheless, as Stuckey (2005) claimed, "National identity, while rooted in fiction, has real consequences" (p. 654). Thus, though it is created through words, a constructed identity can have a real impact on the decisions and actions of a nation. Critically analyzing the enactment of this identity can help to explain how that identity may lead to such real and important global consequences.

CHAPTER 3

Act I: Performing

A few hours after the sun rose over an earthquake-stricken Chile, President Michelle Bachelet stood in front of cameras and declared that the "forces of nature" had hurt the nation "greatly," estimating that its impact had reached more than 2 million people (Santos, Byrnes, & Lane, 2010, para. 8). "We are now having to face adversity and stand again," she declared (Santos, Byrnes, & Lane, 2010, para. 8).

A few short hours later, in the midst of her efforts to repair a nation suffering from one of the worst disasters it had faced in decades, the same Bachelet found the time to accept a phone call from a leader thousands of miles away in a part of the world that was impacted by the earthquake, former President Obama. The fact that President Bachelet prioritized her time to accept a public phone call from the U.S. President communicates much about the relationship between the two nations. This earthquake was one of the worst that the nation had seen in more than 50 years (Barrionuevo & Robbins, 2010), yet Bachelet took the time to communicate with the U.S., only one of more than two dozen nations that eventually contributed to the Chilean relief efforts (Beittel & Margesson, 2010). A closer look at the rhetoric used by government officials throughout the day of the quake helps to explain how the U.S. had created a relationship with Chile that commanded such urgent attention.

In this chapter, I argue that the U.S. government's initial reactions to the February 2010 Chilean earthquake – Act I of its dramatic gesture of sympathy and support – did much more than offer assistance to a stricken Chile. In particular, I analyze Obama's televised statement from the White House Rose Garden addressing the quake's devastation, a press release sent from

former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's office offering condolences, and a press release sent from the U.S. government that briefly describes a telephone call between Obama and Bachelet – each taking place on February 27, the day of the earthquake. Through this analysis, I highlight three ways in which the rhetoric of the U.S. government perpetuated a hierarchical relationship with Chile and simultaneously contributed to the creation of a unique national identity for both nations. First, the rhetoric of U.S. officials contributed to the creation of a U.S. identity as an exceptionally strong nation with proactive, heroic abilities, while Chile, by contrast, played a reactive role. Second, the response of the U.S. to the earthquake in Chile reinforced a hierarchical relationship between the two nations; instead of addressing Chile as an equal, international partner of the U.S., the nation was treated as a less-abled group in need of both physical assistance and verbal recognition. And third, Clinton and Obama perpetuated the idea that the U.S. had an unquestioned obligation to involve itself in the tragedies of other nations.

Overview of Act I

The first act of this drama is comprised of the public reactions of U.S. officials on the day of the quake. First, on February 27, 2010, at 1:28 pm, Obama held a televised news conference from the White House Rose Garden (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). In this short address, he briefly described the situation in Chile, expressed condolences for the losses caused by the quake, and articulated a desire to help Chile should they need international assistance. Obama stated:

> Earlier today, a devastating earthquake struck the nation of Chile, affecting millions of people. This catastrophic event was followed by multiple aftershocks, and has prompted tsunami warnings across the Pacific Ocean. Earlier today, I was briefed by my national

> security team on the steps that we're taking to protect our own people, and to stand with our Chilean friends ... On behalf of the American people, Michelle and I send our deepest condolences to the Chilean people. The United States stands ready to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts, and we have resources that are positioned to deploy should the Chilean government ask for help. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 1-2)

Obama then stated that he had already been in contact with President Bachelet, and had informed her that the U.S. was willing to assist should Chile require help. He continued with a warning for the people of Hawaii, American Samoa, and Guam of a possible tsunami in those regions, and he urged the people along the American West Coast to prepare for dangerous conditions stating that the most important thing they could do to stay safe would be to closely follow the counsel of their state and local government leaders. He ended his remarks by commenting on the devastating impact of natural disasters, reminding his audience, "We can't control nature, but we can and must be prepared for disaster when it strikes," (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 5). He concluded by reaffirming that the U.S. would help Chile in any way possible through their recovery process.

The second part of this act of the drama also occurred on the day of the quake. Clinton sent out a message from the Office of the Spokesman stating that the U.S. government was closely monitoring areas around the world that were and might be affected by the earthquake and that her thoughts and prayers were with those who had suffered its effects (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010). She claimed that the U.S. was ready to provide assistance to Chile in the weeks to come and that it was already "coordinating closely

with senior Chilean officials on the content and timing of such support" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 2). She recognized the efforts of U.S. embassy officials in Santiago to ensure that Americans were safe, and she mentioned an upcoming trip to South America, stating that she would be in contact with the Chilean government about the details of the trip. She concluded her remarks with a unifying statement, "Our Hemisphere comes together in times of crisis, and we will stand side by side with the people of Chile in this emergency" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 3).

In the final gesture of support that makes up Act I, similar to the previous two messages, Obama called Bachelet directly to pledge U.S. assistance, should it be solicited by Chile. This private phone call was then made public in a short press release sent out that day that stated:

> This afternoon, President Obama spoke with President Michelle Bachelet to express his condolences for the losses Chile suffered as a result of this morning's tragic earthquake. The President commended President Bachelet for the Chilean government's response to the disaster and recognized Chile's capacity and expertise in responding to earthquakes. He reiterated that the United States stands ready to assist the Chilean government's rescue and recovery efforts. President Bachelet thanked President Obama for his call, and said that she would be in touch should Chile require any support. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs, 2010a, para. 1)

Again, this last interaction is particularly significant not only because it afforded the U.S. the opportunity to express support to Chile at a critical moment but also because it took place at all. The President of Chile prioritized her time in order to communicate with the U.S. President on

what was arguably the most important day of her presidency up to that point. The subsequent analysis sheds some light on how such dramatic roles were enacted through the rhetoric of both characters.

Parallel Partners?

A surface reading of these three initial messages might indicate that the language of Act I positions the U.S. and Chile as mutually supportive nations, equally capable of working together to help repair the devastating conditions of Chile. For example, in his public statement made on the day of the quake, President Obama stated that Chile was "a close friend and a partner of the United States" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 2). As "partners" with one another, it was conveyed that neither nation led the other and that neither was deemed more important or stronger. Later, Obama claimed that the U.S. would "stand *with* the people of Chile as they recover from this terrible tragedy," (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 5, emphasis added). Again, neither nation was superior to the other as they work *together* to meet national and global goals. Similarly, in her public statement, Clinton stated, "we will stand *side by side* with the people of Chile in this emergency" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 3, emphasis added). On a surface level, this statement also articulated a lateral relationship between the U.S. and Chile in which both nations support each other in a mutually beneficial way as well as a type of international relationship in which neither nation regularly depended on the other for assistance or help. Instead, the nations were equally important, equally strong, and equally abled actors on a world stage.

Interestingly, while words like "partner," "with," and "side by side" denote an interaction between two equal, mutually benefiting nations, a closer look at the three parts of Act I reveals that the U.S. government instead enacted a hierarchical relationship with Chile and that the Chilean response reinforced this hierarchy. In the following analysis, I discuss how the messages of U.S. leaders communicated that the U.S. possessed an exceptional ability to fix the problems that Chile was incapable of resolving, a hierarchical role between the two nations, and that the U.S. possessed an unquestioned responsibility to fix the problems of other nations.

A Nation with Exceptional Heroic Abilities

Campbell (1998) asserted that U.S. leaders consistently use discourse that reflects identity themes of authority and superiority in order to maintain the legitimacy of its historically strong persona. A close analysis of the three artifacts that constitute Act I of the Chilean earthquake drama is consistent with this claim insofar as the U.S. enacted an identity as a strong, active actor with heroic capabilities unparalleled by any other nation. Furthermore, these U.S. leaders' global messages of support not only highlighted and perpetuated the heroic qualities of their own group identity but also painted Chile's persona as a feeble nation that could not solve its problems alone in the wake of disaster. As Campbell claimed, the rhetorical creation of a national identity often also results in the creation of an "other" or a "foreigner" that is described as making different decisions than the self's group identity and therefore is described as having a contrasted group identity.

Both Obama and Clinton described a desire to assist Chile as well as an unparalleled ability to do so. Obama stated, "The United States stands ready to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts and we have resources that are positioned to deploy should the Chilean

government ask for help" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 2). Obama's offer of assistance and resources was the first gesture of heroism by the U.S. in this drama, making it known that the U.S. was capable of helping to repair another nation after a major catastrophe. In order to effectively act out the heroic persona, U.S. leaders first "set the stage" by subtly positioning the U.S. in a powerful role that contrasted with a weaker Chile. A closer look at the language of Obama and Clinton reveals how this aspect of the U.S. persona was perpetuated.

The exceptional heroism of the U.S. was developed in part through the choice of words that the two U.S. officials used to surround the state of the U.S. and the state of Chile. First, in his address, Obama spent a significant amount of time describing Chile's situation after the earthquake occurred. While he used words of sympathy and support, he also used words like "lost," "damage," "awful devastation," and "terrible tragedy," depicting Chile's state as exceptionally needy and ultimately describing the stricken country as possessing a limited ability to fully restore itself on its own (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). Bostdorff (1994) asserted that when foreign disasters are described by international leaders, they are constructed as "crises" through the language used to describe them. This word choice creates a sense of exigency to which nations like the U.S. should respond. Thus, Obama's repetitive use of the word "fall" in its various forms also communicates to his audiences that the quake is severe and requires U.S. attention and action. Indeed, the description created a critical need for a more capable actor – a hero– to come in and recover what was lost, repair what was damaged, and restore Chile to its original state, allowing the U.S. to play the role of international "fixer" in contrast to the devastated Chile.

According to Obama's words, the Chilean government responded to its awful situation in a commendable way ("the President ... recognized Chile's capacity and expertise in responding to the earthquakes..."); however, it also was not capable of solving all of the nation's needs at that time ("...he reiterated that the United States stands ready to assist the Chilean government's rescue and recovery effort") and was in need of an outside source for help (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs, 2010a, para. 1). Here, Obama briefly acknowledged that the Chilean government was "capable" but did nothing to describe Chile's capabilities, claiming that it was a nation still in dire need of help. Indeed, instead of using proactive action verbs to describe Chile's recovery efforts, the only verbs that were attached to the Chilean nation are "ask," "need," "recover," "suffered," "require," and "affected." These words did much to portray the desperate situation of Chile, but spoke little to the measures that country had taken to remedy its situation. Chile was not painted as an active agent with the ability to take real action when disaster strikes but as a suffering and incapable character that needed a more adept figure to step in and play the role of hero on its behalf.

In contrast to the distressed, inert Chilean nation, U.S. officials painted the U.S. as a strong, active agent with the ability to control the devastating situation abroad. The verbs used to describe the U.S. effort were "protect," "stand," "assist," "deploy," "provide," and "prepare." These verbs portrayed an actor that was capable of effecting real change as a response to a destructive situation. "Stand," the verb most frequently used to describe potential U.S. effort, contrasted with a fallen Chile. Between Obama and Clinton, "stand" was used six times in their brief remarks made on the day of the earthquake. This word use created the following dramatic setting: while much of Chile's infrastructure was damaged and many buildings had completely

collapsed, the U.S. stood in a strong position from which it could descend to help Chile rise once again. Furthermore, three times when Obama and Clinton used the word "stand," they specified that the U.S. stood "ready." For example, Clinton claimed, "The United States stands ready to provide necessary assistance to Chile" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 1). While it had no previous knowledge that an earthquake of such magnitude would strike Chile on that particular day, the U.S. was on its feet, fully prepared and ready to take action. Indeed, in his public remarks, Obama stated, "We can't control nature, but we can and must be prepared for disaster when it strikes" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 4). The forces of nature could not be controlled or manipulated, yet their consequences could be overcome by the concentrated efforts of the standing and ready U.S.

In a similar way, Obama and Clinton crafted different rhetorical roles for the U.S. officials living in Chile versus the Chilean citizens themselves, though both groups suffered its effects. Although they had also been affected by the "awful devastation" of the earthquake, U.S. officials living in Chile wasted no time in actively protecting U.S. citizens. Clinton stated, "Our embassy in Santiago has established a command center and is working to ensure the safety of any affected American citizens" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para.1). Thus, in the few hours between the time that the earthquake hit Chile and the time that Clinton made her public statement, U.S. officials in Chile were already "ensuring" that that their citizens were safe. Consistent with the strong and active identity of the U.S., U.S. ambassadors and their staff worked from their own command center, a place from which U.S. officials sent out orders to guarantee that their own citizens were taken care of. Accordingly, the identity of the U.S. was further crafted as an exceptionally strong, active international actor that

was always ready to overcome nature's destructive forces, "commanded" in order to protect its citizens, and provided for other fallen nations that are unable to do so on their own.

Whereas the earthquake left Chile asking, needing, suffering, and requiring, the U.S. was standing, working, ensuring, and commanding to provide what Chile required to restore the damaged country from the effects of the unforeseen forces of nature. In this way, U.S. officials crafted the U.S. as strong, powerful, and capable of taming nature whereas Chile was painted as a passive entity that was left wanting.

