Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Updated Legal Issues and Answers

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Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Updated Legal Issues and Answers

By Perry A. Zirkel
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This updated question-and-answer document is specific to impartial hearing officers (IHOs) and the hearings that they conduct under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The coverage does not extend to the alternate third-party dispute decisional mechanism under the IDEA, the complaint resolution process (CRP) except to the extent that this alternative mechanism intersects with IHO issues. Similarly, the scope only extends secondarily to the IHO’s remedial authority, which is the subject of separate comprehensive coverage. The sources are largely limited to the pertinent IDEA legislation and regulations, court decisions, and the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education’s (OSEP) policy letters. Thus, the answers are subject to revision or qualification based on (1) applicable state laws; (2) additional legal sources beyond

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4 OSEP is the specific organizational unit of the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services (OSERS) within the U.S. Department of Education that administers the IDEA. Although OSEP policy letters do not have the binding effect on IHOs of either the IDEA or, within their jurisdictions, court decisions, they provide a nationally applicable interpretation that courts often find persuasive. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Courts’ Use of OSEP Policy Interpretations in IDEA Cases, 344 EDUC. L. REP. 671 (2017). But cf. Seth B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Dist., 810 F.3d 961, 968 (5th Cir. 2015) (relying on the relevant regulation rather than the “questionable” OSEP interpretation). The citations for policy letters herein include the parallel ed.gov URLs when available for improved accessibility to the reader.
those cited; and (3) independent interpretation of the cited and additional pertinent legal sources. The author welcomes corrections and additions from interested parties so that the document is as accurate, comprehensive, and current as possible. Intended primarily for IHOs but ultimately for any interested individuals, this article organizes the items into various subject categories within two successive broad groups. Its purpose is to be a useful reference as a starting point for applicable authority, subject to the interpretation of the IHO or other interested individuals. For the specific overall organization, see the Table of Contents on the previous page, although presumably the “Find” feature will be the usual way of locating the applicable question and answer.

I. HEARING OFFICER ISSUES

A. IHO QUALIFICATIONS

I-1. Does the IDEA provide any standards for IHO competence?

Yes, the 2004 amendments provided, for the first time, competence standards, which are broadly focused on knowing special education law, conducting hearings, and writing decisions. Specifically, the IDEA competency standards require IHOs to:

(1) possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the provisions of [the IDEA], Federal and State regulations pertaining to [the IDEA], and legal interpretations of [the IDEA] by Federal and State courts; (2) possess the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice; and (3) possess the knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice.

5 For a systematic overview, see Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 3 (2018).


7 Id. In the few pertinent cases prior to these statutory standards, the courts rejected challenges to IHO competency because they were beyond the scope of the IDEA. E.g., Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (D. Md. 2000); Cavanagh v. Grasmick, 75 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (D. Md. 1999). After enactment of this standard, the case law has been very limited and rather deferential. E.g., A.C. v. W. Windsor Plainsboro Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 81 IDELR ¶ 19 (D.N.J. 2022); M.V. v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 75 IDELR ¶ 134 (S.D. Tex. 2019); Reyes v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty. Pub. Schs., 80 IDELR ¶ 286 (D. Md. 2020); Renee J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F. Supp. 3d 674, 698–99 (S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d on other grounds, 913 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2019); Bohn ex rel. Cook v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 8 (N.D. Iowa 2016); cf. Whitaker v. Bd. of Educ. for Prince George’s Pub. Sch., 77 IDELR ¶ 64 (D. Md. 2020) (declining to specifically address this matter in light of plaintiff’s failure to show any prejudicial effect).
I-2. Similarly, does the IDEA provide specific training requirements for IHOs that are enforceable in individual cases?

No, training requirements are a matter of state law. Thus far, the courts have not interpreted these state law provisions as incorporated in the IDEA.

I-3. What about the IDEA’s impartiality requirements?

In contrast to competence and training, IHO impartiality has been the subject of extensive litigation. Courts have been notably deferential, providing wide latitude to IHOs and generally not requiring the appearance of impropriety standard that applies to judges. The leading, but still not per se, exception for such deference, is for ex parte communications. The overlapping issue of recusal is largely a matter of state law, although an occasional court decision has identified
applicable criteria or procedures for appellate review. Finally, the courts have rejected challenges of bias based on box scores of hearing or review officer decisions in favor of either party.

Finally, the courts have rejected challenges of bias based on box scores of hearing or review officer decisions in favor of either party.

I-4. Would a school district’s notification to the IHO that final selection is contingent on the parent’s approval violate the IDEA?

Not according to OSEP’s interpretation, because the IDEA does not provide parents with a veto right in the appointment of IHOs. However, this interpretation does not seem to take into careful consideration that only a few state laws provide for party participation in the selection process.

B. IHO IMMUNITY

I-5. Do IHOs have the same sweeping, absolute immunity that judges have?

Yes, within the scope of their authority as IHOs.

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12 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (within subcategories of IHO qualifications and assignment and Party right to strike),


16 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 5, at 19–20. The approach in these few states is more limited than mutual selection. E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-8.02a(f)(5) (2018) (permitting each party the right to one substitution in the rotational assignment of the IHO).

II. HEARING/DECISION ISSUES

A. RESOLUTION PROCESS

II-1. Does the resolution process (in 34 C.F.R. § 300.510 (2021)) apply when a local education agency (LEA) files a due process complaint?

No, OSEP has explained that this process is not required in such cases. Rather, the forty-five-day period starts when the state education agency (SEA) and the parent receive the school district’s complaint. According to OSEP, the parent’s right to a sufficiency challenge and obligation to respond to the district’s complaint are the same as for the district in the reverse situation. For cases in which the parent raises a sufficiency challenge, OSEP added: “one way for an LEA to amend a due process complaint that is not sufficient is for the parent to agree in writing and be given an opportunity to resolve the LEA’s due process complaint through a resolution meeting.”

II-2. Are the discussions in resolution sessions confidential?

According to OSEP’s interpretation, the only confidentiality provisions that apply are the student records provisions in 34 C.F.R. § 300.610 (2021) and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Absent a voluntary agreement between the parties for confidentiality, OSEP’s


19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.
position is that either party may introduce evidence of these discussions at the hearing.\(^{23}\) Although the admissibility and the weight of such evidence remain within the IHO’s discretion, the limited case law supports the OSEP conclusion.\(^{24}\) Finally, although OSEP’s opinion is that “[a] State could not . . . require that the participants in a resolution meeting keep the discussions confidential,”\(^{25}\) some states have adopted laws saying so.\(^{26}\)

II-3. After filing for the hearing, may the parent unilaterally waive the resolution session?

No. Like mediation, which must be voluntary for each party,\(^{27}\) waiving the resolution session must be mutual (and in writing).\(^{28}\) Moreover, the regulations require delay of the due process hearing if the parent fails to participate in the resolution session in the absence of such mutual agreement, and they also authorize the IHO to dismiss the case upon the district’s motion if the parent’s refusal to participate persists for the thirty-day period despite the district’s documented reasonable efforts to obtain parental participation.\(^{29}\) The limited case law supports such dismissals.\(^{30}\)

II-4. Do difficulties communicating with the parents excuse a district’s delay in conducting the resolution session within the required fifteen-day period?\(^{31}\)


\(^{26}\) E.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(9)(a)(3).

\(^{27}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b)(1) (2021).

\(^{28}\) Id. § 300.532(c)(3) (providing the only alternative of mutually agreeing to mediation).

\(^{29}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(3)–(4) (2021).

No, according to the federal district court in the District of Columbia, at least if the parent has legal representation.\textsuperscript{32}

II-5. After convening the resolution session, may the district refuse to discuss the issues raised in a parent's due process complaint, instead only offering to convene an IEP team meeting to address these issues?

No, according to OSEP, this position would violate the IDEA.\textsuperscript{33}

II-6. In a case where the parent filed for the hearing and either party refused to participate in the resolution session, must the other party seek the IHO's intervention?

Yes, according to OSEP.\textsuperscript{34}

II-7. Would a parent's refusal to participate in the resolution session in person justify an IHO’s dismissal of her due process complaint?

No, according to OSEP, without considering whether the parent had valid reasons for refusing to physically attend the meeting.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, if the parent informs the district in advance of the meeting that circumstances prevent attendance in person, the district must offer the parent alternative means of participation, such as telephone or videoconferencing.\textsuperscript{36}

II-8. Would a state law that permits postponement of the resolution timeline when the SEA or LEA receives the parent’s due process complaint shortly before or during an extended holiday break be

\textsuperscript{31} The regulations require holding the meeting within fifteen days of the filing of the complaint and completing the resolution process within thirty days of the filing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a)(1), 300.510(b)(1) (2021).


\textsuperscript{34} Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item D-13.


consistent with the IDEA?

No, not according to OSEP. The specified period is fifteen calendar days, and the only exceptions are the alternate agreements between the parent and the LEA either to waive the resolution meeting or to utilize the mediation process.

II-9. May the parties mutually agree to extend the fifteen-day resolution period to resolve an expedited due process complaint?

No, according to OSEP. The agency based its conclusion that this deadline was absolute on the lack of any such waiver authority in 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c) (2021) and the overriding purpose of promptness in the applicable disciplinary cases.

II-10. If fifteen days after the parent’s filing for a due process hearing, the school district fails to convene or participate in the resolution session, what may the parents do to move the matter forward?

The parent may seek the IHO’s intervention to start the timeline for the hearing. Additionally, a federal district court ruled that this parental right is voluntary; thus, the parent’s choice not to exercise it did not excuse the district’s failure.


39 See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.

40 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item E-4; see also Letter to Gerl, 51 IDELR ¶ 166 (OSEP 2008), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-may-1-2008-to-west-virginia-attorney-james-gerl/.


II-11. If, after the parent files for a hearing, the parties neither waive nor hold the resolution session after thirty-one days, what happens on day thirty-one?

According to OSEP, the forty-five-day timeline for conducting the hearing and issuing a decision starts on day thirty-one.43

II-12. Does insufficiency of the complaint postpone the timeline or negate the requirement for the resolution session?

Not according to OSEP. More specifically, the commentary accompanying the regulations declared: “We agree with S. Rpt. No. 108–185, p. 38 [i.e., the IDEA’s legislative history], which states that the resolution meeting should not be postponed when the LEA believes that a parent’s complaint is insufficient.”44

II-13. Does a non-attorney parent advocate’s presence at the resolution session trigger the district’s qualified right to attend with its attorney?

Not according to OSEP, even if the advocate is entitled under state law to represent the parent/student at a due process hearing.45

II-14. What is the legal result if a parent fails or refuses to participate in the resolution session upon the district’s timely attempt to schedule the session within fifteen days?

According to OSEP, the district’s obligation is to “continue to make diligent efforts throughout the remainder of the [thirty]-day resolution period to convince the parent to participate in a resolution meeting.” Examples of such efforts include “detailed records of telephone calls made or attempted and the results of those calls and copies of correspondence sent to the parents and any responses received.” Moreover, at the conclusion of this thirty-day period, the LEA “may request


However, mitigating this eventuality, OSEP also stated that the SEA has the responsibility to enforce the LEA’s affirmative obligation to convene the resolution meeting within fifteen days of receiving the parent’s complaint. Id. Moreover, state regulations may contribute to the conclusion that the failure to waive or hold the resolution session precludes holding the impartial hearing. Colbert Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. B.R.T. ex rel. Cagle, 51 IDELR ¶ 16 (N.D. Ala. 2008).


that a hearing officer dismiss the complaint when the LEA is unable to obtain the participation of a parent in a resolution meeting, despite making reasonable efforts to obtain the parent's participation and documenting its efforts.\textsuperscript{46}

II-15. For violations of the resolution-session requirements, must the other party seek the intervention of the IHO?

Yes, according to OSEP, “[t]he appropriate party must seek the hearing officer's intervention to either dismiss the complaint or to initiate the hearing timeline, depending on the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{47}

II-16. Does a district’s delay in conducting the resolution session constitute a denial of the IDEA obligation to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE)?

Not necessarily.\textsuperscript{48}

II-17. Must the district representative at the resolution session have final and absolute authority to resolve the complaint?

