Uber Hitches a Ride with Arbitration: How Pro-Arbitration Attitudes and Uber Will Prevail in California and the Ninth Circuit

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"By agreeing to arbitrate[,] . . . a party does not forgo . . . substantive rights . . . it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."[1] The above passage is one of the most oft-cited quotes in arbitration jurisprudence. While it may have held some truth in 1985, that truth is hard to find in today’s arbitration landscape. In 2011 and 2013, the Supreme Court decided two cases, *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion* and *American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,* respectively, “that enshrined the use of class-action bans in contracts.”[2] While the opinions were sharply divided, “upending decades of jurisprudence put in place to protect consumers and employees,”[3] the holdings were consistent with a trend of liberally construing the application of arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).[4] These rulings had the predominant effect of closing the door on consumer and employee class actions, as companies around the country raced to include class-waivers in employment and customer adhesion contracts.[5] However, adoption of Supreme Court arbitration precedent has been less than uniform. For example, since *Concepcion* and *American Express*, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) still holds arbitration class-action waivers unenforceable under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).[6] The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) maintains the same

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waivers work, contrary to their own policies.9 More curiously, though, courts within the Ninth Circuit and California state jurisdictions, continue to strike down class-action waivers seemingly in the face of the Concepcion and American Express holdings.10 As tension rises between the anti-arbitration courts of California, the Ninth Circuit, and governmental regulatory bodies and the predominantly pro-arbitration federal courts, what does this mean for arbitration agreements originating underneath these jurisdictions, what can it tell us about where arbitration jurisprudence is headed, and, more specifically, how do the recent decisions in the several litigations involving Uber arbitration agreements illustrate trends?

Part I of this article will introduce Uber and describe how the sharing economy functions.11 This section will explain Uber’s current conflict with their drivers regarding arbitration agreements and why the stakes are so high.12 Part II will explore the FAA—its history, original legislative intent and purpose—in order to provide a baseline from which to contrast its current broad application.13 Part III will highlight Supreme Court jurisprudence on arbitration to illustrate how the FAA is now expansively interpreted contrary to its original limited scope.14 This Part will culminate in an examination of the Concepcion and American Express majority and dissenting opinions.15 Part IV will offer an explanation for the Supreme Court’s expansive transformation of the FAA.16 Part V will detail pushback from the NLRB, SEC, Ninth Circuit, and California state courts.17 Part VI will review several California and Ninth Circuit decisions that suggest pro-arbitration attitudes are trending upwards in those jurisdictions.18 This Part will also anticipate the

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11 See infra Part I.
12 See infra Part I.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 See infra Part V.
18 See infra Part VI.
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future of arbitration and where its jurisprudence is headed. Finally, Part VII will bring this analysis out of the theoretical and apply it to the litigation regarding Uber’s arbitration agreements.

PART I: WHAT IS UBER, WHAT ARE ITS DRIVERS DISPUTING, AND WHAT IS THE SHARING ECONOMY?

One of New York City’s iconic images is likely familiar: downtown Manhattan, rush hour, and streets gridlocked with a seemingly never-ending bracelet of yellow cabs. Enter Uber. Since 2011, the chances that a New Yorker hailed a taxi or waited for a yellow cab are slim. With the advent of companies like Uber, gone are the days of “upstreaming,” standing curbside, and frantically waving down a ride. Today, Uber provides 1,000,000 rides daily and counts 8,000,000 people among its users. With approximately 50,000 new drivers each month and service in 250 cities and counting, Uber is quickly becoming the de facto service for navigating the city.

Uber represents one of the most recognizable companies of the new sharing economy. Along with other companies like Lyft and Airbnb, the sharing economy refers to companies using technology to create peer-to-peer markets that convert goods into services. In the sharing economy, companies pair sellers with buyers, “smartphones with GPS let people see where the nearest [buyer/seller] is[,] . . . social networks provide a way to check upon people and build trust[,] and online payment systems handle the billing.” These companies create an interface between consumer and provider, which lowers transaction costs.

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19 See infra Part VI.
20 See infra Part VII.
23 Huet, supra note 22.
24 Id.
26 The rise of the sharing economy, supra note 25.
The viability of sharing economy businesses relies on spreading the supply costs of traditional businesses to the providers that they hire— for Uber, this means their drivers. As it stands, drivers are classified as independent contractors, thus, avoiding the costs associated with employee classification such as insurance, overtime pay, and expense reimbursement for costs like gas, for example. Recently, Uber drivers, tired of this model, brought a class-suit in California state and federal court to challenge this distinction. When Uber moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreements drivers must sign, the drivers challenged the validity of the arbitration agreements.

PART II: WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF THE FAA AND WHAT KIND OF LEGISLATION WAS IT ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BE?

The substance of arbitration—of seeking extra-judicial means to dispute resolution—finds its origin long before the FAA provided the definite form we find familiar today. Prior to the FAA, parties seeking dispute resolution within such a mechanism often ran into a substantial obstacle: the unwillingness of courts to enforce the arbitration agreements. For example, in its early jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held “that at any time prior to the arbitrator’s final adjudication a party to an arbitration agreement could freely revoke its submission on the rationale that each party had a right to know all of the facts of the dispute” before such agreement could be validly agreed to. Eventually, anti-arbitration attitudes relaxed for two primary
reasons: first, a growing American economy demanded efficient resolution to commercial disputes; second, well-developed contract law doctrines based on the respective parties’ intent to abide by their agreement terms led courts to begin upholding arbitration agreements evidencing clear intentions of both parties to be bound by the arbitral decision.35 By 1924, with several states enacting their own arbitration statutes, Congress heard arguments for a federal arbitration statute.36 After the last testimony was heard, Congress passed the FAA with no dissenting votes.37

While the formation of the FAA is important, its original, intended purpose is essential to understanding how askew its modern-day construction is.38 As senators, representatives, lawyers, and businessmen provided testimonies and reports in support of arbitration, their arguments touted arbitration as a less expensive alternative to litigation,39 as expeditious relative to litigation,40 as a means to ease civil court dockets by disposing commercial disputes,41 and as beneficial to consumers.42

The key takeaway is the narrow scope of arbitration imagined by those involved in its construction—“every witness, every Senator, and every Representative discussed one issue and one issue only: arbitration of contract disputes between merchants.”43 In fact, the deliberately limited scope of the

