Equal Protection and the New Rational Basis Test: the Mentally Retarded are not Second Class Citizens in Cleburne

Gordon W. Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr

Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Disability Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Housing Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.
Equal Protection and the New Rational Basis Test:
the Mentally Retarded are not Second Class
Citizens in *Cleburne*

Recently, the Fifth Circuit held that classifications involving the mentally
retarded were quasi-suspect and should be reviewed under a heightened scruti-
ny analysis. The Supreme Court reversed that holding but granted the re-
tarded a remedy by applying a more genuine scrutiny under the rational
basis test. The Court's decision in *City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.* raises the question whether the Court intends to apply an in-
creased level of scrutiny under the rational basis test or whether this case
merely represents another ad hoc decision made on the horns of a dilemma.
This Note discusses the uncertain impact of *Cleburne* on the retarded and
similarly situated individuals.

I. INTRODUCTION

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."1 Yet in the process of making leg-
islative judgments, the legislature creates classifications which bur-
den some groups of people and benefit others.2 The United States
Supreme Court, in its effort to single out invidious political judg-
ments, has developed three standards of review to determine
whether classifications are unduly burdensome and discriminatory.3
However, a controversy has arisen from the Court's failure to articu-
late a coherent set of principles for applying these standards. Fur-
thermore, special scrutiny raises the question of the legitimacy of
judicial review in a democratic society.4

In July, 1985, in the case of *City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne*


(rational basis); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny); McLaugh-

4. See Ackerman, *The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution*, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1013-16 (1984) (discussing the "countermajoritarian difficulty" with judicial re-
view). See generally Thayer, *The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law*, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (the seminal article on the equal
protection clause, arguing for constraints on judicial power lest the legislature be ren-
dered impotent as a governing body). See also infra note 23.
Living Center, Inc., the Supreme Court was presented with another opportunity to clarify standards of judicial review by responding to a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification which warrants heightened scrutiny review. The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, rejected the quasi-suspect standard of review, instead relying on the rational basis test to invalidate the zoning ordinance as applied to the mentally retarded residents of the Featherston home. The holding in Cleburne Living Center raises the question whether the Court intends to apply an increased level of scrutiny under the rational basis test and if so, to which classifications.

In attempting to address these questions, this Note briefly examines the development of the standards of judicial review under the equal protection clause as applied to legislative classifications. Additionally, this Note analyzes the content of the Cleburne Court's majority, concurring and dissenting opinions which established the level of review for legislative classifications concerning the mentally retarded and discusses the possible ramifications of this decision on future equal protection claims.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. History of the Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause was enacted to prohibit state and local governments from abusing their legislative power by arbitrarily classifying persons. It guarantees that classifications will be drawn properly to accomplish a permissible state interest, either to advance a social good or to remedy a social mischief. Equal protection requires that those who are similarly situated be treated similarly. In making this determination a court will consider first, whether the legislative end is legitimate and second, whether the classification relates to...
that end.\textsuperscript{11} If the state interest is found to be illegitimate or the classification unrelated or unduly burdensome, the classification will not be upheld.\textsuperscript{12}

The equal protection clause has evolved from being what Mr. Justice Holmes called, "the last resort of constitutional arguments,"\textsuperscript{13} into "a potent egalitarian instrument."\textsuperscript{14} For nearly eighty years following its ratification in 1868, the equal protection clause was interpreted under a very lenient "rational basis" standard which afforded great deference to legislative classifications.\textsuperscript{15} During the 1940's, the elements of the present equal protection analytical structure began to take shape with the creation of a "suspect classification."\textsuperscript{16} Even so, at the beginning of the 1960's judicial intervention was still virtually unknown except in racial discrimination cases.\textsuperscript{17}

The Warren Court then developed a "two-tiered" analysis based on "a broadly-conceived egalitarianism."\textsuperscript{18} The two-tiered analysis applied a strict scrutiny standard to classifications involving "fund-
mental rights"¹⁹ and "suspect classifications" while applying minimal scrutiny or mere rationality review in all other cases.²⁰ Due to its ever-increasing attention to equal protection claims,²¹ the Burger Court became dissatisfied with the rigid two-tiered, all-or-nothing analysis. This dissatisfaction led to the development of a "middle tier" of intermediate review during the 1970's.²² The Burger Court's current approach to equal protection claims therefore involves the application of three standards of review: (1) rational basis, (2) strict scrutiny, and (3) intermediate scrutiny.

1. Rational Basis Review

Rational basis review,²³ the minimal level of scrutiny, requires that there be "some rationality in the nature of the class singled out"²⁴ as it relates to furthering a legitimate state interest. A legitimate state interest is one which is designed to promote the general good of the people.²⁵ Under this standard of review, the Court does not require a

---

¹⁹. Professor Nowak lists six substantive categories of fundamental rights: (1) first amendment rights, (2) right to vote, (3) right to interstate travel, (4) right to fairness in the criminal process, (5) right to fairness in procedures concerning deprivations of life, liberty, or property, and (6) right to privacy, which includes right to freedom of choice in marital decisions. J. NOWAK, supra note 9, at 460-61. The concept of "fundamental rights" is outside the scope of this note. Some commentators believe that the right to live in the "least restrictive setting" is a fundamental right which zoning exclusions violate. See, e.g., Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 767, 783 (1979).

²⁰. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.