Not quite, according to an unpublished decision. In rejecting the superintendent and special education director in the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that said representative “satisfies the statutory requirement only if he or she, in fact, has the authority—by express delegation or otherwise—to make the decision about what the LEA will or will not do to resolve the issues presented in the IDEA complaint.”\textsuperscript{49}

II-18. Would the district’s violation of this requirement be the basis for an IHO order based on denial of FAPE?

No, according to the same decision, without an evidentiary basis that this procedural violation impeded the child’s substantive right to FAPE.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{46} Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item D-7. \\
\textsuperscript{47} Id. at item D-13. \\
\textsuperscript{48} E.g., J.D.G. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 748 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Del. 2010) (no denial of FAPE where parents contributed to the delay and no harm to child). \\
\textsuperscript{49} J.Y. ex rel. E.Y. v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 33 (M.D. Ala. 2014). \\
\textsuperscript{50} Id.
\end{flushleft}
II-19. Does the IDEA permit the school district to unilaterally amend the IEP during the resolution session to cure the basis for a tuition reimbursement claim?

No.51

B. SUFFICIENCY PROCESS

II-20. Does the filing party’s failure to provide a proposed resolution to the problem automatically render the complaint insufficient?

No, because this specification for the complaint only applies to the extent known and available to the party at the time of filing.52 Moreover, based on the determination of insufficiency being a matter of the IHO’s discretion to determine insufficiency,53 OSEP has concluded, “the inclusion or omission of a proposed resolution should not be read to create a conflict with, or limitation upon, an impartial hearing officer’s authority and ability to formulate an appropriate equitable remedy.”54

II-21. Does the IDEA require the noncomplaining party to specify the basis for its insufficiency motion?

No.55

II-22. What steps are available to the complaining party if an IHO rules that the due process complaint is insufficient?

Citing the pertinent IDEA regulations and the comments accompanying them, OSEP answered that 1) the IHO must identify the specific insufficiencies in the notice; 2) the filing party may amend its complaint if the other party provides written consent and has an opportunity for mediation or a resolution session; 3) the IHO may, if the filing party does not exercise this

51 The Second Circuit clarified that its previous statement to that effect was merely dicta and, upon direct consideration, is contrary to the IDEA. Bd. of Educ. of Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist. v. C.S., 990 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2021).


55 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2021).
amendment option, dismiss the insufficient complaint; and 4) the party may re-file if within the two-year limitations period.⁵⁶

Yes, according to OSEP.⁵⁷

II-24. Have courts been supportive of strict IHO interpretations of the IDEA’s sufficiency requirements?

The limited case law to date leaves the answer to this question unsettled. The Third Circuit upheld an IHO’s dismissal of a case where the parent unsuccessfully argued that the Supreme Court’s characterization in *Schaffer v. Weast*⁵⁸ of the IDEA’s pleading requirements as “minimal” allowed less than strict compliance with all of the required elements of the complaint.⁵⁹ Yet, in another unpublished decision, the federal district court in New Hampshire reversed an IHO’s dismissal for insufficiency, alternatively citing with approval this dictum in *Schaffer* and the school district’s failure to contest the matter within the prescribed fifteen-day window.⁶⁰ Providing a third approach, the Eighth Circuit held, in an unpublished decision, that the IDEA does not provide for judicial review of IHO sufficiency decisions.⁶¹

II-25. Conversely, do courts favor a strict interpretation of the IDEA’s requirements for the defendant’s response to the complaint?

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⁵⁶ *Id.* § 300.507(d); *Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra* note 18, at item C-4.

⁵⁷ *Id.*


No, courts have generally concluded that said procedural violation, without a resulting substantive loss to the student or parents, is not the basis for a default judgment or denial-of-FAPE remedy.\(^{62}\)

### C. JURISDICTION

II-26. **Do IHOs have jurisdiction for violations of the prehearing, including sufficiency, process?**

Yes, at least for a district’s failure to send a prior written notice to the parent regarding the subject matter of the parent’s due process complaint and the failure to provide a response to the complaint within the resulting required ten days.\(^{63}\)

II-27. **Other than unilateral placement (i.e., tuition reimbursement) cases, do IHOs have jurisdiction for the IDEA claims of a child who resides in, but is not enrolled, in the school district?**

The issue is not clearly settled. According to a federal district court decision in the District of Columbia, the answer is yes.\(^{64}\) The court based its conclusion on the language of the IDEA that triggers a school district’s obligations, including child find, on residency, not enrollment.\(^{65}\) Other courts have extended this answer even if the child’s residency changes.\(^{66}\) OSEP agrees with this answer.\(^{67}\) However, the Eighth Circuit answered the question no at least under a Minnesota law that requires the impartial hearing to be “conducted by and in the school district responsible for


\(^{65}\) This obligation is different from the child find and equitable-services obligations for children voluntarily placed in private schools, which are based on the school’s location, not the child’s residency. *See infra* note 78 and accompanying text.


assuring that an appropriate program is provided.” The court reasoned that such challenges were moot because the new school district is responsible for providing the hearing. The federal administrative agency subsequently explained that, “absent additional legal authority,” it could not take action contrary to change this jurisdictional difference.

Conversely, a decision within the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the IHO has jurisdiction for the case when the parents moved their residence to outside the district and did not file for the hearing until after moving.

II-28. Who has the authority to determine whether a parent’s hearing request constitutes a new issue compared to the parent’s previous adjudicated request?

According to OSEP commentary accompanying the 1999 IDEA regulations, this jurisdictional issue is for the IHO—not the school district (or the SEA)—to decide.

II-29. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for issues raised by the non-complaining party during the pre-hearing or hearing process?

Similarly, according to the OSEP commentary accompanying the 2006 IDEA regulations, “such matters should be left to the discretion of [IHOs] in light of the particular facts and circumstances of a case.”

II-30. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for cases that the parent has previously subjected to CRP?

68 Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 120.173(b)(3)(e), renumbered § 125A.50 (2018)).

69 Id. at 578–79.


72 Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); Letter to Wilde, 113 LRP 11932 (OSEP Oct. 3, 1990); see also Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item C-16.

Yes, and they are not bound by the CRP rulings. However, whether the IHO has jurisdiction in such cases as the appellate mechanism for the SEA’s CRP rulings is not entirely settled, as it is subject to state law, OSEP interpretations, and occasional court decisions.

II-31. Do IHOs have jurisdiction over FAPE issues for students whom parents have voluntarily placed in private, including parochial, schools (in contrast with those unilaterally placed for tuition reimbursement)?

No, except for the child find obligation of the school district where the private school is located. Arguably, an additional exception is the extent that a few courts have interpreted state laws, such as those providing for dual enrollment, as extending LEA obligations for special education and related services to parentally placed children in private schools.

II-32. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to decide the child’s residency as a threshold issue antecedent to the IDEA merits of the case?

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75 A few states, including Colorado and Maryland, have laws expressly providing the IHO mechanism for appealing CRP decisions. Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws and Guidance for Complaint Procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 368 EDUC. L. REP. 24, 43–44 (2019).

76 E.g., Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item B-32.


Yes, according to limited authority to date.\textsuperscript{80}

II-33. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for child find claims, although the IDEA is ambiguous or silent about this issue?

Yes, as made clear by a Ninth Circuit decision.\textsuperscript{81}

II-34. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for safety concerns with the child’s IEP?

Yes.\textsuperscript{82}

II-35. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for (a) district’s promotion and retention decisions, or (b) disputes about the student’s grades?

(a) No, according to OSEP, unless related to FAPE or placement, such as where “a student does not receive the services that are specified on his or her IEP that were designed to assist the student in meeting the promotion standards.”\textsuperscript{83} Moreover, such matters may be regarded as within the school district’s exclusive authority.\textsuperscript{84}

(b) No, with the exception of those disputes more appropriately characterized as IEP implementation issues.\textsuperscript{85}

II-36. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for claims of systemic IDEA violations?

Although there may be exceptions where the issue is relatively limited, and a single plaintiff is bringing the claim, the IHO generally does not have jurisdiction for class-action type claims.\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{81} Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Addison, 598 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010).

\textsuperscript{82} Lillbask \textit{ex rel.} R.H. v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005).

\textsuperscript{83} Letter to Anonymous, 35 IDELR ¶ 35 (OSEP 2000).

\textsuperscript{84} Cf. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert O., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (ruling the IHO’s remedy was ultra vires for gifted student).


II-37. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for SEAs as defendants?

No, unless the SEA is servicing the child directly.87

II-38. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to determine and order the stay-put for a child with disabilities?

Yes.88

II-39. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for parental challenges to an IEP that the parent agreed to or an IEP that is not the most recent one?

Yes, according to OSEP, provided that the filing is within the prescribed statute of limitations.89

II-40. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to override a parent’s refusal to provide consent for initial services or for a parent’s subsequent revocation of consent for continued services?

No, the regulations are rather clear that these matters are no longer within the IHO’s jurisdiction.90 However, on the opposite side, the commentary to the amended IDEA regulations add this clarification for selective refusals:

If, however, the parent and the [district] disagree about whether the child would be provided with FAPE if the child did not receive a particular special education or related service, the parent may use the due process procedures in subpart E of these regulations to obtain a ruling that the service with which the parent disagrees is not appropriate for their child.91

87 E.g., Chavez v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 621 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010); Coningsby v. Or. Dep’t of Educ., 68 IDELR ¶ 159 (D. Or. 2016).


In contrast, other changes in placement (i.e., after initial services but not revocation) requiring consent under state law are within the IHO’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{92}

II-41. What if the parent’s refusal is for consent for an initial evaluation and the child is either parentally placed in a private school or is home-schooled?

Similarly, the IHO does not have jurisdiction to override the parent’s refusal.\textsuperscript{93}

II-42. Do IHOs have jurisdiction in disputes between two parents, who both have legal authority to make educational decisions for the child, with regard to consent or revocation of consent for special education services?

No, according to OSEP’s interpretation. IHOs do not have jurisdiction for any disputes between parents as compared to disputes between parents and “public agencies.”\textsuperscript{94} In such cases, the IDEA allows either parent to provide or revoke consent, with their disagreements being subject exclusively (i.e., not under the IDEA) to the resolution mechanisms available “based on State or local law.”\textsuperscript{95} Such consent disputes when concerned with evaluation, rather than services, may be another matter.\textsuperscript{96}

II-42. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for issues arising concerning the education records of the child?


\textsuperscript{92} Letter to Anonymous, 80 IDELR ¶ 23 (OSEP 2021), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-november-17-2021-to-anonymous/ (interpreting the IDEA subject matter jurisdiction for due process hearings to extend to consent provisions of state law that go beyond the consent requirements of the IDEA).

\textsuperscript{93} 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(d)(4) (2021); see also Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-III Sch. Dist., 439 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2006); Durkee v. Livonia Cent. Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp. 2d 313 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).

\textsuperscript{94} 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2021).


Although various hearing and review officers have broadly answered this question with a “no,” often based on the coverage of FERPA, the more defensible answer would appear to be “it depends” in light of the overlapping coverage of the IDEA. More specifically, if the student records issue concerns the identification, evaluation, FAPE, or placement of the child, it would appear to be within the concurrent jurisdiction of the IHO, with one possible exception—if the issue concerns amending the child’s records (based, for example, on inaccurate or misleading information), the IDEA regulations may be interpreted as reserving the matter exclusively for the FERPA hearing procedure. Conversely, a “stand-alone” student-records claim for an IDEA-eligible child fails without a direct connection to the IHO’s specific subject matter jurisdiction.

II-44. Do IHOs have jurisdiction where the district offered, and the parent refused, a settlement prior to the hearing that offered all the relief that the parents sought?

Yes, according to an unpublished Fifth Circuit decision that reasoned, apparently properly, that the effect under the IDEA may be to preclude attorneys’ fees recovery but not subject matter jurisdiction.

II-45. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for enforcement of private settlement agreements?