35 Id. at 748. However, the inevitability of arbitration was by no means a foregone conclusion. Id. at 749-52. As late as 1915, one New York district court judge wrote, American “courts will scarcely permit any other body of men to even partially perform judicial work, and will never permit the absorption of all the business growing out of disputes over a contract by any body of arbitrators, unless compelled . . . by statute.” U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
37 Leslie, supra note 36, at 304-05 (noting the unanimous vote is “not surprising; nobody spoke or wrote in opposition to the legislation.”); see also Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 110 (2006).
38 Leslie, supra note 36, at 300.
39 Id. at 302.
40 Id. at 303.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 304. Supporters billed arbitration as pro-consumer, “but not because consumers would be in arbitration themselves.” Id. Instead, consumers would find benefit in three ways: cheaper arbitration costs would mean creating a cheaper cost of goods for consumers; faster dispute resolution would preserve perishable food products and prevent waste; consumers would pay less in taxes to support busy state courthouses. Id.
43 Id. at 305; see also Moses, supra note 37, at 106 (“The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations. All of the examples given . . . were cases between merchants.”) (emphasis added). Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms.
legislation was essential in persuading Congress.\textsuperscript{64} Julius Cohen, the original drafter of the FAA, testified that the bill would also not apply to adhesion contracts (i.e., “take it or leave it”) because it “was simply not the intent of the legislation, which was specifically aimed at voluntary resolution of disputes between merchants.”\textsuperscript{65} By the end of the congressional hearing, the FAA passed as “a bill of limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants of approximately equal economic strength . . . [and] only apply when . . . agreed to by the parties . . . [and] to disputes involving facts and simple questions of law, not statutory or constitutional issues.”\textsuperscript{66} The FAA, as enacted in 1924, is a far cry from the legislation it is today.\textsuperscript{47} Due to Supreme Court jurisprudence, the FAA has been transformed into an expansive dispute resolution mechanism.

PART III: HOW DID THE SUPREME COURT TRANSFORM THE FAA, AND WHAT DOES IT NOW HOLD REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CLASS-ACTION WAIVERS IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS?

Despite its humble beginnings, the FAA now acts as a legislative monolith: preempting state law, allowing for arbitral adjudication of statutory claims, and barring class-action disputes.\textsuperscript{58} The Supreme Court did not reach this interpretation overnight. Though for many years it held closely to the narrow interpretation Congress demanded, the Court transformed the FAA over a period stretching the last fifty years and created the juggernaut it is now.\textsuperscript{49}

Though passed with the assurance of a limited application, the Supreme Court began rapidly expanding the FAA in 1967 with \textit{Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing}.\textsuperscript{50} Up until \textit{Prima Paint}, “the FAA was
generally thought not to apply in state courts.” 51 Several years later, the Court expanded the FAA to preempt state law in Southland Corp. v. Keating. 52 The Court was only beginning. 53

Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Court’s expansion swept through the arbitragibility of statutory causes of action with little resistance. Though the Supreme Court previously held statutory claims to be non-arbitrable in Wilko v. Swan 54 and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 55 this quickly changed. In Wilko, the Court recognized “the advantages that . . . arbitration may provide for the solution of commercial controversies” 56 in reasoning a security buyer who “waives his right to sue in courts, . . . gives up more than would a participant in other business transactions . . . [and] thus surrenders one of the advantages the [Securities] Act gives him.” 57 The Court, too, questioned an arbitrator’s ability to adjudicate a statutory claim such as this with limited review; 58 it also worried about arbitration’s effectiveness in a securities transaction where a buyer is disadvantaged from the outset, even without an arbitration agreement. 59

In a stunning about-face, the Court began distancing itself from the holding in Wilko by expanding the FAA’s scope to adjudicate statutory

51 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1427 (2008). Until this point, the Supreme Court had not even definitively established the FAA applied in federal courts in diversity cases. Id.
53 Bruhl, supra note 51, at 1429 (“The metamorphosis was not instantaneous, but it is fair to say that the major stages of growth occurred in the 1980s.”) (emphasis added).
54 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). Wilko involved an investor who sued a brokerage firm under the Securities Act of 1933 alleging it fraudulently induced his purchase of stock. Id. at 428-29. His purchase agreement included an arbitration agreement, which he argued was void under Section 14 of the Securities Act declaring, in part, to “void any [arbitration] agreements in any provision of the Securities Act.” Id. at 432, 434.
55 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956) (holding and easily dismissing the idea that an employment contract between a Vermont citizen and a New York corporation was a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce for purposes of the FAA).
56 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
57 Id. at 435.
58 Id. at 435-36 (“This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law . . . [and] may be made without explanation of their reasons.”); see also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437 (“The [FAA] contains no provision for judicial determination of legal issues . . . the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure their effectiveness.”).
59 Id. at 435 (“It is . . . reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities . . . on a different basis from other purchasers.”).
claims. In a dispute between international corporations, the Court held enforceable an arbitration agreement because of the certainty it gave to choice of law questions. Several years later, the Court again upheld an arbitration agreement in an international dispute; however, this time for an antitrust claim. From here, the floodgates opened, and in rapid succession, the Court paved the way for the arbitrability of all types of statutory claims. In 1995, the Court even held the FAA extended to the limits of the Commerce Clause. With all of this, though, the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration stance still continues to grow.

The most recent and significant blow to the FAA’s proper interpretation comes from a series of cases greatly reducing the weight of the Savings Clause. The Savings Clause permits a court to strike down an arbitration agreement upon such grounds that any other contract could be invalidated—
practice, this means fraud, duress, and, most effectively, unconscionability.66 However, two controversial decisions created the foundation for the diminished state in which the Savings Clause currently sits. As mentioned previously, the seminal Supreme Court cases concerning class waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements are Concepcion and American Express.67 In upholding such class waivers, the Supreme Court set dangerous precedent as to how all encompassing an arbitration agreement may be.

The Court heard Concepcion in 2011, which challenged a California state rule disallowing arbitration agreements containing class-action waivers.68 The dispute arose when the Concepcion family saw an advertisement offering free phones if they signed with AT&T as their cellular service provider.69 The family followed the instructions from the advertisement and signed the service agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration clause requiring the parties bring any disputes in their “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”70 When Concepcion received his first bill, he noticed a thirty-dollar charge for sales tax on the “free” phones.71 Concepcion then filed suit in District Court.72 In response, AT&T moved to compel arbitration.73 Pursuant to the existing Discover Bank rule, the District Court held AT&T’s arbitration provision unconscionable for failing to show “that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.”74 AT&T appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who affirmed the District Court’s ruling, holding the Discover Bank rule “placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the exact same footing as” barring “class action

66 Buhr, supra note 51, at 1426. Specht v. Netscape Communications is one such example. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). Here, the Second Circuit held no arbitration agreement existed where the agreement itself lacked mutual assent. Id.
67 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 4.
68 The California rule was the Discover Bank rule, which made most collective-action waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338. When the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individual small sums of money, then . . . such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.
69 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337.
70 Id. at 336.
71 Id. at 337.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 338.
litigation outside the context of arbitration.” 75 In 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and a divided 5-4 Court reversed the lower courts, holding
the class action waiver contained in AT&T’s service agreement as enforceable
under the FAA. 76

In its opinion, the majority and dissent most crucially disagreed on
the purpose of the FAA. 77 The majority argued that the Act is designed to
promote arbitration and its principal advantage – informality. 78 The majority,
too, found the potential for high risk for defendants in class arbitration
troubling. 79 Then, focusing on the Savings Clause, 80 contained within § 2 of
the FAA, the Court held the Discover Bank rule to unfairly discriminate
against arbitration. 81

A sharp dissent, on the other hand, argued that the primary goal of the
FAA is to secure enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, not to ensure the
procedural advantages of arbitration. 82 It first argued the Discover Bank rule
would not be an obstacle by increasing the complexity of arbitration
procedures. 83 But more importantly, it noted the general applicability of
unconscionability rendered the discussion of the merits of class proceedings