²¹. Regarding the increased time spent addressing equal protection claims, Professor Edward L. Barrett calculates that "[d]uring the sixteen terms of the Warren Court, equal protection claims were discussed in an average of five and one-half opinions per year. During the ten terms of the Burger Court the average has been eighteen opinions a year and twenty-two during the 1978 term." Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J. 845, 856 (1979-80).

²². See Gunther, supra note 8, at 12. Professor Gunther identifies three themes in Burger Court decisions: (1) reluctance to expand the scope of the new equal protection, (2) mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court, and (3) willingness to use the equal protection clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to strict scrutiny language. Id.

²³. Rational basis review manifests the Court's concern with issues of federalism and maintaining an independent judiciary in a democratic government. See Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and Distrust, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 214-21 (1981) (judicial power should be constrained by federalism concerns). The Court, whose members are appointed for life, is reluctant to overrule decisions made by an elected body whose actions are subject to popular review at every election. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-9 (1980). See also supra note 4.


²⁵. Legitimate state interests are those which benefit the general good of a state, such as regulations which "promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and [which] . . . increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. at 31. The phrase "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" is frequently used by the
close fit between the classification drawn and the legislative end.\textsuperscript{26} Instead, the Court will uphold a classification if it can find any conceivable rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.\textsuperscript{27}

Traditionally, the Court has given great deference to the legislature as being the branch of government best suited to find the facts and to carefully balance burdens and benefits.\textsuperscript{28} This deference by the Court has become the “equivalent of a strong presumption of constitutionality”\textsuperscript{29} rendering the test “toothless” for the purpose of invalidating economic and social welfare legislation. Even though rational basis review has been considered a rubber stamp for such legislation, the Court has, on several occasions, invalidated statutes under this test.\textsuperscript{30}

2. Strict Scrutiny Review

The maximum level of review applied by the Court is strict scrutiny. It is triggered when legislation affects a “suspect classification” or a “fundamental right.”\textsuperscript{31} A classification becomes “suspect” when it is based on characteristics possessed by members of a class which have no relevance to any legitimate state interest.\textsuperscript{32} The state bears a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (allowing reform to take “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind”).
\item \textsuperscript{27} See generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam) (statute excluding some vendors from city while allowing others to remain was rationally related to city’s interest in maintaining a tourist atmosphere).
\item \textsuperscript{28} See L. Tribe, supra note 24, § 16-2, at 995.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Id. § 16-2, at 996. The Lochner era, 1897-1937, exemplified a deviation from this presumption of constitutionality during which time the Court invalidated a significant number of state and federal statutes under the rationality test. See id. §§ 8-3 to 8-7, at 434-55.
\item \textsuperscript{30} At times the Court has employed an intermediate level of scrutiny under the guise of the rational basis test. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (where Court used greater scrutiny than that used with general economic or social welfare legislation because “sensitive personal rights” of illegitimate children were involved). See generally Barrett, supra note 21, at 856-86 (listing cases in which the Court has invalidated legislation by applying the rational basis test and discussing increased judicial scrutiny of the rational relation of the legislation to the state interest); Gunther, supra note 8.
\item \textsuperscript{31} See supra notes 16 \& 19.
\item \textsuperscript{32} See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (“Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal.”); cf. id. at 223 (illegal alien status is not a “constitutional irrelevancy”). The color of one’s skin can never be constitutionally relevant. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880) (stating
heavy burden in proving that the suspect classification is precisely tailored and necessary to achieve a permissible goal of "compelling" importance.33 The purpose of the test is to preserve substantive values of equality by closely scrutinizing governmental choices.34

Suspect classifications are determined by whether a group's status is "discrete and insular."35 Courts and commentators have recognized certain indicia for determining a group's discreteness and insularity, such as immutability,36 historical prejudice,37 and political powerlessness.38 Courts also look to whether the classification is one "more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice."39 Only a

that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and . . . no discrimination shall be made against them because of their color").

33. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 224-26 (governmental interest in deporting illegal aliens insufficient to justify denial of education). A constitutionally compelling end has a value so great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values. J. Nowak, supra note 9, at 591-92. The only interests thus far considered compelling have been war, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and threat of loss of life to prisoners in custody of the state, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 334 (1968) (where separation of persons in prison by race, in order to stop an outbreak of violence based on racial conflict, was held to be a compelling state interest). This has led at least one author to term classifications burdening minority races as "prohibited." See Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee — Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974).

34. L. Tribe, supra note 24, § 16-13, at 1012. Only in rare cases has the classification been upheld. See supra note 16. The strict scrutiny test has been referred to as "strict in theory but fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.

35. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition calling for heightened scrutiny). See also generally Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (developing the history of Justice Stone's classic phrase, as well as its future impact on equal protection claims).

36. An immutable characteristic cannot be controlled or altered by those bearing it. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.) ("[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth . . . ."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 220 (illegal alien status of minors is a "characteristic over which children can have little control"). But see id. at 219 n.19 (illegal alien status of adults is a "product of voluntary action").

37. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (Court looks to "history of purposeful unequal treatment"). Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 684 (in which the Court comments on classification regarding women, stating that the "Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.") with Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1980) (in which the Court finds "nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special solicitude of the courts").

38. This factor is designed to protect groups which are under represented in the majoritarian political process and therefore cannot have an effect on the democratic system. See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 23, at 164 ("women have been operating at an unfair disadvantage in the political process"). Political powerlessness was a primary factor in extending protection to aliens, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), and denying it to age classifications, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).

39. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14. This determination can be made on the basis of stereotypical characteristics. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
few classifications have been designated suspect: race,\textsuperscript{40} national origin,\textsuperscript{41} and, in some circumstances, alienage.\textsuperscript{42} It seems unlikely that the Burger Court will declare additional classifications to be suspect.\textsuperscript{43}

3. Intermediate Scrutiny Review

When legislation involves an important fundamental interest or a "quasi-suspect" classification,\textsuperscript{44} the Court will apply intermediate scrutiny.\textsuperscript{45} Under intermediate scrutiny the state must show that the legislative means employed are "substantially related" to an important state goal.\textsuperscript{46} This requirement implies that the state must have more than a legitimate interest and the classification must closely relate to the governmental end.\textsuperscript{47} The Court will not engage in hypothetical theorizing but will only examine the articulated or actual purpose for the classification.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{40} See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (where the Court invalidated an anti-interracial marriage statute as being an invidious classification); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classifications are "immediately suspect").

\textsuperscript{41} See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (where exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury service was considered as equally suspect as racial discrimination).

\textsuperscript{42} Alienage in this context refers to non-citizenship. Congress may classify according to alienage with respect to the admission of aliens into this country, but once admitted, discrimination based on alienage becomes suspect. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (declaring a classification based on legal alienage inherently suspect) with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (rejecting the claim that "illegal aliens" are a suspect class).

\textsuperscript{43} See, e.g., L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall criticizing the Court for its conservative bent).

\textsuperscript{44} The phrase "quasi-suspect" classification was used by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For a general treatment of these classifications, see Note, \textit{Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model}, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981).

\textsuperscript{45} The Court first acknowledged its use of intermediate review in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("our decision today will be viewed by some as a 'middle-tier' approach.").

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.} at 199. To withstand a constitutional challenge, quasi-suspect classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. \textit{See generally} L. Tribe, \textit{supra} note 24, §§ 16-30 to 16-31, at 1082-92 (describing circumstances which trigger intermediate scrutiny). \textit{See also} generally Fox, \textit{Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the Role of the Court}, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1980) (analyzing and comparing Tribe's model with the "new equal protection" model proposed by Gunther); Gunther, \textit{supra} note 8.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{See infra} note 50.

\textsuperscript{48} L. Tribe, \textit{supra} note 24, § 16-30, at 1083-84.
The ad hoc quality of intermediate review seems to result from the Court's application of a balancing test by which quasi-suspect classifications are independently examined and balanced against the importance of the state interest.49 Although the Court's use of intermediate review has been sporadic,50 it has been applied to classifications involving gender,51 illegitimacy,52 and minor children of illegal aliens.53 Courts have declined to extend intermediate review to classifications based on age54 or wealth.55 In order to qualify as a "quasi-suspect" classification, the group upon which the classification is based must bear a close resemblance to "discrete and insular minorities", thereby warranting more than minimal judicial scrutiny.56 The criteria used for determining the quasi-suspectness of a class are essentially the same as those used for suspect classifications. The difference between the two is that the quasi-suspect classification need only further an important state interest.

B. History of the Mentally Retarded

1. Institutionalization

Approximately six and one half million Americans are classified as legally retarded.57 These citizens have been historically mistreated58

49. J. NOWAK, supra note 9, at 595.
50. For a discussion on how each Justice regards intermediate review, see Weidner, The Equal Protection Clause: The Continuing Search for Judicial Standards, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 867, 909-17 (1980). Professor Tribe points out five techniques of analysis used by the United States Supreme Court which suggest that intermediate scrutiny has been applied: (1) assessing the importance of the legislative objective; (2) demanding a close fit between the classification and the legislative objective; (3) requiring current articulation of the statutory objective; (4) limiting the use of after-thought to supply a legislative objective; and (5) requiring that an individual be permitted to contest denial of the right on the grounds that such denial does not further the objectives of the statute. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-30, at 1082-89.
51. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1981) (nursing school policy of excluding men was not substantially related to governmental interest in benefiting women because women have not been historically discriminated against in the nursing profession); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based age differential in state drinking law did not substantially further state interest in reducing drunk driving). But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (where Court upheld a state "statutory rape" law holding only men criminally liable).
52. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (statute setting one year limitation within which to bring paternity suit to identify natural father was not "substantially related" to state's interest of preventing fraudulent claims).
56. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-31, at 1090.
57. L.A. Times, July 2, 1985, § 1, at 5, col. 2. Paul Friedman, Director of the Mental Health Law Project, stated that:

340
and considered "a menace to society and civilization; . . . responsible to a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems." During the 1920's, in an effort to protect society from the "deviant" retarded, states engaged in large-scale institutionalization of the mentally retarded. Legislation limited the rights of the retarded to marry and procreate as well as to vote. It was not until a half century later that professionals began to recognize the ability of retarded persons to be habilitated. Mental health professionals now believe that the institutionalization of the retarded causes social and cultural deprivation which hinders them from reaching their full potential as contributing members of society.

2. Normalization

The goal of the "normalization" movement is to make available to the retarded, "conditions of every day living which are as close as possible to the regular circumstances and ways of life of society." The group home concept is the direct progeny of the normalization movement and is considered the principal alternative to institutional living. Group homes aim to provide a less restrictive environment in

A person is mentally retarded when "we" say he is. Mental retardation is not a fact but a label or classification applied to a very diverse group of people — often for purposes of segregating or restricting them, although sometimes for purposes of providing services not available to all in the community.