Through the rhetorical development of a strong, active U.S. identity as well as a devastated, powerless Chile, U.S. leaders crafted a drama in which their nation played the role of hero-protagonist amidst the backdrop of an international disaster. Furthermore, by rhetorically stripping Chile of the ability to serve as an independent agent of repair, they encouraged a dependence on the hero of the drama in this and similar devastating situations. In Act I, a tragedy was presented, and through the rhetoric of U.S. leaders, the victim and the hero emerged, with the latter possessing an unrestricted ability to stand ready and to solve the problems of others, even without forewarning. Because the tellers of the tale are also the heroes, the U.S. was framed as noble and courageous, communicating that similar interaction in the future would be possible, permitted, natural, and even necessary. Later, I will take a closer look at how publicly, the recipients of the assistance (i.e., Chile) did not permit, let alone solicit, any physical aid. Instead, it was the hero itself that created the rules of the drama and then followed them. But first, I will examine how this drama creates hierarchical ties between the two countries.

A Hierarchical Relationship Reinforced

The rhetorical creation of a strong U.S. swooping in to solve the problems of a broken Chile worked not only to construct a strong U.S. persona and a weaker Chilean identity; it also constructed the U.S.-Chile relationship hierarchically. While perpetuating the U.S. attribute of exceptional heroism, the global messages of support relayed by U.S. leaders simultaneously placed the U.S. and Chile in a hierarchy of power and authority; the U.S. assumed a position of superiority to which a weaker Chile was subject. For example, Obama and Clinton's repetitive emphases on a willingness and ability to provide physical assistance allowed the U.S. to play the role of noble provider while Chile was relegated to the position of dependent beneficiary: "The United States stands ready to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts, and we have resources that are positioned to deploy should the Chilean government ask for help" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 2).

Abercrombie and Hill (1976) identified the type of hierarchical relationship represented in this interaction as paternal and explained, "Paternalism pre-supposes unequal access to resources, which reflects differences in the power of the various parties. The paternalist provides resources which subordinates would be unable to find on their own, which is the basis of their dependence" (p. 418). Black (2007) analyzed the U.S. government specifically, finding that it has historically had a pattern of rhetorically creating patriarchal relationships since the 1800s. Since becoming its own colonial power, the United States has created relationships in which it imitates the "family relationship by claiming superior identities and endeavoring to control the needs of its ... 'children'" (Black, 2007, p. 188). These needs, he continued, were based on the principle of dependence; the U.S. as a superior party supplies lacking resources to a needy subordinate. This U.S.-Chile interaction communicates the same principle of dependence, and by

extension, a paternalistic hierarchy. Abercrombie and Hill (1976) also wrote that a paternal relationship is developed when "someone of superior power and influence serves to protect [the subordinate] against the insecurity of an environment which is potentially hostile" (p. 420). The insecurity and hostility resulting from the devastating earthquake of 2010 provided the perfect environment in which the U.S. could serve as protector and parent.

The U.S. leaders' insistence on extending help in this paternal way also defined Chile; if Chile relied on the U.S. for its strength and resources, it would communicate a dependence on the U.S. and relegate Chile to a lesser position in their hierarchical interactions. Black (2007) wrote that paternalism is perpetuated for the U.S. when government leaders provide for the needs of a subordinate without allowing them responsibility, and Van Den Berghe (1985) described the subordinate as incapable, dependent, and even "helpless" (p. 262). When U.S. leaders publically announced deploying their resources, assisting in rescue and recovery efforts, and planning "content and timing" of support (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 2), Chile was painted as a stricken subordinate and recipient of protection after a moment of environmental hostility. Indeed, U.S. "provide-and-protect" messages shaped Chile's identity by rhetorically stripping its leaders of authority over its own recovery.

Goodell et al. (1985) wrote about this type of interaction, claiming that paternalistic messages prevent subordinates from developing an autonomous, independent identity. Their definition of paternalism, "interference with others' *autonomy* justified by reasons referring exclusively to their welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values," focuses on the power that is decreased in the subordinate when public intervention masquerades as altruism (p. 247, emphasis added). When a paternal figure interferes with the leadership of another group, that

group and it leaders are unable to fully implement their will or exercise real power. Goodell et al. (1985) suggested that such paternal "'help' engenders dependence, loss of initiative, and loss of political autonomy" (p. 257). Through the messages of U.S. leaders, Chile was depicted as being directed by the U.S. and driven by the will of U.S. leaders. Clinton stated, "We are closely monitoring reports from Chile ... The United States ... is coordinating closely with senior Chilean officials on the content and timing of such support" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 2); Chilean leaders did not initiate assistance from the U.S. but were expected to accept the messages of the U.S. and the subsequent public actions that they engendered. In these instances, the rhetoric of the U.S. shifted the role of the Chilean leaders "from that of organizing group initiatives to that of funneling downward benefits and directives" (Goodell et al., 1985, p. 251). According to the U.S. description of the Obama-Bachelet phone call from the day of the earthquake, active Chilean organization and repair was not discussed. Instead, Bachelet was portrayed as passively carrying out the will of the U.S. As a result, Chile was given decreased responsibility, choice, authority, and voice, and rendered weak and childlike by the sheltering paternal presence of the U.S.[1] This role was extended even more clearly throughout Act II of their interactions.

In paternal relationships, the identity of the more powerful figure is also developed through rhetorical interactions (Black, 2007). One feature specific to paternalistic rhetoric of the U.S. is played out when the government plays a "supervisory role" (Black, 2007, p. 186). As the paternal figure, the U.S. watches and evaluates the actions of a subordinate group and either criticizes its behavior or praises it, conveying a sense of "benevolence" (Goodell at al., 1985, p.

[1] This was not the first time that U.S. leaders relegated Chile to this role; According to Hersh (1983), decades before, Nixon also viewed Chile as a "child" in danger.

247). In fact, Black (2007) claimed that U.S. "intrusion" into the affairs of other nations is often carried out in the name of benevolence as U.S. leaders publicly address the welfare of needy, subordinate groups (p. 189). In this specific U.S.-Chile interaction, the U.S. employed benevolent rhetoric through an external showing of goodwill and several praising remarks. Simultaneously, this rhetoric served to keep each of the actors in their roles of "parent" and "child." For example, in his phone call to the Chilean president, Obama "commended President Bachelet for the Chilean government's response to the disaster and recognized Chile's capacity and expertise in responding to earthquakes" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs, 2010a, para. 1). This statement both praised Chile for its efforts and placed the U.S. in the role of an authoritative supervisor and surveyor speaking to a nation needing approval; when a group acknowledges or commends another, it communicates its own superiority as it must be capable of assessing what it means to be commendable. It must have its own history of expert experiences that qualify it to judge others according to a created set of standards, thus placing it in a heightened position of authority. In this situation, Chile did not ask the U.S. government for a public assessment of its actions nor did the U.S. have any official obligation to share its valuation. However, U.S. leadership spoke as if it were a natural responsibility to indicate that Chilean leaders were behaving in an appropriate, praiseworthy manner, perpetuating for itself the identity of global expert and evaluator.

As they praised Chilean leaders for their initial attempts to repair their situation, the U.S. leaders spoke almost as if they were proud parents recognizing the accomplishments of a child in the process of gaining independence. Goodell at al. (1985) indicated that parental tutelage such as this is indicative of paternal relationships – the superior figure's rhetoric often includes

"appraisal of [the subordinate's] maturity and ability to help himself" (p. 252). Still, by including with these praising remarks descriptions of their own proactive U.S. assistance – "the United States ... is coordinating closely with senior Chilean officials on the content and timing of ... support"– the U.S. also recognized that Chile was unable to fix all of its problems alone (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 2). Like parents taking precautions in spite of the well-intended efforts their children, U.S. leaders took measures to assist the damaged Chile as it set out to rebuild. In this way, the U.S. rhetorically enacted its dramatic role as a paternal figure with the authority to survey, give praise, and then provide needed assistance where the "child" figure was lacking. Chile, conversely, was treated as the growing, learning child figure that did a commendable job on its own, but had to rely on a more able agent to restore it back to its original state.

Abercrombie and Hill (1976) wrote that when paternalistic language is employed, it often regulates the future behavior of those involved, systematically widening the gap between the superior and inferior parties, unbeknownst to the parties involved and to witnesses of such interactions. Sevitch (1971) wrote that paternalism is "a *system* under which an authority treats those under its control in a fatherly way esp. in *regulating* their conduct and supplying their needs," (p. 15, emphases added). According to these scholars, the paternal rhetor's words have lasting consequences for future interactions with subordinates by creating norms of behavior, standards, and obligations that go unquestioned by external audiences. A deeper look at the language employed by U.S. leaders on the day of the earthquake exposes this specific interaction as an acute example of the U.S. playing out an unquestioned hierarchical role, regulating its identity in the process.

An Unquestioned Responsibility

According to scholars, paternal rhetoric shapes both superiors and their subordinates by systematizing the hierarchical relationship so that it becomes unquestioned and even automatic in future similar interactions (Abercrombie & Hill, 1976; Sevitch, 1971). Abercrombie and Hill (1976) wrote that paternalist rhetoric "can flourish without face-to-face interaction between an owner and employees" and then "it becomes part of the organizational rule system and the normative structure of management" (p. 414).

In this paternalistic interaction, the content and timing of the messages of heroism sent by U.S. leaders reflected a preexisting structure for the U.S.-Chile relationship and conveyed a commanding sense of automation for future interactions; U.S. leaders communicated that they operated from an unquestioned obligation to assist those affected by tragedy. They conveyed that assisting Chile was a natural duty and that Chile need not *ask* for help from the U.S. in order to receive it. In his public remarks, Obama first indicated that U.S. aid for Chile was contingent upon Chile's communicated need for assistance. He stated, "The United States stands ready to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts ... *should* the Chilean government ask for our help" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 2, emphasis added). Similarly, the press release outlining Obama and Bachelet's phone call stated that President Bachelet "would be in touch *should* Chile require any support" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs, 2010a, para. 1, emphasis added). With the use of the word "should," both of these statements communicated that the Chilean government had not yet asked for any direct assistance from the U.S. on the day of the earthquake and that the U.S. was only to provide assistance if and when Chilean leaders asked for it. Nevertheless, both Obama and Clinton

claimed that they were already "ready" to aid Chile and that they had their resources positioned to be sent out at any moment. This ready-to-deploy language indicated that the U.S. expected Chile to need external assistance and that the Chilean government would seek that assistance from the United States.

In her public statement made on the day of the earthquake, Clinton not only declared that the U.S. was "ready to provide any necessary assistance," but also that it was already "coordinating closely with senior Chilean officials on the content and timing of such support" (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, 2010, para. 2). By stating that the U.S. government was communicating with Chilean officials about the *details* of lending support and not about whether Chile first desired or needed help communicated one of two things: one, U.S. aid to Chile was automatic and part of pre-established system so a request was not necessary; or two, help had already been requested, perhaps in a private communication between U.S. and Chilean leaders. Interestingly however, Bachelet notoriously refused to ask for assistance from international sources during the first few days after the quake happened (Long, 2010). In fact, it was not until March 1, two days after the earthquake and Clinton's comments, did Bachelet officially accept international support (Long, 2010).

U.S. public efforts to provide assistance to Chile before the country publicly asked for it perpetuated the idea that the U.S. operates from an unquestioned duty to heroically "fix" the problems of other nations when they find themselves in difficult situations. Thus, as the U.S. acted without being asked, the hero in the drama assumed power through the rhetorical transaction and exercised a type of international authority as it began to organize a relief effort preemptively – consistent with Eliassen Restad's (2015) definition of American exceptionalism:

"The United States does not play by any other rules than its own, and will certainly not be seen as being led by others" (p. 3).

Consistent with what scholars have claimed is a traditionally U.S. transmission-style of communicating (i.e., telling its story without regard to any response), the U.S. did not communicate any effort to listen to Chile at this time (Zaharna, 2010). Furthermore, neither Obama nor Clinton found it necessary to provide reasoning as to why they would make such grand gestures of uninvited physical assistance in the days to follow. Instead, it was taken for granted that Chile was in need of help and that the U.S. was a nation that should fulfill this need. Preemptive assistance efforts communicated that U.S. government leaders felt that they knew Chile enough to know what they would want or need in the future – just as any parent knows his or her child – or that they knew better than the Chilean government itself and would provide help regardless of what Chile might say. Indeed, Van Den Berghe (1985) compared the paternalistic gestures of charity with "mimick[ed] genuine concern of the parent for a child'' (p. 262). In this way, the parent figure capitalizes on moments of unrest for a subordinate in order to serve its own self interests. Externally, such actions are recognized as a selfless attempt to help.