75 Id. at 334, 352.
76 Id. at 351-52.
77 Id. at 365.
78 Id. at 344 (“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”). The majority argued that class
arbitration is “slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.” Id. at 348. The Court cited empirical evidence showing the average consumer arbitration
resulted in a disposition on the merits within six months, whereas, of 283 class arbitrations in the last
year, 121 remained active, and not a single one resulted in a final award on the merits. Id. at 348-49.
79 Id. at 350. Here, the Court reasoned that the informal nature of arbitration makes it more likely
mistakes will happen and that, part of the agreement to arbitrate, includes an acceptance of this risk
because the impact is limited to individual disputes. Id. If a full class is brought to arbitrate, the risk
of error becomes unacceptable and defendants will feel “pressured into settling questionable claims.”
Id. This, coupled with the fact that vacating an arbitration award is extremely difficult, renders the
risk of class arbitration too high. Id.
80 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see supra note 48, 49.
81 Id. at 341-43. The Court began by noting that it had previously “noted that the FAA’s preemptive
effect might extend even to grounds traditionally thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract’” Id. at 341. The Court reasoned that even though the Discover Bank
unconscionability rule is a generally applicable contract defense, in practice, the rule would be used
to discriminate against arbitration. Id. at 342.
82 Id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Here the dissent cited the American Arbitration Association’s
findings that class arbitration is a “fair, balanced, and efficient means of resolving class disputes.” Id.
It also cited evidence that class arbitration takes less time than class litigation. Id. at 363.

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unnecessary. The dissent then disputed the premise that corporations should not be subject to the high-stakes resulting from allowing class arbitration. Finally, the dissent showed no meaningful precedent existed to form the majority’s opinion. After hearing Concepcion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari two years later to another case concerning class waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. In another divided opinion, the Court held that a contractual waiver of class arbitration was enforceable under the FAA even if the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating its claim exceeded the potential recovery. In the case, the restaurant Italian Colors accepted payment from American Express cards used by a large share of its customers. Pursuant to acceptance, Italian Colors signed a mandatory arbitration clause specifically disallowing class arbitration claims. Italian Colors claimed American Express abused its monopoly power to charge fees 30% higher than those charged by competing credit cards; Italian Colors brought claims under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act for violation of federal antitrust law. Italian Colors argued the class arbitration waiver should be held unenforceable because the cost of pursuing individual arbitration greatly exceeded the maximum recovery. Because of this, Italian Colors said the class arbitration waiver barred effective vindication.

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84 Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “Because California applies the same legal principles to address the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address the unconscionability of any other contract provision, the merits of class proceedings should not factor into our decision.” Id. The Court then posed a hypothetical to illustrate the concept, asking “[i]f California had applied its law of duress to void an arbitration agreement, would it matter if the procedures in the covered agreement were efficient?” Id.
85 Id. at 363 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing examples of corporations willing to subject high-stakes disputes to arbitration).
86 Id. at 366 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We have decided dozens of cases about [the FAA’s] requirements. We have reached results that authorize complex arbitration procedures.”).
88 Id., 133 S. Ct. at 2307, 2309.
89 Id. at 2308.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. Italian Colors provided evidence that, at a minimum, it would cost them $1 million to secure the necessary expert analysis for their case. Id. Their maximum recovery, assuming the dispute resolved in their favor, was $12,850 or $38,549 when trebled. Id.
because no economic incentive existed to pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration.\textsuperscript{93}

The majority began its analysis by establishing that the Court must enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms even if the claims “allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s mandate had been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’”\textsuperscript{94} The majority held that no such command existed.\textsuperscript{95} The Court then explained how Italian Colors’ argument that the class waiver barred effective vindication of their claims was inapplicable in this context.\textsuperscript{96} Finally, in disagreement with the lower court, the majority held that their previous opinion in Concepcion resolved this case.\textsuperscript{97}

Justice Kagan was defiant in dissent, characterizing the majority opinion as quite sinister.\textsuperscript{98} Justice Kagan agreed with Italian Colors that the class

\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 2310. Effective vindication is a principle allowing arbitration agreements to be invalided on public policy grounds if they operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).

\textsuperscript{94} Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2309.

\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 2309. The Court explained that antitrust laws do not guarantee a procedural path to the vindication of every claim. Id. That said, Congress had made efforts to open said paths, citing treble damages as an example. Id. However, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” The Court then pointed to the text of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, showing they made no mention of class actions. Id. (“[T]hese acts were] enacted decades before the advent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which was ‘designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual names parties only.’”).

\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 2311. Here, the Court took a very narrow interpretation of the effective vindication doctrine, essentially arguing that so long as a possible path to pursue vindication of claims existed, the practical consequences of such pursuit did not even merit consideration. Id. The majority wrote that the class action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting parties, without precluding it; the waiver no more eliminated each party’s right to pursue a statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief. Id. (“The individual suit was considered adequate to assure ‘effective vindication’ of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did not suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”).

\textsuperscript{97} Id. at 2312 (“We specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”).

\textsuperscript{98} Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan wrote:

The owner of a small restaurant... thinks that American Express... has used its monopoly power to impose a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool’s errand. . . . The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse . . . And here is the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too damn bad.

Id.
waiver barred effective vindication of their antitrust claims. To illustrate her point, Justice Kagan offered a hypothetical to show that if a class action waiver were framed as an exculpatory clause, it would be held unenforceable. Justice Kagan continued, arguing courts will not enforce a prospective waiver of the right to gain redress for an antitrust injury, for, without the rule, a company could use their monopoly power to protect their monopoly power — much like American Express was doing in the present case.

Justice Kagan then explained that the majority construed the effective vindication doctrine far too narrowly in the face of Supreme Court precedent. Two cases were of exceptional relevance — the aforementioned *Mitsubishi Motors* case, from which the effective vindication doctrine was derived, and *Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph*, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). *Mitsubishi Motors* held the effective vindication to operate far more broadly than the majority suggested it did. The *Green Tree* case further developed the effective vindication principle in the context of prohibitive cost, as applicable in *American Express*. Having shown that effective vindication

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99 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). Kagan wrote that court precedent is clear that an arbitration clause may not thwart federal law, irrespective of exactly how it does so. Id.

100 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (We would refuse to enforce an exculpatory clause insulating a company from antitrust liability — say, ‘Merchants may bring no Sherman Act claims’ — even if that clause were contained in an arbitration agreement.

101 Id. at 2313-14 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

102 Id. at 2313-14 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Supreme Court jurisprudence shows “an arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves the results.” Id. By agreeing to arbitrate claims under federal law, “a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Id.

103 *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth*, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 637-38 (1985). In *Mitsubishi Motors*, the Court wrote: An arbitration clause will be enforced only “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum ... if an arbitration provision ‘operated . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’ we emphasized, we would condemn it . . . . Such a clause should be ‘set aside’ if its proceedings in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult’ that the claimant ‘will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.’ Id.

