3-29-2012

Civic Engagement in California: Why Do We Lag?

James Prieger
Pepperdine University, james.prieger@pepperdine.edu

Kelly Faltis
Pepperdine University

Civic Engagement in California

Why Do We Lag?

James E. Prieger
Associate Professor
Pepperdine University
School of Public Policy
Malibu, CA
James.Prieger@pepperdine.edu

Kelly M. Faltis
Research Fellow
Davenport Institute
School of Public Policy
Pepperdine University
Malibu, CA
kellyfaltis@gmail.com

March 29, 2012

Civic engagement is vital for liberal democracy, the proper functioning of social, civic, and governmental institutions, and economic growth. This report examines citizen participation in political and social civic life in California. We begin by comparing the state to the nation at large, and find that California lags the nation in most forms of civic engagement. The data show that, on average, Whites were more engaged than Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, and native citizens born in the US are more engaged than citizens born elsewhere and non-citizens. To analyze whether these factors determine why civic engagement differs in California, we next employ a regression analysis. The participation gaps between California and the rest of the nation (excluding New York and Texas) can be entirely explained by differences in demographics for four of the six measures of civic engagement. For the other two, the differing demographic profile of California explains about a third to a half of the gaps. We also find that ethnicity, race, and citizenship are generally the most important determinants and explain much of the California engagement gaps. The fact that California has more Hispanics, Asians, naturalized citizens, and noncitizens than the rest of the US thus appears to go a long way toward explaining the lower civic engagement we observe in the state. We conclude by comparing California to New York and Texas to ascertain if those states lag the rest of the nation for the same reasons as California. Unsurprisingly, race, ethnicity, and citizenship also play large roles in explaining the participation gaps in New York and Texas. However, some other factors have more impact in these other two states than in California (income and the low marital rate in New York, and education in Texas).

Table of Contents

Civic Engagement in California

Why Do We Lag? [*]

I. Introduction

A. The Importance of Civic Engagement

Alexis de Tocqueville keenly observed that a citizenry engaged in both political and civil associations is vital to liberal democracy.[1] Without such, he warned, "civilisation itself would be endangered."[2] The assumption that a civically engaged citizenry results in a healthier republic underlies much current research in the area of civic engagement. Involvement in civic affairs comprises more than just voting. Political civic engagement includes discussion of politics in the community and taking local political action, in addition to voting. In addition, social civic engagement complements the political dimension with activities such as involvement in community groups and charitable volunteerism. Meeting one another "face to face" increases connectivity and interpersonal trust which in turn encourages commitment to both the local community and to political interests at large (Putnam, 1995a). One of civic engagement's prominent proponents, Robert Putnam, argues that civic involvement creates communities and strengthens political interest. Putnam refers to this type of engagement as "social capital" and argues that it can facilitate the proper functioning of social, civic, and governmental institutions[3] or otherwise increase overall social welfare.[4] Sociologists and economists alike have identified the important and beneficial roles that trust and social capital play in building strong public institutions (La Porta et al. 1997) and in stimulating overall economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Tabellini, 2010).

B. Cause for Alarm in the Nation and California?

Despite the importance of civic engagement, Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000) finds evidence of a decline in civic engagement in America. He expresses alarm that membership in fraternal organizations, parent-teacher groups, and labor unions—all traditional forms of civic engagement—is declining. Although some new environmental and other political associations have grown in membership, such non-traditional "tertiary" or "mass-membership" organizations, where the members rarely meet one another, may not build community relationships. Putnam (1995a) faults the decrease in connectivity on

[*] We thank Pete Peterson and Ashley Trim for helpful comments on this work.

[1] Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy In America* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2002), 473.

[2] Tocqueville (2002), p.473.

[3] Fukuyama (2000, p.6) states that "[t]he economic function of social capital is to reduce the transaction costs associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, and bureaucratic rules."

[4] However, Fukuyama (2000, p.8) cautions that it is "… possible to have too much of a good thing. One person's civic engagement is another's rent-seeking…." Enthusiasm for civic engagement should perhaps be attenuated to the extent that social capital is employed merely to secure public resources for this or that interest group.

changing family structure, women entering the workforce, and increasingly isolating leisure activities such as television and other in-home entertainment. In later work, Putnam (2007) argues that increasing diversity reduces trust, altruism, and cooperation in the community (at least in the short run), all of which are important for civic engagement.

Most research affirms that civic engagement (at least as traditionally measured) has declined in recent decades (Galston and Levine, 1998; Levine and Lopez, 2002; Galston, 2004; Macedo, *et al*., 2005).[5] However, by some measures citizen participation has increased recently. At the time of Putnam's research (the 1980s and 1990s), voter eligible participation (VEP) rates were near 50 year lows and under 55% on average.[6] According to the U.S. Elections Project, the most recent 2008 election saw national VEP rates climb to 62%. The rates may indicate that civic participation is not in permanent decline in the US, and Putnam himself does not espouse a strict "declensionist" view.[7] On the other hand, it may turn out that the 2008 election was only an exception to the downward trend.

Researchers disagree on the implications of declining civic engagement for society. Putnam (1995a, 2000) focuses on the decline in membership in organizations like the PTA and Kiwanis as reducing the opportunity for individual trust-building interaction that can strengthen communitarian norms and increase social capital. Skocpol and Fiorina (1995) and Skocpol (2003) argue that the changing structure of organizations, from member driven to top down and "oligarchic," is problematic for participatory democracy. Additionally, the new style of Washington-centered advocacy organizations may offer some level of important national civic participation; however, "too many valuable aspects of the old civic America are not being reproduced or invented in the new public world run by memberless organizations." (Skocpol, 1999, p. 499) Other research argues for the primacy of associational institutions and the scope of membership over the level of individual member activity in the group (Wollebæk and Strømsnes, 2008; Alexander, *et al*., 2010).[8] Counter to most research, Ladd (1999) and Zukin et al. (2006) optimistically suggests the decline in traditional organizational membership levels merely reflects a shift in the expression of civic engagement. Ladd (1999) points to the increase of environmental advocacy groups and informal and formal local groups as evidence of vibrant, contemporary engagement. However, Putnam (1995) views the style of the new advocacy organizations as lacking the power to build community interconnectivity.

What about California? Given the state's role as a bellwether of social and political trends in the US, it is important to note that civic engagement is generally measured to be lower in California than elsewhere. California is a diverse state, and Putnam's (2007) research demonstrates that many forms of social capital and civic engagement are negatively correlated with the ethnic diversity of a community.

---

[5] See Lin (2001) for a contrary view, based on the notion that social capital is moving to cyberspace and that Putnam (1995) was measuring the wrong outcomes.

[6] See the U.S. Elections Project data at http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm.

[7] "American history carefully examined is a story of ups and downs in civic engagement, *not just downs*…." (Putnam, 2000, p.25).

[8] These authors argue that the main contribution of voluntary organizations to civic society is not the socialization of the groups' members or the intensity of their participation, but rather the groups' contributions to the "infrastructure of collective action," which creates a pervasive sense of social capital in the community (Wollebæk and Strømsnes, 2008).

Putnam (2007) concludes from his own extensive empirical investigation of individuals' attitudes and actions, as well as from a large body of previous literature, that immigration and multicultural diversity lead to social isolation, at least in the short run. Therefore, the state's large immigrant and non-white and Hispanic population may lead to less civic engagement than is found in more homogeneous states. One report found large gaps in political participation and volunteerism in the state across racial and ethnic groups and for immigrant status (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004). The recent California Civic Health Index Report (NCOC *et al*., 2010) shows that civic engagement in California as a whole lags the national average in some measures of civic connectivity, such as discussing politics with family and friends.

