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Reflections on the Practice of Law as a Religious Calling, From a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics

Samuel J. Levine*

I. INTRODUCTION: LIFE AS A RELIGIOUS CALLING

In thinking about the practice of law as a religious calling, it might be helpful to first consider the broader issue of the general relevance of religion to various areas of life, including work. From a perspective of Jewish law and ethics, moral conduct comprises an imperative at home and at the workplace no less than at the house of worship.¹ Starting with the Biblical text and spanning thousands of years of legal interpretation and philosophy,

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This Essay is based on introductory remarks I delivered at the Inaugural Conference of the Pepperdine Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics, "Can the Ordinary Practice of Law be a Religious Calling?," held on February 6-7, 2004 at Pepperdine University School of Law. I thank my colleague Bob Cochran, Director of the Institute, for the opportunity to address the Conference, and I thank Courtney Lang and the Editors of the Pepperdine Law Review for publishing this Symposium issue in connection with the Conference proceedings. In accordance with Bob's request, the observations in this Essay draw largely upon my own religious heritage of Jewish faith and tradition in the hope and expectation that many of the issues I raise will find more universal relevance and application. I thank Tom Shaffer and Russ Pearce for their pioneering work and their personal guidance in the areas discussed in this Essay. Finally, I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah Tzvi, and Aryeh Shalom for their encouragement.

1. As Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik has explained, Jewish thought "does not differentiate between the [person] who stands in [the] house of worship, engaged in ritual activities, and the mortal who must wage the arduous battle of life." RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 93 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983) (originally published in Hebrew as *Ish ha-halakhah*, in 1 TALPIOT 3-4 (1944)). Instead, Jewish law "declares that [a person] stands before God not only in the synagogue but also in the public domain, in [one's] house, while on a journey, while lying down and rising up." *Id.* In short, "[t]he marketplace, the street, the factory, the house, the meeting place, the banquet hall, all constitute the backdrop for the religious life." *Id.* at 94.

Jewish religious thought has addressed not only the apparently sacred, but also the seemingly mundane aspects of human behavior. Indeed, the range of halacha, Jewish legal and ethical thought, encompasses all facets of the human experience, emphasizing the importance of an ethically unified life and demonstrating that every area of life has moral significance.²

The Biblical verse that may best articulate this concept commands “[i]n all your ways acknowledge [God].”³ As noted in the Talmud and elaborated upon in many of the foundational works of Jewish ethical literature, this concise formulation powerfully captures a basic *ethos* of Jewish thought.⁴ Maimonides understands this verse to teach that all of one’s activities, pursued with proper motivation, may and should be performed in service to God.⁵ Likewise, a classic ethical tract delineating an aspirational path

2. It may be instructive to quote at length from the eloquent words of a leading contemporary scholar of Jewish law and ethics:

On the one hand, there may be a dualistic conception that would set up a rigid barrier between [religious and secular life], a conception that conceives of [a person’s] purely natural life as intrinsically corrupt, that sees the religious as established not upon the secular but despite it On the other hand, we have a unified conception that stems from a deep-seated belief that life is basically one, that the secular and religious aspects of human experience are in fundamental harmony I think that the attitude of [the] Torah is clearly aligned with the latter view Our whole *Weltanschauung*, from eschatology to ethics, is firmly grounded upon the profound conviction that the physical, the natural, the secular, is not to be destroyed but to be sanctified. The Hala[c]ha stresses not rejection but inclusion, not segregation but transmutation The Torah is neither world-accepting nor world-rejecting. It is world-redeeming.

See 1 RABBI AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, *LEAVES OF FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LEARNING* 103 (2003) [hereinafter LICHTENSTEIN, *LEAVES OF FAITH*].

Cf. Samuel J. Levine, *Introductory Note: Symposium on Lawyering and Personal Values - Responding to the Problems of Ethical Schizophrenia*, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, *On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at Home*, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (1997).

3. *Proverbs* 3:6. A literal translation of the quoted phrase might read “in all your ways know him.” I have chosen the term “acknowledge,” however, because, as is often true of translations, this substitution for literalism may in fact provide a more accurate and meaningful translation of the original into modern English. See generally Aryeh Kaplan, *Translator’s Introduction to RABBI ARYEH KAPLAN, THE LIVING TORAH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES v-vii* (1981) (describing the perils of a literal translation of the Talmud). See also 2 THE HOLY SCRIPTURES 1763 (Jewish Publication Society of America 1955) (using the term “acknowledge” in translating this verse).