104 *Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph*, 531 U.S. 92 (2000) (holding that the effective vindication principle applies when an agreement thwarts federal law by making arbitration prohibitively expensive). “Where . . . a party asserting a federal right seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” Id. Later in her dissent, Justice Kagan wrote that *Mitsubishi* and *Green Tree* in conjunction create the principle that when an arbitration agreement prevents the effective vindication of federal rights, a party has the right to go to court. *Am. Express*, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting “prevents” can manifest in many ways to capture all the ways a clever drafter might devise).
should apply in the present case, Justice Kagan discussed how the effective
vindication doctrine furthered the purposes not just of other federal laws, but
also of the FAA itself.105 Finally, Justice Kagan brought into question the idea
that the majority was simply furthering Congress’ intent when it passed the
FAA.106

As seen in the Concepcion and American Express holdings, the Supreme
Court clearly believes that class action waivers in arbitration agreements will
and should be upheld. These opinions continue the trend of pro-arbitration,
favoring the perceived policy goals of the FAA at the expense of its spirit,
practical usage, and own Savings Clause.

PART IV: WHAT ARE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT’S PRO-
ARBITRATION STANCE?

The FAA’s scope now extends to and preempts state law that is
conflicting with it.107 The FAA now applies to adhesion contracts – the exact
“take it or leave it” contracts Julius Cohen assured Congress arbitration would
not extend to.108 The Supreme Court expanded the FAA to serve as a suitable
remedy for statutory claims, again in direct opposition to the testimony

105 Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“What the FAA prefers to litigation is
arbitration, not de facto immunity. . . . [E]ffective-vindication . . . ensure[s] that arbitration remains a
real, not faux, method of dispute resolution.”). Justice Kagan reasoned that arbitration is a streamlined
method of dispute resolution, not a foolproof way of killing claims as the alleged American Express
did by including a class waiver rendering arbitration prohibitively expensive. Id.
106 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). “So down one road: More arbitration, better enforcement of federal
statutes. And down the other: Less arbitration, poorer enforcement of federal statutes. Which would
you prefer? Or still more aptly: which do you think Congress would?” Id.
because Congress would not have wanted differing outcomes regarding the validity of arbitration in
similar cases based on a state-federal forum dichotomy and holding that state courts cannot apply state
statutes to invalidate arbitration agreements) with Southland, 465 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating the holding in Southland was an “exercise in judicial revisionism” that was “unfaithful to
congressional intent.”); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casaro, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding the
FAA preempts conflicting state law).
108 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (The Court held arbitration
applicable to adhesion contracts in an employment context.). Four years later, the Court extended
arbitration to adhesion contracts in a customer context. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (holding that section 2 of the FAA making enforceable a written arbitration
 provision in “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” should be read broadly to
to extend the FAA’s reach to the limits of the Commerce Clause.). See Moses, supra note 37, at 107.
necessary to ensure it passed Congress in 1925.109 Further, the FAA today eliminates the requirement of consent to arbitration and removes the right to a jury trial from citizens without their knowledge or consent.110 Clearly, the FAA looks and operates in a markedly different fashion from the legislation it was intended to be.

The driving rationales behind the expansive interpretations of the FAA are twofold: first, is the perception Congress intended for a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary,”111 and second, is a rigid adherence to compelling enforcement of arbitration agreements “according to their terms” or “as written.”112

As to the liberal policy favoring arbitration, legal academics have struggled to determine where the Court found such a decree. In Moses H. Cone, a hospital sued a construction company in state court; in response, the construction company moved to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA.113 When the district court stayed the suit pending resolution of the state court action, the federal court of appeals ordered the district court to compel arbitration.114 The Supreme Court considered whether the federal action be stayed out of deference to the parallel litigation in state court.115 Here, the Court responded negatively, holding “stay of the federal suit had thwarted Congress’ clear intent ‘to move parties . . . into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible. . . . The stay thus frustrated the statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements.’”116 As Professor Moses highlights, “the Court . . . emphasized, without citing any authority, that there is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . [When] [i]n fact, however, nothing in the legislative history suggests a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.”117 As is clear, the Court’s jurisprudence takes great

109 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that no merit existed to the claim that where the arbitration clause at issue failed to mention the relevant statutes at issue, it could not be read to contemplate arbitration of such claims).
112 Id. at 4.
113 Id. at 14-15.
114 Id. at 123 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22-23) (emphasis added).
115 Moses continues:
The 1925 Congress never indicated in the slightest way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial resolution of disputes. It simply made arbitration of commercial and maritime agreements enforceable
liberty in revamping and interpreting the legislative intent with regards to the scope and application of the FAA.

The second principle used by the Court to justify augmenting the FAA’s purpose lies in the adherence upholding arbitration agreements “according to their terms” oftentimes much to the detriment of the Savings Clause.118 The Supreme Court embraces this principle in its modern arbitration jurisprudence, as Professor Leslie notes, “the Court has claimed in over a dozen opinions that Congress intended arbitration clauses to be enforced ‘as written’ or ‘according to their terms.’”119 In the Court’s view, this line of reasoning allows arbitration agreements that contain objectionable terms to be enforced, where if these were contracts other than arbitration agreements they would not be; it is the parties’ objective intent doctrine underscoring contract formation taken to an absolute extreme.120

Further explanation comes from the historical context in which the Court expanded the FAA. Professor Bruhl attempts to explain how “the massive expansion of the FAA . . . happened fairly quickly and without any legislative amendment of the relevant provisions of the FAA itself.”121 He cites pressure in federal court because, until 1925, such agreements had essentially been revocable at will by the parties. At no point did anyone argue that arbitration was overall a superior method of resolving disputes. Rather, Congress was persuaded that where merchants were concerned, arbitration provided a less expensive option that should be made available to those who voluntarily agreed to this alternative. . . . [T]here appears to be no basis for Justice Brennan to state that “[s]ection 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” and that “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.

Moses, supra note 37, at 123 (emphasis added); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (re-characterizing the original Congressional testimony provided by Julius Cohen and other witnesses as proposing the FAA for contracts arising in interstate commerce and failing to mention that such interstate commerce referred to that between merchants and not between merchants and their customers).

120 Leslie, supra note 36, at 266, 298, 312.
121 Bruhl, supra note 51, at 1432.
from business interests and the Court’s desire to curb a perceived litigation explosion.\textsuperscript{122} However, no matter the reason, the plain fact exists that the FAA is more powerful than its intended purpose.