On the other hand, eligible Californians vote at about the same rate as elsewhere, and in some areas of civic engagement where the state has lagged in recent years, such as volunteering and working with neighbors, the gap is narrowing. The Civic Health Index also compares California to New York and Texas, and generally concludes that Californians are more engaged than residents of those states. However, the comparisons in the Civic Health Index may be misleading, for two reasons. First, with about 12% of the nation's population, California is large enough to significantly pull down the national civic engagement averages, attenuating the degree to which the state lags the nation in some measures.[9] Second, the comparison to New York and Texas reveals that these other large states also pull down the national average.

These complications can be avoided by comparing California to the rest of the US excluding New York and Texas. This comparison, which we pursue in this report, highlights that populous states in general - but California in particular - differ from smaller states when it comes to civic engagement. With this comparison group, we find larger gaps in civic participation between California and elsewhere than were found in the Civic Health Index. In particular, California has statistically significant participation gaps in two of the three measures of political civic engagement we consider (political discussion and non-electoral political action, but not voting) and three of the four measures of social civic engagement (group leadership, group participation and helping neighbors, but not dining with family). Our research questions are then 1) why does California lag? and 2) does it lag for the same reasons as New York and Texas?

C. The Determinants of Civic Engagement

To begin to understand why civic engagement differs in California, a theoretical groundwork for analyzing voluntary participation in community affairs will be helpful. The two main competing models of participation in a civic action (such as voting for example) are the *rational actor* model and the *socio-economic status* (*SES)* model (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). In the rational actor model, pioneered by Downs (1957), the individual is assumed to behave as *homo economicus* and to compare the benefit with the cost of voting. The decisionmaker may consider both "hard" benefits (e.g., the

[9] A simple (hypothetical) numerical example illustrates the point. If 25% of Californians vote and 75% of others in the US vote, then the national voting average will be about 69%. The actual gap between California and the rest of the country, 50 percentage points, is 14% higher than the apparent gap of 44 percentage points calculated with reference to the national average (as in the methodology from the Civic Health Index).

probability that the individual's vote affects the outcome of the election times the benefit following from the preferred outcome) and "soft" benefits (e.g., additional utility gained from fulfilling the responsibility of a citizen or of wearing an "I voted!" badge). The cost of participation includes the opportunity cost of the individual's time, the disutility of dealing with bureaucratic obstacles involved in participation, and the effort cost necessary to become familiar with the issues and to form opinions.[10]

In contrast to the rational actor model, which is rooted in the well-developed theory of utility maximizing behavior from neoclassical microeconomics, what Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) term the SES model is really a collection of empirical predictions holding that people of higher socio-economic status will be more civically engaged.[11] E.g., the SES model predicts that wealthier or more educated individuals will be more active in politics.[12] The SES model is well verified in empirical literature such as Ramakrishnan and Baldassare (2004), who show that after race and ethnicity the three most important factors explaining civic engagement in California are education, home ownership, and income.

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) also synthesize the rational actor and SES models with their *civic voluntarism model* (CVM). The CVM postulates that individuals' resources, psychological engagement with civic matters, and recruitment determine whether they participate in civic life. That is, according to the CVM a person engages civically if he or she *can* do so, *wants* to do so, and is *asked* to participate. The most important resources Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) identify are free time, money, and civic skills, which include both organizational and communication skills. The components of the CVM have obvious connections to the rational actor model. The resources available to the individual affect both the benefits and costs of participation, as well as the constraints placed upon the individual's choices. Furthermore, the degree of mental engagement with civic affairs affects the utility of pursuing political or electoral action.

The CVM also explains the empirical regularities found with the SES model. For example, Hispanics or other minorities may be less civically engaged because they lack the necessary time, money, and civic skills inculcated by education that are more readily available to whites. Because these important resources are generally positively correlated with the schooling of the individual,[13] education plays a central role in the CVM for explaining different levels of civic engagement among racial and other SES dimensions. Education can have a strong effect on civic engagement because it reduces participation

[10] Cho (1999) highlights these latter two factors.

[11] Thus, the SES model hardly qualifies as a "model" to an economist or theoretical political scientist.

[12] See the many citations to studies in Milbrath and Goel (1977) confirming the SES model, which those authors summarize as, "No matter how class is measured, studies consistently show that *higher class persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower class persons…"* [p.92].

[13] The resource of time is a partial exception. Those lacking a high school degree have the most free time, presumably due to unemployment, underemployment, and employing their labor inside the household, where schedules may be more flexible. However, the differences in self-reported free time among those with a high school degree, some college, and a college degree are small (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, p.292). Measuring the time resource with survey results on self-reported free time is likely to give a biased view of the relationship between time and participation, in any event. Putnam (1995) notes that "[t]he available evidence strongly suggests that, in fact, long hours on the job are *not* associated with lessened involvement in civic life or reduced social trust. Quite the reverse…." Putnam quotes research showing that busier people both manage their time better and accomplish more with their available time than others (Robinson, 1990).

costs by improving "the cognitive skills that facilitate learning about politics" and lowers the cost of overcoming bureaucratic obstacles (Cho, 1999, p.1143).

Other factors, such as trust, may influence an individual's psychological engagement in politics and help explain why groups such as Asians and Hispanics tend to be less civically engaged. Uslaner and Conley (2003) argue that ties within an ethnic community may prevent broader civic engagement. The authors point out that perceived discrimination against an individual's affiliated ethnic group may strengthen group identity but lead him or her away from participating in civic life outside the group, due to the destruction of generalized trust in outsiders. The inclination of some cultures (Uslaner and Conley (2003) use the Chinese as an example) to focus inward toward the family also may create "particularized trust" within the group or a smaller social unit at the expense of generalized social trust.[14] Anxiety over immigration status and a general sense of "social distance" from mainstream civic groups can also contribute to a lack of civic trust (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006). Finally, Putnam (2007) finds that greater ethnic diversity in a community is associated with less trust toward those outside *and* inside an individual's racial group.

Immigration is another important factor that affects people's psychological engagement in politics and helps explain differences in engagement among racial and ethnic groups. Cho (1999) argues that foreign-born US residents often differ sharply from the native-born in their past political experiences. People born in the US are much more likely to be socialized from an early age to learn about and participate in voting and other democratic activities. Immigrants, on the other hand, often come from countries with limited opportunity for citizen involvement and high levels of corruption in government, requiring many years of "political acculturation" or socialization in the US to build understanding, trust, and the desire to participate in civic life (Ong and Nakanishi, 2003). This may explain in part why first-generation immigrants in California volunteer less frequently than second- and later-generation immigrants (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006).

A third factor influencing cognitive and physical engagement in civic life, and one that links the CVM directly to the rational agent model, is the perceived benefits of action. The rational agent model predicts that if the stakes for the individual are low because political action accomplishes little, the person is more likely to check out of the civic sphere. Griffin and Newman (2008, ch. 8) demonstrate empirically that an African American voter is no more likely to be a policy winner—defined as concordance between the desired and actual outcome—than a black nonvoter in the areas of defense and environmental spending, and only slightly more likely to be a winner regarding educational spending. Latino voters, on the other hand, are more likely to be winners than Latino nonvoters, and by about the same margin as for whites, but nevertheless Latino voters are still less likely to win than non-Hispanic nonvoters. Thus, for blacks and Hispanics, the rewards from voting appear to be small.