Nevertheless, there is clear significance to the use of the Biblical term for “knowledge” in the original Hebrew verse, connoting a close form of intimate connection, which is applied here to an individual’s relationship with God. See, e.g., *Genesis* 4:1; see also YITZCHAK HUTNER, *PACHAD YITZCHAK, PURIM 77-78* (1998); *Iggeres Ha-Kodesh*, in 2 KISVEI RAMBAN 334 (Chaim Dov Chavel ed., 1994); RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, *FAMILY REDEEMED: ESSAYS ON FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 94-95* (David Shatz & Joel B. Wolowelsky eds., 2000). Finally, the last word in the quoted phrase is actually the pronoun “him,” to which the antecedent is clearly “God.” See *Proverbs* 3:6.

For an analysis of some of the more technical legal applications of this verse, see Samuel J. Levine, *Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to “Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework*, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337 [hereinafter Levine, *Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously*].

4. See TALMUD BAVLI, BERACHOTH 63a.

5. See MAIMONIDES, *MISHNE TORAH, LAWS OF DE’OTH 3:2-3*; MAIMONIDES, *SHEMONA PERAKIM*, ch. 5; see also RABBI YOSEF KARO, *SHULCHAN ARUCH* 231; Address by Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, in *BY HIS LIGHT: CHARACTER AND VALUES IN THE SERVICE OF GOD* 30-32 (Rabbi Reuven Ziegler ed., 2003) [hereinafter Lichtenstein, *BY HIS LIGHT*]. See generally Samuel J. Levine, *Professionalism Without Parochialism: Julius Henry Cohen, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, and the Stories of Two Sons*, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2003) [hereinafter Levine, *Professionalism*].

toward “holiness” concludes with a citation to this verse, to support the notion of the individual’s unique means of achieving piety, corresponding to the unique circumstances and experiences encountered in life.⁶

Indeed, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik has explained that “[t]he idea of holiness according to the hala[c]hic world view does not signify a transcendent realm completely separate and removed from reality.”⁷ Rather, “[h]oliness, according to the outlook of Hala[c]ha, denotes the appearance of a mysterious transcendence in the midst of our concrete world. . . . appear[ing] in our actual, very real lives.”⁸ Thus, “[t]ranscendence becomes embodied in [a person’s] deeds, deeds that are shaped by the lawful physical order of which [humans are] a part.”⁹ In short, “[t]he true sanctuary is the sphere of our daily, mundane activities, for it is there that the realization of the Hala[c]ha takes place.”¹⁰

Without Parochialism]; Samuel J. Levine, *The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession*, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1199 (1996) [hereinafter Levine, *Broad Life*].

For further explication of this verse in support of the proposition that, when conducted with the proper intention, seemingly optional and mundane activities may be infused with holiness, see RABBI YITZCHAK HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHAK, PESACH 123-26 (1999); RABBI ARYEH KAPLAN, THE LIGHT BEYOND: ADVENTURES IN HASSIDIC THOUGHT 2 (1981); Lichtenstein, BY HIS LIGHT, *supra*, at ch. 2; RABBI AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, 2 LEAVES OF FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LEARNING 327-29 (2004); RABBI MENACHEM MENDEL SCHNEERSON, 23 IGROTH-KODESH 450 (1994).

In fact, Nachmanides understands the command to “be holy” as referring specifically to activities not otherwise regulated under enumerated biblical commands. See 3 RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES), COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH 282 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1971) (explicating *Leviticus* 19:2). See also RABBI MORDECHAI YOSEPH OF IZHBITZ, MEI HA-SHILOACH (explicating *Numbers* 30:3). See generally Samuel J. Levine, *Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework*, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003); Samuel J. Levine, *Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics*, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511 (1998).

6. See RABBI MOSHE CHAIM LUZZATTO, MESILLAT YESHARIM 336-39 (Shraga Silverstein trans., 1966). The notion that each individual has a unique role and potential to fulfill is captured in the statement of the Chassidic master Rebbe Zusia who declared, shortly before his death: “When I shall face the celestial tribunal, I shall not be asked why I was not Abraham, Jacob or Moses. I shall be asked why I was not Zusia.” ELIE WIESEL, SOULS ON FIRE: PORTRAITS AND LEGENDS OF HASIDIC MASTERS 120 (Marion Wiesel trans., 1972). See also RABBI HERSHEL SCHACHTER, NEFESH HARAV 63-68 (1994); RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, YEMEI ZIKARON 9-27 (Moshe Krone ed., 1996).