These preemptive assistance efforts also communicated failure to listen on the part of the U.S. In this drama, as the protagonist-hero, the U.S. communicated messages without exhibiting any indication of listening to the group in distress. Even the press release which summarizes a telephone *conversation* between the U.S. and Chilean Presidents (the only official U.S. government record of a two-way interaction between the two nations on the day of the disaster) failed to indicate any listening on behalf of the U.S.:

> This afternoon, President Obama spoke with President Michelle Bachelet to express his condolences for the losses Chile suffered as a result of this morning's tragic earthquake. The President commended President Bachelet for the Chilean government's response to the disaster and recognized Chile's capacity and expertise in responding to earthquakes. He reiterated that the United States stands ready to assist the Chilean government's rescue and recovery efforts. President Bachelet thanked President Obama for his call, and said that she would be in touch should Chile require any support. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010, para. 2)

In three lines and 66 words, this summary indicated that Obama "expressed condolences," "commended," and "recognized" Chile, and affirmed the U.S. as a strong source of assistance. In only one additional line (21 words), Bachelet's messages were conveyed wherein she thanked Obama and promised to reach out if needed. Nowhere in this summary of the conversation were the sentiments of Bachelet described – her disastrous situation, her needs, nor her desires from the U.S. Regardless of whether or not such remarks were actually made, this press release communicated that Obama's words were more important than Bachelet's and that the U.S. did not need to hear the voice of Chile to find out – directly from the source – what the nation needed most to address its critical issues. Instead, this lack of listening indicated to the global public that the U.S. international agenda was more important than the subservient Chilean voice. Rhetorically, this communicated that the U.S. was the ultimate authority on global problems. It did not work with others to determine what their needs are; rather, U.S. leaders were expert and/or experienced enough just to know. Ultimately, this gesture of support communicated a real lack of empathy. While the U.S. expressed condolences, it did not exhibit

any effort to come to a real understanding of what the disaster-stricken Chile needed. Such interactions reflected an automated power and authority in U.S. international relations.

Conclusion: Setting the Stage for Further Assistance in Acts II and III

Bruner (2002) wrote that the U.S. has historically enacted a "declared need to protect ... oppressed people" or those found in crises (p. 5), and Hixson (2008) cited a uniquely American need to help and protect those who are found particularly vulnerable. Toward Chile specifically, U.S. leaders have provided physical assistance on several occasions in its history (Cottam, 1994). The statements of support of Chile that make up the first act of the United States' dramatic response to the 2010 Chilean earthquake were not particularly unique or uncharacteristic of U.S. leaders; they went largely unquestioned and were even supported by the general public. However, what is not generally recognized is the deeper rhetorical significance of such messages. Through their interactions with Chile on the day of the earthquake, the U.S. perpetuated an exceptionally strong and forceful persona for itself on an international stage that contrasted starkly from weakened foreign nations; maintained a hierarchical – even a paternal – relationship with Chile; and illustrated an unchallenged obligation for itself to heroically assist other nations, stripping Chile of agency and rhetorically creating a system that regulates future interactions. These rhetorical constructs were created through the dramatic choice of words used to describe the state of both the U.S. and Chile as President Obama assessed and praised Bachelet for her recovery effort and as the U.S. took steps to assist Chile before the nation could publicly ask for help.

In these public interactions, no public expression of permission or desire invited U.S. involvement in Chile's national affair. Instead, through their messages, U.S. leaders prompted

audiences to accept their interference in the repair of the disaster without question, simultaneously communicating their superiority to the international public. Because their interaction was publically uninvited and unquestioned, U.S. leaders exhibited a type of preemptive agency that was superior to that of Chile, its named "partner" and counterpart, and positioned the U.S. as an unattainable model for other nations. Furthermore, as the surveyor of Chile's actions, the U.S. served as a paternal figure; however, "younger" groups might be unable to mimic the behavior of their exemplar. The rhetorical result is that the U.S. exhibited an heir of "magic" to its formulas – it possessed an agency and an authority that were unacknowledged and unexplained in word. Indeed, the U.S. communicated as if it knew that international audiences would accept the parental role of itself as the hero-protagonist and as if it already knew that Chile would be grateful that such help was extended. An analysis of the next act in this drama reveals a different approach to a hierarchical relationship between the two nations.

CHAPTER 4

Act II: Responding

Three days after the 8.8-magnitude 2010 earthquake struck Chile, Chilean citizens struggled to get their basic needs met. A Chilean army official from one of the hardest-hit cities reported that there was "an enormous need for basic ingredients to prepare meals" (Murphy, 2010, para. 13). In response, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet flew "hundreds of tons of food, water and other basics" to this and many other hard-hit cities (Murphy, 2010, para. 35). Paul Simons, the U.S. ambassador to Chile at the time of the earthquake, reported that the U.S. planned to supply the country with such basic items as temporary bridges, electrical generators, emergency shelters, and temporary kitchens. However, due to broken roads and bridges, Chilean leaders struggled to deliver those basic supplies to affected areas.

In the midst of these challenges, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in Chile to offer support in both private and televised meetings with Bachelet and then President-elect Sebastian Piñera. Despite the fact that the U.S. was planning to supply additional basic resources to Chile, Clinton's public meetings culminated in one symbolic gesture of support: the donation of 25 satellite phones to Bachelet. This very public gesture did not reflect the direst needs of the Chilean citizens who were in desperate need of food, shelter, water, and medical supplies in the wake of the earthquake. Indeed, 25 phones would not even scratch the surface of what was needed in terms of technological support. Instead, the gesture represented something different in terms of U.S. assistance in Chile.

What does it communicate when a representative of the U.S. government arrives on a plane and delivers satellite phones on an airport tarmac to a country in need in front of news

cameras? Furthermore, what is communicated when two of Chile's most important leaders found time to meet with the U.S. Secretary of State – both privately and publicly – three days after Chile's most devastating national disaster in decades? How has the U.S. created an identity that commands such attention? The ensuing analysis of the second act of this U.S.-Chile earthquake drama will shed light on the rhetorical significance of Clinton's philanthropic visit.

In the previous chapter, I explored how Act I of the earthquake "drama," the initial response of the U.S. on the day of the earthquake, set the scene for these interactions as U.S. leaders enacted the role of moral hero and acted as a paternal figure to a devastated Chile. In this chapter, we turn to Act II, which consists of two important meetings that took place on March 2, 2010, three days after the earthquake occurred, as part of Clinton's previously planned tour of South America: one with Bachelet and the other with Piñera. Throughout these visits, the U.S. made several public pledges to fill the gaps left by a devastated Chilean government in the wake of a major national disaster. In this chapter, I argue that as it did so, government officials enacted character traits to create a hierarchical relationship between the U.S. and Chile and a strong "moral" identity for the U.S. Throughout this act, much like the parent-child relationship illustrated in Act I, the U.S. propagated a teacher-student relationship between the two nations: Clinton took on the role of an all-knowing teacher and evaluator of disaster response and Chile's leaders were her pupils. Further, Clinton's rhetoric perpetuated the exceptionally strong U.S. identity, this time with unparalleled technological know-how. As she enacted these identity traits, Clinton's words also reflected a U.S. moral obligation to help nations that demonstrated democratic ideals.

Overview of Act II

The first part of Act II consisted of public remarks between Bachelet and Clinton and some follow-up questions from news reporters. This meeting took place at the Santiago airport on March 2, only three days after the earthquake occurred. It was televised and broadcast nationally and internationally, and it followed a private meeting between Bachelet and Clinton that was not broadcast to the public. The remarks of this public meeting opened with a statement from Bachelet in which she expressed gratitude for the international help that Chile had received in the days prior. Bachelet specifically expressed thankfulness for the U.S. government's extension of solidarity and support. Bachelet pointed out that the U.S. was already deeply involved in helping to organize the Chilean relief effort and had donated satellite phones for Chile's use in the earthquake relief effort. Additionally, she remarked that she and Clinton had discussed Chile's priorities and most urgent needs earlier, such as the need for food and water, medication, power generators, water purification units, and temporary hospital facilities. She expressed her desire to communicate with the people of her country in order to address their personal needs and stated that she and her government were attempting to "get to the remotest corners of the country and get there soon" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 6). Finally, she addressed Clinton directly, thanking her and former President Barack Obama for "the great support and friendship that they have given us and that the Chilean people" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 8).

Clinton responded to Bachelet's comments by acknowledging the destruction caused by the earthquake as well as Chile's "extraordinary efforts" to remedy its situation, then discussing U.S. efforts to aid the nation. She publicly gave Bachelet one of 25 satellite phones that she had brought with her, claimed that eight purification units were being sent from the U.S., and that

other aid requested by Bachelet (e.g., a field hospital unit, electrical generators, medical supplies, portable bridges) was "ready to go" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 11). She then discussed the desire of the U.S. to provide additional equipment that Chile had not specifically requested.

Following Clinton's remarks, the questioning portion of the public meeting began. One reporter asked about a more exact dollar amount needed by Chile as well as what specific things the U.S. could do to help out. Bachelet responded by stating that Chile would be receiving aid from many different countries and that since the communication lines throughout Chile were broken, it was too difficult for her to assess exactly how much it would cost to repair the damages. Nevertheless, Chilean officials had made estimates as to the monetary damages left by the quake (around $2 million) and the amount of homes that were damaged (500,000) and were sending experts to certain parts of the nation to officially evaluate the extent of the destruction. Simultaneously, the Chilean government was focused on the immediate needs of the people such as food, water, and public order and security. Bachelet stated, "Chile has the capacity, we have the engineers, we have the people, we have the experience, we have people trained and all that, but I think it will take long and it will mean a whole lot of money" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 23). Clinton also responded to the question stating that the U.S. government was willing to help Chile in any way they asked. She also commended Chile's government for its support of Haiti after Haiti experienced an earthquake earlier that year. She ended her comments by reiterating that as a friend of Chile, the U.S. was committed to supporting the nation in its time of need.

The second part of Act II is comprised of a public meeting between Clinton and Piñera, which also took place on March 2. This public meeting also followed a different, private meeting between Clinton and Piñera, and Clinton began the public portion of their reunion by describing that earlier meeting. She spoke specifically about the "very close bilateral relationship" between the two nations, about their plans to work together in the future, and about how the U.S. would support Chile in this specific time of need (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 2). She ended this comment by telling the President-elect that the U.S. stood as a support for him and looked forward to working more closely with him in the near future. Piñera thanked Clinton for her visit and pledges of assistance, stating that it would allow Chile to reconstruct itself "with a sense of unity and solidarity" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 6).

Following these remarks, Piñera spent time describing some of the goals and democratic values that the two nations shared, such as freedom, democracy, and a desire to protect human rights. He thanked the U.S. for its support and technological aid because he claimed it would help the Chilean people in their current devastated state to "make a leap forward" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 9). He asserted that his goal for Chile was to be the first nation in Latin America to overcome poverty and underdevelopment and ended this comment by affirming his hopes for a strong relationship between the two nations in the future.

After Piñera's remarks, the question-and-answer portion of this public meeting began. The first question, directed to both Piñera and Clinton, asked how the two government leaders evaluated the Chilean government's response to the quake. Piñera responded by reiterating how

devastated the quake had left the nation and then said that he supported the Chilean government's logistical repair efforts under Bachelet's leadership. He stated that when he took office the following week, he would continue Bachelet's "state of emergency" status for Chile because it was the best way to address the nation's immediate needs. Clinton responded to the same question by praising Chile for its efforts, claiming, "Chile is prepared, is dealing with this massive disaster and will be on the road to an even better recovery in the future" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 20).

The next questioner asked about the cost of the reconstruction effort in Chile. Piñera claimed that it was too difficult to assess the cost at the moment and that the most devastating repercussion from the earthquake was the cost of human lives. Nevertheless, he provided a rough estimate of $30 billion, which would be 16% of the nation's GNP. Although rebuilding the nation as Chile's president would be a difficult task, he stated, "Chile's financial situation is extremely solid. We have fruitful resources – financial resources and human resources that will allow us to do much" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 17). Piñera made it clear that the strength of the nation combined with the aid received from international sources, such as Brazil and Peru, would allow for Chile to fully recover from this tragedy.

One questioner asked Clinton about the extent to which Piñera's relationships with Venezuela and Cuba affected the U.S.-Chile relationship. Clinton responded by stating that Chile and the U.S. shared democratic and capitalistic values. She stated, "We will stand strongly on behalf of those values in our hemisphere and around the world" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 18). A different question was then directed to Piñera, once

again about his evaluation of the actions of Bachelet's government and her use of the military. Piñera acknowledged that the earthquake had led to a large amount of crime but stated that the government needed to focus its efforts on providing solutions to problems instead of evaluating them or casting blame on anyone. The questioner then asked Clinton if the U.S. would be willing to send troops to Chile in order to help the nation restore order if the troops were needed. Clinton responded by stating that the Chilean government did not ask for military aid at that moment and that she was confident that Chile would be able to address its security needs without any international assistance. Instead, the U.S. government would assist Chile in its reconstruction efforts where and when the country would be left wanting after first trying to assist itself.

As the analysis of this act will show, this publically pledged assistance was laden with character traits that worked to create an "all-knowing" teacher-like identity for the U.S., a pupil-like identity for Chile and a hierarchical relationship between them in front of international audiences. A deeper look at how this identity was enacted also reveals that it was crafted carefully and intentionally by an important U.S. government leader.