The weight of the case law seems to say no, but the answer is less than clear-cut due in large part to the muddy difference between the existence and enforcement of a settlement agreement

97 E.g., Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR ¶ 221 (Mo. SEA 2004); Fairfax Cnty. Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR ¶ 275 (Va. SEA 2003); Bourne Pub. Sch., 37 IDELR ¶ 261 (Mass. SEA 2002).


99 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.619–.621 (2021). The additional scope of education records that, alternatively, “are otherwise in violation of the privacy or other rights of the child” extends the boundaries of the exception potentially to swallow the rule. Id. § 300.619. The opposing interpretation is that these regulations require, exhaustion-like, resort to the FERPA hearing procedure as a prerequisite for IHO jurisdiction.


101 A.O. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 368 F. App’x 539 (5th Cir. 2010).

and the varying overlap between the scope of the settlement agreement and the broad specified areas of IHOs’ subject matter jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{103} Observing that interpretation that the IDEA only provides for judicial enforcement of settlement agreements as part of mediation or the resolution process, OSEP opines that a state may have uniform rules specific to an IHO’s authority or lack of authority to review and enforce settlement agreements reached outside of the mediation or resolution processes.\textsuperscript{104} Whether exhaustion applies to judicial enforcement of settlement agreements is a separate issue, which depends in part on the terms of the settlement agreement.\textsuperscript{105}

II-46. Does the IDEA provide for IHO’s jurisdiction over homeschooled students?

Generally, no. Homeschooled students are largely beyond the IDEA’s jurisdictional scope according to OSEP interpretations\textsuperscript{106} and, also indirectly, court rulings.\textsuperscript{107} The exception is for states with laws treating homeschooling as private schools,\textsuperscript{108} which triggers IHO jurisdiction only for the district’s child find obligations.\textsuperscript{109}

II-47. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to enforce a previous IHO decision, an issue typically arising


\textsuperscript{105} E.g., F.H. v. Memphis City Sch., 64 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2014).

\textsuperscript{106} E.g., Letter to Sarzynski, 29 IDEL R 904 (OSEP 1997); Letter to Williams, 18 IDEL R 742 (OSEP 1992); Letter to Farris, 213 IDEL R 142 (OSEP 1988); Letter to Wierda, 213 IDEL R 148 (OSEP 1988) (seeming to suggest that homeschoolers’ rights under the IDEA are limited to the equitable services obligation, which is expressly excluded from the IHO’s jurisdiction).

\textsuperscript{107} Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty. v. Thomas, 205 F.3d 1332 (4th Cir. 2000) (ruuling that parents’ initiation of homeschooling during judicial review mooted their request for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA); Durkee v. Livonia Cent. Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp. 2d 313 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (ruuling that district may not, via a due process hearing, override homeschooling parents’ refusal to consent to an evaluation).

\textsuperscript{108} E.g., Hooks v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2000).

\textsuperscript{109} See 34 C.F.R. § 300.140(a)–(b) (2021).
when the parent claims that the school district failed to implement the order(s) of the previous decision?

No. The prevailing view is that the two appropriate forums are the state CRP under the IDEA and, alternatively via various legal bases, the courts, rather than the IHO process.

\[110\] E.g., Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2000); B.D. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 225, 231 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item C-26. However, parents need not exhaust the state’s CRP before seeking judicial enforcement of an IHO order. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, CRP—in contrast to a court—does not have jurisdiction for an IHO’s refusal to hear or decide an issue. Letter to Hathcock, 19 IDELR 631 (OSEP 1993); cf. Letter to Jacobs, 49 IDELR ¶ 287 (OSEP 2007), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-october-25-2007-to-advocacy-center-for-persons-with-disabilities-education-team-manager-robert-jacobs/. However, the § 1983 avenue may be open only to parents, not districts. E.g., Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Buskirk, 950 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ind. 1997). Another alternative is under Section 504 and the ADA. E.g., Stropkay v. Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 593 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014); A. v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 741 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D. Conn. 2013). Where the district belatedly implemented the IHO’s orders, a federal court ruled that the parents lacked standing for such an enforcement action. A.S. v. Harrison Twp. Bd. of Educ., 66 F. Supp. 3d 539, 550 (D.N.J. 2014). Finally, the courts are split as to whether the IDEA is a viable avenue for judicial enforcement. E.g., B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing the case law to date and rejecting the view that a particular provision of the IDEA provides such a cause of action).


\[112\] However, the concurring judge in a recent federal appeals court decision pointed to the U.S. Department of Education’s brief in a previous case to conclude that the IHO route “might” be viable. B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792, 803–04 (D.C. Cir. 2016); cf. Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. M.L. ex rel. D.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (allowing IHO enforcement based on state law). Moreover, where the district is the initiating party, the answer may vary. Compare Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.U., 63 IDELR ¶ 250 (E.D. Cal. 2014), with Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 741 F. Supp. 2d 920 (N.D. Ill. 2010). For the related issue of whether the IHO has the jurisdiction to reopen the case upon the request of either party for enforcement purposes, see Bd. of Educ. of Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 337 (N.Y. SEA 1998). For the applicable time period for implementation, see Letter to Voigt, 64 IDELR ¶ 220 (OSEP 2014), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-june-2-2014-to-mark-w-voigt/.
II-48. Do IHOs have the authority—whether viewed as a matter of jurisdiction or remedies—to raise and resolve an issue *sua sponte*, i.e., on their own without either party raising it?

Generally no, according to a the lengthening line of judicial authority whether viewed as a matter of the underlying issue in the case or the predicate remedy, whether for declaratory\textsuperscript{113} or injunctive\textsuperscript{114} relief. Moreover, whether the due process complaint sufficiently raised this *sua sponte* issue depends on various factors, at least in the Second Circuit.\textsuperscript{115} As a possible limited exception to the overall question, OSEP policy interpretation seems to suggest a “yes” answer for the particular issue of the child’s “stay-put.”\textsuperscript{116}

II-49. Does expiration of the forty-five-day period prior to the start of the hearing, including any extensions, deprive the IHO of jurisdiction for the case?

No, according to a federal district court decision in Hawaii. Contrary to the IHO’s interpretation, the court concluded that this automatic divestiture of jurisdiction would “fly[y] in the face of the very spirit of the IDEA” and could result in a “serious injustice” to the rights of the parent and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{115} E.g., H.W. v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 65 IDELR ¶ 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing C.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2014)).
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997). The question to OSEP contained the at least partial *sua sponte* condition that “stay put is not raised as an issue during the pre-hearing stages,” but the answer did not specifically differentiate this contingency.
\end{itemize}
child with a disability.\textsuperscript{117}

II-50. In a disciplinary hearing, where manifestation determination is at issue, does the IHO have jurisdiction to determine whether the student violated the school’s code of conduct?

Yes. More specifically, according to OSEP, “there may be instances where a hearing officer, in his discretion, would address whether such a violation has occurred.”\textsuperscript{118}

II-51. Do IHOs have the authority to dispose of a case on the grounds of mootness?

Yes, but they should make sure that the case meets the applicable relatively narrow standard for mootness.\textsuperscript{119}

II-52. Do IHOs have jurisdiction when the parent names a SEA as a defendant?

According to OSEP, this issue is within the IHO’s discretionary authority. More specifically, the IHO “has the authority to determine, based on the individual facts and circumstances in the case, whether the SEA is a proper party to the due process hearing.”\textsuperscript{120} The limited case law establishes that SEAs are not necessary parties at due process hearings.\textsuperscript{121}

II-53. May a state, through its procedures, or the IHO limit the issues to those previously raised at the IEP team level?

Not according to OSEP, because such limits “would impose additional procedural hurdles on the right to a due process hearing that are not contemplated by the IDEA.”\textsuperscript{122}

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{119} \textit{E.g.}, Morris v. District of Columbia, 38 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D.D.C. 2014).


\textsuperscript{121} \textit{E.g.}, Wachlarowicz v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 832, 40 IDELR ¶ 209 (D. Minn. 2003) (collected cases).
\end{flushleft}
II-54. Do IHOs have remedial authority for the extent of related services determined by another agency via an interagency agreement under state law?

Yes, according to a Ninth Circuit decision. However, the answer ultimately depends not only on the IDEA but also the state (which, in this case, was California) law.

II-55. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504) or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?

In most states, the IHO, if within the system under the IDEA, does not have jurisdiction for § 504/ADA claims regardless of whether they are on behalf of a child with an IEP or a child who is only covered by § 504/ADA; however, a few states (e.g., Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) are full exceptions, and others provide for jurisdiction in certain specialized situations (e.g., if the § 504 or ADA issue is intertwined with the IDEA issue(s) or if the school district makes special contractual arrangements with the state IDEA IHO system).

D. **Timelines in General**

II-56. Does the total time limit from filing to decision amount to seventy-five days?

Not necessarily. The variance is attributable to (a) the regulatory timeline for the resolution period, which could cause it to be less or more than thirty days, and (b) the provision for extensions to the forty-five-day limit for the post-resolution period.

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124 Id.


126 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(c), 300.515(c) (2021); see also Letter to Zirkel, 81 IDELR ¶ 22 (OSEP 2022), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-22-04-april-15-2022-to-zirkel/. Attributable in part to these
II-57. **Does the “clock” for the timeline re-start if the filing party amends the complaint?**

Yes, but such amendments are limited to two situations.\(^{127}\)

II-58. **If the district allegedly failed to respond to the parents’ due process complaint within the required ten-day period, what is the appropriate avenue of relief?**

According to OSEP, the appropriate recourse is for the parents to proceed with the hearing, with the IHO having the discretion to identify and resolve this issue.\(^{128}\)

II-59. **What is the statute of limitations for filing for a due process hearing under the IDEA?**

In short, two years unless state law prescribes a different period.\(^{129}\) However, the interpretation and application of the statutory language, which the regulations repeat without elaboration, are complicated. The complications include (1) determination of the triggering point of when the parent or district had actual or constructive notice of the alleged action; (2) the scope of the two specified exceptions; and (3) the potentially broadening effect of the alleged action and its redressability.\(^{130}\)

II-60. **Does the IDEA’s statute of limitations for an impartial hearing call for a “look back” approach from the filing date?**

No, the starting point is the date that the filing party “knew of should have known” (KOSHK) of the alleged violation.\(^{131}\)

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\(^{127}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d)(4). The two limited situations are written consent of the opposing party (including the opportunity for a resolution session) and permission from the hearing officer (up until five days before the hearing). *Id.* § 300.508(d)(3).

\(^{128}\) Letter to Inzelbuch, *supra* note 63. Because of its overlapping subject matter and breadth, this OSEP letter is also included in the Jurisdiction section. *Id.*


II-61. Have courts generally interpreted the exceptions for the limitations period broadly or narrowly?

Although the case law is limited and not uniform, the majority of courts have taken a rather narrow view.\(^{132}\)

II-62. If the IHO exceeds the forty-five-day regulatory deadline, is a reviewing court likely to provide the challenging party with remedial relief?

Not in the majority of the cases, because the courts treat it as a procedural violation, which often does not result in harm to the student. For example, in a Seventh Circuit case where the court upheld the IHO’s decision that the district had provided an appropriate program for the child, the parent’s claim was to no avail.\(^{133}\) Conversely, in the minority of cases where the court either uses a per se approach or the court concludes that this procedural violation is prejudicial, the result may be tuition reimbursement or compensatory education.\(^{134}\) Other consequences to the defendant may be attorneys’ fees,\(^{135}\) an exception to the exhaustion doctrine,\(^{136}\) or possibly compensatory…

\(^{132}\) E.g., Zirkel, supra note 130, at 487 nn.34 & 36.

\(^{133}\) Heather S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 780 F. App’x 505 (9th Cir. 2019); C.W. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395 F. App’x 824 (3d Cir. 2010); J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000); Amann v. Stow, 982 F.3d 644 (1st Cir. 1992); Oskowis v. Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., 76 IDELR ¶ 292 (D. Ariz. 2020); Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2008); E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 39 (E.D. Cal. 2007); G.W. v. New Haven Unified Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 103 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Grant ex rel. Sunderlin v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 43 IDELR ¶ 219 (D. Minn. 2005).