[14] Particularized and generalized trust are closely linked to the concepts of bonding (i.e., exclusive) and bridging (i.e., inclusive) capital, respectively (Gittel and Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000).

D. Our Approach and Findings

Using data from the 2008 and 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS), our research looks at various measures of civic engagement, with an emphasis on California. Consistent with the Civic Health Index report (NCOC *et al*., 2010), we look at measures for both political and social civic engagement and compare California with the nation excluding New York and Texas, with New York, and with Texas. For political civic engagement we choose three measures: whether the survey respondents discuss politics with family and friends, whether respondents are involved in one or more non-electoral political activities, and the 2008 voter turnout rates. For social civic engagement, we look at four different measures: group membership, group leadership, eating dinner with family, and helping a neighbor with a favor.

In section II, we explore how civic engagement differs in California by looking at breakdowns of civic involvement among various subpopulations, including by race and citizenship status. We find that while California indeed lags the nation in most forms of civic engagement, there appears to be no clear ordering of involvement among California, New York, and Texas. Whites were more engaged than Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Native citizens born in the US are more engaged than those born in Puerto Rico or other territories, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens.

To analyze why civic engagement is different in California, we employ a regression analysis in section III. For each participation measure, we look at how race, citizenship status, income, education, and other demographic factors affect civic engagement in the nation and in California. We find that the participation gaps between California and the rest of the nation (excluding New York and Texas) can be entirely explained (indeed, are *over*-explained) by differences in demographics for four of the six measures. For the other two, the differing demographic profile of California explains about a third to a half of the gaps. We also break apart the impact of individual factors, and find that ethnicity, race, and citizenship are generally the most important determinants and explain much of the California engagement gaps. The importance of these factors persists despite controlling for SES indicators such as education and income, indicating that any formulation of the SES model of civic participation lacking racial and ethnic variables would be incomplete. The fact that California has more Hispanics, Asians, naturalized citizens, and noncitizens than the rest of the US thus appears to go a long way toward explaining the lower civic engagement we observe in the state. Our results are in line with much recent empirical work by economists, who analyze data from the US and abroad to find nearly universally that diversity in a community (heterogeneity) reduces civic engagement (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000).[15] The results are also in accord with Putnam's (2007) evidence that greater ethnic diversity leads to lack of trust in a community, social isolation, and less civic engagement.

In section IV, we more directly compare California to New York and Texas to ascertain if those states lag the rest of the nation for the same reasons as California. Unsurprisingly, race, ethnicity, and citizenship

[15] See Costa and Kahn (2003) for a review of more than a dozen recent articles in the economics literature studying the consequences of heterogeneity in the community for civic engagement. See also the literature review by Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006), who state that "…there is mounting evidence that more homogenous communities have higher levels of social interactions leading to a more highly developed civil society" (although their research leads to a more nuanced view).

also play large roles in explaining the participation gaps in New York and Texas. However, some other factors have more impact in these other two states than in California. In New York, income and the low marital rate are important. The low level of educational attainment in Texas, by contrast, is a key driver of the gap in civic engagement in that state.

In section V we draw some conclusions from our work and discuss the promise of the internet to provide social space for civic life.

II. How Civic Engagement Differs in California

In this section, we look at various measures of civic engagement in California taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Most of the data we examine are from the Civic Engagement Supplement to the CPS, collected in November 2009. We also look at electoral participation, using data from the Voting and Registration Supplement from November 2008. The CPS samples have the advantages of a large sample size and careful weighting by the Census Bureau to allow state and nationally representative statistics to be computed. All subpopulations are limited to individuals aged 18 and up. Additional information regarding the survey data is in the appendix. For each indicator of civic engagement, we compare California to the whole nation, to the rest of the US without New York and Texas, and to New York and Texas. In the first subsection we consider political civic engagement along the dimensions of political discussion, non-electoral political activity, and voting behavior. In the second subsection we turn to social civic engagement, and examine leadership and participation in groups, sharing family meals, and exchanging favors with neighbors. For each measure, the averages are broken out by race and ethnicity, and also by citizenship. These bivariate tabulations help identify which groups lag in civic engagement, and also serve to motivate the regression analysis in section III.

For all the measures involving civic engagement outside the home, Whites were more engaged than Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. For the measure of engagement inside the household, eating dinner with family, Asians slightly outpace Whites. For some variables, the differences among racial and ethnic groups are slight, but for others such as political discussion the gaps between Whites and others are large. Regardless of the form of civic participation, native citizens born in the US are more engaged than those born in Puerto Rico or other territories, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens. Native citizens born abroad of US parents are just as engaged as those born in the US for many measures, but lag in a few important activities such as voting and helping neighbors.

Our findings are generally in accord with existing literature, and we have noted some of the similarities with results of previous studies below.

A. Political Civic Engagement

1. Discuss politics with others

The first survey question regarding political civic engagement we consider asked, “How often were politics discussed when communicating with family and friends?” (during a typical month). The results comparing the prevalence of political discussion among California, New York, Texas, and the entire US

are in Table 1 and Figure 1. The table shows comparisons to the nation average and to the rest of the US without New York and Texas, while only the former is included in the figure. In 2009, 27.4% of Californians discuss politics at least a few times per week or more, below the national average by 7.5 percentage points. A further 35.6% of Californians discuss politics at least once a month (but less than once per week), leaving 28.8% who do not talk about politics at all. The fractions of New York and Texas residents who discuss politics weekly are just slightly below the national average at 33.4%.

For the national averages differentiated by race, shown in

Figure 2, Whites are most likely to discuss politics at all, followed by Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. Almost two out of five Whites discuss politics weekly, compared to 29% of Blacks, 22% of Hispanics, and 20% of Asian Americans.[16] However, 39% of Asians report discussing politics at least once per month (but less than weekly), compared to only 32% of Hispanics. Citizenship status also is associated with differences in the frequency of discussing politics (see Figure 3). Those who are native citizens born abroad lead in discussing politics weekly, reporting 37.8%, followed closely by 37.2% for those who are native born in the US.[17] Only 16.3% of those born in Puerto Rico discuss politics at least a few times per week. Interestingly enough, naturalized citizens and non-citizens discuss politics at almost the same rate (23.3% and 22.7%, respectively).

2. Non-electoral political activity

We turn now to civic engagement in the form of non-electoral political activity. The survey includes two measures of political involvement other than voting: whether, in the last year, the individual has "contacted or visited a public official—at any level of government—to express your opinion" and whether the respondent "bought or boycotted a certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that provides it." If the respondent answered yes to either one of these, we deem him or her to have engaged in at least one non-electoral political activity for purposes of analysis. Results are in Table 2 and

Figure 4. California is 2.8 percentage points behind the national average of 17% in engaging in these political activities. Contrast this finding with earlier data from 2002 indicating that Californians were just as likely as others in the US to write to elected officials (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004, p.12). New York and Texas reported slightly higher rates than California, with rates of political involvement at about 16%.

In the US, a race gap exists for non-electoral political activity (see Figure 5), as it also does for voting (as we show in the next subsection). Whites lead with 21% saying they participate in one or more non-electoral political activities. In California, the figure is similar: 23.7% of Whites participate. Blacks in California participate at a rate 8 percentage points higher than the national average of 9.6%, but still lag the participation rate of Whites. Only 6.4% of Hispanics and 5.75% of Asians in the US report non-electoral political involvement. Ramakrishnan and Baldassare (2004, p.48) also found that Blacks in

[16] Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders are also included in this category.
[17] While "native born in the US" appears to be redundant, the survey distinguishes between that category and "native, born in Puerto Rico" and "native, born abroad of American parents".