58. The leading work on the developmental approach and philosophy of the mentally retarded is W. Wolfensburger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Model, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensburger eds. 1969) (containing a discussion of the historical mistreatment of the mentally retarded). As early as the Puritans, the retarded were hanged and burned, being suspected as witches. Id. at 35-36.


60. Id.

61. Id.

62. Id. at 231.
which retarded persons can develop to their full potential. Typi-
ically, a small number of retarded persons live in a family-type envi-
ronment with trained supervisors acting as parents. One of the
major obstacles to the establishment of group homes for the retarded
has been community resistance manifested through local zoning
ordinances.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In July of 1980, Jan Hannah purchased a building in Cleburne,
Texas to establish a group home for thirteen mentally retarded men
and women. Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. (CLC) was to supervise
the home. Because the site was located in an R-3 district, Cleburne's
applicable zoning ordinance required that a special use permit, re-
newable annually, be obtained from the Cleburne City Council for
the construction of "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or al-
coholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." CLC
accordingly applied for the permit. It was denied by a three-to-
one vote at a public hearing on October 14, 1980, based on the re-
commendation of the Cleburne Planning and Zoning Commission.

Having exhausted administrative remedies, CLC, Advocacy, Inc.,
and the Johnson County Association for Retarded Citizens (JCARC)
filed suit against the city and several officials in federal
district court alleging that the zoning ordinance was invalid both on
its face and as applied because it violated the equal protection rights
of the mentally retarded. The district court upheld the ordinance
and its application to the group home despite its determination that
the city council's decision "was motivated primarily by the fact that

67. See Chandler & Ross, supra note 59, at 308. See generally O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (where court declared involuntary hospitalization of mentally
ill to be a violation of the constitutional right to liberty); Nirje, supra note 65 (discuss-
ing development of normalization movement).
68. Lippincott, supra note 19, at 769.
69. Included among the reasons given for resistance to group homes by com-
nunity home owners are decreased property values, safety, traffic, and noise level. Id.
70. Hannah is the vice president and part owner of CLC (presently called Commu-
nity Living Concepts, Inc.). 726 F.2d at 193. For expediency, Hannah and CLC will
both be referred to as CLC in this Note.
71. CLEBURNE, TEX., ZONING ORDINANCES § 16 (1965) (emphasis added). An R-3
district is zoned for apartment housing and allows such uses as: apartment houses, mul-
tiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, hospi-
tals, sanitariums, nursing or convalescent homes. Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
72. 726 F.2d at 194. See also infra note 97.
73. Advocacy, Inc. is "a non-profit corporation that provides legal services to de-
velopmentally disabled persons." 105 S. Ct. at 3252 n.1.
74. JCARC was found to lack standing by both the district court and the court of
appeals. 726 F.2d at 203.
75. CLC also alleged violation of the Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6716(b)(2)
(1983), and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Both claims were
dismissed by the district court and court of appeals. 726 F.2d at 194.
the residents of the home would be mentally retarded.'”76

CLC subsequently filed suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 5, 1984, the court of appeals reversed, holding that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and legislation utilizing this classification must be subjected to intermediate level scrutiny.77 The appellate court cited several factors for arriving at its determination: (1) historical mistreatment, (2) discrimination likely reflecting deep-seated prejudice, (3) political powerlessness, and (4) immutability of the mentally retarded condition.78 Applying a heightened scrutiny test, the court held the zoning ordinance invalid both facially and as applied because it did not substantially further an important governmental interest.79

After a petition for a rehearing en banc was denied, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.80 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court on July 1, 1985, holding that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect classification.81 Nevertheless, by applying the rational basis standard of review, the Court held the ordinance invalid as applied to the respondents, potential residents of the CLC group home.82

IV. MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Mentally Retarded are not a Quasi-Suspect Class

Justice White,83 giving the opinion for the Court, began his analysis of whether mental retardation should be deemed a “quasi-suspect” classification by recounting the history of the three standards of review.84 He proceeded to analyze why the appellate court's

76. 105 S. Ct. at 3253 (quoting App. 93, 94). The district court held the ordinance constitutional based on the traditional rational basis test giving great deference to the legislature.
77. 726 F.2d at 198. This decision of the fifth circuit is the “first appellate court decision to unequivocally adopt the intermediate level of scrutiny when dealing with legislative discrimination against mentally retarded persons.” Note, Expanding the Quasi Suspect Class to Include Mentally Retarded Persons: Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 18 AKRON L. REV. 141 (1984) (discussing the case after the court of appeals decision but before the Supreme Court reversed).
78. 726 F.2d at 197-98. See also supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
79. 726 F.2d at 201.
81. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
82. Id.
83. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor.
84. 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
heightened scrutiny test was inappropriate, primarily whether the indicia of the group's classification was "discrete and insular" in nature. Justice White pointed out that the immutable characteristic of mental retardation is "a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world." This is a characteristic which legislators, with the help of "qualified professionals," may legitimately take into consideration in dealing with the specific needs of such a diverse class.