\textbf{PART V: HOW HAVE THE NINTH CIRCUIT, CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS, AND SEVERAL GOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY AGENCIES RESPONDED IN THE WAKE OF CONCEPCION AND AMERICAN EXPRESS?}

Despite the Supreme Court’s clear stance on the enforceability of class waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements, the NLRB, Ninth Circuit, and California state courts still issue opinions holding otherwise. The NLRB, through the NLRA, has consistently held that class action waivers, as a condition of employment, are unenforceable.\textsuperscript{123} The NLRB has found “that the NLRA is sui generis among employment statutes and” that it “guarantees employees a substantive right to engage in concerted activity,” which includes “class and collective action litigation.”\textsuperscript{124} The NLRB also contends that the NLRA has no conflict with the FAA for two reasons: the NLRA is within the Savings Clause; and “the NLRA constitutes a ‘contrary congressional command’ sufficient to override the FAA’s strong federal policy favoring arbitration” as required by the Supreme Court in \textit{American Express}.\textsuperscript{125}

The seminal NLRB case regarding this issue is \textit{In re D.R. Horton, Inc.}\textsuperscript{126} In the case, D.R. Horton, a home builder with operations across more than twenty states, required employees to sign a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” that provided employee’s “will not have the authority to consolidate the claims of other employees . . . [or] fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action.”\textsuperscript{127} The NLRB looked to Section 7 of the NLRA, and held it precluded the class waiver contained within the agreement.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Id.} at 1429 ("[T]he Court’s view [was] that litigation had become excessive and needed to be curtailed. In 1976, Chief Justice Burger promoted and spoke at the Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, the chief message . . . was that the ‘litigation explosion would’ . . . ‘be controlled.’").


\textsuperscript{124} Fritts, supra note 123.

\textsuperscript{125} Id.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{In re D.R. Horton, Inc.} 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012) rev’d by \textit{D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.} 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id.} at 1.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.} at 2. Section 7 reads in part “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through reps of their own choosing, and to engage
Importantly, the NLRA held class action out as a “substantive right to engage in specified forms of associational activity.” The NLRA reconciled the decision with the rule from Concepcion, distinguishing them by both type of agreement and scope of people affected. On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision. Under Concepcion, the Circuit Court held that disallowing class action waivers in employment contracts was not neutral to arbitration. Like Concepcion, the Court held that the rule would undermine the attributes of informality. Still, the NLRB maintains its position, and many commentators expect the issue to come before the Supreme Court in the near future.

Despite the overwhelming appearance of adherence to the Concepcion and American Express rules, the circuit courts beneath the Supreme Court have demonstrated some willingness to invalidate arbitration

in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2015). The Court, too, noted that it is well settled that “mutual aid or protection” includes employee efforts to “improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.” Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-566 (1978).

129 Id.; Weiss Attorneys at Law, Arbitration Agreements Preventing Employees from Joining Together to Pursue Employment Claims Violate Federal Labor Law, WEISS ATTORNEYS AT LAW, (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.weisslawllp.com/2012/01/10/arbitration-agreements-preventing-employees-from-joining-together-to-pursue-employment-claims-violate-federal-labor-law. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2015). This is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on the legislation. “It is well settled that ‘mutual aid or protection’ includes employees’ efforts to ‘improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.’ The Supreme Court specifically said Section 7 “protects employees from retaliation by their employer when they seek to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.” Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565-66. “The same is equally true of resort to arbitration.” In re D.R. Horton, Inc. at *2. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” in Section 7. 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(1) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 114-244, approved 10/14/16).

130 Id. at 15. The NLRB argued Concepcion applied to customer adhesion contracts, whereas its decision would affect employment contracts. Id. Related and important to this distinction are the difference in scale of the two types. Id. The average number of employees at an employer is twenty, compared with the thousands and thousands of customers that can make a class in a customer adhesion contract challenge. Id. The employment classes are far more akin to the individual arbitration proceedings along the dimensions of speed, cost, risk, and informality. Id.

131 D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013).
132 Id. at 359.
133 Id.
134 Id.

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agreements. Nowhere is this more pronounced than the Ninth Circuit. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit heard Chavarria v. Ralphps Grocery Co. where it voided an arbitration agreement it found both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. In its opinion, the Court made a point of illustrating how the agreement’s requirement “that the arbitrator must, at the outset of the arbitration proceedings, apportion the arbitrator’s fees between Ralphps and the employee regardless of the merits of the claim” was substantively unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit held that the Concepcion decision “cannot be read to immunize all arbitration agreements from invalidation no matter how unconscionable they may be, so long as they invoke the shield of arbitration.” Further, it held American Express did not bar a court from considering the costs that may be imposed by virtue of the arbitration agreement at issue.

The NLRB and Ninth Circuit are not alone in striking down class action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements, as the California state courts have used the malleability of unconscionability to avoid enforcement. A


[136] The arbitration policy created a system for selecting the arbitrator that “invariably [chose] one of the three candidates nominated by the party that did not demand arbitration,” Chavarria v. Ralphps Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2013). It also permitted Ralphps to unilaterally modify the policy without notice to the employee. Id. The Court explained “where . . . the employee is facing an employer with ‘overwhelming bargaining power’ who ‘drafted the contract and presented it to [the employee] on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,’ the clause is procedurally unconscionable.” Id. at 922-23 (quoting Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. 469 F.3d 1257, 1284).

[137] Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 923 (“This provision [is] a model of how employers can draft fee provisions to price almost any employee out of the dispute resolution process.”). It is an important indicator of a major federal court implicitly recognizing the ways a clever drafter may devise a way to bar effective vindication to a claim even after the American Express decision. Id.

[138] Chavarria, 733 F.3d at 927.

[139] Id. at 926.

[140] California courts have gained some notoriety for their hostility towards arbitration agreements in the employment and consumer contexts. One ABA article wrote: Since . . . Concepcion . . . many have wondered how the California Court of Appeal – a court (in)famous for its hostility to enforcing employment and consumer arbitration agreements – may attempt to limit the reach of this arbitration-friendly decision. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since the issuance of Concepcion, the California Court of Appeal has continued to strike down numerous arbitration agreements, and it has done so largely based on the unconscionability doctrine. Damon Thayer, If You Thought Concepcion Would Stop California Courts From Invalidating Arbitration Agreements, Think Again, ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/if_you_thought_concepcion_would_stop_california_courts_from_invalidating_arbitration_agreements_think_again.html (last visited January 23, 2016); see also Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the
case providing a good example of this is Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{141} In Iskanian, Iskanian filed suit alleging his employer failed to pay for overtime, meal breaks, business expense reimbursements, or pay wages in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{142} He brought his action under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA").\textsuperscript{143} The Court examined the statute and held a class waiver would impermissibly frustrate its objectives.\textsuperscript{144} The Court then found the statute did not conflict with the FAA because they dealt with different types of disputes.\textsuperscript{145} This case is interesting because it seems to contradict Supreme Court precedent ruling the terms of an arbitration agreement usurp applicable state law.\textsuperscript{146}

California again threw out arbitration agreements on the basis of unconscionability\textsuperscript{147} in Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC\textsuperscript{148} and Mayers v. Volt Management Corp.\textsuperscript{149} In Samaniego, two employees were provided non-