\(^{134}\) Miller v. Monroe Sch. Dist., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2015); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 71 (D.D.C. 2003) (awarding tuition reimbursement); Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. T.G. ex rel. Cheryl G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw. 2011) (adopting per se denial of FAPE approach for outright denial to provide a hearing but remanding reimbursement issue for determination of appropriateness of unilateral placement); cf. Rose ex rel. Rose v. Chester Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 24 IDELR 61 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1173 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding violation but unclear to what extent, if any, it was the basis for the denial of FAPE and reimbursement).


damages under § 504. Regardless of the judicial consequences, OSEP continues to emphasize the SEA’s responsibility to monitor compliance with this timeline, with the limited exception being for allowable extensions.

II-63. Do the IDEA regulations’ allowance for extensions excuse any such alleged delay?

Yes, but 1) the extensions must be requested by a party (not unilaterally by the IHO) and for specific periods of time; and 2) the defendant agency—whether the LEA or the SEA—ultimately must show the documentation and justification for the extensions.

II-64. Does the IHO have discretion to deny such requests?

Yes, subject to state law, denying continuances is within an IHO’s good faith discretion with due consideration to unrepresented parents.
II-65. May states specify timelines that differ from those that the IDEA specifies for situations not expressly authorized in the IDEA?

Not, under the preemption doctrine, if they provide less protection to the child, unless the IDEA expressly provides for state variation, as it does for the limitations periods or for evaluation.

II-66. Does the SEA’s monitoring responsibility to assure correction of noncompliance within one year limit the IHO’s remedial order for compensatory education to one year?

No, not in light of the statute of limitations and broad IHO remedial authority under the IDEA.

OSEP recently appeared to agree with the inapplicability or at least relaxed applicability of the regulation requiring the state to correct noncompliance “as soon as possible, and in no case later than one year” by opining that “hearing decisions must be implemented within the timeframe prescribed by the [IHO] or, if there is no timeframe prescribed by the [IHO], within a reasonable timeframe set by the State as required by 34 CFR §§ 500.111–300.514.” Nevertheless, it is an effective practice for IHOs to write their remedial orders in such a way that the state can verify the district’s initiation of implementation and plan for completion of the award.

E. EXPEDITED HEARINGS

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143 The doctrine, which is based on the supremacy clause in the Constitution, applies at least if the conflict, and Congressional intent for supplanting state law, is “clear and manifest.” E.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995).

144 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), 300.516(b) (2021).

145 Id. § 300.301(c).

146 Id. § 300.600(e).

II-67. **Under what circumstances is the parent entitled to an expedited hearing?**

The IDEA regulations require the opportunity for an expedited hearing when the parent challenges a manifestation determination or any other aspect of a district-imposed disciplinary change in placement or interim alternate educational setting.\(^{148}\)

II-68. **Under what circumstances are school districts entitled to an expedited hearing?**

The school district must have the opportunity for such a hearing upon requesting an interim alternate educational setting based on the substantial likelihood of the current placement resulting in injury to the child or others.\(^{149}\)

II-69. **What is the timeline for an expedited hearing?**

Unless the state has adopted different procedural rules, the deadlines are as follows, starting with the receipt of the complaint: resolution session – within seven days; hearing – within twenty school days; decision – within ten school days of the hearing.\(^{150}\) The actual total length varies due to district calendars’ wide variance as it applies to the meaning of “school days.”\(^{151}\) Moreover, according to OSEP, the reference to “school days” for the second and third parts of this specified schedule includes days during the summer period for school districts that “operate summer school programs for both students with, and students without, disabilities,” but not when the summer programming is only ESY.\(^{152}\) Moreover, OSEP clarified that the overall forty-five-day deadline, upon completion of the resolution period, applies regardless of whether the summer days count for these two steps.\(^{153}\)

\(^{148}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (2021).


\(^{150}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(2)–(4) (2021). The references to school days would seem to conflict during the summer months with the general requirement for issuance of the decision within forty-five calendar days after completion of the resolution-session period. \textit{Id.} § 300.515(a). However, the absence of extensions, or postponements, in the regulations for expedited hearings potentially mitigates this possible conflict.


II-70. Do the IDEA provisions for specific IHO extensions apply, whether directly upon the request of one or both parties or via state law, to expedited hearings?

Apparently not, because—as summarized in the previous item—the IDEA regulation for expedited hearings provides its own timeline and the express allowance for state law variations preserves these deadlines.\(^{154}\) OSEP recently reached this conclusion, reasoning that “[t]here is no provision in the Part B regulations that would give a hearing officer conducting an expedited due process hearing the authority to extend the timeline for issuing this determination at the request of a party to the expedited due process hearing.”\(^{155}\) More recently, OSEP reaffirmed this conclusion, emphasizing that waiver of the IDEA timeline for expedited hearings is not permissible.\(^{156}\)

II-71. In expedited hearings, does the usual five-day disclosure rule apply or does a special two-day rule replace it?

Although the proposed IDEA regulations contained a two-day exception for expedited hearings, the final version retained the five-day rule without exception.\(^ {157}\) The Agency’s stated reasoning was that “limiting the disclosure time to two days would significantly impair the ability of the parties to prepare for the hearing since one purpose of the expedited hearing is to protect the child.”\(^ {158}\) In an analogous case under state law, a federal court in New Jersey remanded the case back to the IHO for a new hearing based on the prejudicial effect of not providing the requisite five-day notice.\(^ {159}\)

II-72. For expedited hearings, may a party challenge the sufficiency of the complaint, or may an IHO otherwise extend the timeline for completion?

\(^{154}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(4) (2021). However, the accompanying preserved cross-referenced regulations for non-expedited hearings do not include the one concerning extensions. Id. § 300.515(c).


\(^{157}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (2021) (incorporating id. § 300.512(a)(3) without exception).


\(^{159}\) B.G. v. Ocean City Bd. of Educ., 64 IDELR ¶ 105 (D.N.J. 2014).
No, according to OSEP.\footnote{Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item E-6.}

II-73. Do the requirements for expedited hearings apply if the hearing request encompasses both the requisite disciplinary circumstances and one or more other issues?

In light of the qualified discretion accorded to IHOs, OSEP opines that in such cases “a hearing officer could decide that it is prudent to bifurcate the hearing, thus allowing for an expedited hearing on the discipline and removal issues, and a separate hearing on any other issues.”\footnote{Letter to Snyder, supra note 155.}

II-74. Do the two remedies that the IDEA regulations specify for expedited hearings limit the IHO from other relief?

No. The regulations authorize the IHO to restore the student’s placement or order a forty-five day interim alternate educational setting agency.\footnote{34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (2021).} The agency issued guidance concluding that these two remedies do not preclude an IHO from “ordering relief that is appropriate to remedy the alleged violations based on the facts and circumstances of each individual complaint.”\footnote{Letter to Zirkel, 74 IDELR ¶ 171 (OSEP 2019), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-may-13-2019-zirkel/.}

D. PREHEARING AND HEARING PROCEDURES, INCLUDING EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

II-75. Does a school district’s practice of providing the IHO with a copy of the student’s records immediately upon receiving notice of the IHO’s appointment violate the IDEA, including its incorporated FERPA requirements?

Not according to OSEP, regardless of whether the parent or the district was the filing party.\footnote{Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996).}

II-76. Are discovery procedures available in IDEA due process hearings?

The IDEA does not provide for discovery (beyond the five-day rule),\footnote{Letter to Zirkel, 74 IDELR ¶ 171 (OSEP 2019), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-may-13-2019-zirkel/..} and only a minority of
state laws provide for it in IDEA hearings.\textsuperscript{166} If state law is silent in this matter, OSEP has stated that whether discovery procedures are available and, if so, their nature and extent are within the discretion of the IHO.\textsuperscript{167} In a Florida case, the appellate court held that in the absence of state law the IHO lacked authority to order discovery.\textsuperscript{168} However, a year later Florida’s legislature repealed the exemption of IDEA hearings from the statute providing such authority.\textsuperscript{169} In the minority of jurisdictions that allow for discovery in IDEA cases, such as Florida and Massachusetts, related legal issues come to the fore.\textsuperscript{170}

II-77. Does the IDEA require a prehearing conference?

No, although it is generally regarded as best practice for IHOs, and some state laws require it.\textsuperscript{171}

II-78. Does the IDEA specify the time or place for the hearing?

No, except that the time and place be reasonably convenient to the parents and the child.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{165} E.g., B.H. ex rel. S.H. v. Joliet Sch. Dist. No. 86, 54 IDELR ¶ 121 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (distinguishing the IDEA’s five-day disclosure provision); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (observing that discovery is contrary to the timeline for IHOs).

\textsuperscript{166} Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (identifying 19 states that have some form of discovery though not necessarily the full procedures of civil courts).

\textsuperscript{167} Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996).


\textsuperscript{169} FLA. STAT. § 120.569(2)(f) (2018).

\textsuperscript{170} E.g., Andover Pub. Sch., 68 IDELR ¶ 208 (Mass. SEA 2016) (partially granting parent’s discovery request, specifically allowing for the redacted IEPs and 504 plans, but not the other specified information, for other students in the child’s proposed placement).

\textsuperscript{171} E.g., Andrew M.I. Lee & Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Pre-Hearing Phase of Due Process Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 40 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 18 (2021) (finding approximately a dozen state laws requiring prehearing conferences); cf. Donlan v. Wells Ogunquit Community School District, 226 F. Supp. 2d 261, 270 (D. Me. 2002) (upholding a state regulation requiring a pre-hearing conference “to consider the simplification or clarification of issues, the limitation of the number of witnesses, the possibility of agreement disposing of all or any of the issues in dispute, and such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the adjudicatory proceeding.”).

\textsuperscript{172} 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(d) (2021).
II-79. Must the IHO enter a default judgment against the district for failing to file a sufficient response to the parents' complaint within ten days of service?

No, as the Ninth Circuit explained, the IDEA “only required the District to ‘send to the parent a response’ to the complaint,” and, thus, “[a] due process hearing is the redress for an unsatisfactory response.”

II-80. What is the proper procedure if the district fails to file any response at all to the complaint?

According to the Ninth Circuit, rather than go forward with the hearing, the IHO “must order a response and shift the cost of the delay to the school district, regardless of who is ultimately the prevailing party.” Moreover, the Ninth Circuit advised that the IHO should raise the issue sua sponte even if the parent does not make a motion on this matter.

II-81. Does the IDEA allow the filing party to amend the complaint?

Yes, but only if (a) the other party consents in writing to the amendment and has the opportunity to resolve the due process complaint through the resolution meeting; or (b) the IHO grants permission no later than five calendar days before the first hearing session.

II-82. Do IHOs have authority to dismiss a case and, if so, with prejudice?

IHOs certainly have the authority for dismissal in certain circumstances. First, the IDEA regulations provide the explicit authorization of dismissals for parents who do not participate in resolution sessions and the implied authorization of dismissals for complaints the hearing officer finds to be insufficient.

173 G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 F.App'x 698, 699 (9th Cir. 2014).


175 Id. at 1200 n.6.


Second, some state laws provide IHOs with authority for dismissals with or without prejudice.\textsuperscript{179} For example, Georgia authorizes the IHO to write a decision for dismissal with prejudice when the party with the burden of production does not meet its burden of persuasion\textsuperscript{180} and to issue a dismissal without prejudice upon a party’s motion for voluntary dismissal for cause.\textsuperscript{181}

Third, courts have delineated other circumstances, such as a federal court decision upholding dismissal with prejudice, where the parents repeatedly violated the IHO’s hearing orders.\textsuperscript{182} Another federal court decision ruled that dismissal with prejudice should be reserved for extreme cases, with close calls—especially for \textit{pro se} parents—disfavoring this sanction.\textsuperscript{183} An occasional court decision has relied on state law provisions, such as the incorporation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,\textsuperscript{184} but without carefully analyzing the possibly preemption of IDEA language.

Finally, however, OSEP recently issued the following interpretation, which indirectly raises preemption questions for state laws that are to the contrary:

\begin{quote}
To the extent any summary proceedings in a hearing on a due process complaint—
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{178} 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(c) (2021). As a general matter, OSEP has opined that “apart from the hearing rights set out at § 300.308, decisions regarding the conduct of Part B due process hearings are left to the discretion of hearing officers.” Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073, 1075 (OSEP 1995).