The U.S.: Proactive and Public

Throughout her public remarks made in Chile, Clinton was careful to make certain details of the assistance that the U.S. offered very public. By so doing, her rhetoric reflects that the U.S. was consciously enacting its national character on the world stage. For example, though her public meeting with Bachelet lasted under a half an hour, Clinton devoted some of this time to disclosing details of how her trip was planned. She stated:

> I was planning to be in Chile today anyway for a long-scheduled trip and I was so looking forward to meeting with President Bachelet who is a leader whom I admire

> greatly and consider a friend. And when I spoke with the president, I said, "I will not come if it will interfere in any way." And we changed the itinerary so that I could come. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 10)

The details revealed by Clinton in these statements would not have been made known to the global public if she had not revealed them here. She disclosed that her trip was already scheduled and was not specially planned to assist Chile in its time of need. By publicly disclosing this fact in this moment, she communicated that the current disaster may not have warranted her visit on its own. Instead, the trip occurred as it had previously been planned by the U.S. with some adjustments to accommodate Bachelet's schedule in the aftermath of the earthquake.

In this statement, Clinton also chose to share with the world a part of a private conversation that had taken place earlier in which she told Bachelet that she would not make her previously scheduled trip if it would be inconvenient for a devastated Chile. This was the only public moment of her trip in which Clinton openly revealed that her visit was not automatically and unquestionably deemed important or necessary by Chile. Instead, Clinton inferred for a brief moment that her trip may have interfered with Chile's rebuilding process. Nevertheless, ultimately, Bachelet still desired for Clinton to come and even altered her schedule to make it happen. These comments dramatically set the stage for her visit with the President of Chile, providing justification for a trip from such an important U.S. leader; though revealing details such as these about the planning of this trip was not necessary for her to accomplish the trip's primary goals of expressing "sympathy and support" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 10), she included these remarks anyway. Much like an actor enacting

a specific persona for an audience, such seemingly unimportant details craft the identity of the main characters in this drama.

Another moment in this public meeting that reflected Clinton's proactive involvement in enacting a public U.S. identity occurred as Clinton gave Bachelet a satellite phone in their internationally televised meeting. This donation was not given in a quiet, personal, or passive setting. Indeed, even though Bachelet had already mentioned that the U.S. had donated satellite phones to Chile's relief effort the day before, Clinton restated that this donation had been made, going into greater detail about the gift. In a dramatic way, Clinton went on to publicly hand Bachelet one phone while the cameras recorded: "I brought with me 25 of these satellite phones. We have identified 62 as the highest priority for the government's request. I had 25 on my plane loaded on and I'm going to give this one to you, Madam President" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 10).

This is a clear example of the U.S. publically performing its own persona and crafting a specific identity as a result. The government's donation of the 25 satellite phones was undoubtedly not made merely to help out a nation struggling after a devastating earthquake; indeed, Chile's list of dire needs did not include satellite phones. The gesture also served as a public symbol – the U.S. was not only willing to give to another nation in their time of need, but was also prepared with the technological know-how to do so. Had Clinton not been so public and ceremonial about this manifestation of support, the simple donation of satellite phones to a struggling nation may have gone unnoticed by international audiences. Instead, this dramatic gesture illustrated the proactive and public way in which U.S. officials broadcasted their strong, prepared, heroic identity. In line with Burke's (1972) suggestion that social interaction is drama

and human action is symbolic, Clinton's words in this moment were perhaps a careful form of action in which a certain idea was perpetuated. Here, once again, the U.S. resembled an actor carefully playing out a specific role on a world stage. The character traits assigned to this role, developed publically in these interactions, will be analyzed in the next sections of this chapter.

The U.S.: All-knowing Teacher and Evaluator

As in Act I, Clinton made public remarks that would imply a lateral relationship between the U.S. and Chile. In her public meeting with Piñera, Clinton stated that there were a number of issues that the U.S. and Piñera would work on "together" when he became president, unrelated to the earthquake (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 1). She stated, "Chile and the United States have a very close bilateral relationship. We have explored a number of the important matters that are on our agendas together ... There are a number of critical issues that we must work on together" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 2). Here, Clinton referred to the U.S.-Chile relationship as one of equal partnership in which two nations work together to tackle national and international problems alike. Additionally, in reference to the situation at hand, Clinton stated that the U.S. would stand "with" Chile and work "with" Chile in its rebuilding process. Once again, on a first reading, Clinton's words denoted an equal relationship in which the two nations worked side-by-side. However, a deeper reading of the rhetoric of Clinton and even one of Chile's own leaders illustrates a much different relationship.

Much like Obama had on the day of the quake, in Act II of this drama, Clinton positioned the U.S. as a paternal leader to a much less-experienced Chile. However, in this act, Clinton also took on the role of a teacher or evaluator with the expertise necessary to educate its pupils by

evaluating and praising the rebuilding efforts as a whole, the efforts of Chile's leaders, and Chile's assistance to another American nation in its time of need. As it had done throughout Chile's short history as a democracy (Sater 1990), the U.S. once again decided how successful Chile was in governing itself.

In these interactions, Chilean leaders (in particular Piñera) also played an important role in establishing a hierarchical relationship between the two nations and elevating the U.S. to a higher, "exceptional" status. Indeed, the very fact that Bachelet and Piñera took time out of their busy schedules only a few days after the quake to meet publicly with Clinton illustrated the elevated status that Chile granted to the U.S. nation as a whole. For example, as Piñera would shortly be taking office, Clinton and Piñera spent a large portion of their conversation discussing issues that were not related to the imminent problems of Chile's current devastating situation. Instead, they discussed how they would work together when his presidency began. In fact, in the remarks he gave before the question-and-answer portion of the meeting began, less than 85 of Piñera's 430 words referenced the earthquake. His priority was to establish a long-term, positive relationship with an important U.S. leader, not to address the present needs of his suffering nation.

Piñera also elevated the U.S. by rhetorically aligning his nation with the U.S. He stated, "I think that we have covered not only many bilateral issues as well as the issues Chile is facing now during the emergency and its phase of reconstruction, but also many multilateral issues of interest to us both," (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 7). For example, he discussed his goals for Chile in the years to come. He stated that like the U.S., Chile upheld certain values such as "freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, a sense of

cooperation" and that Chile and the U.S. shared "ideas with regards to the challenges of the 21st century" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 8). He also stated that in his upcoming presidency, he planned for Chile to work with the U.S. even more closely than before. In this way, Piñera used the opportunity that he had to spend time with a U.S. official after a major national disaster to publicly align the two nations in their values and goals, making it clear that he hoped they would strengthen their bonds with one another in the future. Thus, despite the fact that some of Clinton's vocabulary defined the U.S.-Chile relationship as one of equal partnership, her reception in Chile by its most important government leaders illustrated a different relationship. An analysis of the rhetoric of Clinton helps to explain why foreign government leaders would uphold the U.S. to such an elevated position.

Throughout her public discussions with the president and president-elect of Chile, Clinton spent a substantial amount of time praising the nation in a way that put her, as a representative of the U.S., in a position of elevated credibility and authority. For example, in her visit with Piñera, her first meeting with Chile's future president, she made it clear that he possessed specific qualities that she deemed favorable – even qualities that might make up for the nation's shortcomings. Clinton stated:

> The president-elect informed me that Chile is not a member of the G-20, but the G-20 will be working to help Chile as long – as well as other international financial institutions. And certainly with the president-elect's background in business, he will be a very important voice in all of the multilateral discussions about the economy going forward. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 4)

Though this statement ended with what would seem to be an accolade for Chile's president, Clinton began by pointing out that Chile was not a member of G-20. The G-20 is a group of representatives from 20 major economies that collectively accounted for 85 percent of the global gross national product and can be joined by invitation only (Mustafa, 2016). This group claimed to bring together the most advanced and emerging economies in the world (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 1). Piñera reminded Clinton that Chile was not a part of this group in an earlier, private conversation. By calling attention to this fact in this public, televised meeting, Clinton conveyed that Chile was in a disadvantaged position but would be receiving help from the more advantaged members of the G-20, such as the U.S. This statement elevated the U.S. by grouping it within a community of strong economies with the resources to help less advantaged groups that were in need. Furthermore, although the U.S. was a member of this exclusive group, Clinton mentioned that it was Piñera who notified her that Chile was not a member. The fact that Clinton was ignorant to this fact before Piñera mentioned it to her communicated that the details of this exclusive group were unimportant to a U.S. leader like herself.

In this same statement, after noting that Chile was not a member of the privileged G-20 economic group and thereby relegating Chile to a position of weakness, Clinton went on to praise Piñera for his background in business. In this way, her compliment to one of the Chile's most important leaders was qualified and limited by the nation's inability to help itself. While Clinton did communicate that Piñera's experience put him at an advantage as the future president of Chile, she only stated this as an afterthought and as a brief redeeming quality that was overshadowed by the fact that Chile was in a disastrous state and was not as able to help itself as

would a group of 20 more economically capable nations. Furthermore, Clinton stated that Piñera's background gave him the credentials to be a key player in discussions about "the" economy in the future. It is not clear which economy Clinton was referring to but because this comment was made right after a comment about Chile's own condition after the earthquake, Clinton arguably communicated the idea that Piñera would be an important player in conversations about his own economy. While it is also possible that she was referring to Piñera's future role in discussing global economic matters, as a representative of the United States, Clinton either way enacted the role of a global authority as she assessed Piñera's ability to contribute to important economic conversations.

According to Clinton, the favorable qualities of Chile's leaders were also reflected in the way that Chile so effectively reacted to the present devastating earthquake. Clinton stated that the leaders of Chile made extraordinary efforts to restore the nation to its previous state and that both the government and the people themselves responded to the disaster with "resilience and strength" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 10). Here, Clinton took on the role of all-knowing teacher and evaluator as she decided what it took to make a "strong" response to an international disaster. However, with this statement, she went on to make it known why she was qualified to make such a judgment. She said, "I have been visiting sites of disasters for more than 30 years, as a first lady in Arkansas, as a first lady of the United States, as a senator from New York, and now as Secretary of State" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 21). Here, Clinton publicized her credentials as a global evaluator of disastrous situations and identified herself as a true, proven representative of the U.S. possessing much experience with the situation at hand. Thus, she aligned herself with the experience and

expertise of the U.S. government in a way that elevated herself to a position that was a step higher than the President-elect of Chile – a position from which she could evaluate his actions. This rhetorical self-elevation also communicated something about the identity of the U.S. itself. Clinton only made an effort to point out her official experience as a government representative because the nation that that government represented was synonymous with strength and authority over other nations.

After establishing her credentials as an experienced U.S. leader and evaluator of international disasters, Clinton went on to praise Chile and its leaders for their response to the earthquake, stating:

> And it is very clear to me that Chile is much better prepared, much quicker to respond, more able to do so. The leadership that President Bachelet and President-elect Piñera are providing to make sure that they work together in order to keep the recovery and relief efforts going seamlessly is exactly what one would expect. There is no doubt in my mind as we stand here at an airport that thankfully is functioning and relief flights are coming in, that Chile is prepared, is dealing with this massive disaster and will be on the road to an even better recovery in the future. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 20)

In this statement, once again Clinton put herself and the U.S. government in the role of a global evaluator who decided what makes for a successful nation and what makes for a successful response to a tragedy. Since the U.S. government had unparalleled experience assisting at the sites of international disasters, its leaders were like teachers in an authoritative position to evaluate the progress of Chile in comparison to other disaster sites. As a global authority, the

U.S. found that Chile was better prepared, quicker, and more able than other nations and that its leaders lived up to certain pre-established but unstated expectations. Indeed, later in her remarks, Clinton interrupted her own comments to praise the nation for their relief efforts. In the middle of her description of the aid that would be sent by the U.S., she paused for a moment and then stated, "People are working. That's a good sound" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 11). Like a teacher assessing the progress of a troubled student, these comments made throughout her public remarks communicated to international audiences that a main purpose of her visit was to "check- in" on Chile after their disaster and encourage them as they continued their relief and restoration efforts.

In this second act of the Chilean earthquake drama, a U.S. government leader rhetorically elevated the U.S. to the position of an all-knowing evaluator of a less fortunate and less able nation. Even her physical presence when Bachelet and Piñera were speaking – standing by their side and nodding approvingly – enacts this positioning in roles (Conchademango, 2010). Much like a teacher in a role of authority and respect in front of her students, Clinton enacted her credentials as an experienced person with expertise on the type of devastating situation faced by Chile. Furthermore, just as a teacher would evaluate the progress of one of his or her students, Clinton compared Chile's disaster response to the response of other leaders around the world and judged that Chile was more able than others she had seen. Chile's most important leaders worked in a way that met Clinton's expectations, and Clinton made it clear that she was satisfied with the work that they had done. As such, she assured the general public that Chile was on its way to making a complete recovery. No Chilean government leader officially invited her to visit in order to assess progress but by making this visit and these specific remarks, it communicated that

she felt that it was her job to do so nonetheless. It also communicated that Chile's progress could not have been made without the assistance and coaching of more experienced government leaders who had an unparalleled ability to get Chile back on its feet.