California had much less citizen contact with elected officials than Whites, and that Latinos and Asian Americans are underrepresented in most types of political activities. Our findings are also in accord with those of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p.233), who found for the US in general the same ordering of rates of contacting public officials among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos that we do.

Similar to the results for political discussion, citizenship affects the propensity to engage in political activities. US citizens by birth, born in the US or abroad, lead in non-electoral political activity, at rates of about one in five (see Figure 6). Those born in US territories, naturalized citizens, and noncitizens have far lower rates of political involvement.

3. Voter turnout

To measure electoral political activity, we consider whether the individual claimed to have voted in the 2008 presidential election.[18] See Table 3 and Figure 7. California, with a rate of 63.4% that is similar to the national average of 63.6% for voting age citizens, had a greater voter turnout than New York and Texas. That Californians voted at nearly the same rate as the rest of the US stands in contrast with findings from the earlier 2000's. Voting in California lagged the nation for the first time in decades in 2002 (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004), and continued to lag in the 2004 general election (McDonald, 2008). Of the three states, Texas had the lowest voter turnout in 2008 at 56.1%. Overall, in 2008, Californians were relatively civically engaged as voters. However, the analysis in the next section shows that if New York and Texas are removed from the national average, then California continues to lag in its voting rate by a few percentage points. We will explore this in section III.C.3.

The breakdown of the voting turnout by race and ethnicity is in Figure 8. As with the other measures, Whites are the most involved voters (66.1% voted across the US), although Blacks do not lag by much (64.7%). It is well known that the Black turnout was especially high in the 2008 Presidential election, with an African American on the ballot for the first time in US history. Historically, Black voting rates lagged those of Whites (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995). Hispanics and Asians were much less likely to vote (50% and 48%, respectively), as has been found elsewhere in the literature (Ong and Nakanishi, 2003; Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004). Citizens born in the US voted at a higher rate (65%) than those born abroad or naturalized (54%) or born in a US territory (48%) (see Figure 9). All of these results are in line with the voluminous literature on voting behavior and its relationship to sociodemographic factors.[19]

B. Social Civic Engagement

1. Group leadership

The first measure of social civic engagement we examine is participation in civic groups. The survey asks if the individual had been an officer or served on a committee of any group or organization in the past year. The results are in Table 4 and Figure 10. The US average for this measure of civic leadership is

[18] Refer to footnote 32 for discussion on treatment of NA, refusals, and answers of "don't know" for the voting question.

[19] The papers collected in Niemi and Weisberg (2001, 2010), particularly those in Part III of each volume, provide a good introduction to the literature on the determinants of the propensity to vote.

9.7%. Texas is close behind at 9.6%. California is slightly less at 7.5% but higher than New York at 5.8%. In 2009, more Whites engaged in group leadership than others, with a national average of 12.0% (see Figure 11). Hispanics have the lowest measure at 3.1%. The low leadership rate for Hispanics is in accord some other findings indicating that Latinos participate in groups less in general (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006), but in contrast to the specific finding of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) that Hispanics are the *most* likely group to serve on a local governmental board such as a school or zoning board. The US average for group leadership is led by native citizens who were born abroad, who reported 11.9% (see Figure 12). Those who are native citizens born in Puerto Rico report the lowest level of leadership at 1.9%.

2. Group participation

While groups need leadership for effective civic engagement, they also need actively involved members. We turn now to civic engagement in the form of participation in various types of civic groups. The groups specifically mentioned in the survey were school groups, neighborhood or community associations (such as PTA or neighborhood watch groups), service or civic organizations (such as American Legion or Lions Club), sports or recreational clubs, and religious institutions (such as churches, synagogue, and mosques). For the latter category, participation had to be beyond normal attendance at religious services. Respondents indicated whether they had participated in any of these organizations in the past year. Respondents could also report participation in groups not listed, and these also are included in our statistics.

The results for group membership[20] are in Table 5 and Figure 13. In 2009, California and Texas had the same level of participation with 33% stating membership in any type of group. California is only 1.5 percentage points below the national average in this category. However, the nature of participation in California differs from that of the US at large. When we examine participation in individual types of groups, Californians are much less likely to participate in religious groups (14.7% vs. 19.8% for the whole US) and service and civic associations (6.0% vs. 8.0% for the US). The participation rates in California for the other types of groups are about the same as elsewhere.

We see racial differences in group participation, consistent with previous studies (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006).[21] Leading all racial groups, 39% of Whites nationally engage in at least one social organization (see

Figure 14). At 21%, Hispanics report the least amount of group participation in the US. Blacks and Asians fall in the middle ground with 33% and 29% participation rates, respectively. For citizenship status (see Figure 15), the same two categories as usual, native residents born in the US or abroad, report the highest group membership (both with 37%). Noncitizens and those born in a US territory such as Puerto Rico have the lowest group participation rates.

[20] We use the terms "participation" and "membership" as synonyms here.

[21] Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2006) found that Latinos and first generation immigrant Asians lag the average group participation rate in the US and California. They also found that Blacks lag the average participation rate in the nation, but not within California.

3. Dining with family

Social civic engagement often begins with the smallest social unit, the family. The survey contains a measure of engagement in the family: dining together. The survey asks "how often did you eat dinner with any of the other members of your household?" Both California and Texas lag only a small bit (1.2 percentage points) below the national average of eating dinner with the family at least once a week of 87.9% (see Table 6 and

Figure 16). New York is slightly above the national average. Unlike the other sorts of engagement we consider, in this category Asian Americans participate more than others (see Figure 17). Over 91% of Asians eat dinner with family at least a few times per week, compared to Whites at 89%. Blacks and Hispanics have lower prevalence of sharing weekly family meals, with rates of around 83%. Other research indicates that these patterns may be set from early age, since African Americans and Hispanic young children are far more likely to never eat lunch or dinner with their family (Flores, Tomany-Korman, and Olson, 2005). The US average for native citizens born in the US who eat dinner weekly is 88.08%. Regarding the breakdown by citizenship status (see Figure 18), all categories have fairly similar participation rates.

4. Helping neighbors

Some authors contend that reciprocal altruism is a vital part of civic engagement. Florini (2003, p.47) states that reciprocal altruism is the basis of social trust, in that reciprocity norms are a critical part of social capital and alleviate free riding behavior in society. The survey asks a question regarding reciprocal behavior: "how often did you and your neighbors do favors for each other?" where helping a neighbor is defined as "watching each other's children, helping with shopping, house sitting, lending garden or house tools, and other small acts of kindness." The results are in Table 7 and Figure 19.

All three large states fell below the national average of 15.4% for helping a neighbor on a weekly basis. However, many more help their neighbor at least once per month or more. Only 13% of Californians help their neighbors at least weekly; however, 42.1% of Californians help their neighbors at least monthly, which is above the national average of 40.8%.

Figure 20 shows that nationally, Whites and Asians help their neighbors the most on a monthly basis (44.64% and 35.26%, respectively). Native citizens, born in the US, lead with 16.7% among citizenship categories in helping a neighbor a few times per week and 42.11% helping once per month or more (see Figure 21).