\textsuperscript{180} See, e.g., \textit{GA. COMP. R. & REGS.} 616-1-2-.35 (2010).

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Id.} at 160-4-7-.12(3)(m).

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Edward S.}, 63 IDELR ¶ 34; \textit{cf.} Oskowis v. Sedona-Oak Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 73 IDELR ¶ 226 (D. Ariz. 2019) (upholding dismissal without a hearing for repeated baseless claims). For further examples under the rubric of the IHO’s sanctioning authority, see \textit{infra} notes 220–21 and accompanying text.


other than a sufficiency determination—limit, or conflict with, either party’s rights, including the right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, we believe such proceedings can be used only when both parties consent to use the summary process (e.g., cross-motions for summary judgment). 185

In general, as a matter of best practice, it appears advisable to limit such summary decisions to exceptional circumstances and, in such cases, to 1) hold a hearing where the basis is a factual matter of material dispute; 186 2) limit dismissals with prejudice to cases of egregious conduct by the filing party, whether separately sanctionable or not; 187 and 3) issue a written opinion with factual findings and legal conclusions sufficient to withstand judicial review. 188 Finally, for another variation a federal court upheld an IHO’s contingent order of dismissal with prejudice in a state that did not expressly prohibit such an order. 189

II-83. Does the same answer apply to motions for summary judgment?

Basically yes. First, the use of these terms in the context of IDEA hearings is often without the same relatively clear distinction that applies in the judicial context, especially because discovery often does not apply in the same full sense. 190 Second, several state laws, especially those where IHOs are central panel ALJs, expressly provide for summary judgments as part of their standard


186 E.g., Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 30 (Pa. SEA 2001).


188 For examples of IHO decisions that did not meet this sufficiency test, see Wehrspann v. Dubuque Cmty Sch. Dist., 118 LRP 33775, adopted, 72 IDELR ¶ 212 (N.D. Iowa 2018); A.B. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 259 (M.D. Ga. 2009). Of course, even where the decision is sufficiently specific, it is subject to being reversed on appeal to court. E.g., Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 93 (D.N.H. 2009).

189 Silva v. District of Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2014). In this case, the court concluded that the contingent order of dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion where the filing party withdrew her complaint one week before the hearing and the IHO allowed thirty days for either refilling or requesting recusal. However, the court recommended that additional findings of facts and statements of appeals rights “might have been helpful to all parties.” Id. at 68.

190 E.g., Lee & Zirkel, supra note 171, at 7.
civil procedure practice. A recent federal court decision upheld IHO’s summary judgment dispositions in such states as not violating the parent’s rights under the IDEA for confrontation and cross-examination.

II-84. Do IHOs have wide discretion with regard in conducting the hearing, including determining the scope of evidence?

Yes. For example, the weighing of testimony, even in the absence of rebuttal or objection, is within the IHO’s authority. The generally applicable judicial standard of review is abuse of discretion, which usually favors the IHO. However, the federal district court for the District of Columbia has required IHOs to provide parents with a flexible opportunity for providing evidence to support the remedies of tuition reimbursement and compensatory education where the parents prove the requisite entitlement for such relief. Similarly, courts have provided ample latitude

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191 Id. at 17.

192 Miller, 79 IDELR ¶ 98.

193 In the commentary accompanying the IDEA regulations, OSEP’s illustrations of IHO’s broad procedural discretion include 1) determining appropriate expert witness testimony (Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,691 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300)); 2) ruling upon compliance with timelines and the statute of limitations (id. at 46,705–46,706); 3) determining whether the non-complaining party may raise other issues at the hearing not specified in the complaint (id. at 46,706); and 4) providing proper latitude for pro se parties (id. at 46,699).


to IHOs in maintaining an efficient completion of the case, keeping the parties focused on the issues.\textsuperscript{197}

II-85. Do IHOs have the authority to determine procedural issues that the IDEA does not address?

Yes, according to OSEP, just as long as “such determinations are made in a manner that is consistent with a parent’s or a public agency’s right to a timely due process hearing.”\textsuperscript{198}

II-86. What are the key factors that IHOs should carefully consider and reasonably explain in their credibility determinations?

Although various factors may apply depending on the circumstances, they include the extent of the witness’s pertinent experience with the child\textsuperscript{199} and the witness’s relevant expertise.\textsuperscript{200}


\textsuperscript{199} \textit{E.g.}, Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2012); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Michael R. \textit{ex rel.} Lindsey R., 44 IDELR ¶ 36 (N.D. Ill. 2005), \textit{aff’d}, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007); \textit{cf.} W. Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S. \textit{ex rel.} M.S., 44 IDELR ¶ 159 (D.N.J. 2005) (ruling that exclusive reliance on parents’ experts as “utterly persuasive” was unsupported in the record and, thus, not entitled to any deference). The child’s teachers and other regular service providers merit special attention in this regard. \textit{E.g.}, Heather S. \textit{v.} Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir. 1997); Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd. \textit{v.} Smith, 230 F. Supp. 2d 704, 730 (E.D. Va. 2002). However, this factor is not without limits and is partly jurisdictional. K.S. \textit{ex rel.} P.S. \textit{v.} Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004–1005 (N.D. Cal. 2008). For example, in the Ninth Circuit, the view was that according deference to the testimony of school personnel based on the child-experience factor, without careful consideration of the parents’ witnesses, would not only create a discriminatory standard but also obviate the need for an impartial hearing. \textit{Id.} For another example of the non-bright limits, compare the majority and minority (and lower court) opinions in the Fourth Circuit’s 2-to-1 decision in \textit{County School Board of Henrico County v. Z.P.}, 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005).

\textsuperscript{200} This overlapping factor often extends to the child’s teachers and other district professional personnel, but not exclusively or arbitrarily. \textit{E.g.}, K.S. \textit{ex rel.} P.S. \textit{v.} Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009), \textit{aff’d}, 426 F. App’x 536 (9th Cir. 2011); \textit{see also} Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 \textit{v.} C.D. \textit{ex rel.} Brian D., 616 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinction between medical and educational professionals).
II-87. Do the Federal Rules of Evidence, such as Rule 702 concerning the standard for expert witnesses, apply to IDEA impartial hearings?

Not directly, because they apply to federal courts; state courts may follow a different standard.\(^{201}\) If state law does not specify the applicable procedural rules for IHOs, the Federal Rules would appear to provide guidance by analogy within the broad discretion of IHOs.\(^{202}\) In general, the IDEA does not require detailed procedures and formal rules of evidence.\(^{203}\)

II-88. May an IHO limit the number of days for the hearing?

Yes, according to OSEP, just as long as the IHO provides the parties with the hearing rights that the regulations prescribe.\(^{204}\) Although OSEP has referred to the IHO’s responsibility “to accord each party a meaningful opportunity to exercise these rights during the course of the hearing,”\(^{205}\) the courts’ aforementioned abuse of discretion standard provides ample latitude to the IHO to rule in favor of efficiency, particularly in light of the forty-five day regulatory deadline.\(^{206}\)

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\(^{203}\) E.g., Lillbask *ex rel.* Mauclaire v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (D. Conn. 2000), aff’d, 397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005):

Due process does not require formal rules of evidence and procedure. Detailed rules of procedure are no panacea against lengthy, contentious, wasteful, divisive, or delay-causing arguments. Indeed, highly formalized systems of legal procedure can be fodder for delay. Due process is not always served by bringing every dispute into a mini-courtroom where only lawyers can navigate the myriad rules. A formalized system could serve to disenfranchise and exclude the very people meant to be served, namely the parents and the educators.

\(^{204}\) Letter to Kerr, 22 IDELR 364 (OSEP 1994). For the prescribed hearing rights, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2021).

\(^{205}\) Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 (OSEP 1995).

\(^{206}\) See, e.g., B.S. *ex rel.* K.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch., 799 F.3d 1217 (8th Cir. 2015) (upholding prehearing order of nine hours per party based on circumstances of the case, including state law); M.V. v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 75 IDELR ¶ 134 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (upholding IHO allocation of four hours for each side in absence of a finding of absoluteness or prejudice); T.M. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 233 (D.D.C. 2014) (viewing limitation on cross-examination as reasonable in the context of hearing
recently, OSEP has opined that a state best-practice guideline limiting a hearing to three sessions of six hours per session does not violate the IDEA if it allows the IHO to make an exception.\textsuperscript{207}

II-89. In a case with more than one hearing session, does the five-day disclosure rule apply as of the first session or may the IHO extend it to a subsequent session in which the evidence may be proffered?

Although the case law is slim, the more flexible interpretation would be within the IHO’s discretion.\textsuperscript{208}

II-90. Do IHOs have the discretion to determine the consequences of not meeting the five-day disclosure deadline?

Although a literal reading of the regulation would suggest an answer of No,\textsuperscript{209} the authority to date suggests otherwise, including, but not limited, to prohibiting the introduction of the evidence or allowing the rescheduling of the hearing.\textsuperscript{210}


\textsuperscript{208} See, e.g., C.P. ex rel. F.P. v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 77 IDELR ¶ 46 (D.N.J. 2020).

\textsuperscript{209} 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(3) (2021) (“Any party to a hearing . . . has the right to . . . [p]rohibit the introduction of any evidence . . . that has not been disclosed to that party at least five business days before the hearing.).  \textit{But cf. id.} § 300.512(b)(2). (“The [IHO] may bar [evaluations not meeting five-day deadline]).

II-91. Do state rules that provide specific procedures (e.g., numbered and redacted exhibits) or consequences (e.g., dismissal upon re-filing after fatally failing to meet the deadline in the first hearing) in relation to the IDEA disclosure requirement permissible?

Yes, according to OSEP, as long as they fit within the considerable latitude of states for such rules and the broad discretion of IHOs for their application.\textsuperscript{211}

II-92. Does the IHO have the authority to allow testimony by telephone or television?

According to OSEP, this matter is within the IHO’s discretion, subject to judicial review in terms of whether the parties had meaningful opportunity to exercise the rights specified in the IDEA regulations, including the right to “present evidence and confront, cross-examine and compel the appearance of witnesses.”\textsuperscript{212} However, except where the parties jointly agree or where state law provides such authority,\textsuperscript{213} the applicable case law is inconclusive.\textsuperscript{214}

II-93. Do IHOs have the authority to compel the appearance of witness, including those who are not district employees?

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the outcome of the hearing decision.” Letter to Steinke, 18 IDELR 739 (OSEP 1992); cf. Letter to Bell, 211 IDELR 166 (OSEP 1979) (“It is not interpreted to mean that everything that will be used by either party must be revealed. It does mean that names of witnesses to be called and the general thrust of their testimony should be disclosed”). In the commentary accompanying the most recent IDEA regulations, OSEP added that parties may agree to a shorter time period. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). For a decision in which the failure to follow the five-day rule contributed to a judicial remand to re-do the hearing, see B.G. v. Ocean City Bd. of Educ., 64 IDELR ¶ 105 (D.N.J. 2014).
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\textsuperscript{211} Letter to Philpot, 60 IDELR ¶ 140 (OSEP 2012), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/policy-letter-november-7-2012-to-dorene-j-philpot/.

\textsuperscript{212} E.g., Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 (OSEP 1995) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(2) (2021)).


According to OSEP, yes.\footnote{Letter to Steinke, 28 IDELR 305 (OSEP 1997) ("[IHOs] must be provided the necessary means to ensure that parties to a due process hearing can confront, cross-examine, and compel witnesses whose testimony is needed to resolve disputes concerning the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child with a disability, or the provision of a [FAPE] to the child"). For state laws that specifically provide IHOs with subpoena authority, see Zirkel, \textit{supra} note 5, at 14–16.}

II-94. May an IHO order the LEA to provide the parent with e-mails from or to school district personnel?