The Court admitted that there has been a continuing trend of legislative antipathy or prejudice toward the mentally retarded, but asserted that the federal government had responded by enacting legislation to provide equality to retarded persons. This positive legislative response to the plight of the retarded led the Court to conclude that the retarded are not "politically powerless, in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers." The Court stated further that applying a heightened scrutiny test would stifle new legislation by requiring legislative bodies to more fully justify their efforts.

The Court argued that granting the mentally retarded quasi-suspect status would open the "quasi-suspect" flood gates to equally amorphous groups like the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. This would certainly pose new problems in reviewing classifications. Relying on the presumption that governmental action is legitimate and the fact that retardation is a characteristic which is relevant to state interests, the majority refused to recognize the

85. His disqualification of the quasi-suspectness of the class appears to hinge on the warning in Murgia that "the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how and to what extent those interests should be pursued." Id. at 3255. See also supra notes 4, 15, 22, 23 and accompanying text.
86. 105 S. Ct. at 3256. See also infra note 140.
87. 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
89. 105 S. Ct. at 3257. Compare Note, supra note 62 (where it is argued that retarded have no democratic voice) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (plurality opinion) (discussing underrepresentation of women in our nation's decision-making bodies). See also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
90. 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
91. Id. at 3257-58. In an analogous case, the ninth circuit held that heightened scrutiny was appropriate in reviewing an ordinance which excluded former mental patients from an R-2 zone. J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983). Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the status of the mentally ill, some commentators believe they should be designated a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See generally Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
92. 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class. Therefore, the Court found rational basis to be the appropriate level of review for classifications based on retardation.

B. Rational Basis For the Retarded

Applying the rational basis standard, Justice White stated that legislation distinguishing between the retarded and others must be "rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." The question was whether Cleburne's zoning ordinance provided such a rational relationship. The majority felt that if requiring a special use permit did deprive the respondents of their constitutional rights, there would be no occasion to address the broader issue of whether the ordinance was facially invalid or invalid as against all retarded persons.

Justice White pointed out that the zoning ordinance did not require a special use permit for numerous other facilities. Addressing the factors for requiring the permit, the Supreme Court's analysis virtually repeated the appellate court's analysis. Both opinions asserted that negative attitudes and unsubstantiated fears are not permissible bases for treating a home for the retarded differently than apartment houses or nursing homes. The city's interest in reducing traffic and noise was not supported by proof that the retarded

93. Id. The Court's primary reason for not deeming the retarded quasi-suspect seems to be that:

[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect..., it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.

94. Id. at 3257-58. See also supra note 25.

95. See also supra note 25.

96. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Boarding houses, fraternities, hospitals, sanitariums and nursing homes were among the permitted uses.

97. The factors in the city council's decision included: (1) the negative attitude of property owners located within 200 feet; (2) the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood; (3) the location of a junior high school across the street; (4) location of the group home on a five hundred year flood plain; and (5) the size of the home and number of people to be housed. 726 F.2d at 194.

98. Compare 105 S. Ct. at 3258-60 with 726 F.2d at 200-02.

99. 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
"drive more cars," "wander aimlessly into the streets" or create more noise than others.\footnote{100}{The City's asserted interest in reducing noise and traffic problems as a justification for the restrictive zoning suggests that the ordinance was being enforced based on stereotypes of the mentally retarded. \textit{Id. at} 3260.}

The city's stated desire to protect the retarded from harassment by teenagers at the junior high school across the street was rejected as a justification after looking to the extrinsic fact that there were some thirty retarded students attending the school. The city's interest in protecting the future residents from the danger of flood damage which occurs every five hundred years was also held to be insufficient justification. The retarded were likely to be better prepared than most residents due to strict federal standards imposed on intermediate care facilities.\footnote{101}{The retarded must be able to satisfy the federal standards imposed on an Intermediate Care Facility for safety, including knowing how to evacuate in an emergency. Telephone interview with Jan Hannah, vice president and part owner of CLC (Oct. 22, 1985).} In fact, the Court could find no satisfactory basis for requiring a special use permit of the mentally retarded while not requiring it of other groups. Justice White concluded that enforcement of the permit requirement in this case rested on "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded"\footnote{102}{105 S. Ct. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).} and was invalid as applied to the Featherston home.

V. \textbf{Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion}

Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion,\footnote{103}{Justice Stevens was joined in his concurrence by Chief Justice Burger.} agreed with the majority's application of the rational basis test as the appropriate standard of review. His philosophy of judicial review, however, is uniquely different.\footnote{104}{On Justice Stevens' philosophy, see generally Comment, \textit{Mr. Justice Stevens: An Examination of a Juridical Philosophy}, 23 St. Louis U.L.J. 126 (1979).} For Justice Stevens, there are not three standards of review but rather "a continuum of judgmental responses . . . ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one extreme to 'rational basis' at the other."\footnote{105}{105 S. Ct. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).} The tiered analysis is simply "'a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.'"\footnote{106}{\textit{Id.} at 3261 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring)).} According to Justice Stevens, the rational basis test is the only standard to be applied when reviewing equal protection decisions.\footnote{107}{\textit{Id.}}

Justice Stevens posed the following three questions which he believed would determine, in most cases, whether a statute has a rational basis: "What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been
subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor' by our laws?" 108  "What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?" 109 Asking these basic questions will result in "virtually automatic invalidation of racial classifications and in the validation of most economic classifications." 110 Justice Stevens points out that there is never a rational relationship between the color of one's skin and a legitimate state interest, whereas there is almost always some rationality between economic classifications and legitimate state interests. 111