III. Why Civic Engagement Differs in California

The results in the previous section show that, generally speaking, that non-Whites, Hispanics, noncitizens, and citizens not born in the US do not participate as much in civic life as Whites and native citizens born in the country. Since California's share of these less-engaged groups is disproportionate to that of the rest of the US, at least part of the civic participation gaps may be explained by these demographic factors. Before drawing any conclusions, however, the analysis must be extended in several regards. Other demographic factors besides race and citizenship are correlated with civic

engagement. Ignoring them would give an incomplete picture of participation in civic life in California. In order to understand which factors are actually driving civic engagement, a multiple regression framework is necessary to examine each demographic variable holding other things equal. Also, we do not want to assume that the engagement patterns are the same in California as elsewhere. This requires an analytic framework that allows the propensity of African Americans to vote (for example) to be different in California from elsewhere.

In this section, we take a closer look at the gaps in the various measures of civic engagement between California and the rest of the nation. The reference group in the discussion below is the entire US except for California, New York, and Texas, which we call *US-3* (i.e., the US minus the three most populous states). The aim of the analysis here is to break down each gap by contributing economic and demographic factors, to understand why California lags. We first discuss the regression methodology we use for the decompositions of the gaps. In part B, we present how the demographics in California differ from those elsewhere. In part C and D, we apply the results of the first two parts to comprehend the driving forces behind the gaps in civic engagement in California.

A. Methodology

For each measure of civic engagement considered, we begin by recalculating the fraction of the subpopulations of California and *US-3* that participate in the particular form of civic involvement. Unlike in the previous section, here survey responses coded as N/A, "refused," and "don't know" are dropped from the sample, so that only respondents who gave definite answers are included in the engagement rates estimated.[22] The difference between the means for the two groups is the engagement gap in California (where a positive figure for a gap means that the civic engagement rate is lower in California than in *US-3*). We then split the engagement gap between California and *US-3* into two components: the part explained by differences in demographics and the unexplained residual. Each component, in turn, is decomposed into the underlying contributions from each demographic variable. For example, we show below that 3.4 percentage points of the nine point gap between California and *US-3* in discussing politics is explained by there being more Hispanics, Asians, and non-citizens in California, all of whom are less likely to discuss politics. The rest of the gap not explained by differences in demographics, the "unexplained" portion, arises because (for example) Hispanics living in California may have a different propensity to discuss politics than Hispanics do elsewhere. Finally, even after controlling for all differences in the demographic composition of the state and the propensities of various demographic groups to discuss politics, the attitudes held by California residents of any demographic type toward discussing politics may be fundamentally different than those held by residents elsewhere, and this contributes further to the unexplained portion of the gap.

More formally, the technique we use to break down the gaps is called the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.[23] Let $\bar{X}_j^g$ be the average of the j^{th} demographic variable for the g^{th} group. For illustration, consider the two groups $g = CA$ for California and $g = US\text{-}3$ for the US excluding the three

[22] The one exception is for the voting variable; see footnote 32.

[23] The seminal citations are Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), who developed the method to study wage discrimination.

largest states. Let b_j^g be the estimate of the regression coefficient for the j^{th} demographic variable in a multiple linear regression of civic engagement variable Y^g on the K demographic variables and a constant,[24] using data only from group g. Then the gap in mean outcomes between the groups, $\Delta = \bar{Y}^{US-3} - \bar{Y}^{CA}$, can be decomposed into explained and unexplained components. The first part of the gap, denoted Q for the *quantity effect*, is

$$Q = \sum_{j=1}^{K} b_j^{US-3}\left(\bar{X}_j^{US-3} - \bar{X}_j^{CA}\right) \quad (1)$$

which is the portion explained by differences in the averages of the demographic variables.[25] The quantity effect computes how outcome Y is expected to differ between groups if each individual had the group's average characteristics and the demographics were related to Y as they are in the reference group (*US-3*). Each term in the sum isolates a particular variable's contribution to the quantity effect Q. For example, if Y is a voting variable and the first X is a Hispanic indicator variable, then the first term in (1) shows how much of the gap between California and the rest of the nation is due to differing proportions of Hispanics in the two subpopulations, holding other demographic characteristics equal, and assuming Hispanics everywhere had the same propensity to vote that they do in *US-3*.

The remainder of the gap, denoted U for "unexplained," stems from differences in the coefficients:

$$U = \sum_{j=0}^{K} \bar{X}_j^{CA}\left(b_j^{US-3} - b_j^{CA}\right) \quad (2)$$

The unexplained part of the gap is due to differences in the regression coefficients between groups. In the expression, the differences in how the demographics relate to the outcome (as reflected by the regression coefficients) are weighted by the demographic variables held fixed at their California average levels. Again, each term in the sum is the contribution of a single variable to U. Continuing with the example above, the term for $j = 1$ in (2) shows how much of the gap between California and the rest of the nation is due to Hispanics having a different propensity to vote in California than elsewhere. The term for $j = 0$ in U is the difference in the estimated intercepts from the regressions, and is the residual unexplained part of the gap after accounting for all differences in group average demographics and regression coefficients. This third type of impact is sometimes called the pure "group membership" effect. Together, Q and U exactly match the total size of the gap, so that $\Delta = \mathrm{Q} + \mathrm{U}$. Further details related to the decompositions are in the appendix.

B. The Demographic Difference in California

To understand the decompositions of the gap for a particular measure of civic engagement, we must first look at how the demographics differ between California and the rest of the nation, and second at how demographics relate to civic engagement. While the latter task involves looking at regressions of the particular measure of civic engagement on demographic variables, the former can be examined here before delving into specific types of civic engagement. Table 8 contains the comparison along each measured demographic dimension of California to *US-3*, using the data for 2009 used in all regressions

[24] The constant is $X_0 = 1$.

[25] Since all statistics and regressions are computed using survey weights, the averages are to be understood as weighted averages that estimate the mean values in the subpopulation.

except for the voting sample.[26] The demographic profiles for New York and Texas are also included in the table for later reference.

1. Demographic profile in 2009

Comparing California (in column one of Table 8) to *US-3* (in the last column), we see that Hispanics in California compose a much higher fraction of the total population. There are distinct racial differences as well. California has a lower proportion of Whites and relatively fewer Blacks (all comparisons in this section should be understood as made to *US-3*). Asians make up more of the population of California. Regarding citizenship, California has fewer native citizens born in the US, more naturalized citizens, and more non-citizens than elsewhere.

Education is a mixed picture in California. Fewer California residents have a high school degree. However, the proportion who attain education above a high school degree is about equal to the rest of the state, although fewer individuals hold advanced degrees. California is also wealthier and more of its residents live in metropolitan areas. The state's residents tend to be younger. California has slightly more men, and marital rates are lower in the state.

2. Demographic profile in 2008

For the voting sample, survey data are from 2008. The subpopulation for the voting sample is further restricted to eligible voters. Due to the different subpopulation, demographic change, and sampling variation, the estimated demographic profiles of California and elsewhere are different in 2008 than they are in the following year. Table 9 shows the profiles for 2008, and here we comment briefly on differences between the years' samples in how California compares to the rest of the US.

The largest difference between Table 8 and Table 9 for California is that in the eligible-to-vote subpopulation the state does not have more people lacking a high school degree than elsewhere. California appears more educated across the distribution, with a greater fraction of its residents holding college degrees of each type than in *US-3*. There are other differences compared to the 2009 sample, but none greatly affect the comparison of California to *US-3*.[27]

C. Political Civic Engagement

In this section, California's gaps in the political measures of civic engagement—political discussion, non-electoral political activity, and voting—are dissected. The subsequent section discusses the decompositions of the gaps in social civic engagement.