Presumably this discretion is within the IHO’s subpoena power,\footnote{In addition to any implied subpoena power of IHOs under the IDEA, approximately 40 states laws expressly provide IHOs with this power. Zirkel, \textit{supra} note 5, at 14–16.} except for e-mails that qualify as records of other students under FERPA.\footnote{Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City Sch. Dist., 739 F. App’x 870 (9th Cir. 2018); S.A. \textit{ex rel.} L.A. v. Tulare Cnty. Off. of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 111 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (ruling that only those e-mails that not only personally identify the student but also are in the student’s permanent file qualify as education records under FERPA); \textit{see also} E.D. \textit{ex rel.} T.D. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (ruling that parent was not entitled to access to e-mails not maintained by district).}

II-95. Do IHOs have authority to order the district to provide the parent with access to the records of one or more other students as part of an impartial hearing?

Not without the consent of the parents of the other student(s), according to the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO), which is responsible for administering FERPA, the disclosure of the FERPA-covered emails of other students would require the consent of the parents of the other students. For the hearing in question, which concerned a disciplinary record that included identifiable information about not only the student with disabilities whose parent initiated the hearing but also other students, FPCO provided this guidance:

[A] school district should redact the names of, or information which would be directly related to, any other students mentioned in another student's education records before providing a parent access to the student's education records. In instances where joint records cannot be easily redacted or the information segregated out, the school district may satisfy a request for access by informing the parent about the contents of the record which relate to his or her child.\footnote{Letter to Anonymous, 113 LRP 14615 (FPCO Feb. 13, 2013).}

Adding support for this answer, a federal district court recently upheld an IHO’s refusal to allow
the parents, via their expert, to access other student’s records. The court reasoned that even if the parents had obtained a court order to compel the district to produce redacted copies, the IHO would not have erred in denying their request in light of the overriding individualized nature of FAPE.

II-96. Do IHOs have contempt powers?

No, unless state law provides such authority.

II-97. Do IHOs have the authority to issue disciplinary sanctions against a party or the party’s attorney for what the IHO regards as hearing misconduct?

Again, the answer is a matter of state law, according to OSEP. The published case law is limited and largely supportive.

II-98. May an IHO dismiss a hearing after multiple postponements?

It depends on state law. In a Massachusetts case, the court reversed such a dismissal where the


221 Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997).

222 E.g., Edward S. ex rel. T.S. v. W. Noble Sch. Corp. 63 IDELR ¶ 34 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (upholding IHO’s dismissal with prejudice where parents repeatedly violated IHO’s hearing orders); G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 223 (E.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 698 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding IHO’s decision to partially award attorneys’ fees of $3880 to district for frivolous claim of parent’s attorney); Silva v. District of Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2014) (upholding IHO’s conditional dismissal with prejudice if not refiled within 30 days after withdrawal one week before hearing); Nicholas W. v Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 43 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (upholding IHO’s dismissal without prejudice where an alternative sanction was unavailable due to in forma pauperis status of complainant); K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding IHO’s decision to grant sanctions against parent’s attorney); Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Stewart, 2008 WL 607530 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2008) (upholding IHO sanction of $3091 for parent’s withdrawal of the case on morning before the hearing); Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist., 841 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (ruling that IHO has implied powers similar to those of a court but in this case the sanction of dismissal with prejudice was too harsh); Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 32 IDELR ¶ 90 (D. Minn. 2000) (upholding IHO’s order for parent’s attorney to pay $2,432 as a sanction for filing a frivolous fourth hearing request–based on Minnesota statute repealed in 2004). The majority of these cases arose in states that expressly grant IHOs sanctioning authority, although some states viewed this authority as inherent. For a comprehensive analysis, see Salma A. Khaled, The Sanctioning Authority of Hearing Officers in Special Education, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2012).
hearing officer did so after granting the latest postponement request, but state law required the hearing officer to either 1) deny the motion for postponement or 2) grant it and set a new hearing date.  

II-99. May the school district or its attorney provide the IHO with the student’s education records without prior consent of the parent?

Yes, according to OSEP, if the parent filed for the hearing. Conversely, according to OSEP, if the district filed for a hearing, the school district may do so but only after providing due disclosure to the parent and via witnesses, not on an ex parte basis.

II-100. Does the IDEA entitle the parent to a choice between a written or electronic hearing record?

Yes. Although the earlier version of the IDEA did not afford parents this choice choice, the 1997 amendments granted parents with “the right to a written, or, at the option of the parents, electronic verbatim record of such hearing.” The IDEA’s 2004 amendments have retained this choice-providing language. However, the choice is for one or the other option, not both.

II-101. Does an audio-tape qualify as an “electronic verbatim record of [the] hearing” as provided in the aforementioned choice-providing language in the IDEA’s 2004 amendments?

Probably yes.


225 E.g., Edward B. v. Paul, 814 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1987).


227 Supra text accompanying note 226.


229 One reason is that at the time of the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, digital records’ availability was much more limited than now, thus affecting the determination of Congressional intent. Second, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that in reenacting the phrase Congress is presumed to have been aware of the previous judicial interpretation that “an audio recording is included as an electronic verbatim record under the IDEA.” Stringer v. St. James Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d at 804–05.
II-102. Does this right to a transcript or other verbatim record extend to prehearing sessions?

No, according to an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, unless state law expressly provides otherwise.230

II-103. Do the parties have a right to a transcript or other verbatim record before their closing oral arguments or written briefs?

Probably not under the IDEA, unless state law provides otherwise. OSEP interprets the timing of the availability of the oral or written verbatim record as relatively open-ended, extending even after the expiration of the period to appeal the IHO’s decision.231

II-104. Are the parents entitled to a hearing transcript translated into their native language?

Not in the absence of a state law, according to a Pennsylvania appellate court in a gifted education case.232

II-105. Does the failure to provide the parent with the complete transcript or recording amount to a denial of FAPE?

It depends on whether the missing testimony is significant in terms of affecting the child’s substantive right to FAPE.233

II-106. May IHOs take official notice of a fact or standard akin to a court’s power of judicial notice?

The pertinent case law is insufficient to provide a clear answer where state law does not expressly provide this power.234


231 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item C-24.


II-107. May an IHO admit hearsay evidence?

Generally, yes—unless state law dictates otherwise, but relying on it in the IHO’s decision without corroborative proof may be problematic.

II-108. May an IHO admit evidence from the period prior to the applicable statute of limitations?

Yes. This determination is within the IHO’s broad discretion, which allows for three overlapping bases. First, this period’s calculation provides latitude between the triggering KOSHK date and “the alleged action that forms the basis of the [due process] complaint.”

Second, courts distinguished the relevant claims period from the relevant evidentiary period. Finally, the IHO’s discretion extends to limited evidence for contextual purposes.

Washington law specifying said authority); C.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 67 IDELR ¶ 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (sidestepping the challenge where the IHO’s use of judicial notice was not essential to his ruling).


239 E.g., Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 630 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (11th Cir. 2015) (clarifying that “s]tatutes of limitations operate to bar claims that mature outside the applicable limitations period,” but “evidence that is relevant to establish claims maturing within this limitations period is admissible.”); M.S. v. Randolph Bd. of Educ., 75 IDELR ¶ 103 (D.N.J. 2019) (“a statute of limitations will not preclude the introduction of evidence that predates the start of the limitations period if it is relevant to events that give rise to a timely claim.”); J.Y. ex rel. E.Y. v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 33 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (“Statutes of limitations operate only to bar claims that accrue outside the applicable limitations period; evidence that is relevant to establish claims that accrued within the limitations period is generally admissible.”).

240 E.g., Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. E.B. ex rel. J.B., 45 IDELR ¶ 249 (D. Haw. 2006) (consistent with [the] statute of limitations, the [IHO] was permitted to consider . . . prior events for other purposes, such as to provide context”).
II-109. Does the “snapshot” rule, or evidentiary standard, apply for IHO’s assessment of the appropriateness of IEPs?

It depends on the jurisdiction. For example, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted this standard, whereas the Tenth Circuit partially disagreed previous to the seeming endorsement of the snapshot approach in Endrew F. This approach considers the time of the educational decision, not the adjudicator’s deliberations, as controlling to determine appropriateness.

II-110. On the other hand, what is the “four corners” evidentiary rule in relation to FAPE determinations?

This standard originates in contract law and limits consideration to the final version of the IEP that the school system offered during the IEP process. Various circuits have adopted it but typically only in limited circumstances or with exceptions. However, on occasion it is confused with the above-mentioned snapshot approach, which is overlapping but separable.

II-111. May the party that requested the hearing generally raise issues not in the complaint?

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244 E.g., C.G. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining but not either adopting or rejecting this standard).


No, unless the other either party agrees—or—at least in the Second Circuit—“open[s] the door” (e.g., via its opening statement or via its questioning of witnesses). Clarifying that “the waiver rule is not to be mechanically applied,” the Second Circuit has explained that “[t]he key … is fair notice and preventing parents from ‘sandbag[ging] the school district’ by raising claims after the expiration of the resolution period.” In a subsequent decision, a federal district court in New York concluded that the parent had provided fair notice of the issue of methodology via a general reference in the complaint to the lack of sufficient progress in a similar program. Reaching a similar result as the Second Circuit’s exceptions, the Ninth Circuit found applicable to IDEA hearings the federal evidentiary rule that treats issues as raised in the complaint if tried by express or implied consent.

II-112. May the complaining party raise additional issues specifically via a reservation of rights provision in their complaint?

No, according to a published federal court decision in New York.

II-113. May the other (i.e., noncomplaining) party raise issues not in the complaint?

The regulations do not address this question, but the accompanying commentary takes the position

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\text{\textcopyright 249 M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 250 (2d Cir. 2012); Y.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (via its witnesses and via cross examination of the other side’s witnesses). This exception is narrowly limited. E.g., B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 634 F. App’x 845, 849–50 (2d Cir. 2015).}
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\text{\textcopyright 250 A.S. ex rel. Mr. S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2014)).}
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\text{\textcopyright 251 J.W. ex rel. Jake W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 95 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).}
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\text{\textcopyright 252 M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1159, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017).}
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\text{\textcopyright 253 B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 841 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).}
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that the answer is a matter of state procedures and, in their absence, the IHO’s discretion.\textsuperscript{254}

II-114. Does an IHO have authority to proceed with the hearing in the party’s absence?

In general, courts review such matters on an abuse of discretion standard, which makes it advisable for the IHO to provide and document due notice to the non-appearing party and ample opportunity for rescheduling participation. Thus, it is essentially a last resort within the need for a prompt decision. In applying these limited circumstances, courts have upheld the IHO in the clear majority of cases.\textsuperscript{255}

II-115. May an IHO order the independent evaluation of the child? If so, who is responsible for payment of the evaluator, and are there any limits to the cost and qualifications?

The IDEA regulations make clear that if the IHO orders the evaluation it is at public expense (i.e., the district is responsible for payment).\textsuperscript{256} The courts have recognized that this regulation provides the underlying authority for such an order,\textsuperscript{257} including its use for providing an expert assessment for determining a compensatory education award per the qualitative approach.\textsuperscript{258} The cost and qualifications limits are those that apply to the district’s use of evaluators.\textsuperscript{259} However, an order


\textsuperscript{256} 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(d) (2021).


for a trial period as the evaluation poses other limits, and is distinct from the issue of an IEE at public expense.

II-116. Does the school system have the legal right to object to the parent’s choice to have the hearing open or closed to the public?

Not according to OSEP.

II-117. What is the outer boundary of a parent’s right in terms of having individuals, including members of the press, attend hearing that they have chosen to be closed?

According to OSEP, the hearing is limited to “individuals who have some direct relationship to the parties and/or a personal need to understand the conduct of proceedings generally,” thus excluding press. OSEP further clarified that an IHO may “remove any individual in attendance whose behavior is disruptive or otherwise interferes with conducting a fair and impartial hearing.”

II-118. Do school employees, whom the parent has not invited, have the right to attend a closed hearing?

No, according to OSEP, unless (1) the parents have provided consent, (2) the IDEA regulations authorize their attendance, or they meet the FERPA exception for “legitimate educational

259 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c) (2021). Limitations of an evaluator’s implementation of the IHO’s order is a separable issue. E.g., Luo v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (recognizing a constitutional privacy claim upon private psychologist’s access to student’s records in the absence of parental consent).