An Exceptional Nation with Technological Expertise

As a teacher with proven international experience, the U.S. depicted itself as having capabilities beyond those of any other international resource. For example, in their public meeting, Clinton told Bachelet, "We'll be there to help when others leave because we are committed to this partnership and friendship with Chile" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 27). Here, Clinton communicated the idea that other nations would not commit themselves to helping Chile restore itself for long. Conversely, the U.S. was committed to Chile in a way that other countries were not. As a "partner" and a "friend" of Chile unlike no other, the U.S. had an unparalleled ability to follow through with their pledged assistance.

Clinton also extended this theme of an exceptional U.S. through the type of assistance that she publicly offered to a disaster-stricken Chile. In her remarks, Bachelet was clear that the Chilean people needed food, water, and medical supplies. For example, she stated "donations in money are very useful, very important, because we need to buy food and medication" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 27). However, the U.S. was not as interested in aiding Chile with these basic necessities and instead, took it upon itself to decide what Chile needed most. While the U.S. did ultimately assist Chile in the form of more basic and immediate necessities (see Appendix), in this publicly televised and radio-broadcast meeting with Bachelet, Clinton provided satellite phones to Bachelet and her government. Clinton

remarked, "I brought with me 25 of these satellite phones. We have identified 62 as the highest priority for the government's request. I had 25 on my plane loaded on and I'm going to give this one to you, Madame President" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 10). Through her words and ceremonious delivery of a phone, the U.S. Secretary of State communicated to Chile and to the world that the U.S. government prioritized a technological gift over donations that would address the basic needs of the people as explained by the Chilean president. The delivery of technological resources sent a distinct message about the abilities of the U.S. nation.

Although Clinton mentioned that the U.S. was also sending water purification units, hospital equipment and medical supplies, and electrical generators, the U.S. government selected satellite phones as a symbol of all of the assistance that would be provided to assist Chile in the near future. Ultimately, these satellite phones were doubly symbolic; they represented a larger gesture of physical assistance, and they also served as a symbol of technological know-how. When a gift is given as a gesture of assistance, especially at a desperate time such as this, it communicates that the receiver of the gift could not access the resource on its own. This gesture communicated to the world not only that the U.S. had resources that Chile did not have access to but also that Chile must rely on the more advanced U.S. in order benefit from such technology. This type of gift would only be given by someone who is certain that their own technology is more advanced than the technological resources of the gift's recipients. As such, the gift communicated to the world that the U.S. was advanced and unconcerned with attending to basic and simple needs as a less technologically advanced nation might. Hixson (2008) claimed that "technological know-how" is a trait historically enacted by the U.S. government and is tied to a

"masculine" role often taken on by the U.S. (p. 12). In his perspective, as the U.S. flaunts its technological ability to other nations, it puts itself in the position of being able to "provide for" other, less advanced groups of people.

The setting of this interaction also appropriately set the stage for a dramatic gesture of technological superiority. Bachelet mentioned that a problem for Chilean leaders at the time was transporting aid where it was needed because of broken roads and fallen bridges. She spoke of impacted areas with no water, of an estimated 500,000 damaged homes, and of the wounded and the victims. In stark contrast to this dismal situation, Clinton came arrived on an airplane, met with Bachelet at the Santiago airport, and had a meeting that was televised to the world without a problem. Clinton's presence was far removed from the devastation and suffering left from the earthquake. Indeed, it was surrounded by flourishing technology and ease of transport.

With this technological donation, the U.S. once again perpetuated its role as a parent or a teacher helping out a child. Just as a parent or teacher provides children and pupils with the resources they need to learn and progress and learn, the U.S. publicly extended to Chile a tool that it would not have had access to otherwise to help it advance. Anthropologists have long tied paternal relationships between nations with technological know-how. Goodell et al. (1985) provided examples in which paternal nations sought to exhibit technological authority over other nations, which was spurred by "political and not just social purposes" (p. 254). In this way, nations can exact power over other nations by helping them to become dependent beneficiaries of the knowledge they lack.

It is important to note that Chilean officials also played a part in elevating the U.S. to the role of technological leader and expert. In his public meeting with Clinton, Piñera made a comment that demonstrated Chile's dependency on the U.S. for technological help:

> We also asked Secretary Clinton for cooperation from the United States with regard to technology, because if the United States can provide us with very good information on renewable energy, environmentally friendly energy, technology necessary to provide housing – temporary housing, to provide prefabricated housing quickly, this is going to help particularly in the cases of 500,000 people who have been left without shelter as a result of the earthquake; also in terms of renovation and also issues of entrepreneurship, because Chile is now at a time in its history where it needs to make a leap forward. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 9)

In this statement, Piñera not only asked for technological help in addressing this disaster, but he also asked for assistance that would outlast the earthquake response. He did not provide the U.S. government with an itemized list of specific physical things or acts that Chile needed as a result of the quake. Instead, he asked for knowledge – a resource that would assist the fallen nation long after the major effects of the disaster had worn off – and mentioned that this knowledge would help Chile renovate and to elevate itself as an entrepreneurial leader on a world stage. This appeal for technological know-how communicated that Chile had technological insufficiencies in comparison with the U.S.

After asking for this knowledge from Clinton, Piñera continued by aligning Chile with U.S. values in a way that rhetorically elevated the disaster-stricken nation. He stated, "Our hope for Chile is that it will be the first country of Latin America to beat underdevelopment, to beat

poverty. And we hope to do so while we strengthen democracy and work towards peace" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010b, para. 9). In this statement, Piñera reiterated that Chile had a desire not only to become an advanced, financially stable country, but that it would attempt to do so in the way that the U.S. would best approve – as a strong, democratic, and peaceful nation. As a result, through his rhetoric, he put the nation of Chile in the same ideological camp of the U.S. and elevated the U.S. to the position of a desirable group that possessed the national traits necessary to overcome financial burdens and advance developmentally. As suggested by Wander (1984), at the same time he distanced Chile from "third persona groups" or those aforementioned countries that did not belong to this camp (e.g., Cuba and Venezuela). He followed this statement with an invitation for President Obama to come visit Chile and expressed his desire to continue to work closely with Clinton in the years to come. He stated that working more closely with Clinton would help to "further the ties that join our two countries, so that we can work towards the achievement that our people require" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, , 2010b, para. 10). This statement communicated that Chile's progress was a direct result of strengthening its relationship with the U.S. Taken together, the group of statements enacted Chile's dependent role on the U.S. and elevated the U.S. to the status of a teacher and mentor with an unequaled ability to help Chile overcome its current situation and to progress for years to come.

Conclusion: Hierarchy and Moral Obligation

In this chapter, I analyzed Act II of the United States' dramatic response to Chile's 2010 earthquake, arguing that Clinton enacted hierarchical roles for the two nations – teacher-student, evaluator-subject, parent-child – asserting the higher role of the U.S. on the basis of its ability,

and in particular, its technological expertise. As the U.S. took on this role, it also demonstrated an intangible moral obligation to assist other countries. Specifically, it demonstrated that it was morally obligated to assist *certain* countries and helped Chile because it was a nation that shared the U.S. way of thinking. For example, Clinton praised Chile for upholding characteristically American ideals before reiterating the commitment of the U.S. to provide support:

> Chile and the United States share common values: a great belief in democracy, a respect for private property and free markets, a commitment to free expression and independent media, and so much else. And we will stand strongly on behalf of those values in our hemisphere and around the world. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 31)

Here, a U.S leader highlighted the traditional "American" values that were upheld by Chile – democracy, respect for private property and free markets, free expression and independent media – and described Chile as one of its own kind. As it had throughout its historical relationship, once again the U.S. communicated that it "saw Chile in a very favorable but patronizing light" and held it up "as an example of the success ... of gradual economic reform and political democracy, U.S.-style" (Cottam, 1994, p. 55).

This alignment further explained why it was appropriate for the U.S. to assist a nation that had not even asked for help. Clinton stated that the U.S. would stand on behalf of important American values throughout the world, and the fact that she was there to assist Chile communicated that the U.S. would also stand on behalf of those groups of people that exhibited them. Thus, Clinton illustrated a moral obligation on behalf of the U.S. government to help those

who operated in the America way, almost as if it was part of the U.S. "calling" to protect the ideals upon which it was founded.

Furthermore, these statements perpetuated a rhetorical system of rewards and punishments in front of an audience of other potential international pupils. Since the Chilean government had for some years upheld democratic, capitalist, and liberal values, the U.S. government "rewarded" the nation by coming to its aid when disaster struck. This grand and very public act of assistance could be applied in the future to other nations that also chose to uphold the same traditional American ideals. Here we see what Morris (2002) referred to as the "textual wink" (p. 230). Those members of the "fourth persona," or the "stealth partner who quietly affirms" the ideological messages of the U.S., (i.e., U.S. democratic allies) are privy to the fact that they would receive assistance if needed as well (Morris, 2002, p. 241).

Arguably, these messages would exclude those groups that are not based on the same ideology – perhaps undemocratic nations that would not receive the same type of attention from the U.S. after a disaster. These groups, what Wander (1984) called the "third persona," are "unacceptable, undesirable, [and] insignificant" to the rhetor because their ideologies are so different (p. 209). In these U.S.-Chile interactions, while third persona groups are not a primary audience, anyone listening in would hear the benefits of subscribing to democracy.

Clinton evaluated and praised Chilean government officials not only for their efforts to address their current situation but also for their efforts to assist Haiti after a major earthquake struck that nation one month prior to Chile's 2010 earthquake. She stated, "We are so grateful for what Chile did in Haiti. Your rescue teams were among the very best in the entire world. And we want to help Chile, who has done so much to help others" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of

Public Affairs, 2010a, para. 25). Just as the U.S. assisted Chile when a disaster occurred in another part of the world, Chile helped Haiti to recover after its earthquake. The U.S. government evaluated these relief efforts and found them to be praiseworthy. As a result and in a sense as a reward, the U.S. had even more of an obligation to assist Chile in its own time of need.

This statement also perpetuated the role of the U.S. as international evaluator and parent. The U.S. was "grateful" to Chile, a Latin American nation for helping out Haiti, another Latin American nation as if the U.S. had a higher, established responsibility to ensure that Haiti recovered from its tragedy as well. The gratitude on the part of the U.S. communicated that the nation had some stake in the wellbeing of Haiti as well. Once again, the U.S. served as the parent evaluating the behavior of its children and coming to their aid when needed. Chile served as a child but perhaps a more experienced and more able child than Haiti, and Chile was praised for helping out a "sibling." Chile's efforts to help Haiti lightened the burden of the U.S. as the parent to help "child" nations get back on their feet after tragedy. For this reason, Chile was itself worthy of similar help.

As a global authority with exceptional technological resources and possessing the knowledge essential for a nation to advance, the U.S. demonstrated an unparalleled ability to assist other nations in times of disaster. Such disaster relief, however, was only distributed as a reward to a nation that complied with and exhibited traditional American ideals.
Chile, with recent years of democratic success and recent efforts to assist another nation, was thus fit to receive help and support from the U.S. An analysis of the U.S. government's documentation of the total global disaster response to the earthquake in Act III – albeit less

"dramatic" – will further illustrate how an elevated U.S. identity was developed, this time through expert assessments and reporting.

CHAPTER 5

Act III: Assessing

Although the magnitude 8.8 earthquake that hit Chile in February 2010 only lasted about three minutes, it has taken years to repair and restore the nation from the damage that the earthquake caused. Immediately after the incident, several countries and other international humanitarian relief organizations around the world pledged aid and assistance in this restoration. In the weeks following the earthquake, the U.S. delivered on the promises made by former President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State Clinton to provide aid. The U.S. embassy in Santiago wrote on March 9, 2010 that the U.S. government was quickly working to provide the items that the Chilean government asked for (U.S. Department of State, Embassy in Santiago, Chile, 2010a, para. 1). From water purification units to satellite phones, tools, and electrical generators to $1 million in monetary donations made to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the U.S. was actively involved in providing assistance to the rebuilding process.

U.S. government agencies and U.S. government leaders also actively documented and analyzed the experience of the 2010 earthquake, including the aid that the U.S. and other nations offered Chile and the Chilean government's response to this aid. This documentation exists in the form of official reports by government agencies released in the months following the disaster. For example, in July 2010, five months after the quake occurred, the American Red Cross sent 20 experts on earthquake response down to Chile for the sole purpose of learning and analysis in order to learn lessons from Chile's experience, stating: "At some point ... we will be faced with a very large and potentially catastrophic earthquake … The American Red Cross recognized the

... earthquake ... as an opportunity to learn and prepare for what we will face" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 4).

Although these documents were billed as objective and empirical reports written by scientists and other experts in their fields, the tone and tenor of the analyses vary widely from comments of praise and commendation to sharp critiques of inadequate preparation and poor decision making. For instance:

> The emergency plans in Chile lacked the necessary detail, scope, redundancy, and flexibility required to effectively and efficiently respond to an event of this magnitude. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 25)
>
> The initial response of the central government was problematic. Delayed decisions, miscommunication, communication failures all contributed to a serious impact on the success of the initial response. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 23)
>
> Local fire departments and the police in the impacted cities and towns appear to have worked heroically and effectively ... (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 24)
>
> The response at all levels was surprisingly rapid, resourceful, and successful. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 32)

In addition to these comments, the reports include recommendations and directives for both Chile and the U.S. should either country experience a similar disaster in the future. For

example, the document from U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team (2010) indicates that "the government of Chile and the Chilean people must not use the February 2010 earthquake as the standard for their preparations for the next event" (p. 25). Chile is a completely autonomous country and not governed by the U.S. Despite this lack of authority, the U.S. scrutinized the post-disaster actions of the Chilean government throughout these reports. While it is true that this was done in the name of educating the U.S., rhetoric such as that found in the examples above does more than educate – it also assesses, directs, and defines the identities of the two nations. Indeed, the U.S. government continued to enact the role of authoritative evaluator by offering unsolicited evaluative assessments and directives to Chile. The fact that the U.S. presumed to assess and evaluate another nation is highly symbolic of the role that it plays and the role that it rhetorically assigns Chile.