\textit{Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2004).}
\textsuperscript{141} Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (Cal. 2014).
\textsuperscript{142} Id. at 361
\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 359. The Private Attorney General Act authorizes an employee to bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the state against his or her employer for Labor Code violations committed against the employee. See \textit{CAL. LAB. CODE} § 2699 (WEST 2004).
\textsuperscript{144} Civil Code § 3513 providing that "a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement" is violated if one cannot bring a representative Private Attorney General Act claim.
\textsuperscript{145} A single-claimant arbitration under the PAGA for individual penalties will not result in the penalties contemplated under the PAGA to punish and deter employer practices that violate the rights of numerous employees under the Labor Code. That plaintiff and other employees might be able to bring individual claims for Labor Code violations in separate arbitrations does not serve the purpose of the PAGA, even if individual claim has collateral stopped claims. Id. at 384.
\textsuperscript{146} Where the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, claims under the PAGA are a dispute between an employer and the state Labor and Workforce Development Agency. Id.
\textsuperscript{148} California's unconscionability law requires showings of procedural and substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability requires oppression or surprise. Oppression exists where a contract involves a lack of negotiation and meaningful choice; surprise exists when the unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form. Substantive unconscionability is found where a contract reallocates risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner. Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 502 (Cal. App. 2012).
\textsuperscript{149} Id.
negotiable arbitration agreements as conditions of employment. The two men did not understand English but were given agreements composed of lengthy, single-spaced textual blocks of legalese with no separate header from which to distinguish it from the rest of the document. The employer failed to provide governing arbitration rules, as well. The court found the agreement procedurally unconscionable for the above reasons. The court found the agreement substantively unconscionable for shortening the limitations period for a claim, making the arbitration obligation one-sided, and requiring employee payment of the employer’s attorneys’ fees.

On the other hand, Mayers and its final adjudication in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Company, demonstrates a recent trend in California, in the wake of Concepcion and American Express, of enforcing arbitration agreements which previously might have been overturned. Though the California Court of Appeal held the employment arbitration agreement Mayers signed as unconscionable, the Supreme Court of California later reversed the decision in Sanchez. It held that although a contract of adhesion can be found procedurally unconscionable even without a showing of non-negotiability, a provision subjecting the appealing party responsibility for filing fees and other arbitration costs was not unconscionable absent any showing that cost of appellate arbitration filing fees was unaffordable.

More recently, the California Supreme Court decided Baltazar v. Forever 21, holding an arbitration agreement within an employment contract was not unconscionable. Though the terms of the arbitration agreement were not

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150 Samaniego, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 495-96.
153 Id. at 499.
154 Id. at 500.
155 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899 (Cal. 2015).
156 See also Titi v. Lucky Chances, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 231 (Cal. 2014) (adopting the rule from Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) (permitting a delegation clause within an arbitration agreement to California state law)).
157 Similar to Samaniego, the Court disapproved of the absence of and provision for exact arbitration rules; the Court also held unconscionable a provision allowing award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party because it exposed the employee to a higher risk of pursuing a claim than if he had simply sued in court. Mayers v. Volt Mgmt. Corp., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1197 (2012).
158 Sanchez, 61 Cal. 4th at 920.
159 Id.
160 62 Cal. 4th 1237 (2016).
very controversial, the holding is still significant because of the higher scrutiny employment agreements are given in evaluating unconscionability.

California’s insistence on permissible unconscionability standards raises the question of how long such a strategy can be successful. Generally, unconscionability is considered a weak contract defense, yet, it is widely used in challenging arbitration agreements. Some commentators believe it is a strategic choice by courts seeking to lower the risk of reversal. While it is effective now, it might just be a matter of time before arbitration advocates provide an effective rebuttal to the unconscionability argument.

PART VI: WHERE IS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE HEADING?

With the state of arbitration jurisprudence seemingly divided between pro-arbitration federal courts and state courts favoring narrow interpretations of the FAA, it is difficult to anticipate where arbitration law is heading. That said, several factors contribute to the belief that pro-arbitration attitudes may continue to proliferate: first, the recent decision in DIRECTV v. Imburgia seems to only reaffirm the Court’s position on arbitration; and second, even with its pervasive applications to employment and consumer contracts, one large void in arbitration jurisprudence exists for expansion – corporate bylaws mandating arbitration for shareholder disputes; third, California and the Ninth Circuit have both shown signs of adopting pro-arbitration attitudes. However, two counterpoints remain. The death of Justice Antonin Scalia means an incoming Justice may provide a swing vote for a Court strongly

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161 The agreement provided a non-exhaustive list of arbitrable claims and also contained a confidentiality provision. See Baltazar, 82 Cal. 4th at 1241-42.

162 See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 (2000) (holding courts must be “particularly attuned” to the danger of unconscionability in the employment setting, where “economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute”).

163 Bruhl, supra note 51, at 1442 (“It is well known that unconscionability is generally a lesser of an argument.”). Unconscionability challenges appear in 15-20% of all cases involving arbitration. Bruhl, supra note 51, at 1441.

164 Professor Bruhl argues lower courts realize they can manipulate the grounds of decision to advance their preferred outcomes and raise the costs of reviewing. Bruhl, supra note 51, at 1422. He argues unconscionability is effective for a few reasons: it carries a low policy impact so is unlikely to garner extra attention, low technical and expressive ease of review, and, thus, a low risk of reversal. Id. at 1442, 1448.


166 See generally supra Part V.
divided in *Concepcion* and *American Express*. Further, perception from legal scholars and the public seem to be at a low-point and may provide pressure necessary to persuade judicial restraint as to the FAA.

The Court’s recent opinion in *Imburgia* signals both an affirmation of existing arbitration jurisprudence and an overt frustration with lower courts unwilling to enforce it. The facts are familiar to other cases like it: DIRECTV and Imburgia entered into a service agreement containing a mandatory arbitration agreement with a class waiver stipulating “if the ‘law of your state’ makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable’.”

While a California Court of Appeal held “the law of California would find the class action waiver unenforceable” even after the Court’s holding in *Concepcion*, the Supreme Court reversed. While the holding may come as little surprise, the majority’s foreboding tone coupled with its explicit point that the “conclusion . . . falls well within the confines of (and goes no further than) present well-established law” raises the reasonable inference that the Court stands firmly behind its pro-arbitration interpretations. The fallout from this opinion was made even more clear when the Court removed *MHN Government Services, Inc. v. Zaborowski* from its calendar. Commentators speculate the “vigor” of the *Imburgia* opinion caused the parties to settle and withdraw from the Court’s docket.

*Imburgia* offers little hope to the consumers and employees who bear the brunt of the harm from broad applications of the FAA.

Even more troubling for opponents of arbitration is the issue of mandatory arbitration agreements with class waivers in corporate bylaws — an area that

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167 *Imburgia*, 136 S. Ct at 466.
168 Id. at 467 (quoting *Imburgia v. DIRECTV*, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 (2014)).
169 Id. at 471 (emphasis added). One passage demonstrating frustration with lower courts is:

No one denies that lower courts must follow this Court’s holding in *Concepcion*. The fact that *Concepcion* was a closely divided case, resulting in a decision from which four Justices dissented, has no bearing on that undisputed obligation. Lower court judges are certainly free to note their disagreement with a decision of this Court. But the “Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of agreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source.” . . . The Federal Arbitration Act is a law of the United States, and *Concepcion* is an authoritative interpretation of that Act. Consequently, the judges of every State must follow it.