Applying this approach, Justice Stevens balanced historical mistreatment of the retarded against the state's legitimate interest in dealing with the mentally retarded because of their reduced ability to function in society. Therefore, Justice Stevens would also invalidate the ordinance as applied to the CLC home. 112 It appears however, that Justice Stevens’ rational basis continuum would be less deferential toward economic or social legislation than the test used by the majority, 113 subjecting all legislation to equal scrutiny and to a balancing of burdens and benefits. 114

VI. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Marshall 115 began his analysis by agreeing with the majority that the retarded should have a remedy under the equal protection clause. 116 Having thus concurred, he attacked the majority on

108. Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens notes that "[t]he Court must be especially vigilant in evaluating the rationality of any classification involving a group that has been subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor . . . .'" Id. at 3261 n.6 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). This special vigilance seems to belie Justice Stevens’ application of an intermediate form of review. Weidner, supra note 50, at 915.

109. 105 S. Ct. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 3262.
111. Id. at 3261-62.
112. Id. at 3263.
113. It appears that Justice Stevens would be willing to subject all legislation to a more realistic scrutiny.
114. This philosophical approach bears close resemblance to that recognized by Professor Gunther as an early trend in the Burger Court. See generally Gunther, supra note 8.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall advocates a sliding scale approach to equal protection claims in which the level of scrutiny "should vary with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which
several points: first, the majority engaged in a wide ranging heightened scrutiny discussion while purportedly applying a rational basis standard; second, the majority was creating a “second order rational basis test”; third, the majority applied the wrong standard; and fourth, the majority provided a novel, truncated as-applied remedy.

A. Two For The Price of One

Justice Marshall first criticized the Court for violating one of the cardinal rules governing the federal courts: “[N]ever . . . formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” When a lower court properly decides a case by reaching unnecessary constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has generally affirmed on the narrower ground available without reaching the broader interpretation. Thus, having decided on the rational basis test, the Court should have declined to address heightened scrutiny.

B. Second Order Rational Basis

Justice Marshall next pointed out that the majority, though purporting to apply rational basis review, nonetheless subjected the ordinance to “precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny.” The standard used by the majority is not the traditional rational basis test set out in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., which gave great deference to the legislature. Rather, it is one which “sift[s] through the record to determine whether policy decisions are squarely supported by a firm factual foundation.”

the particular classification is drawn.” Id. at 3265 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). See also Weidner, supra note 50, at 912.

117. 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

118. Id. at 3264. This new rational basis test is the result of applying heightened scrutiny analysis under the guise of rational basis. The Court has done this on previous occasions. Id. at 3265 n.4. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

119. 105 S. Ct. at 3268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

120. Id. at 3272. Justice Marshall felt the remedy was truncated because it did not strike down the ordinance on its face but merely invalidated it as applied to the CLC home residents. Id.

121. Id. at 3263 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. at 2801). Interestingly, this is precisely what the majority purported to be doing. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.


123. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9 (declining to address strict scrutiny when heightened scrutiny is sufficient).

124. 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

125. 348 U.S. at 489 (where “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind”).

Court has thus shifted the burden to the legislature to prove a rational relationship to the classification.127

Justice Marshall criticized the Court's application of the rational basis test as "a small and regrettable step backward" toward Lochner.128 As the Court has provided no principled foundation for applying a more searching inquiry under the rational basis standard, lower courts are left in the dark and are likely to follow the precedent set in this case by invalidating more economic and social legislation in the future.129

C. Equal Protection Demands Heightened Scrutiny

Justice Marshall, after discussing at length the history of heightened scrutiny review, focused his attention on the factors relating to the mentally retarded which demand this standard. First, the exclusion of group homes deprives the retarded of a fundamental liberty.130 Second, the retarded have been subjected to a "lengthy and tragic history"131 of discrimination which rivaled and paralleled "the worst excesses of Jim Crow."132

Further, Justice Marshall pointed out the inconsistency in the majority's argument that because Congress had enacted legislation benefitting the retarded, the retarded could not be considered politically powerless.133 The Court applied the opposite analogy regarding gender in Frontiero v. Richardson, where it was indicated that because " 'Congress itself has concluded that classifications based on sex are

127. See 105 S. Ct. at 3260 (majority opinion) ("'The City never justifies its apparent view...'") (quoting 726 F.2d at 202) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (where the court invalidated legislation regulating number of hours bakery personnel could work). See also supra note 29.
129. 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 3265. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to "establish a home" is a fundamental liberty). See generally Chandler & Ross, supra note 59. Currently group homes are the principle alternative to institutionalization that the retarded have for living in the community. See supra note 67.
133. 105 S. Ct. at 3268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
inherently invidious,'" the Court likewise should do the same.\textsuperscript{134} The Court has never suggested that a classification becomes less suspect simply by virtue of extensive beneficial legislation.\textsuperscript{135} Justice Marshall concluded that "[f]or the retarded, just as for Negroes and women, much has changed in recent years, but much remains the same."\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{D. Applied Analysis of An As-Applied Remedy}

Justice Marshall finally addressed the majority's "preferred course of adjudication", which invalidated the ordinance only as applied to the respondents in this case.\textsuperscript{137} The paradox is that the majority, having held that the ordinance rested on "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the Featherston facility,"\textsuperscript{138} still invalidated it only as applied to the respondents. However, the Court was apparently acting under the belief that the ordinance might be "rational" in relation to a sub-group of the retarded.\textsuperscript{139}