261 E.g., M.Z., 521 F. App’x at 77 (ruling that the IHO erred by not ordering an IEE at public expense upon finding the district’s evaluation to be inappropriate); Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 169 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (ruling that the regulation authorizing an IHO to order an IEE “as part of a larger process” does not deprive an IHO of jurisdiction of a request for an IEE at public expense).


263 Id.

264 Id.
interests.” OSEP also emphasized that in such matters, the IHO “is in the best position to ensure that the confidentiality of personally identifiable information is properly protected and that standard legal practice is followed in the due process hearing.”

II-119. Is opposing counsel entitled to a copy of an expert’s notes for cross-examination if the expert uses the notes on direct examination?

Yes, according to an unpublished decision in New Hampshire, but the court relied in part on the state-adopted Federal Rules of Evidence.

II-120. Does attorney-client privilege apply to lay advocates in impartial hearings under the IDEA?

It depends on state law. For example, a federal magistrate concluded that New Jersey law implied an affirmative answer for impartial hearings under the IDEA.

II-121. In a compensatory education or tuition reimbursement case, does the IHO have the discretionary authority to bifurcate the hearing so that the remedial issue is reserved for a second stage depending on the outcome of the FAPE issue?

This matter is largely unsettled. With very limited exception, state laws do not address this question. Similarly, the directly applicable case law provides qualified but limited support. Arguably, this procedure, if exercised prudently, fulfills the IDEA purpose of efficient hearings. Moreover, if the parties agree to the procedure and cooperate in its prompt completion, its practical


266 Id.


269 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(b) (authorizing IHOs to bifurcate the hearing in tuition reimbursement cases); cf. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:1-14.6(e) (providing more general and qualified authority for HO bifurcation of the hearing).

270 L.J. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 486 F. App’x 967 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding the IHO’s bifurcation of the hearing in a tuition reimbursement case based on state law as applied to the particular circumstances); Maple Heights City Sch. Dist. v. A.C. ex rel. A.W., 68 IDELR ¶ 5 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (concluding that the IHO implicitly has bifurcation authority in a compensatory education case and any delay affects both parties equally).
utility and legal defensibility would seem to be high.

II-122. May an IHO (a) rely in part on unsworn statements of a party during the prehearing conference and (b) consider sworn testimony of the parent showing a bias for parochial schools?

According to a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the answers are (a) yes, and (b) maybe. More specifically, the court respectively (a) rejected the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding settlement and other such statements, and (b) concluded that this considered preference was relevant to the FAPE issue but not the ultimate foundation for the IHO’s decision.271

III. DECISION ISSUES

A. DECISIONAL FACTORS

III-1. What is the role of medical, psychological, and educational diagnoses that are not listed in the IDEA classifications for eligibility?

Such diagnoses may provide a supplementary role, but they are not generally necessary; in cases of conflict in definitions or criteria, the IDEA specifications are controlling.272

III-2. Is the “educational performance” component of the eligibility definition limited to the academic, as compared with the social, dimension?

The two major appellate decisions are split on this interpretational issue.273

III-3. Are any of the procedural violations of the IDEA a per se denial of FAPE?

The only seeming possibility, depending on the interpretation of the relevant IDEA language, is where the proof is preponderant that the district “[s]ignificantly impeded the parent’s opportunity


273 Compare C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., 322 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2009) (academic only), with Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (extends to social dimension).
to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent’s child.”

III-4. Has the Rowley floor-based substantive standard for denial of FAPE changed?

Yes.

III-5. What is the prevailing standard for FAPE implementation cases?

Rather than 100% compliance, the leading judicial standards are (1) failure to implement a material, i.e., substantial or significant, portion of the IEP, and (2) the same material failure plus the lack of benefit.

III-6. Do an IHO’s minor corrections of the transcript constitute per se reversible error with respect to his or her decision?

No.

III-7. Would the verbatim adoption of all of either party’s proposed findings of facts undermine the traditional deference to the IHO’s findings and presumption of impartiality?

It certainly could do so.

III-8. Who has the burden of persuasion at the hearing stage?

For FAPE cases, the Supreme Court held that under the IDEA, which is silent on this point, the


275 In Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1, 580 U.S. at 399, the Supreme Court held, based on the confined facts and conclusions in Rowley, that the substantive standard is whether the IEP “is reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”


277 E.g., Paschl v. Sch. Bd., 453 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2008) (ruling that IHO’s corrections to the transcript were, if error, harmless).

burden of persuasion is on the challenging party, i.e., the parent. However, some state laws have put the burden of proof in such cases on the district. Conversely, lower courts have extended the Supreme Court’s ruling to other issues, such as whether the child is eligible and whether the child’s placement is in the least restrictive environment (LRE).

III-9. What is the standard, or quantum, of proof at the hearing stage?

Presumably it is the general civil standard of preponderance of the evidence, as derived from the judicial review stage.

III-10. Does an IHO have authority to grant res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to a previous IHO decision?

Yes.

III-11. Does an IHO’s FAPE or placement decision for one academic year have a binding effect, via res judicata or collateral estoppel, on FAPE or placement for the next academic year?

No, according to the Ninth Circuit; each school year represents a separate issue.

III-12. May an IHO remand a case to the district for further action or information rather than deciding the case?


280 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1)(c). The limited exception in New York is for the second step in tuition reimbursement cases, which is whether the parent’s unilateral placement is appropriate. Id. Other state laws put the burden of production in FAPE cases on the district without making clear the possible distinction from the burden of persuasion. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-55) (2018).


283 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c)(3) (2021).


285 T.G. ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baldwin Park Unified Sch. Dist., 443 F. App’x 273, 276 (9th Cir. 2011).
No, such action would violate the IDEA’s imperative for a timely final decision.\textsuperscript{286}

B. WRITING FEATURES

III-13. Does the IHO have the discretion to restate the issue(s) of the case?

Yes, within reasonable limits, based on the IHO’s consideration of the parties’ arguments.\textsuperscript{287}

III-14. May IHOs comment in the written decision about attorney conduct at the hearing?

OSEP has indirectly addressed this issue by opining that a state law that expressly allows such comments is not contrary to the IDEA provided that the comment is 1) linked to a relevant issue (e.g., a complaint perceived to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation) and 2) does not preclude a party’s ability to address such comments in court or in any application for attorneys’ fees.\textsuperscript{288}

III-15. Do the IHO’s legal findings need support in the record?

Yes. Without such support, a court may conclude that the findings were arbitrary and capricious.\textsuperscript{289}


\textsuperscript{287} E.g., M.M. \textit{v.} Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014); J.W. \textit{v.} Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2002); K.E. \textit{ex rel.} K.E. \textit{v.} Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 54 IDELR ¶ 215 (D. Minn. 2010), \textit{aff’d on other grounds}, 747 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2011); W.H. \textit{ex rel.} B.H. \textit{v.} Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal. 2009); cf. Adam Wayne D. \textit{v.} Beechwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 482 F. App’x 52 (6th Cir. 2012) (implicit notice to defendant-district); Adam J. \textit{v.} Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2003) (impartiality challenge); Renollett \textit{v.} Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 42 IDELR ¶ 201 (D. Minn. 2005), \textit{aff’d on other grounds}, 440 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (limiting the issues). \textit{But cf.} M.C. \textit{ex rel.} M.N. \textit{v.} Antelope Union High Sch. Dist., 852 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2017) (questioning wisdom of IHO reframing issues where the complainant has legal representation).

\textsuperscript{288} Letter to Zimberlin, \textit{supra} note 122.

Conversely, where the IHO’s legal findings are supported in the record, courts generally afford them notable deference.\textsuperscript{290} In general, the deference increases where the IHO’s factual findings are careful and thorough.\textsuperscript{291} Moreover, given the grey area of mixed questions of fact and law, the boundary between factual findings and legal conclusions under the IDEA does not amount to a bright line. For example, in the Third and Fourth Circuits at least, the appropriateness of an IEP is a question of fact.\textsuperscript{292} Finally, some state laws expressly require cited support from the record.\textsuperscript{293}

III-16. Does the IHO have to limit the factual findings in the written decision to those essential for the legal conclusions?

Although it may be appropriate practice, as a matter of efficiency, to do so, there is no such legal requirement; i.e., it is not reversible error to include additional facts.\textsuperscript{294}

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\textsuperscript{290} \textit{E.g.}, Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 2010); D.B. \textit{ex rel.} Brinson v. Craven Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR ¶ 86 (4th Cir. 2000); Doyle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); \textit{cf.} Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995) (credibility-based factual findings). However, the Seventh Circuit has made an ambiguous distinction between the “evidence” and IHO’s “decision.” Heather S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1053 (7th Cir. 1995).

\textsuperscript{291} \textit{E.g.}, Pointe Educ. Serv. v. A.T., 610 F. App’x 702 (9th Cir. 2015); J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenburg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995); Doyle v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Sch., 931 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2010). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has counted the IHO’s participation in the questioning of witnesses as part, although not necessarily the controlling part, of the “thorough and careful” calculus for according deference. R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007); Park v. Anaheim High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006). Conversely, a court exhibited disappointment and aversion to a case where the hearing officer adopted verbatim the 480 factual findings and 79 legal conclusions proposed by one of the parties. B.H. \textit{ex rel.} T.H. v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 66 (E.D.N.C. 2015).

\textsuperscript{292} \textit{E.g.}, D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010); G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2003).

III-17. Do IHOs have similar qualified discretion with regard to their legal conclusions?

Yes, except to the extent that some state laws have specified requirements for the legal conclusions. For example, writing shortcuts, such as cutting and pasting a selected group of conclusions from another decision, are not legal error if well founded. Conversely, however, an IHO’s legal conclusion that fails to reference the supporting facts may not receive judicial deference. For example, a federal court vacated and remanded a hearing officer’s decision that “lack[ed] sufficiently detailed reasoning” (which in this case overlapped with insufficiently explained fact-finding).

III-18. Is it appropriate for an IHO to use the term “mental retardation” in a written decision referring to a child with this classification?

No. On October 5, 2010, the President Obama signed legislation that changes the use of “mental retardation” in the IDEA and other federal legislation and regulations to “intellectual disability.”

III-19. Do IHO remedial orders need to have a specific evidentiary foundation?

Yes, but the reversals on this basis are relatively infrequent and more a matter of the underlying substance than the quality of the writing.

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295 Zirkel, supra note 293, at 8–14.

296 Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 249 (E.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 319 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2009).


III-20. Are IHOs allowed to amend their decisions for technical errors?

Yes, within the boundaries specified in some state laws and to the extent that OSEP leaves the matter to the discretion of SEAs and IHOs, provided that both parties receive proper notice. Such corrections may be either *sua sponte* or, when it does not change the substance or outcome of the decision, at the request of either party.

III-21. Must IHOs redact their written decisions to avoid information that is not personally identifiable to the student(s)?

This issue is reserved to state law and policy, but OSEP has clarified that the SEA is ultimately responsible for redacting, before public dissemination of the decision, “any personal characteristics or other information that would make it possible to identify the student who is the subject of the written decision with reasonable certainty or make the student’s identity easily traceable.” This redaction does not extend to the IHO’s name, the district’s name, or the case number unless it would result in personally identifiable information to the student(s).

III-22. Do IHO decisions have a precedential effect on other IHO decisions within the state?

No, not as binding authority. However, as California law makes explicit, it is generally understood that IHOs have the discretion to cite these decisions as persuasive.

301 Zirkel, *supra* note 293, at 15.
303 *Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra* note 18, at item C-25.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS

IV-1. Does a noncustodial parent have standing to file for a due process hearing?

Yes, according to the Seventh Circuit, unless (a) unless the divorce decree expressly eliminates all rights in educational matters or (b) the custodial parent’s exercise of the decreed rights trumps this right. However, the hearing right is limited to the noncustodial parent’s rights, such as records access and meeting notices, not the child’s rights, such as FAPE.

IV-2. May IHOs hold the hearing ex parte?

Yes, if the IHO provided reasonable notice and opportunity for the missing party’s appearance. Courts will generally review such matters based on an abuse of discretion standard, with due attention to the specific circumstances and applicable state laws.

IV-3. What is the standard of judicial review for an IHO’s decision?