Id. at 468 (quoting *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)).
170 Ronald Mann, *February Argument Calendar Losses Arbitration Case to Settlement*, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/february-argument-calendar-losses-arbitration-case-to-settlement/. Zaborowski came from the Ninth Circuit and was largely concerned with the severability of unconscionable provisions of an arbitration agreement. Id. After *Imburgia*, it appeared clear the dissent from the Ninth Circuit would prevail in the Supreme Court. Id.
171 Mann, *supra* note 170.
until recently was largely untapped for corporate strategists looking to insulate themselves from litigation and class proceedings. There is very little case law on the subject, and even less as it pertains to public companies—this cuts both ways: it means few companies have attempted to implement such provisions; however, it also implies fertile ground with which to expand arbitration policy.172

Relevant authorities offer conflicting outlooks on this practice. As the leading state of incorporation, Delaware’s statutory language is instructive, if indirect; plain-text interpretation seems to allow implementing arbitration agreements in one of three ways: the corporation’s articles of incorporation; the corporation’s bylaws, either as an initial bylaw or a subsequent amendment; or negotiated between the corporation and shareholders on an individual basis.173 Though extremely limited, three cases—two in state trial court and one in federal district court—invoking the Commonwealth Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”) show a public company successfully defending inclusion of mandatory arbitration provisions with a class ban in its bylaws.174

Still, more evidence suggests a practice of mandatory arbitration clauses within corporate bylaws faces some significant obstacles. For one, this practice conflicts with SEC policy. The SEC believes such agreements work against the public policy interests underlying federal securities laws and

172 See Allen, supra note 9, at 778 (“As of December 2014, there were only three known opinions addressing the validity and enforceability of a mandatory arbitration bylaw adopted by a public company.”); cf. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 4 (“More than a decade in the making, the move to block class actions was engineered by a Wall Street-led coalition of credit companies and retailers . . .”).


violate Section 14 and Section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.\footnote{Section 29(a) relates to waiver provisions and reads, "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or any rule of regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2015); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2015). Thomas Riesenber, at the time the Assistant General Counsel of the SEC, believed mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of shareholder claims "would be contrary to the public interest to require investors . . . to waive access to a judicial forum . . . where such a waiver is made through a corporate charter rather than through an individual investor's decision." Hartlieb, supra note 173, at 158 (quoting Thomas L. Riesenber, Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A Reply to Carl Schneider, 93 N.C. L. REV. (Aug. 1990)); Allen, supra note 9, at 775-76 (The "SEC disfavors mandatory arbitration, as evidenced by its policy against accelerating the registration statements of companies which such provisions in their organizing documents.").} Another impediment to this practice is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank").\footnote{Hartlieb, supra note 173, at 157 ("Although the [SEC] has not issued formal opinions or decisions prohibiting arbitration bylaws, it has still been able to exert pressure in guiding corporations away from including the terms."); The SEC also provided relief under the anti-waiver provision in Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act when Pfizer Inc.’s shareholders proposed a bylaw requiring arbitration of stockholder disputes with specific parameters. The SEC stated, "there appears to be some basis for [the] view that implementation of the proposal would cause the company to violate the federal securities laws." Gannett Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 2012). See also Allen, supra note 9, at 779.} Enacted in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, Dodd-Frank includes several provisions limiting, or providing authority to limit, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.\footnote{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).} The path to embedding mandatory arbitration clauses with class bans within corporate bylaws is not completely clear, but remains a logical continuation of pro-arbitration policies.\footnote{See Allen, supra note 9, at 775 n.129; see also Hartlieb, supra note 173, at 160 (describing how Dodd-Frank permits the SEC to "prohibit, or impose condition or limitation on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute." (quoting Can Companies Force Arbitration on Shareholders?, SLINDE NELSON STANFORD, http://www.slnidenelson.com/Articles/Can-Companies-Force-Arbitration-on- Shareholders.shtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(3)). But see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 428 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding non-arbitrability does not extend to claims under the SEC).}
Further, California’s recent decisions in Sanchez and Baltazar and Governor Brown’s veto of legislation, which would have made arbitration agreements in all employment contracts unenforceable, signal that California is adopting a pro-arbitration outlook. Assembly Bill No. 465 would have prohibited employers from requiring employees sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. Though passed in the California Legislature, Governor Brown vetoed the bill, stating “a blanket ban on mandatory arbitration agreements is a far-reaching approach that has been consistently struck down in other states as violating the Federal Arbitration Act.” The governor’s actions, specifically his rationale for doing so, strongly indicates California is prepared to depart from its anti-arbitration past.

On the flip side, some hope exists for restraint in the arbitration context. A large unknown for arbitration jurisprudence lies in the Supreme Court’s future make-up. Though, historically, the Court is considered strongly pro-arbitration, the Concepcion and American Express decisions were harshly divided. Justice Scalia penned the majority opinions in both decisions. The Justice who is confirmed in his place may end up providing the vote necessary to reign in the Court’s expansive interpretation of the FAA and provide some relief to consumers and employees who are disadvantaged by it.

Besides speculating the arbitration preferences of the next Supreme Court Justice, there is some possible weight to the notion that perception of arbitration is so low that pressure to reform may be in order. Empirical studies


\[181\] Campbell, supra note 180.

\[182\] See supra Part III.

\[183\] AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 335 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013).

\[184\] See supra Part III.

\[185\] Current Supreme Court nominee, Neil Gorsuch, however, is likely not the person to bring about such change. See Edith Roberts, Judge Gorsuch’s arbitration jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2017), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuchs-arbitration-jurisprudence/.

For example, in a 2016 dissent, Gorsuch would have compelled arbitration because of “the federal policy favoring arbitration embodied in the FAA.” Ragab v. Howard, 841 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, N., dissenting). Gorsuch has also authored opinions suggesting he will limit the discretion of the NLRB to invalidate class-action waivers in arbitration agreements, should the issue come before the Supreme Court. See Edith Roberts, Judge Gorsuch’s arbitration jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2017), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuchs-arbitration-jurisprudence/.
show that, for example, when investors go to securities arbitration, they exhibit low levels of faith in the impartiality of arbitrators, belief that the process itself is fair, and satisfaction with the outcome, especially relative to the companies they oppose.\textsuperscript{185} They are also likely to believe arbitration does not compare favorably to litigation.\textsuperscript{186} A study from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau finds that arbitration disproportionately favors business over consumers in outcome success rates and award amounts.\textsuperscript{187} It seems various media outlets have taken notice to the current trends too.\textsuperscript{188} Negative public perception along with pressure from anti-arbitration courts may provide the impetus to curb the tide of arbitration.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in \textit{Morris v. Ernst & Young} shows a willingness, on the federal level, to still limit arbitrations application. In \textit{Morris}, the Ninth Circuit held, an employment agreement, which funneled all disputes to individual arbitration, ran at odds with the NLRA.\textsuperscript{189} The Court, taking after the NLRB’s holding in \textit{Horton}, found the FAA could not trump the NLRA where it violated the NLRA’s statutory right to “engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection” and “join together to pursue workplace grievances, including litigation.”\textsuperscript{190} The case has been petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court for next year.\textsuperscript{191}