7. SOLOVEITCHIK, *supra* note 1, at 45.

8. *Id.* at 46. For further discussion of the concept in Jewish thought that holiness is manifested specifically when spirituality and morality are applied to the physical aspects of human behavior, see RABBI CHAIM YAakov GOLDVICH, ARBA’A MA’AMRIM B’AGGADA 21-31 (1984); Rabbenu Bachya ben Asher, *Kad Ha-kemach*, in KISVEI RABBENU BACHYA 350-54 (Chaim Dov Chavel ed., 1995). See also SCHACHTER, *supra* note 6, at 285-86; RABBI MORDECHAI I. WILLIG, AM MORDECHAI ON TRACTATE BERAKHOT 13-14 (1992); Rabbenu Bachya ben Asher, *Shulchan Shel Arba*, in KISVEI RABBENU BACHYA, *supra* at 453.

9. SOLOVEITCHIK, *supra* note 1, at 45.

10. *Id.* at 94-95.

II. WORK AS A RELIGIOUS CALLING

Of all of life's activities, a person's work demands an arguably disproportionate amount of time and energy. Regardless of the particular form it takes, nearly every job occupies a substantial portion of an individual's most productive hours. In addition, depending on the nature of a job, a person may be required to expend considerable physical and/or psychic energy in order to perform an often mundane set of responsibilities. Thus, it would seem that a person's work may present a significant challenge to, and, therefore, perhaps should be central to a discussion of, the goal of imbuing daily activities with moral and spiritual meaning.

Responses to this challenge are based in various conceptions and applications of the moral and spiritual potential latent in the performance of occupational tasks. For example, some jobs, such as that of the Biblical shepherd,¹¹ may allow for contemplation of and concentration on more profound matters unrelated to the often mundane nature of the work. Alternatively, Jewish thought recognizes ethical and religious value in the fulfillment of obligations owed to a customer or an employer.¹²

These two approaches are expressed in differing explanations of the Biblical narrative stating that "Enoch walked with God."¹³ A midrashic interpretation of this verse posits that Enoch was a shoemaker who worshipped God with every stitch.¹⁴ The apparent meaning of this interpretation suggests that, while physically involved in the mundane work of shoemaking, Enoch directed his attention toward overtly spiritual pursuits such as prayer.¹⁵ However, some commentators were concerned that such an understanding attributes to Enoch thoughts that might have distracted him and detracted from his work, thereby leading to a violation of his duty to focus all of his energies on the task for which he was employed.¹⁶ Therefore, others instead explained the midrash as teaching that Enoch worshipped and served God in the measure of honesty and integrity with

11. See, e.g., MALBIM, COMMENTARY ON PSALMS (explicating *Psalms* 23:1 and describing David's days as a shepherd as a uniquely spiritual time in David's life).

12. A Biblical model for this virtue may be found in Jacob's description of his meticulous and selfless service in behalf of Laban. See *Genesis* 31:6, 38-40; see also Maimonides, *Mishne Torah*, Laws of Sechiruth 13:7; Lichtenstein, *BY HIS LIGHT*, *supra* note 5, at 41. Cf. Lichtenstein, *BY HIS LIGHT*, *supra* note 5, at 42 (stating that "[i]t is entirely conceivable that a person may be more spiritually engaged in a less inherently spiritual activity, than a person who is engaged in an inherently spiritual activity but performs it in a very lackadaisical manner").

13. *Genesis* 5:22.

14. Levine, *Professionalism Without Parochialism*, *supra* note 5, at 1344 n.31 (citing 1 ELIYAHU DESSLER, MIGHTAV M'ELIYAHU 34 (Aryeh Carmell & Alter Halpern eds., 1954)).

15. A similar lesson is expressed in a famous Chassidic tale:

A teamster in Berdichov was saying his morning prayers, and at the same time, was greasing the wheels of his wagon. He was indeed an interesting sight, praying with his grease-covered hands, and townspeople snickered, "Look at this ignoramus. He doesn't know better than to grease his wagon wheels while he is praying." The great Rabbi Levi Yitchok then came along and said, "Master of the universe, look at Your servant, the teamster. Even while he is greasing his wagon wheels he is still praising Your great and holy Name."

KAPLAN, *supra* note 5, at 5.