Criticizing this reasoning, Justice Marshall pointed to the overinclusiveness of the ordinance. Nine-tenths of the group covered by the statute were similarly situated.\textsuperscript{140} Nevertheless, the nine-tenths were excluded on the basis of the one-tenth. Justice Marshall further stated that the Court had deviated from former precedent which struck down "impermissibly overbroad generalizations."\textsuperscript{141} This type of as-applied remedy poses future problems by placing on the courts "the task of redrafting the statute through an ongoing and cumber-

\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 3269 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 687).
\textsuperscript{135} Id. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984) (racial classifications are still suspect).
\textsuperscript{136} 105 S. Ct. at 3269 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 3258. The majority preferred this course in order to avoid making "unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments." Id.
\textsuperscript{138} Id. at 3260 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{139} Since the rational basis test does not require a close fit between the classification and legislative purpose the Court could justify not invalidating the ordinance completely.
\textsuperscript{140} 105 S. Ct. at 3273 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). There are four categories of mental retardation which are based on the level of intelligence quotient (I.Q.): (1) Mild - I.Q. 50 to 70 (89% of all retardates are educable), (2) Moderate - I.Q. 35 to 50 (6% are trainable), (3) Severe - I.Q. 20 to 35, and (4) Profound - IQ under 20 (remaining 5% fall into categories 3 & 4 and are totally dependent). 105 S. Ct. at 3256 n.9. These categories seem to have been drawn for administrative purposes, but legislation which pertains to five percent of the class can never justify exclusion of the whole class. Furthermore, due to the high federal standards placed on group homes, it is unlikely that the ordinance would pertain to even five percent of the group as the severely and profoundly retarded are rarely admitted as residents to these facilities.
\textsuperscript{141} See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating in toto a maternity leave policy which was rationally related to only a small percentage of teachers).
some process of 'as-applied' constitutional rulings."142 The alternative approach and the preferred course of adjudication, in Justice Marshall's view, would have been to invalidate the ordinance in toto, thus putting the responsibility back on the legislature to redraft outdated and discriminatory legislation.143

VII. IMPACT

The Supreme Court's holding in *City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center* appears to be another "ad hoc doctrine flexible enough to accommodate a cautious Court's preference for mildly progressive results."144 This case presented to the Court the question of whether mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification. In the process of deciding that question, the holding raises many more questions. How will the Court apply standards of judicial review in future equal protection claims? Is the rational basis test evolving? How has this decision helped retarded citizens? What does this decision mean for other groups?

The Court has emphatically embraced the fact that it uses three standards of review: rational basis, heightened scrutiny and strict scrutiny. By refusing to deem the mentally retarded a "quasi-suspect" class, the Court has reaffirmed its unwillingness to broaden current suspect and quasi-suspect categories, the implication being that the current suspect and quasi-suspect categories will be frozen to the existing classifications. Heightened scrutiny will be applied to gender, illegitimacy and minor children of illegal aliens, and strict scrutiny to classifications based on race, national origin and alienage. Other classifications will be reviewed under the rational basis test.

Perhaps the reason for not granting the retarded quasi-suspect status was pragmatic: the Court would have had to deal with an influx of equally amorphous groups like the aged, the disabled, the mentally ill, the poor and others. The Court seems to have ascertained, however, that the immutable characteristic of a reduced ability to cope in the everyday world is relevant to many state interests, both to benefit the retarded and to protect other citizens.

Has the Court created a second order rational basis test? The Court has on previous occasions used a stricter rational basis test, so

142. 105 S. Ct. at 3274. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 3273. Justice Marshall notes that the current Cleburne zoning ordinance was a redrafted version of a previous ordinance dating back to 1929, a time when discrimination against the retarded was at its worst. Id. at 3268 n.17.
one cannot legitimately say this is a new test. Perhaps a better question is whether this form of rational basis scrutiny will become a precedent or will it simply be limited to the facts of this particular case?

Considering the nature of this case, and the history of prejudice against the retarded, it seems obvious that justice requires a remedy in favor of the retarded. On this point, all nine justices unanimously agreed. A remedy could have been supplied under heightened scrutiny, requiring a holding that retardation is a quasi-suspect classification, or under a rational basis test involving more genuine scrutiny. (It could not have been supplied under the traditional deferential rational basis test.) Faced with these two alternatives, the majority once again chose the more cautious course, "the preferred course of adjudication." Having made the decision, the remainder of the opinion seems to be a justification and limitation of its consequences.

The natural consequences might have been a "small and regrettable step back" toward the *Lochner* era. However, the Court's intent in utilizing an "as-applied" remedy appears to be to impede such a constitutional step by limiting the decision to the facts. This adequately constrains judicial intrusion into legislative decisions and sends out the message that "the courts [are] very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices." The Court still believes that legislators, with the help of qualified professionals, are best suited to the task of dealing with the special needs of diverse classes of people. Although an as-applied remedy may lead to a greater congestion in the courts by requiring a case by case adjudication, courts could still summarily dispose of a case if the facts are similar enough to *Cleburne*. The Court may have intended to discourage such an influx of equal protection claims by rendering a narrow holding.