In the previous two chapters, in which I analyzed Acts I and II of the 2010 earthquake drama, I discussed how identity themes were enacted for both the U.S. and Chile through the public discourse of former President Obama and former Secretary of State Clinton on the day of the earthquake and soon thereafter. The themes that emerged through these words were exceptional heroism, hierarchy, unquestioned responsibility, proactivity and intentionality, all-knowing teacher and evaluator, technological expertise, and moral obligation. In the third and final part of my analysis of the U.S. response to the 2010 earthquake in Chile, I analyze two reports created by experts and scientists to relay objective information about the responses to the earthquake and objective knowledge about the best ways to respond to future similar earthquakes in the future. Interestingly, a close reading of these reports reveals that the dramatic elements

similar to those identified in Acts I and II also come through in the "objective" reports that make up Act III.

The first part of this act consists of a report made by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) entitled, "Chile Earthquake: U.S. and International Response," in which June Beittel, analyst in Latin American affairs, and Rhoda Margesson, specialist in international humanitarian policy, summarized Chile's condition before the earthquake, described the effects of the earthquake on the nation, and explained what Chile, the U.S., and other nations did to provide relief for Chile. The second part consists of a USGS Open-File Report created by a delegation put together by the American Red Cross, which documents the analysis of the 20 earthquake experts sent to Chile in July, 2010.

In this chapter, I argue that these documents do much more than offer straightforward reporting of the facts that surround the earthquake disaster response. Instead, much like Acts I and II, U.S. government employees continue to perform dramatic identity themes for both the U.S. and for Chile in the crafting of these documents. Specifically, they present a U.S. that has broad authority, demonstrate the nation's strict adherence to the value of being prepared, and describe the Chilean culture as one that acts on instincts and lacks data reporting. While the Chilean culture is somewhat praised and celebrated, such praise is overshadowed by framing of the U.S' more "successful" way of handling disaster. These messages communicated dramatically in the two reports point to a hierarchical relationship between the two countries.

Overview of Act III

The U.S. concluded its role in the 2010 Chile earthquake drama by issuing two government reports that document and analyze the global response to the 2010 earthquake in

Chile. Unlike the messages analyzed in Acts I and II, these reports are not communicated by a single U.S. leader who makes comments on a world stage in a short period of time. Instead, they reflect the analytical work of teams of U.S. employees conducted for a limited audience. Arguably, their purpose is not to make a statement to the public or to global audiences but is instead to convey knowledge back to leaders in the U.S. Indeed, both documents explicitly state that they were prepared for use by different U.S. government bodies. Nevertheless, while these messages may be communicated in a less "dramatic" way and to smaller audiences, they have been made publicly available and reflect the degree to which the hierarchical view and identity themes previously identified in this analysis are embedded how officials of the U.S. government see the world and enact that worldview through their work.

Published on March 11, 2011, the 26-page CRS report titled, "Chile Earthquake: U.S. and International Response" begins with a depiction of Chile's condition almost two weeks after the earthquake struck. It states that repairs to the nation would cost somewhere between $15 and $30 billion, the equivalent of 10 to 20% of the nation's gross domestic product. Nevertheless, according to the report, "many believe the economic and human toll would have been much worse if not for Chile's stringent building codes and past experiences with earthquakes" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 1). It then summarizes the Chilean government's efforts to restore itself to its previous condition, including a general evaluation of these efforts from the perspective of international sources.

Following these statements, the summary briefly discusses the period of transition between Michelle Bachelet's time as president and Sebastian Piñera taking office, describing the challenges that he would face as he became Chile's leader at this dire moment in history. The

report then includes a summary of the status of the relief effort. It discusses the humanitarian needs of the nation and the effort to meet those needs, including statistics about food, shelter, water, education, infrastructure, and agriculture needs, as well as figures relating to nation's health concerns. Although the report repeatedly mentions that the Chilean government did not make an official request for assistance to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) until days after the quake, it also outlines eventual attempts to fulfill those requests by the U.N., other non-governmental organizations, private contributions, other financial institutions, and Chilean citizens themselves. Despite their efforts, the report states that "international recovery efforts are typically complex because they require coordination among numerous different actors" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 8).

The report summarizes the U.S. government's assistance to Chile through the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense. The reported "focus" of the U.S. response to the earthquake was "conducting needs assessments, working with the U.S. embassy in Chile and the Chilean government on priority humanitarian needs, coordinating delivery of USAID/OFDA-funded relief supplies, and providing communication support" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 10). Aid was also sent by countries neighboring Chile, including Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

Next, the report includes a brief outline of the history between the U.S. and Chile, including a synopsis of the financial assistance given to Chile by the U.S. before the earthquake occurred. According to this document, the U.S. provided Chile with $1.2 million in the 2009 fiscal year, $1.7 million in 2010, and an estimated $1.2 million in 2011 under former President Obama's administration. This financial assistance was provided to Chile to support "programs

that deter weapons of mass destruction, improve civilian control over the military, and upgrade military equipment" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 12).

Interestingly, Beittel and Margesson (2010) include not only a summary of the messages sent by U.S. leaders as they pledged to assist the nation through this disaster but also a brief discussion as to whether or not they believed the U.S would be able to deliver on these pledges. Their analysis is based on the financial situation of the U.S., as well as pledges to assist with the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. While the U.S. was a self-reported "leader and major contributor to relief efforts in humanitarian disasters" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 13) and had provided $10.7 million in humanitarian assistance up to the point that the document was published, the report also claims that it would be difficult to find the resources to actually put their pledges of support into action.

Following these statements, the report includes details about the earthquake's resultant tsunami and general information about tsunamis and tsunami alerts. The last section of the text portion of the document discusses the effect that Chilean building codes had on the destruction caused by the earthquake. It claims that because Chile's rigorous creation and enforcement of building codes severely mitigated the destruction caused by the earthquake.

The text of the report is followed by six appendices containing information such as a map of Chile, a list of all of the nations that donated to the Chilean relief effort with their approximate monetary donations in U.S. dollars and brief summaries of non-monetary donations, a description of the U.S. system for response to international disasters, a list of three resolutions made by the U.S. Congress to express sympathy and support for the victims of the earthquake and to encourage U.S. citizens to donate to the relief effort, information on how to report and

find Americans who may be missing in Chile as a result of the earthquake, and a list of links that would provide more information about the earthquake and international response to the earthquake.

The second part of this act consists of a USGS Open-File Report created based on the work of a 20-person expert delegation sent down to Chile five months after the earthquake occurred. As the report notes:

> In July 2010, in an effort to reduce future catastrophic natural disaster losses for California, the American Red Cross coordinated and sent a delegation of 20 multidisciplinary experts on earthquake response and recovery to Chile. The primary goal was to understand how the Chilean society and relevant organizations responded to the magnitude 8.8 Maule earthquake that struck the region on February 27, 2010, as well as how an application of these lessons could better prepare California communities, response partners and state emergency partners for a comparable situation. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 1)

The report begins with a brief summary that detailed the intentions of the delegation and high-level findings. This section also consists of 10 recommendations for the state of California, which include "conduct comprehensive exercises before the event," "empower people to be prepared," and "recognize vulnerabilities in our communications systems and make comprehensive backup plans to avoid complete communication collapse" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 2). A brief introduction follows, which details the importance of preparation when it comes to national disasters and describes the preparatory purposes of the delegation and subsequent report. In describing this purpose, it uses

verbs like "better understand," "get a better handle," "see," "observe," "note similarities," "learn from the strengths and weaknesses," and "take lessons back" (p. 24).

The 53 pages that follow are split into five sections that detail the findings of five delegation teams: Science and Technology, Emergency Management, Health and Medical Services, Volunteer Management, and Executive/Red Cross Management. Each team had a different function and role on this trip; met with different government groups, leaders, and volunteers; and had different methods for gathering their information. The scope of their analyses in the report are as follows:

- The Science and Technology Team met with Chile's National Seismological Service and some engineers. In the report, they discuss the impact of the earthquake and tsunami and compared it to both the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and a hypothetical earthquake that could occur on the San Andreas Fault in California.
- The Emergency Management Team contribution to the report analyzes the structure of all aspects of the emergency response, including local response, government response, and armed forces. The Emergency Management Team makes recommendations for California based on this analysis.
- The Health Services Team describes Chile's medical organizational structure and response both immediately after the quake occurred and in the long term. It also makes recommendations and provides questions for the American Red Cross to consider in its own disaster planning.

- The Volunteer Management Team describes the nature and structure of volunteerism for disaster response in Chile and includes recommendations for the U.S. based on this analysis.
- The Executive Management Team analyzes social interactions and relationships between agencies and uses them as the basis to derive implications for Californian governments and the American Red Cross.

The report concludes with final recommendations for California and for the American Red Cross, such as "Education about what will happen during the event is an important part of preparing for a disaster; this information can save lives during a disaster" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 55). These recommendations are followed by a Sources and Acknowledgments section and appendices which include the delegation's participant list, a summary of the meetings that were conducted, and a glossary of terms and acronyms.

These two reports provide extensive information about the 2010 earthquake and disaster response and support from within Chile and across the globe. In the following sections, I describe how they also rhetorically craft specific identity traits for the U.S. and for Chile.

Dramatic Authority (Even with Limits)

The preceding analyses of Acts I and II of this drama demonstrated that a strong persona was rhetorically created for U.S. leaders and for the U.S. as a whole. The analysis of Act I described how U.S. leaders reflected identity traits of hierarchy and heroism, and the analysis of Act II shows that rhetoric that depicted the U.S. as an "all-knowing teacher and evaluator" and exceptionally strong. Despite the fact that they are official reports conducted by scientists and

experts, Act III further perpetuates this dramatic role for the U.S., even when there may be limits on its ability to put these traits into action.

Specifically, the reports in this act depict the U.S. as a strong nation within the context of readiness and preparedness in the face of any future disasters that may come. For example, one report states, "It is very clear that in the United States, a high priority and expectation is placed on government ... to keep people safe and provide for their basic human needs during times of emergencies and disasters" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 52). Here and throughout several passages of the reports, the U.S. is described as adhering to the highest standards of preparedness in order to remain standing strong in the face of disaster.

Act III also continues the strength themes of Acts I and II that highlight that the U.S. is a strong leader when it comes to assisting other nations. Indeed, it is such a strong leader that government leaders are united across political lines in providing assistance: "Humanitarian assistance generally receives strong bipartisan congressional support and the United States is typically a leader and major contributor to relief efforts in humanitarian disasters" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 13).

The numbers that the Beittel and Margesson (2010) CRS report provides also support this depiction. The report indicates that USAID and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has provided $10.7 million to Chile for emergency response support as of March 10, 2010. Appendix B of this same report includes a list of monetary pledges from 28 other nations, none of which come close to the amount of aid provided by the U.S. The highest pledge on this list is Australia with a pledge of $4.4 million and is followed by Japan with a $3.3 million pledge. Even Chile's

closest neighbors did not give close to that of the U.S. As such, the numbers mentioned in the report support the statement that the U.S. "leads" in providing humanitarian relief.

The Beittel and Margesson (2010) CRS report also describes the functions of different U.S. government entities in responding to disaster in such a way that highlights strength and power for the U.S.:

> The President has broad authority to provide emergency assistance for foreign disasters and the U.S. government provides disaster assistance through several U.S. agencies. The very nature of humanitarian disasters—the need to respond quickly in order to save lives and provide relief—has resulted in a rather unrestricted definition of what this type of assistance consists of at both a policy and an operational level. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to provide for urgent food, shelter, and medical needs, the agencies within the U.S. government providing this support typically expand or contract the definition in response to circumstances. (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 19)

Here, the report uses language that indicates agency and authority rather than mere function. The President of the United States "has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel" in times of disasters (p. 19) and is afforded "wide latitude" as he or she responds to emergencies (p. 20). Similarly, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is a government agency with power and ability to provide assistance. It is described as providing "immediate" relief materials and personnel, "quickly" assembling response teams, and as having "wide authority" (p. 19). Furthermore, policymakers adhere to an "unrestricted" definition of assistance and can "expand or contract" this definition as needed (p. 19). Using this language to define the limits – or lack of limits – of the U.S. government instead of a basic list of duties when

it comes to international giving in the face of disaster associates U.S. leaders with power and further develops the identity traits of strength outlined in Acts I and II. As Sweet and McCue-Enser (2010) claimed, once again, the U.S. government positioned the U.S. as "accomplishers" with agency and power (p. 618).