[26] Survey weights are used to estimate the subpopulation averages in the table. Nevertheless, the estimates may not match better estimates of state or national demographics from other sources designed for that purpose. The purpose of the table is not to provide the best estimate the demographic profile of California or the other areas, but to show the values of $\bar{X}_j^{CA}$ and $\bar{X}_j^{US-3}$ used in application of equation (1) below.

[27] For example, in the 2008 vote-eligible subpopulation, 78% of California residents are estimated to be native citizens born in the US, whereas in the 2009 subpopulation excluding non-citizens, only 62% are in that category. However, in both cases the comparison to the rest of the US shows that California has a far lower share of people in that category.

1. Political discussion

We first examine civic engagement through discussing politics with others. The binary variable *Discuss Politics* takes value 1 if the individual typically discussed politics once a month or more when communicating with family and friends.[28] *Discuss Politics* equals zero otherwise. There is a gap of nine percentage points between California and elsewhere in discussing politics with others. We begin by looking at the regression of the political discussion variable on demographic explanatory variables for the reference group *US-3*. The coefficients from the regression, shown in Table 10, are the b_j^{US-3} parameters in equation (1).[29] Column one of Table 10, for the dependent variable *Discuss Politics*, shows that Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians are less likely to discuss politics than are Whites (the excluded categorical variable in the regression).[30] Native citizens born abroad are more likely to discuss politics, while foreign-born naturalized citizens show the opposite tendency. The propensity to discuss politics rises with the level of education and income, although the latter is significant only for the highest income category. Other research also finds that wealthier and more educated individuals are more likely to pay attention to politics, to hold political knowledge, and to engage in its discussion (Eveland *et al.*, 2005). Living in a metropolitan area is associated with more discussion of politics, as is being female or married. Gender differences in political knowledge and discussion are widely reported and explored in the literature (e.g., Dow, 2009). The likelihood that the individual discusses politics is greatest for the 56 to 65 age group. Much previous work examining data from the US and California confirms that the younger the individual (except perhaps for the eldest Americans), the lower the level of political participation of various forms (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004).

With an understanding of the demographic differences in California and the reference regression results, we can now unpack the determinants of the gap in political discussion between the state and the rest of the nation. Results from the decomposition of the gap are presented in Table 11. The table shows a summary of results, whereas the complete estimation results for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can be found in Table 20 in the Appendix.

The results in Table 11 show that differences in demographics account for 37.3%, or 3.4 points, of the 9 percentage point gap. The single largest contributor to the explained gap, making up slightly over half of *Q*, is the difference in the racial composition of the state. The greatest impact regarding race comes from the fact that California has many more Asians, who are less likely to engage in political discussions than any other racial group. The second largest factor is ethnicity. The greater proportion of Hispanics, who are less likely to discuss politics than non-Hispanics, accounts for 39.4% of the explainable gap. Differences in the citizenship profile explain about one-fifth of *Q*. Despite a minor amount of offsetting

[28] For this and all other civic engagement variables except for *Voted*, survey responses coded as N/A, "refused," and "don't know" are dropped from the estimation sample in this section to keep the dependent variable binary.
[29] The regressions are linear probability models, and so the magnitude of the coefficients are readily interpretable. For example, the coefficient of -0.048 for Hispanics in the first column of Table 10 implies that Hispanics are 4.8 percentage points less likely to discuss politics than non-Hispanics, other things (including race and citizenship) equal. It is worth noting that the R^2 of this and the following regressions are relatively low, ranging from 0.05 to 0.15.
[30] We only discuss coefficients that are statistically significant.

by having more native citizens who were born abroad (who are more likely to discuss politics), the greater proportion of non-citizens implies that there will be less political discussion in California. Education is the only other factor that adds significantly to the gap, although it contributes much less than the ethnicity, race, and citizenship factors. The facts that California has more residents without a high school degree and fewer with an advanced university degree both widen the gap in political discussion. The educational attainment variables altogether account for 9.2% of the explained gap. The impacts of age, gender, and marital status are small and statistically insignificant.

Ethnicity, race, citizenship status, and education together thus account for more than the entire explained gap—122% of it, to be exact. What does this mean, since the contributions of all categories of demographic variables must sum to 100%? The answer lies in the fact that two other factors, income and metropolitan location, contribute *negatively* to *Q*. California is relatively wealthier and more urban than elsewhere, and since both of these *increase* the propensity to discuss politics, they make up about -29% of *Q*. This implies that without the mitigating effect of income and urban location, the gap would be even higher (*Q* would be 29% higher, for a total gap Δ of 10.0 percentage points, in fact). The same logic applies to any negative percentages encountered below: such demographic factors by themselves would cause California to have *more* civic engagement than elsewhere. Thus, to summarize the discussion, while the greater wealth and population density of California stimulate political discussion in the state, the negative impacts of having more Hispanics, Asians, non-citizens, and high-school dropouts and fewer holders of advanced degrees predominate in the final analysis. The differences in demographics, altogether, compose 37.3% of the total gap.

The remainder of the gap, *U*, warrants less discussion because the statistical significance of the estimates of its components are mostly insignificant. Table 20 shows that the largest factors in the unexplained portion of the political discussion gap are metropolitan location and citizenship. Residents in metropolitan locations are less likely to discuss politics than are similar residents elsewhere in the US, which contributes toward the lower level of political discussion in California. As an offsetting factor, however, native citizens born in the US are more likely to discuss politics in California than elsewhere.

2. Non-electoral political activity

The binary variable *Political Acts* takes value 1 if, in the past year, the individual contacted or visited a public official or participated in a boycott motivated by the social or political values of the targeted company. *Political Acts* takes value zero if neither action was performed in the past year. There is a gap of 3.6 percentage points between California and elsewhere in such non-electoral political acts. As in the previous section, we begin by looking at the regression of the binary variable *Political Acts* on demographic explanatory variables for the reference group (see column two of Table 10). Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians are less likely to engage in political acts than are Whites. Ramakrishnan and Baldassare (2004) also found in their study of California residents that controlling for demographics does not eliminate racial disparities in most types of political activity. Multiracial residents are more likely to contact politicians or boycott products. Native citizens born in Puerto Rico or other territories, foreign-born naturalized citizens, and non-citizens are less likely than native citizens born in the US to perform political acts. The propensity toward political action generally rises with the level of education, income, and age, although for the latter activity tails off for those above 75 years old. These relationships

between political activity and education, income, and age have also been found for the US (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) and California residents in earlier data (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004, pp.34,37) as well as for 2008 (PPIC, 2008). Women are slightly less likely to engage in non-electoral political action. Metro areas are associated with less political activity, but insignificantly so, despite the findings of other research that the weaker social relations and greater "psychological disengagement" of residents of larger cities results in them being much less likely to contact officials (Oliver, 2000).