16. Levine, *Professionalism Without Parochialism*, *supra* note 5, at 1344 n.31.

which he performed his job.¹⁷ Through the virtue of such conduct, Enoch merited the Biblical praise of having walked with God.¹⁸

On another level, many jobs may provide an avenue for the service of God through the opportunities they present to help others and to contribute to society. Thus, Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner responded with encouragement to a student who expressed concern that his choice of a secular profession was inappropriate as potentially leading him to live a “double life.”¹⁹ Citing the example of the conduct of a doctor, Rabbi Hutner explained that, through his work, the student was instead engaging in a “broad life,” incorporating professional activities consistent with his religious values.²⁰

III. THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS A RELIGIOUS CALLING

In addition to general issues that confront many other occupations as well, lawyers may be presented with unique challenges to and, perhaps, corresponding opportunities for, aspirations of spiritual and religious expression and growth. In considering the relevance of religion to the work of lawyers, it may be helpful to employ a framework that is familiar in legal thought, looking at what might be termed “substantive” and “procedural” areas of legal practice.

“Substantive” issues might include the clients a lawyer chooses to represent and the goals or causes a lawyer chooses to advocate. Although similar questions undoubtedly apply to many professions, they may be of distinct significance in the practice of law because lawyers may be—or may, at least, be perceived as—particularly prominent and influential members of society.²¹ Moreover, although scholars have debated and offered numerous characterizations of the precise nature of the attorney-client relationship,²² it often may be necessary for lawyers to become—or, again, lawyers may be perceived as—closely associated with the clients and causes they represent.²³

17. *Id.* (citing DESSLER, *supra* note 14, at 34-35).

18. *See id.*; *see also* DESSLER, *supra* note 14, at 34-35.

19. Levine, *Broad Life*, *supra* note 5, at 1204 (citing YITZCHAK HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHAK, LETTERS, No. 94 (1991)).

20. *Id.*

21. *See, e.g.*, CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, ch. 1 (1986).

22. *See, e.g.*, MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 7-9, 56-62 (2d ed. 2002); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); WOLFRAM, *supra* note 21, at 76-78; Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, *Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend*, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977); Charles Fried, *The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation*, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).

23. Indeed, a perception that a lawyer's representation of a client or a cause reflects the lawyer's personal approval of the client or cause was the apparent impetus behind the somewhat anomalous Model Rule stating that: “A lawyer's representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.” MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (b) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

Challenges and opportunities for the expression and fulfillment of spiritual and moral values may arise in a variety of areas of legal practice, including representation of low-income clients, vindicating clients' civil rights, family law, and even corporate law.²⁴ In addition, opposing lawyers in the same arena may encounter respective avenues for religious and ethical growth. Thus, in the area of criminal law, the prosecutor may find that the obligation to serve justice²⁵ is consistent with concepts in Jewish law and tradition emphasizing the importance of the human role in bringing justice to God's world.²⁶ At the same time, however, the criminal defense attorney may embrace the role of counseling, comforting, and guiding those who are in many ways often among the most vulnerable in society, consistent with religious imperatives to assist the needy and the downtrodden.²⁷

"Procedural" aspects of legal practice may likewise present challenges to and, perhaps, opportunities for, spiritual expression and growth, relating to the manner in which lawyers conduct their professional obligations. The work of lawyers may often encourage or even require behavior that, in other contexts, might be considered less than ideal, if not downright improper. Indeed, a brief look at just a few of the tactics central to a lawyer's work demonstrates the potentially detrimental impact the practice of law may have on an individual's spiritual, moral, and ethical character.

Perhaps the most fundamental element of the lawyer's conduct is the obligation to argue on behalf of a client, which is behavior that, in other contexts, may lead a lawyer to develop an overly contentious personality.²⁸ Moreover, it is not uncommon for a lawyer to advocate an argument that,

24. Of course, a more complete list would extend to many other areas of legal practice providing a potential means for spiritual growth. The enumeration in the text corresponds to those areas of practice addressed at the Conference.

25. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.") [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. See also MODEL RULES, *supra* note 23, R. 3.8, Comment [1] ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."). See generally Levine, *Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously*, *supra* note 3, at 1337.

26. See Levine, *Broad Life*, *supra* note 5, at 1206-10.

27. There are countless enumerations and expositions of these imperatives in sources of Jewish law and ethics, from the Torah to contemporary works. Moreover, the criminal defense attorney might point to Elie Wiesel's characterization of the approach espoused by the Chassidic master Rabbi Nachman of Breslov: "Miscreants need redemption more than saints." WIESEL, *supra* note 6, at 189. See *id.* (explaining, according to Rabbi Nachman, that "[t]o pull [others] out of the mud, [a righteous person] must set foot into that mud"; that "[t]o bring back lost souls, [a righteous person] must leave the comfort of [] home and seek them wherever they might be"; and that "[a] Messiah who would seek to save only the Just, would not be the Messiah"). For further discussion of the thought and works of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, see Levine, *Professionalism Without Parochialism*, *supra* note 5.