Interestingly, buried on page 13 of the 26-page CRS report is an indication that discrepancies often arise between pledges made by government bodies and actual donations given as a result. As Beittel and Margesson (2010) note, "Pledges made by governments do not necessarily result in actual contributions. It also cannot be assumed that the funds committed to relief actually represent new contributions, since the money may previously have been designated to provide support for the affected country" (p. 13). Here, it is revealed that official pledges in times of disaster may not be reflected in reality and that they may merely indicate support that was earmarked for the affected countries prior to the disaster itself. Furthermore, the Beittel and Margesson (2010) report indicates that the U.S. government in particular may not in practice be able to fulfill the pledges of support made by U.S. leaders in support of Chile, saying, "Finding the resources to sustain U.S. aid pledges may be difficult, particularly amid efforts to tackle rising budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing or reducing discretionary spending" (p. 13). It goes on to indicate how funds had been completely depleted after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and then restored by supplemental appropriations, a cause of concern for some members of Congress.

Still, this restriction was confined by Beittel and Margesson (2010) to one paragraph and 10 lines in a 26-page report, and was included in a section with a title, "Policy Issues – Budget Priorities and U.S. Assistance in Chile" that did not indicate that a powerful departure in

messaging would be made therein. As such, despite this quick departure, the report taken as a whole enacts a strong persona for the U.S. Though the pledges of the U.S. may not have been sustained because of limited resources, this fact is overshadowed by language such as "wide authority," "broad authority," and "unrestricted" aid assigned to U.S. leaders.

As mentioned, one substantial difference between the messages sent out in Acts I and II and the reports included in Act III is that the former were created by recognized public figures and intended for a wide public audience while the latter was created by a group of unknown scientists and intended primarily for audiences of government officials. Indeed, almost all of the messages that make up Acts I and II were televised and delivered live in front of hundreds of thousands on a world stage. Conversely, Act III messages were merely made public online but not prepared specifically for public interpretation. Because of the nature of the reports that make up Act III, the mention of limits to physical donations is unavoidable. Despite this fact, U.S. government officials still manage to enact a strong, authoritative identity.

America, the Prepared

In addition to power and authority, other messages in these reports indicate a different source of strength for the U.S. – its esteem for preparation and its adherence to practices that make it prepared and ready in the face of unforeseen disasters. Throughout these reports, the preparers repeatedly indicate how important it is to be prepared in general. Multiple statements indicate that the U.S. adheres to the firm belief that "multiple actions can reduce risks" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, becoming better prepared and gaining new technical knowledge are explicitly identified as significant goals that would be supported by creation of the two reports that make up Act III. For example, the USGS report was prepared for

government agencies in an attempt to learn "general lessons" from the "strengths and weaknesses of the Chilean response" such that the U.S. government would revise its own practices and policies in the face of future disaster (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 4). The report indicates:

> The philosophy of the U.S. with regard to preparation was summarized succinctly: While the earthquake is inevitable, the magnitude of the human disaster is not. We know that the degree to which we are prepared before a large earthquake will dictate how well we are able to survive and thrive after the event. The challenge to those in disaster prone regions is to understand the consequences of the largest events before they happen ... (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 4)

This bold statement says much about American ideals. The U.S. may not have power over natural disaster, but it has the power to mitigate the reality of disasters' consequences as they are experienced by the people. Not only will the level of preparation implicate the magnitude of how a disaster is felt, it is also a direct indicator of survival and the ability to thrive. Put simply, for the U.S., preparation equals power.

In general, the reports find that Chile had a strong culture of open assistance and support, excellent building codes in place that mitigate the effects of the strong quake and a long history of experience with earthquakes, but it lacked sufficient codified policies to be as prepared as is necessary according to U.S. ideals of disaster readiness. One report indicates that because Chile had not experienced a large earthquake in many years, there was a "gradual reduction of planning, exercising, and investment in preparedness infrastructure, thus contributing to the deterioration (and ultimate failure) of their systems and other emergency response and recovery

capabilities" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 49). Chile had forgotten how important it was to be prepared and stopped investing in preparation as a result, leading led to failures of their system of disaster response.

In fact, Chile's lack of adequate preparation was partially a result of its previous experience with earthquakes. For example, Chilean officials interviewed indicated that they were surprised by the extent of the destruction caused by the quake "because they know they had already experienced the largest earthquake in recorded history (the magnitude 9.5 event in 1960), and they thought that they should have been able to handle anything else that came along" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 13). For the U.S., however, experience alone does not equal preparation. Without codification, policies, and practices, a culture and history of experience are not effective. Per the U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team (2010) report, experience is too infrequent and as a result "much of the hard-earned emergency management experience gained by officials at all levels will be lost or forgotten unless the lessons learned are captured and translated into new laws, plans, and procedures" (p. 24). Thus, although Chile may have more experience with devastating earthquakes than most other countries, it is not prepared unless it creates procedures out of that experience.

The U.S., conversely, has exhibited a strong adherence to policies that would make it better able to face disasters both in its response to the Chilean earthquake and in the proposed changes to policies after learning from Chile's mistakes. For example, to improve emergency disaster preparation in the U.S., the U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team report (2010) includes recommendations and themes gleaned from the

team's investigations and analyses. These recommendations are scattered throughout the subsections of the report, and the report culminates in a broad summary of recommendations for use by the state of California and the American Red Cross. From "emergency plans need to be redundant, flexible, and detailed" (p. 56) to the broad but direct "It is critical to empower people to be prepared" (p. 55), the recommendations demonstrate a strong appreciation for preparedness on the part of the U.S. Unlike Chile's experience, the report indicates that the U.S. should make these preparations immediately despite infrequent high-magnitude earthquakes.

Overall, the U.S. approach to preparation is elevated as being a more effective way of facing disasters. Such an approach requires strong "pre-disaster" relationships with external and internal partners, "organizational commitment, as well as a significant investment of time and personnel," and a "'bottom up approach, where local government is considered as having primary responsibility for emergency management" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 52). Furthermore, the U.S. approach to disaster should be "well-defined", unlike Chilean preparation which was "forgotten" through the passage of time (p. 52).

One statement made in the U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team (2010) report indicates one reason why preparation is so important to the U.S., associating national preparation with the public's view of governments in general:

> How a government responds after a disaster usually captures the headlines. But most often, it is the role that government plays in preparing for these types of events that can be the single biggest factor in minimizing not only the event's initial toll, but also the

> recovery time necessary to bring a community back to a healthy, functional state. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 48)

In just a few words, the report makes it clear that the U.S. was thinking about how the role of governments are dramatically portrayed in the headlines in front of a world stage after disaster strikes. Successful preparation is the antidote not only for mitigating the toll of disaster and bringing back good living conditions but also for negative headlines that dramatically portray a country's identity in a positive or negative light.

Data vs. Intuition

The two reports that make up Act III analyze different approaches to disaster preparedness that led to different levels of success. For example, Chile's approach to disaster response lacked the reporting of facts and figures that effectively quantified the extent of the disaster and the response to it. As the U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team (2010) report explains:

> A key finding for most of the team members was the paucity of data relating to the earthquake response. Even four months after the event, many areas of statistical information had yet to be developed or completed... The inconsistency with which data were being mined and developed was reflected by all disciplines, even hospitals. (p. 50)

To the authors of this document, reporting about disaster relief using data is *the* way to this type of analysis and *the* standard by which all disaster reporting should occur. Thus, the U.S. communicates that the ideological foundation upon which Chile had built its emergency response system was flawed and inadequate. Just as the Chicago scholars had done decades before, the

nature of the Chilean people and their way of thinking are criticized, and their flaws are exposed through the report (Klein, 2007).

Indeed, the lack of data was clearly problematic for Chile as it "led to national statistics that were inconsistent and inconclusive" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 50). Because of a lack of data reporting, it was impossible to quantify the number of fires caused by the earthquake and because of a lack of documentation, hospital records were at risk of being lost because they flew from the shelves from the shaking and had not been backed up electronically. Additionally, the report indicates that the fact that Chile did not hold the same beliefs about data was problematic. For the team, it was "somewhat telling that while there was a general acknowledgement that better systems for collecting and analyzing data were necessary, this was never cited as one of the leading problems or areas of future concern by any of the organizations" (pp. 50-51). In other words, not only was it problematic that the Chile did not act in accordance with U.S. standards for collecting and analyzing data but also that Chile did not believe in these standards in the first place.

Here, the U.S. acted as standard bearer for disaster response, and its methods are the measuring stick by which it evaluates Chile's actions. Eliassen Restad (2015) commented on this approach to foreign relationships by the U.S., stating that the U.S. often approaches foreign relationships from a unilateral ideology that is enacted as national exceptionalism. Since the U.S. way is the best way and since the U.S. "does not play by any other rules than its own," those rules are the standard and the goal for other nations to follow (p. 3). Chile did not approach disaster response in the same way as the U.S., and the report deems Chile as unsuccessful for its failure to do so. Furthermore, Zaharna (2010) claimed that the U.S. is often blind to the rich

cultural overtones inherent in the international communication of its leaders. As the U.S. identity is one that values accuracy and objectivity, U.S. leaders often think that their words are neutral and free of questionable assertions when in fact they are evaluating from an ideological perspective that might indeed be doubted by different cultural groups.

Still, the U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team (2010) report authors indicate that while Chile lacked some modernizing and was unfortunately not a data-driven country, the Chilean people were able to successfully mitigate the problems of the earthquake as a result of their culture and "intuition" (p. 53). This was referenced as the Chilean "earthquake culture" or "culture of preparedness" that was developed over years of being a seismic country – albeit a different type of preparedness than that which is so esteemed by the U.S. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 51). For example, the report teams learned that the people had learned from past earthquakes that when an earthquake was strong enough to make it difficult to walk, people living in coastal regions should seek higher ground in case of a tsunami. Consequentially, all who were physically able to seek higher ground during the 2010 earthquake did so, and the casualty rate from the tsunami was low as a result. Further, patients in one community's hospital were all saved because patients and staff followed instinct and immediately helped patients out of the building instead of waiting for orders from any "centralized command structure or the person in charge" as might be done in the U.S. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 33). The report includes the assessment that "in the absence of organized, functional response plans, the actual response to the Chilean earthquake by many individuals was based on 'instinct,'" the

USGS report indicated – a much different response than what would be witnessed in the U.S. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 33).

The reports praise these "cultural" responses as the reason for low casualty rates and for low impact for the surviving Chilean people. Theirs was a culture of sharing, and food, water, and shelter were shared with family and neighbors before government resources could arrive in the wake of the earthquake. The Chilean people made donations and volunteered in large numbers "to fill gaps in the earthquake response" – gaps left by government officials (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 9).

Because of this esteemed culture, the lack of data reporting could be overlooked and even forgiven. While "initially somewhat disorienting" to the study team members who were used to being "immersed" in data in their professional roles at home, the teams indicate that the best lessons learned from their analyses of the Chilean earthquake response are actually "difficult to 'measure'" anyway (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 51). While hard to fully appreciate at first, one team member included his own assessment about Chile's lack of data:

> Despite our best efforts, we all know from experience that many of our most significant learning moments come from intuition and observation, rather than from a data set. Albert Einstein once said, "Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted." This statement exemplifies many of the most significant lessons we learned during our time in Chile, such as our observations about the ability of Chileans to react to the needs in front of them, taking action without waiting for some

> central authority to tell them what to do. (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 53)

Here, the report authors seem to come around to the idea that statistical data may not be the only way for successfully analyzing the earthquake response. What was once "disorienting" in the Chilean culture compared to the U.S. standard became acceptable after some convincing and after taking into account that this same culture also led to quick action and low death tolls (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 53).

Yet this praise and others are directed at the Chilean people living out their culture and responding to instinct rather than at the Chilean government for successfully responding to the disaster. For example, the teams note "an amazing resiliency in the Chilean people" – a resiliency that was learned generationally from parents and grandparents not from national or local government officials (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 51).

In fact, the resiliency and self-reliance that were so esteemed in the Chilean people were actually criticized in the Chilean government. The authors of the USGS report indicate that a history and culture of self-reliance at the national level led the Chilean government to wait too long to ask for international assistance. When it did, the list of items needed for repair was limited. As a result, critics "claimed this as a contributing factor to the delays seen in meeting the basic needs of victims in the first days following the disaster" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 51). Thus, not only were successful practices of self-reliance a result of the culture of the people and not the efforts of the government, but unsuccessful practices of self-reliance were carried out by government leaders.

Furthermore, the praise for the cultural aspects of the Chilean people's response is limited. According to the authors of the USGS report, disaster response procedures must be codified and taught in an organized manner in order to be successful and sustainable. The Chilean "'culture of preparedness'" was esteemed, but the report authors claimed that adequate disaster response "must incorporate the lessons learned from this event to ensure that [it] is maintained and enhanced" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 24). Consistent with Black's (1970) theory on the second persona, the U.S. Government presents Chile as "a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become" (p. 113). While Chile's emergency planning was promising, it lacked the details, redundancy, and flexibility that it needed in order to be effective and efficient.