Summary results for the determinants of the gap in non-electoral political action between California and the reference group are presented in Table 12. As before, the complete estimation results can be found in Table 20. Table 12 shows that differences in demographics account for 123% of the 3.6 percentage point gap, implying that demographics alone would cause the gap to be even larger than it is. As for political discussion, the three largest contributors to the explained gap in *Political Acts* are the three closely related elements of ethnicity, race, and citizenship. These three factors account for almost nine-tenths of the explained gap. Differences in the citizenship profile (mostly the lower proportion of native citizens born in the US) alone explain half of *Q*. Race and ethnicity differences each contribute about one-fifth of the explained gap. As before, the greatest impacts from these variables come from the greater number of Asians and Hispanics. Education is the fourth factor that adds significantly to the gap, although as before its impact is much smaller than that of citizenship, ethnicity, and race. Again, the twin facts that California has more residents lacking a high school degree and fewer with an advanced university degree both widen the gap in *Political Acts*. None of the impacts of the other demographic variables are significant at the 5% level.

The other component of the total gap, *U*, acts to decrease the size of Δ. Almost all of the individual components of *U* are insignificant at the 5% level. The lone exception is for those lacking a high school degree, who are more politically engaged in California than elsewhere, which acts to decrease the size of the gap in *Political Acts*.

3. Voting

California's voting rate is close to that elsewhere. The voting rate of 63.3% in the state, compared to the rate of 64.8% for *US-3*, yields a gap of only 1.4 percentage points.[31] The gap is not significant at the 5% level. The binary variable *Voted* takes value 1 if the individual voted in the November 2008 elections, and zero if not.[32] The regression of *Voted* for the reference group is reported in column three of Table

[31] The figures do not add up because of rounding.

[32] Unlike for the other civic engagement variables considered in this section, survey responses of N/A, "refused", and "don't know" are treated as "did not vote." We thus adopt the convention from past census reports, and others in the literature, although we do not agree with it. Treating someone who refused to answer an entire survey on multiple subjects (and so appears in the data as N/A for the voting question) as a non-voter is arbitrary, and can only artificially depress the voting rate calculated from the data. We suspect previous reports follow this convention because without it, the implied voting rates are embarrassingly—and clearly erroneously—large. For example, if we treat responses of N/A, "refused", and "don't know" as missing data (consistent with our treatment of the other civic engagement variables), then the estimated national voting rate is 73.8% for 2008. This estimate is greater (to an unbelievable extent) than estimates based on actual numbers of ballots cast, which are around

10. Hispanics, Native Americans, and especially Asians are less likely to vote than are Whites, while Blacks were nearly ten percentage points more likely to vote than Whites (other things equal). A lower raw voting rate for African Americans than Whites, but the opposite comparison after controlling for socioeconomic status, is commonly found in the literature (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990). Native citizens born in US territories and naturalized citizens are both far less likely to vote than citizens born in the US. The inclination to vote increases monotonically with educational attainment, income, and age (except for the eldest). These inclinations have also been found to hold for California eligible voters in particular in past (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004, pp.34,37) and concurrent (PPIC, 2008) years. Other research indicates that the apparent effect of education on the propensity to vote from the regression is causal, and not merely driven by unobserved factors correlated with education and voting (Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2004). The parabolic shape of the life cycle pattern of voter turnout is also well established in the literature (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).[33] Women are four percentage points more likely to vote than men, and married individuals are 7.4 percentage points more likely to vote than their unmarried counterparts.

The determinants of the small gap in voting rates between California and *US-3* are shown in Table 13 (more extensive results are in Table 20). Table 13 shows that differences in demographics account for 110% of the 1.4 percentage point gap. Although the gap itself is not statistically significant, some regressors do contribute significantly toward the gap. The determinants of the gap are somewhat different than for the other political civic engagement variables examined above. The largest contributor to the voting gap is the set of racial indicators, which alone would lead to a 2.1 percentage point gap. Examination of the detailed decomposition of *Q* in Table 20 reveals that the higher Asian and smaller Black population in California drives the result. The next greatest impact on the explained gap comes from the educational variables. California's higher educational profile of its voting-eligible population (recall the discussion in section B.2 above) favors higher voting rates, and the total impact of educational demographics is to reduce the explained gap by 1.6 percentage points. Differences in the citizenship profile explain nearly four-fifths of *Q*, and the greater proportion is Hispanics in the state explains a further one-third. The lesser impact of Hispanics toward explaining the voting gap, compared to the other measures of political civic engagement, is due in part to the fact that almost 40% of Hispanics of voting age in California are ineligible to vote because they report that they are not citizens. The relatively greater income in California acts to reduce the size of the gap, and the greater fraction of unmarried residents in a minor positive contributor to the voting gap.

Since the unexplained component accounts for only -9.8 percent of the total gap, we do not focus on its determinants, except to note that the one with the greatest impact is from naturalized citizens, who are more likely to vote in California than elsewhere.

62% (McDonald, 2010), which indicates that the CPS data suffer from severe over-reporting bias (Bernstein *et al.*, 2001).

[33] Low voting rates among the young may be due to residential and occupational mobility, while the declining rates among the elderly are likely due to fatigue and constraints on physical mobility (Cho, 1999).

D. Social Civic Engagement

We now look at California's gaps in the social dimension of civic engagement. The variables considered here are leadership of and participation in groups and helping neighbors with reciprocal favors.

1. Group leadership

The binary variable *Group Leadership* takes value 1 if the individual had been an officer or served on a committee of any group or organization in the past year. *Group Leadership* equals zero otherwise. There is a gap of three percentage points between California and elsewhere in reported group leadership. The regression of *Group Leadership* on the demographic explanatory variables using data from the reference group is reported in column one of Table 14. The estimated regression coefficients show that Asians are less likely to serve as group officers or committee members than are Whites. In contrast to the political measures of engagement, Hispanics are not significantly less likely to take on leadership roles than are non-Hispanic. Foreign-born naturalized citizens, men, and unmarried residents are less likely to take leadership positions in groups. Those living in metropolitan areas are 3.2 percentage points less likely to lead groups, after controlling for other factors, which echoes findings in the literature (Oliver, 2000).[34] The propensity toward group leadership generally rises with the level of education and age (again excepting the oldest age group). Group leaders have disproportionally higher income, other things equal, although the coefficient is significant only for the highest income group.

Table 15 contains the summary of the decomposition of the gap in group leadership for California. The full Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is in Table 21 for reference. The results in Table 15 show that differences in demographics account for a bit more than the entire total gap. Citizenship and race are the two largest contributors to the explained gap, together accounting for more than half of *Q*. The lower proportion of native citizens and the higher proportion of naturalized citizens cause most of the impact from the citizenship variables. The greatest impact regarding race, as commonly found for the political civic engagement variables examined above, comes from the Asian group, who are less likely to serve as officers or on committees than any other racial group. Ethnicity contributes no significant amount to the gap, which contrasts starkly with the importance of Hispanics in explaining the gaps in the political civic engagement measures. The next largest contribution to the gap is from metropolitan residence. The relatively urban nature of the state accounts for almost one-fifth of *Q*. The income and age profiles largely offset each other, with the higher income in California offsetting the younger age profile. The greater fraction of residents in the lowest educational category also contributes a small amount toward the explained gap.

As with the voting variable, since the unexplained component accounts for such a small part of the total gap (-8.6 percent), its determinants are less interesting. The factor with the greatest significant impact is native Citizens born in the US, who in California are more likely to lead groups than elsewhere.

2. Group participation

The binary variable *Group Participation* takes value 1 if, in the past year, the individual participated in any of the various sorts of organizations described in section II.B.2. If no participation in any sort of civic

[34] Oliver (2000) finds that residents of large cities are less likely than other to serve on a community board.

or community group, including unlisted types of groups volunteered by the respondent, *Group Participation* is equal to zero for the individual.