\textbf{PART VII: HOW DO THESE TRENDS AFFECT THE SEVERAL ONGOING UBER LITIGATIONS?}

For Uber and its drivers, the dispute is real and now. The procedure of the several litigations, along with some recent outcomes provide further
example that pro-arbitration attitudes are here to stay. Though the Ninth Circuit recently granted Uber a victory in upholding its arbitration agreements, several other actions still exist.\textsuperscript{192} The strategic argument the drivers have and will continue to use is unconscionability – it is undoubtedly their best chance at convincing a reviewing court that the arbitration agreements are unenforceable, which will allow them to maintain their class against Uber.\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Company} discusses and slightly reformulates California unconscionability rules – barring new case law, this is the prevailing definition.\textsuperscript{194} The \textit{Sanchez} court found procedural unconscionability due to the adhesive nature of the contract, yet ruled against a finding of substantive unconscionability, drawing on factors including provision of some limited appeal and the type of contract (customer versus employment contract).\textsuperscript{195} In ruling Uber’s 2013 and 2014 arbitration agreements unconscionable, the Northern District Court of California first held the clauses to be procedurally unconscionable as adhesion contracts

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\item The Ninth Circuit enforced the arbitration agreement for several reasons: one, the delegation clause was clear and unmistakable; two, the delegation was not unconscionable because the drivers had the ability to opt out; three, the drivers were not prevented from effectively vindicating their rights in arbitration because Uber agreed to committed to paying the full costs of the arbitration. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 12-16178 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2016).
\item See Bruhl, \textit{supra} note 51, at 1443 ("Unconscionability’s allure is not limited to the fact it remains available. Another of its virtues is that it provides at least the opportunity for futile manipulation and evasion of review, making it a move that is hard to counter directly."); see also Hartleb, \textit{supra} note 176, at 161 ("...California and the Ninth Circuit have stringent understandings of unconscionability."). \textit{But cf.} Bruhl, \textit{supra} note 51, at 1443 (explaining that unconscionability may be a desirable short-term option, yet, in the long-run, "pro-arbitration courts will try to respond to the . . . tools being used to limit arbitration . . . arbitration jurisprudence is not at rest but is still evolving.").
\item \textit{Sanchez} builds on the unconscionability rules described by the \textit{Sananiego} court and detailed \textit{supra} note 123. Unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability, though not necessarily to the same degree – rather, they operate on a sliding scale where an excess of one can compensate for a lack of the other. \textit{Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Company}, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 910 (2015). Unconscionability is generally concerned with terms unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. \textit{Id.} at 910. That said, a contract is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; unconscionability requires one-sided terms that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "unreasonably favorable." \textit{Id.} at 910. Evaluating unconscionability is highly dependent on context . . . [and] often requires inquiry into the "commercial setting, purpose, and effect" of the contract." \textit{Id.} at 911. Finally, the court reiterates that under \textit{Concepcion}, unconscionability must be applied similarly to arbitration and non-arbitration agreements. \textit{Id.} at 912. See e.g., \textit{Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.}, 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (2003) (holding unconscionable a $50,000 threshold for an arbitration appeal that decidedly favored defendants in employment contract disputes).
\item \textit{Sanchez}, 61 Cal. 4th at 916.
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despite the existence of opt-out provisions.\textsuperscript{196} The Court found substantive unconscionability in both agreements where they created a fee-splitting arrangement imposing “hefty fees” even to arbitrate “the gateway question of arbitrability.”\textsuperscript{197}

In light of \textit{Sanchez}, the challenged 2013 and 2014 agreements would likely be upheld as unconscionable. As to procedural unconscionability, the 2013 and 2014 agreements are adhesion contracts, which \textit{Sanchez} tells us is sufficient for a finding of some procedural unconscionability. Murkier, though, is the relation between the two disputes as they relate to substantive unconscionability. That said, it is reasonable to infer the \textit{Sanchez} court would find the 2013 and 2014 agreements substantively unconscionable because: they are employment contracts – a context requiring more protection than a sales contract; Uber lacks the limited appeals existing in \textit{Sanchez}; and the fee-shifting arrangement is one posited as unenforceable by previous California and United States Supreme Court holdings.\textsuperscript{198} Though, despite its apparent conformity to existing California law, this analysis may become irrelevant, contingent on its applicability to the ongoing litigation, as Uber unveiled an even further revised arbitration agreement at the end of 2015.

Since the District Court ruling, Uber re-issued a new arbitration clause “excluding anyone who signs it from participating in current or future class-action lawsuits.”\textsuperscript{199} The new agreement contains several critical modifications, none more important in overcoming an unconscionability attack than the change made to the claimant’s responsibility to pay

\textsuperscript{196} The Court determined the 2013 Agreement’s opt-out clause was “buried in the agreement,” “extremely onerous,” and “largely illusory” because the clause was buried in the contract, printed on the penultimate page in small and densely packed text, and required hand-delivery to Uber’s office in San Francisco. \textit{Mohamed v. Uber Technologies}, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting \textit{O’Connor v. Uber Technologies}, 2013 WL 6407583 at *6 (2013)). The 2014 agreement created a “meaningful right to opt-out” but remained procedurally unconscionable under \textit{Gentry v. Superior Court}. 42 Cal. 4th 443, 471 (2007) (holding an identical opt-out provision procedurally unconscionable under California state law because “it is not clear that someone in Gentry’s position would have felt free to opt out.”); \textsuperscript{197} see \textit{Mohamed}, F. Supp. 3d at 1216 ("[T]he Court cannot conclude that the 2014 delegation clauses are without procedural unconscionability . . . . Mohamed’s ability to opt-out of the delegation clause was not sufficiently meaningful to eliminate all oppression from the contract.").

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Mohamed}, F. Supp. 3d at 1208, 1216.

\textsuperscript{198} See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013) (holding “administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable” may well be enforceable (citing \textit{Green Tree Fin. Corp. Alabama v. Randolph}, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)); see also \textit{Armenduz v. Found. Health Care Servs.}, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 110 (2000).

administrative and filing fees.\textsuperscript{200} Uber’s new agreement provides, a claimant’s responsibility for these fees will be paid by Uber “if your claim for damages does not exceed $75,000.”\textsuperscript{201} Though this still presents some barriers and costs to arbitrability, the damages threshold is so high as to not effectively bar many suits; under California case law, it will likely survive a test for substantive unconscionability.\textsuperscript{202} The legal weight this new agreement is afforded remains to be seen, but a week after Uber released it, Judge Edward Chen, expressed doubt that “he can bar Uber Inc. from enforcing [its new] arbitration agreement,” especially in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in \textit{Imburgia}.\textsuperscript{203} Given how far the pro-arbitration pendulum has swung, barring drastic political change or groundbreaking interpretations of the FAA, it is difficult to see how Uber drivers – and in the greater picture, employees and consumers as a whole – will be able to effectively find relief in a world so permeated with arbitration.

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\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Legal - Terms and Conditions}, Uber, (last updated Nov. 21, 2016), \url{https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms}.
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{LJEN}, supra note 199.
\textsuperscript{202} \textit{C.f. supra} p. 35.

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