Ultimately, the data-driven method of responding to disaster as utilized by the U.S. is held up in the U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team (2010) report as the standard for excellence and success. Indeed, in the final recommendations section, two of the points mention lack of data as a problem. One point highlights "the importance of not only data collection, but also the need to establish methods to process and analyze such data in order to provide meaningful information for purposes of better informed planning and mitigation" (U.S. Geological Survey, American Red Cross Multidisciplinary Team, 2010, p. 57). While the report teams had come to terms with Chile's lack of data and praise the culture that operated based on intuition, this trait is ultimately not acceptable by the standards of the report authors.

The Final Act

The final act of the 2010 Chilean earthquake drama is made up of two reports that document the event itself and the response from different countries. Unlike the messages that make up Acts I and II, Act III was not delivered dramatically in front of a world stage but was instead put together by U.S. government employees with the goal of improving government processes. However, the dramatic identity traits enacted by the U.S. and rhetorically assigned to Chile still come through in these "objective" reports.

A few quick lines in one of the reports in Act III indicate that the words of U.S. government leaders may not be backed by action, the U.S. government maintains an identity of strength and authority. Additionally, exceptional preparation is a key identity theme for the U.S. in these reports. Although Chile may have been a very experienced nation when it comes to earthquake response, the report posits the preparation and codified processes and guidelines esteemed by the U.S. as the standards for success and elevate them as more important than experience. Lastly, the reports analyze the differences in the culture of disaster response between the U.S. and Chile – the former places emphasis on data and the latter an emphasis on tradition and intuition. While Chile's response to the earthquake was consistently praised within these reports, tradition and intuition alone are pointed to as not enough. Instead, data is absolutely necessary by U.S. standards. Furthermore, the high praise attached to Chile's cultural response is directed at the Chilean people rather than Chilean government.

Like Acts I and II, an analysis of the reports that make up Act III reveals dramatic identity themes enacted through the rhetoric of U.S. officials. While a surface read of these reports may indicate straightforward messages about objective analyses, a deeper reading reveals that they do much more than that. They give both high praise and sharp criticism to Chilean

leaders but privilege U.S. standards and values as ideal and as the only truly successful way to approach disaster response.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Unquestioned Identity Formation Critiqued

On March 21, 2011, just over a year after the devastating 8.8-magnitude struck the nation of Chile, former President Barack Obama visited Chile's capital to deliver a speech to all of Latin America. The first time that a U.S. president had visited Chile in more than 20 years, Piñera declared that the visit had "enormous significance" for Chile (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, para. 1). Consistent with the drama that took place the year before, Obama's remarks that day were replete with evaluative comments directed at Chile, particularly comments of praise and gratitude – praise for a thriving economy and social progress after a difficult period in history and gratitude for taking on a leadership role among the other Latin American countries. He stated:

> Chile is one of the great success stories of this region. It's built a robust democracy. It's been one of the most open and fastest growing economies in the world. The spirit and resilience of the Chilean people, especially after last year's earthquake, have inspired people across the globe. And in my speech this afternoon, I look forward to paying tribute to Chile's progress and the lessons it offers as America forges a new era of partnership across the Americas. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011, para. 23)

The fact that the U.S. government presumed to evaluate, praise, and perhaps even parent Chile here and in public messages, meetings, and internal government reports resulting from the earthquake in 2010 is remarkably symbolic and says much about the identity it enacted for itself and for Chile. Chile has never been under any official "rule" by U.S. government leaders and

Chilean leaders did not ask for assistance when it was first given, nor did they ask for an evaluation of their work. While in his speech, Obama declared, "We are all Americans … there are no senior partners or junior partners, only equal partners" (Long, 2011, para. 5), assistance, praise, and evaluation communicate an elevated position on the part of the giver and evaluator.

Indeed, throughout the three acts of the 2010 play, the U.S. consistently enacted its superior role in the international hierarchy, reflecting a history of foreign policy that serves to assert the U.S. as a leader with economic and cultural power (Poole, 1999). In Acts I and II, it took on the role of paternal provider as it publically offered and provided assistance to a nation in need. In Acts II and III, it took on the role of supervisor, teacher, and evaluator as it praised Chile's efforts to restore itself a few days after the earthquake and then later decided how effective that effort was based on its own definition of success. In doing so, it performed the role of standard bearer throughout Act III, thoroughly evaluating the experience of the earthquake using its own methods and experience as the criteria for excellence.

Furthermore, though located thousands of miles away and essentially unaffected from the devastation of the earthquake, the U.S. rhetorically made itself the hero of the play by sending messages of hope on the day of the earthquake and sending one of its most important leaders to publically provide assistance when the country needed help. Indeed, throughout the three acts, it performed heroic identity traits "exceptionally." In Acts I and III, it demonstrated an unparalleled preparedness as it communicated that it was ready to help before Chile could even ask for help and had codified guidelines and other tools in place to act in future similar instances. In Act II, it demonstrated exceptional technological knowledge through the public delivery of satellite phones, and it held itself as the standard for exceptional disaster response in Act III

through its adherence to codified guidelines and successful use of data in reporting mechanisms. Furthermore, the U.S. was a mission-driven hero as the assistance it provided was given in the name of helping a nation that shared the democratic ideals that are so important to the U.S. identity.

In enacting its own identity, U.S. leaders also projected dramatic identity traits for Chile. Wodack et. al (2009) wrote, "In imagining national singularity and homogeneity, members of a national community simultaneously construct the distinctions between themselves and other nations" (p. 4). In other words, as nations construct a unified identity, they also create distinctions between themselves and others, as well as distinct identities for other nations. Indeed, Sklar (1999) claimed that the process of national identity formation occurs as much outside of a nation as it does within it. In this drama, as the U.S. performed its authoritative and heroic identity, it also prescribed Chile's role in the drama. As the U.S. took on different authoritative roles, it simultaneously put Chile in lesser roles – as the U.S. was a paternal provider, Chile was a child; as the U.S. was the teacher, Chile was the student; as the U.S. was an evaluator and standard bearer, Chile was a subject; and as the U.S. was the hero of the drama, enacting several exceptional heroic traits, Chile was the victim, painted as helpless and with insufficient – albeit commendable – means for restoring itself. Even as the U.S. rhetorically set the scene of the drama in remarks throughout the three acts, it repeatedly used words to communicate suffering, powerlessness, and a fallen state – a stark contrast from the strength, preparedness, and ultimate impenetrability of the U.S.

Furthermore, although the U.S. commended Chile throughout the drama, this praise was qualified and ultimately overwhelmed by criticism. For example, Chile's strong building codes

were praised on more than one occasion but merely as a sign of its potential and a departure point from which Chile could make further necessary improvements: "Chile has demonstrated its willingness and capacity to create, implement, and enforce building codes and … has the mechanisms and technical capacity to learn from the quake to improve its codes and policies to support more resilient structures and communities" (Beittel & Margesson, 2010, p. 15). Thus, while building codes and other strengths were commended by the U.S., they were overshadowed by an even longer list of weaknesses.

Arguably, the dramatic construction of the U.S. and Chilean identities through this event went largely unquestioned by international audiences. Perhaps this is true because of the nature of the situation that prompted the drama. An earthquake is an unplanned natural disaster and, while tragic, invokes far less scrutiny and attention than would a disaster that results from intended hurtful actions of another party. Thus, a nation's gestures of assistance might largely go unexamined by international publics as well. Still, even in a situation like this, unquestioned action and identity formation by the U.S. is troubling as it hinders critical thought about U.S. foreign policy in times of natural disaster. If U.S. leaders always act as if their assistance and evaluation is wanted and warranted when a friendly nation is in a crisis and acts on that assumption without invitation, they rhetorically create a recurring dramatic plot wherein crisis overseas calls for evaluation and heroic intervention. This type of behavior could, at least in a small way, be extended to foreign policy in other situations that involve conflict.

As Sevitch (1971) wrote, any type of paternal rhetoric has an effect on the larger system in which it takes place and performs a regulatory function that might affect future interactions.

Another troubling result of this interaction that is worth considering is described by Abercrombie and Hill (1976), who wrote that one motivation for paternal figures is "the desire ... to make their labour dependent and to increase the control they [have] over their employees" (p. 417). Indeed, specific to the U.S.-Chile relationship, Martí (1997) wrote that as the U.S. has intervened in the affairs of its neighbors to the south, it has also made those nations dependent on the U.S. – a position that those nations have struggled to bequeath and that is exacerbated by the use of language that reflects superiority and exceptionalism (Campbell, 1998). Although it is difficult to know the precise intention of the U.S. as the superior figure in this relationship, the performative function was clear: with messages of control given in a tone of certainty, U.S. leaders rhetorically undermined Chile's agency, framing it as a weaker nation in comparison to the potent U.S.

Analyzing this two-way identity-building interaction leads a critical thinker to question what might have happened had a different drama played out in which the roles were reversed. Would the U.S. President have accepted a call from Chile's leadership on the very day of a disaster of such magnitude? Would Chilean leaders have spent such a significant portion of these interactions pledging assistance and indicating the proactive steps they were undertaking to assist a devastated U.S.? Would they have taken such bold, preemptive action without first seeking for an invitation or permission from the U.S.? If so, would the U.S. have publicly received these messages without objection as Chilean leaders did? And would Chile have extended a large list of recommendations to the U.S. to help it improve its processes in the future? While answering these questions is beyond the scope of the present critique, one can reasonably assume that the rhetorical significance of reversed messages would certainly have had much different

implications for the identity of both nations. It is important not only that the roles, the scripts, and overall drama played out as they did to perpetuate certain national identity traits but also that this interaction occurred without controversy in front of a global audience.

Furthermore, a broad look at the historical relationship between the U.S. and Chile provided earlier in this thesis reveals that this rhetorical construction of Chile's identity has occurred in the past as the result of incidents that did not involve natural disaster. For example, Cottam (1994) claimed that in the 1960s, "the United States saw Chile in a very favorable but patronizing light as an example of the success ... of gradual economic reform and political democracy, U.S.-style" (p. 55). Thus, in the fifty years prior to the 2010 earthquake, the U.S. held Chile up to its own standards of successful governance and evaluated it based on these standards. Further, during Chile's years under Allende's rule, President Nixon and his advisors saw Chile as a "child" in danger, reflecting themes of paternalism also brought to light in this analysis (Hersh, 1983, p. 263). While the government of Chile and the relationship between the U.S. and Chile has changed considerably over the past few decades, some identity traits assigned to Chile by U.S. government leaders remain the same.

As many scholars have claimed, the formation of identity by national leaders has incredible power. McGee (1975) asserted that a rhetor's words have the potential to change the behavior of his or her audience members as they seek to enact the identity that the rhetor helped to create. Thus, the rhetoric of the most important global leaders who regularly "perform" in front of audiences of millions has the power to change behavior and ultimately change reality for those millions. No matter who leads the U.S. government and no matter which party they represent, classic American identity traits will persist. It is therefore important to think critically

about the dramatic rhetoric of our leaders in order to better understand how it enacts these traits for us and other nations and relegates hierarchical relationships between us. Only when we dig beneath the surface of this rhetoric can we attain a real understanding of the course of the drama we perform in on a world stage and change that course for the better.

Appendix

List of Aid Provided to Chile

The following is a list of the aid that was provided to Chile as it is reported by the U.S. Embassy in Chile (US. Department of State, Embassy in Santiago, Chile, 2010a):

- 33 Humanitarian Reconstruction Projects through the U.S. Southern Command Humanitarian Assistance Program (USSOUTHCOM-HAP) directed at four regions severely affected by the earthquake (USDOS Embassy in Santiago, Chile, 2010b).
- A U.S. Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) sent by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was sent to Chile on March 5 to identify and respond to humanitarian needs.
- USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) sent eight mobile water treatment units.
- The U.S. Government donated over 50 satellite phones to facilitate communication while local telephone services were not functioning.
- The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) provided two C-130 Aircrafts with teams of airmen to transport cargo and passengers between Santiago and Concepción, Chile.
- The U.S. military created a Command and Control center at the U.S. Embassy in Santiago where U.S. relief efforts could be coordinated.
- USAID and the U.S. Air Force provided an Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) unit to provide medical care for effected victims.

- The DoD provided tents and heavy duty tools.
- USAID, OFDA, and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) sent shelter and sanitation supplies.
- 20 dual voltage generators were sent.
- USAID and OFDA donated $1 million to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to support the organization in their relief efforts.
- The FBI provided the Chilean law enforcement agencies with a Virtual Command Center (VCC).
- The FBI's Criminal Justice Information Service Global Initiatives Unit provided Biometric Records Assistance to help Chilean law enforcement identify victims.
- The U.S. Navy sent a technical team to help assist damages of two sites.
- The State of California joined the Chilean Government in carrying out research and training programs to help prevent destruction from future earthquakes.
- The California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) participated in the seminar "2010 Issues: Chile Reconstruction" on April 6.
- The U.S. also provided much scientific and technical support such as satellite images provided by a U.S. interagency group, seismometers and reports from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), sensors from the Incorporated Research Institutions of Seismology (IRIS), as well as other surveys and assessments.

*The U.S. Embassy also acknowledges that numerous donations were made by private individuals and companies from within the U.S.; however the present study is

exclusively concerned with official aid provided by the U.S. government in response to the 2010 Chilean earthquake.

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