From perspectives of contemporary American legal ethics scholars applying many of these concepts to their work as criminal defense attorneys, see, Monroe H. Freedman, *Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective*, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1131 (1996); Abbe Smith & William Montross, *The Calling of Criminal Defense*, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 451-52 (1999).

28. It may be instructive that although Jewish thought acknowledges the necessity of argument as an element of legal dispute, the Talmud suggests that, with the proper attitude toward the resolution of legal analysis and dispute, the process has the potential to bring individuals closer rather than perpetuating personal contentiousness. See TALMUD BAVLI, KIDDUSHIN 30b; see also LICHTENSTEIN, *LEAVES OF FAITH*, *supra* note 2, at 14, 90-91.

although not frivolous, does not comport with the lawyer's own assessment of the issue, thus requiring that the lawyer sacrifice intellectual honesty in favor of supporting the client's position.²⁹ Likewise, commercial and transactional lawyers, among others, may find themselves involved in a difficult bargaining process that calls for tough and unpleasant, if not morally questionable, negotiation tactics.³⁰ In the courtroom, upon cross-examination, lawyers may have to treat opposing witnesses in a way that, at the very least, may be considered hostile and may result in insult and embarrassment.³¹ Indeed, the prevailing basic norm of lawyering, providing a zealous representation of a client's interests, though open to some degree of interpretation, undeniably elevates the interests of the client as paramount, generally disregarding potential detriment to others.³²

Attempts to confront these challenges and possibly transform them into opportunities for spirituality may prove even more difficult than responding to challenges arising out of substantive aspects of the practice of law. The very nature of the procedural questions, relating largely to internal issues of character, seems to defy general prescription. Perhaps resolution of these matters requires even greater attention to individual circumstances and conditions. Ultimately, then, it may be particularly appropriate for the lawyer's religious and personal values to provide moral and ethical guidance in these areas.

29. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, *PARTISAN JUSTICE* (1980); David Luban, *The Adversary System Excuse*, in *THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS* (David Luban ed., 1983).

30. See, e.g., Alvin B. Rubin, *A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation*, 35 *LA. L. REV.* 577 (1975); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, *The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations*, 75 *IOWA L. REV.* 1219 (1990).

31. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, *REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS* 465-69 (6th ed. 2002) (describing the debate over the tactics of Max Steuer's cross-examination of truthful witnesses in the criminal trial connected with the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire).

32. See MODEL CODE, *supra* note 27, Canon 7 ("A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."); MODEL RULES, *supra* note 25, R. 1.3, Comment [1] ("A lawyer should also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."). See also FREEDMAN & SMITH, *supra* note 24, at 79-125; Fred C. Zacharias, *Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests*, 36 *WM. & MARY L. REV.* 1303, 1340 (1995).

When the codes authorize lawyers to choose between emphasizing partisanship and important third party or societal interests, lawyers' natural [personal and economic] incentives encourage them to select partisanship. Lawyers who make that choice can readily justify their conduct as mandated by the code by claiming adherence to the code provisions that call for zeal.

Id. But see WILLIAM H. SIMON, *THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS* (1998). See generally Samuel J. Levine, *Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation*, 37 *IND. L. REV.* 21 (2003).

IV. CONCLUSION

Numerous scholars have documented a growing ethical, psychic, and spiritual crisis in the legal profession, resulting in the emergence of various responses and movements.³³ One of the most promising developments in this area, the “religious lawyering movement,” examines the relevance of religion to the practice of law, in the interest of demonstrating that religion may serve to provide lawyers a valuable source of moral and ethical values.³⁴ In recent years, through the emergence of conferences, symposia, and law school institutes, the movement has gained considerable prominence and many adherents.³⁵ The establishment of the Pepperdine Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics represents an important step forward, not only for Pepperdine University and the religious lawyering movement, but also, more broadly, for the exploration of an increasingly significant area of legal ethics.

33. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, *Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics*, 61 MD. L. REV. 217 (2002); Russell G. Pearce, *The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar*, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).

34. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, *Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism*, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).

35. See generally Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelman, *Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation*, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127 (2004). See, e.g., Symposium, *Faith and the Law*, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 911 (1996); Symposium, *Lawyering and Personal Values*, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998); Symposium, *Rediscovering the Role of Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent*, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium, *The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith Conference*, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Rose Kent, *What's Faith Got to Do With It?*, 6 FORDHAM LAW. 11 (2001) (describing Fordham University School of Law's Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer's Work).