Will such a narrow holding help retarded citizens? Certainly "the justices have given out the message that the retarded aren't second class citizens and can't be pushed aside into industrial areas of the city." At the same time, the Court has determined that "the retarded don't pose any more of a threat to the community than any other group," such as fraternities or nursing home residents. The

145. See supra note 30.
146. 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
147. Id. at 3256.
148. L.A. Times, July 2, 1985, § 1, at 5, col. 2 (quoting Diane Shisk, supervising attorney for Advocacy, Inc.).
149. Telephone interview with Diane Shisk, supervising attorney for Advocacy, Inc. (Oct. 22, 1985). Diane Shisk mentioned that this decision would definitely help the mentally retarded. As a result of this decision, Texas passed a law allowing group homes of up to six residents to be established in any residential district in any city.
Court's holding in *Cleburne* may allow bigotry and prejudice to continue on the books;\(^{150}\) it may also determine how cities will interpret similar ordinances.\(^{151}\) It is ironic, in view of the expressed fears of the Cleburne residents, that two weeks after the Featherston Home began operating, it held an open house for the community; at that time, most of the neighboring residents were unaware that the home had been functioning.\(^{152}\) Though the retarded would have benefitted far more by a determination that they constituted a quasi-suspect class, the real import of the decision may be its future impact on other equally amorphous groups.

The logical effect is that other amorphous groups like the mentally ill, the infirm, the aged, the poor and homosexuals will likewise be reviewed under this second order rational basis test. The Court has already indicated in *Murgia*\(^ {153}\) that classifications based on age will receive rational basis review. Although the Ninth Circuit held the mentally ill to be a quasi-suspect class in *City of Tacoma*,\(^ {154}\) the *Cleburne* decision will probably alter that status. For groups which have a medical disability, science and medicine will probably provide the basis for determining whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state end.

AIDS victims, for example, will probably have to await a medical explanation to determine whether they may legitimately be excluded from campuses or schools. As long as the communicability of the disease remains uncertain, however, the state's interest in protecting the lives of its citizens will probably override the individual's interest in pursuing an education on campus. Although homosexuals have had difficulty obtaining intermediate review (due to the questionable nature of the class' "immutable" characteristic), unless science or medicine can prove immutability from birth, this group will likely be

\(^{150}\) Id.

\(^{151}\) Id.

\(^{152}\) Telephone interview with Jan Hannah, Vice President and part-owner of Concepts in Community Living, Inc. (formerly Cleburne Living Center, Inc.) established a group home in Keen, Texas. Keen has an ordinance which is almost identical to the ordinance in Cleburne. The City Council in Keen, however, analogized the mental retardation facility to a boarding house or a fraternity thereby circumventing the necessity of a special use permit. Telephone interview with Jan Hannah, Vice President and part-owner of Concepts in Community Living, Inc. (Oct. 22, 1985).

\(^{153}\) Id.


\(^{154}\) 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983).
subject to a heightened rational basis scrutiny. However, there still exists the possibility that homosexuals will ultimately find refuge under the fundamental right to privacy doctrine.  

Some statutes may have to be rewritten “through an ongoing and cumbersome process of ‘as applied’ constitutional rulings.” Nevertheless, for many groups, it appears that the holding in *Cleburne Living Center* will lead to a more scrutinizing judicial inquiry into legislative classifications thereby requiring the government to prove its motivation as something more than mere stereotypes and prejudice.

**VIII. CONCLUSION**

Equal protection claims are a constant reminder of the paradox inherent in many democratic ideals. The Supreme Court has struggled with equal protection standards of review because it must balance, on the one hand, “liberty,” and on the other, “justice for all.” The paradox presented by these concepts is, as one commentator has stated, that “equality is liberty’s great enemy and can be purchased only at an unacceptable price to freedom.”

The Court must balance these two fundamental ideals of democracy through the equal protection clause. It is unlikely that the controversy surrounding standards of judicial review of classifications will be quickly resolved. Moreover, the democratic system inherently questions judicial review of majoritarian decisions by a countermajoritarian body. Although the Supreme Court is still wrestling with this problem, the holding in *Cleburne Living Center* indicates that it is unwilling to allow injustice.

While the Court’s application of a heightened rational basis scrutiny seems to be preferable to deeming the mentally retarded a “quasi-suspect” class, the majority’s as-applied remedy remains inadequate. Zoning exclusions present a great obstacle to the ultimate goal of training the educable retarded to be contributing members of society. Ordinances of the Cleburne type are unnecessarily limiting.

---


156. 105 S. Ct. at 3274 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

157. Wash. Post, July 2, 1985, at A5, col. 1 (quoting Burt Neuborne, Litigation Director, American Civil Liberties Union). The ACLU was one of many groups to submit an amicus brief.

158. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 16-1, at 991.
Such ordinances are intended to be applied only to the noneducable retarded who comprise only five percent of all retarded persons; however, they remain in effect against all of the retarded. Had the majority invalidated the ordinance on its face, it would have placed the onus on the legislature to more closely tailor its ordinance to meet the legislative end. This would have had far reaching implications for all poorly drafted zoning ordinances.

Nevertheless, for the retarded and other groups upon which the decision will have an impact, the Court’s “preferred course of adjudication” can be seen as another small step in the direction of narrowing the gap between strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny “by raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.”159 For the retarded and these other groups, *Cleburne Living Center* may hold a promise of equal protection under the rational basis test.

GORDON W. JOHNSON

---