The lower courts have varied in their interpretation and application of the Supreme Court’s “due weight” standard. However, the general theme is to provide (1) presumptive deference to the IHO’s factual findings, particularly for the credibility of witnesses, and (2) de novo review for the IHO’s legal conclusions. The deference for factual findings tends to be less for those that are

307 Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2001), after remand, 49 F. App’x 69 (7th Cir. 2003).


based on additional evidence\(^{313}\) and more for those that are careful and thorough.\(^{314}\)

Overall, the party challenging an IHO’s decision faces a steep “uphill climb.”\(^{315}\)

IV-4. Does an IHO have authority to confer consent decree status on a settlement agreement?

The likely answer is “in limited circumstances,” although the case law is not sufficiently on point for a more definitive answer. More specifically, the court decisions concerning whether the parent is entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party of a consent decree are indirectly applicable and have varying limits.\(^{316}\) A few states prohibit hearing officers from using the settlement agreement as their decision.\(^{317}\)

IV-5. May parents proceed pro se (i.e., representing themselves and their child) at due process hearings?

Yes, including the option to have an “individual[] with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children with disabilities” to advise and accompany them.\(^{318}\) In pro se cases under the IDEA, IHOs, like judges,\(^{319}\) need to exhibit special care to provide due latitude and

\(^{313}\) E.g., Alex R., ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Cmty. United Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2004).

\(^{314}\) E.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995). See supra note 291 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently clarified that this deference is inapplicable to a lengthy IHO decision that failed to address all the issues and evidence. M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2017).

\(^{315}\) E.g., James S. ex rel. J.S. v. Town of Lincoln, 59 IDELR ¶ 191 (D.R.I. 2012). For an empirical analysis that shows the high correlation in outcomes upon judicial review, see Zirkel & Skidmore, supra note 311.

\(^{316}\) E.g., Justin R. v. Matayoshi, 561 F. App’x 619, 620 (9th Cir. 2014); Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 626-31 (6th Cir. 2010); Maria C. ex rel. Camacho v. Sch. Dist., 142 F. App’x 78, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2005); V.G. v. Auburn Enlarged Cent. Sch. Dist., 349 F. App’x 582, 584 (2d Cir. 2009).

\(^{317}\) E.g., 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 2365.1.6.14(b); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)(4)(iii).

\(^{318}\) 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(1) (2021). In contrast, at the judicial level under the IDEA, parents may proceed pro se only for their own rights, not for their child’s rights. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).

equitable balance without excusing *pro se* parents from the basic applicable rules and standards for the hearing.\textsuperscript{320}

IV-6. May lay advocates represent parents at due process hearings?

It depends primarily on state law. In survey data published in 2007, ten states prohibited their representation, and twelve permitted it.\textsuperscript{321} A more recent and direct canvassing of state laws found seven states that expressly permitted it.\textsuperscript{322} In other states, the decision is within the IHO’s discretion, with some IHOs not allowing it as the unauthorized practice of law.\textsuperscript{323}

IV-7. When lay advocates represent parents at due process hearings, are their communications privileged at subsequent judicial proceedings to the same extent as under the attorney-client privilege?

Yes, according to a published federal magistrate’s decision in New Jersey.\textsuperscript{324}

IV-8. May an IHO reconsider a decision upon the request of either party or both parties?

Only if (1) the state’s applicable procedures allow it,\textsuperscript{325} and (2) the reconsideration is before the

\textsuperscript{320} Incidentally, for research concerning the outcomes for *pro se* parents in IDEA hearings as compared with those with attorney representation, see Perry A. Zirkel, *Are the Outcomes of Hearing (and Review) Officer Decisions Different for Pro Se and Represented Parents?*, 34 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 263 (2015).


\textsuperscript{322} Zirkel, *supra* note 5, at 19.


\textsuperscript{324} Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.N.J. 1993). The court did not definitively rule on the related question of work-product protection, although seeming to lean in the same direction for that answer. *Id.*

\textsuperscript{325} Zirkel, *supra* note 295, at 15.
final decision and is issued within the forty-five-day, or properly extended timeline.326

Only if the state procedures allow it327 and within a limited time.328

IV-10. Does an IHO have the authority to retain jurisdiction *sua sponte* after issuing the decision?

No, according to the limited case law due to the finality requirement for IHO decisions.329

IV-11. Do parents have the right to place under seal the transcript and exhibits of an open due process hearing for which the redacted IHO decision is available on the SEA website?

Yes, according to an unpublished decision in Ohio, in which the court relied on FERPA and the child’s right to privacy.330

IV-12. Does the IDEA permit interlocutory appeals of IHO prehearing orders or interim rulings (e.g., partial dismissal) to court?

No, according to various courts.331


328 *E.g.*, T.G. *ex rel.* T.G. v. Midland Sch. Dist. 7, 848 F. Supp. 2d 902, 930–31 (C.D. Ill. 2012); see also Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12, 613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).  For a review officer decision that vacated an IHO’s clarified decision as not meeting these criteria, see *In re* Student with a Disability, No. 17-021, 117 LRP 25324 (N.Y. SEA May 22, 2017).


IV-13. In a tuition reimbursement case, does the IDEA require payment during the stay-put period?

Not necessarily, according to OSEP. It is a state law matter, subject to IHO and court interpretation. However, various courts applied stay-put to an IHO’s—or, in a two-tier state, a review officer’s—decision that orders tuition reimbursement.

IV-14. May a school district delay in implementing an IHO’s remedial order in favor of the parent prior to expiration of the period for appeal?

According to OSEP it depends on whether state law allows it and whether the state’s appeal period is reasonable. However, the ultimate criterion is what is a “reasonable period of time” in the particular case, which is a factual matter based on various factors that include the timing of the district’s appeal and the nature of the IHO-ordered relief.

IV-15. Do IHOs have authority to enter a contingent final order?

Yes, in limited circumstances, according to a federal district court case. As the second step of its analysis, the court concluded that the IHO did not abuse their discretion in conditionally dismissing the parent’s case with prejudice if the parent did not file a new complaint within thirty days.

IV-16. Do IHOs have a constitutional right to a hearing upon their termination?


335 Letter to Voigt, supra note 111.


337 Id.
No, according to the limited case law authority where the IHO received notice of the findings and an opportunity to reply in writing under the applicable state law.\textsuperscript{338}

IV-17. Is an IHO’s prehearing order appealable to court?

No, according to the Ninth Circuit.\textsuperscript{339} The court reasoned that the principles underlying the "final judgment rule"—the promotion of judicial efficiency and the avoidance of multiple lawsuits—also applied to reviews of IHO decisions under the IDEA.\textsuperscript{340}

IV-18. Do the two specifically authorized IHO remedies for disciplinary changes in placement at 34 C.F.R. § 300.432(b)(2) (2021) preclude additional or alternative remedies in such cases?

No, according to OSEP.\textsuperscript{341} In some of these expedited cases, OSEP offered compensatory education as an example of a permissible remedy.\textsuperscript{342}

IV-19. Does an IHO have authority to order a district to comply with a violated procedural requirement even if the violation does not amount to a denial of FAPE?

Yes, just as long the order is limited to ordering prospective procedural compliance.\textsuperscript{343}

IV-20. To resolve the issue of res judicata or collateral estoppel, may a SEA assign a case to the same IHO who adjudicated a prior case with the same parties?

Yes, according to OSEP.\textsuperscript{344}

IV-21. Must the SEA make IHO decisions available to the public? If so, for how long?

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{339} M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d at 1088–90.
\item \textsuperscript{340} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{342} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{344} Letter to McDowell, 213 IDELR 162 (OSEP 1988).
\end{itemize}
Yes.\textsuperscript{345} OSEP has added that this availability should be FERPA-required redaction.\textsuperscript{346} The agency clarified that the required redaction includes information that (a) would make the student identifiable with reasonable certainty, or (b) would “make the student’s identity easily traceable if disclosed to the school’s community or the community at large.”\textsuperscript{347}

Further, OSEP stated that they view a “five and a half year[] time period as the most reasonable minimum time period during which States must make due process and State-level review findings and decisions available to the public under [the IDEA regulations].”\textsuperscript{348}

**IV-22. Do the provisions of a state manual for hearing officers have the force of law?**

Generally, no, unless the state issued it via the applicable rule-making process.\textsuperscript{349}

**IV-23. After a parent files a complaint for investigation under the SEA’s complaint procedures process, may a district file for a due process hearing on the same issue(s) so as to trigger the IDEA regulations’ mandatory deferral?**

Yes, although OSEP strongly encouraged districts not to do so, instead recommending mediation or other informal dispute resolution procedures.\textsuperscript{350} OSEP’s rationale was as follows:

> Public agencies that seek to force parents who have already exercised their right to file a State complaint into a potentially more adversarial due process hearing harm the "cooperative process" that should be the goal of all stakeholders. Moreover, diverting resources into adversarial processes between parents and public agencies is contrary to Congressional intent in the 2004 amendments to IDEA's dispute resolution procedures to give parents and schools expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in

\textsuperscript{345} 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.513(d)(2), 300.514(c)(2) (2021).

\textsuperscript{346} Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 18, at item C-27.


positive and constructive ways.\textsuperscript{351}

IV-24. What should the IHO do if the parents file for a hearing their child’s charter school closes?

First, the answer depends on the status of the charter school under state law, with the two primary but not exclusive categories being the charter school as a LEA or being part of an LEA.\textsuperscript{352} If the charter school is part of an LEA, the LEA is the proper party (unless state law assigns responsibility to another public entity).\textsuperscript{353} However, if the school is an LEA, the SEA would appear to have the ultimate obligation in the matter,\textsuperscript{354} and the IHO’s actions will depend on whether the parents file against the SEA as an additional or alternative party.\textsuperscript{355} If not, the IHO faces the difficulty of a charter school defendant who may not appear or, upon appearing, may claim insolvency.\textsuperscript{356}

IV-25. Do IHOs have the authority to award attorneys’ fees?

No. Neither the IDEA nor any corollary state law provides for this authority, although two states require IHOs to designate the prevailing party on an issue-by-issue basis.\textsuperscript{357} In the absence of the requisite statutory basis, IHOs lack this authority.\textsuperscript{358}

\textsuperscript{351} Id. For a proposed interpretation that would disallow such district tactics: see Perry A. Zirkel, \textit{Questionable Initiation of Both Decisional Dispute Resolution Processes under the IDEA: Proposed Regulatory Interpretations}, 49 J.L. & EDUC. 99 (2020).

\textsuperscript{352} Frequently Asked Questions about the Rights of Students with Disabilities in Public Charter Schools under the IDEA, 69 IDELR ¶ 78 (OSERS 2016), at item 6.

\textsuperscript{353} Id. at items 7 and 49.


\textsuperscript{356} E.g., Mr. B. v. E. Granby Bd. of Educ., 201 F. App’x 834, 837 (2d Cir. 2006); Mathern v. Campbell Cnty. Children’s Ctr., 674 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D. Wyo. 1987).

\textsuperscript{357} Zirkel, \textit{supra} note 5, at 14–16 (identifying California and Tennessee as the only states with this requirement).

IV-26. **Is there any case law about the employment security of IHOs?**

The case law is limited, and although the expectation of continued employment varies widely per individual contract arrangements and applicable state law, the current outcomes are unfavorable to IHOs.\textsuperscript{359}

IV-27. **Is it permissible to use IDEA funds for due process hearings?**

Yes, within the applicable limits, according to OSEP.\textsuperscript{360}

\textsuperscript{359} *E.g.*, Doyle v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 77 IDELR ¶ 277 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (dismissing § 1983 due process, breach of contract, and § 504 retaliation challenges to termination of IHO); Stengle v. Off. of Disp. Resol., 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577–84 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (rejecting First Amendment, Rehabilitation Act, and state whistleblower law claims of IHO whose nonrenewal was based on her blog of IDEA advocacy); Tyk v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 796 N.Y.S.2d at 406–07 (upholding revocation of IHO’s certification based on “misconduct or incompetence,” including failing to issue a decision in a timely manner, according to statutory due process, which included an opportunity to respond in writing to the notice of proposed revocation).