There is a gap of 3.3 percentage points between California and *US-3* in group participation. To begin to look at the decomposition of the gap, we first discuss the regression results for *Group Participation* for the reference group (see column two of Table 14). The results are qualitatively similar to the regression for *Group Leadership*, with one exception. While Blacks are neither more nor less likely to take leadership roles in civic groups than Whites, they are almost four percentage points more likely to participate in groups as Whites (mainly religious groups and school or community organizations). After controlling for the other demographics, women have a greater propensity for participation than men, an interesting result standing in contrast to earlier literature finding that women have fewer group memberships on average than men, before and sometimes even after controlling for other individual characteristics (e.g., Curtis, Baer, and Grabb, 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001; Lam, 2006).

Summary results for the determinants of the gap in group participation between California and the reference group are presented in Table 16. As before, the complete estimation results can be found in Table 21. Table 16 shows that differences in demographics account for 139% of the 3.3 percentage point gap, implying that demographics alone would cause the gap to be 4.6 percentage points. As with group leadership, the largest contributor to the explained gap in *Group Participation* is citizenship, which accounts for over a third of *Q*. The impact of race on the explained gap is about the same size as for group leadership, 21 percent of the whole, but it is statistically significant only at the 10% level. The Hispanic impact is estimated to be larger than that for race, but is also significant only at the 10% level. Differences in the profiles of educational attainment and income offset each other, as for group leadership. None of the impacts of the other demographic variables are significant at the 5% level.

The other component of the total gap, *U*, acts to decrease the size of Δ by 38 percentage points. One of the two factors with the greatest impacts is native Citizens born in the US, who in California are more likely to participate in groups than elsewhere. This result matches the similar finding for group leadership. The other important factor in *U*, and the largest in magnitude, is residing in a metropolitan area. Such residents are much less likely to participate in groups in California than elsewhere.

3. Helping neighbors

Californians are much less likely (by 9.4 percentage points) to report helping neighbors than are residents elsewhere. The binary variable *Help Neighbor* takes value 1 if the individual reported that favors were exchanged with neighbors at least once a month on average during the past year. The regression of *Help Neighbor* for the reference group is reported in column three of Table 14. Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians are less likely to exchange favors with neighbors than are Whites, even after controlling for income and urban location. Native citizens born abroad, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens are all less likely to help their neighbors than citizens born in the US. The inclination to exchange favors mostly increases with educational attainment, although the coefficients are significant only for four-year college and advanced university degrees. The income group most likely to help neighbors is the $35,000-50,000 group, an unusual finding when compared to the regressions for the other civic engagement variables, although the propensity to help is nearly as large for those with

annual incomes over $75,000. The propensity to help neighbors generally rises with age until age 75. Metropolitan dwellers are four percentage points less likely to help their neighbors, and married individuals are 11 percentage points more likely to exchange neighborly favors than their unmarried counterparts.

The determinants of the gap in helping neighbors between California and *US-3* are shown in Table 17 (more extensive results are in Table 21). Table 17 shows that differences in demographics account for only half of the 9.4 percentage point gap. The determinants of the gap do not follow the patterns for either of the other social civic engagement variables, except in that the largest contributor to gap in helping neighbors is the set of citizenship indicators. The citizenship profile of the state accounts for 43% of the explained gap in helping neighbors. The next largest factor is Hispanic ethnicity, at 27% of *Q*, although the impact is significant only at the 10% level. The racial profile is highly significant but accounts for only 8.6% of the explained gap. Metropolitan status, at 15% of the explained gap, appears to be a more important determinant than is race. None of the other factors are significant at the 5% level.

Since the unexplained component, *U*, accounts for almost half of the total gap, it is interesting to look at its largest contributors. As with political discussion (see section C.1), in California, native citizens born in the US are more likely to help their neighbors. By far the largest component of *U* comes from the difference in the constants in the regressions. Since the constants capture the impact of pure "group membership"—e.g., living in California versus living elsewhere, this has the unfortunate implication that much of *U* and Δ remain unexplained by demographics or the differing likelihoods that various demographic groups are willing to help their neighbors.

E. Summary

The work in this section shows that for most of the civic engagement measures, differences in the demographics explain most of the gaps between California and the rest of the country. For non-electoral political action, voting, and group membership and leadership, the decomposition of the gaps shows that differences in demographics alone explain more than 100% of the gap in each case. For these measures, at least, seekers of why California lags in civic engagement need look no further than the demographic and economic make-up of the state. In fact, for these measures California's demographics would cause even larger gaps than actually observed, but for mitigating unexplained differences in the propensity of the state's residents to engage. The two exceptions to this observed result are political discussion and helping neighbors, for which differences in demographics explain 37% and 51% of the California gap, respectively. The importance of the unexplained factors is relatively larger here, and indeed it is only for these two measures that the unexplained parts of the gaps are statistically significant.[35]

[35] As shown by the confidence intervals for the unexplained gap (U) for the dependent variables *Discuss Politics* in Table 20 and *Help Neighbor* in Table 21, which do not span zero.

There is some regularity among the individual determinants of why California lags the rest of the nation in various measures of civic engagement. There are also some differences among the measures. The most important regularity is that ethnicity, race, and citizenship explain much of the California gaps.

First, consider the political measures of civic engagement. Hispanics are less politically engaged, by the measures examined, and the greater presence of Hispanics in California accounts for 18 to 40% of the explained part of the gaps in political civic engagement, depending on the measure examined. Asian Americans are far less likely to engage politically, and their larger numbers in the state are the primary reason why racial factors altogether account for 20 to 133% of the explained gaps. Blacks are less likely to engage by the non-electoral measures, but were more likely to vote than others in 2008 (when, of course, a multiracial candidate who self-identified as African-American was on the presidential ballot). That there are fewer Blacks in California contributed (along with the larger impact of Asians) to the small voting gap. Individuals with citizenship gained by means other than being born in the US are generally less politically engaged, and their greater prevalence explains between 21 and 78% of *Q*. The only other factor that was a consistently significant determinant of the political engagement gaps was education. California's lower education profile than elsewhere widened the gaps for the non-electoral measures, although by smaller amounts than the "big three" factors of ethnicity, race, and citizenship. When restricting attention to those eligible to vote, however, the state's higher education profile acted to narrow the voting gap.

The picture is more mixed when looking at the measures of social civic engagement, although ethnicity, race, and citizenship typically still are large, albeit sometimes statistically insignificant, determinants. The regressions show that while Hispanics appear to be less socially engaged, the significance of the estimates is tenuous. The borderline significance of the regression coefficients leads to the impacts of the Hispanic variable on the gaps also being insignificant, although the size of the impact ranges from 11 to 27% of the explained gaps. Asian Americans are less likely to engage socially as well as politically. The impact of Asians composes again makes up the largest part of the total impact of the racial factors, and race accounts for between 9 and 21% of *Q*. The impacts of citizenship on the gaps in social engagement generally stem from naturalized citizens and non-citizens, both of whom are less likely to engage. The larger numbers of residents who are not native citizens in California leads to total contributions of the citizenship factors of 35 to 43% of *Q*. Unlike race and ethnicity, the impacts of citizenship as a whole are significant for all three social measures. The impact of the other demographic factors varies greatly across the measures. The tendency of metro-dwellers to be less likely to be socially engaged leads to significant determinants of *Q* for only two of the three measures. Similarly, education and income explain some of the gap for some measures but not others.

IV. Is Civic Engagement in California Distinctive?

California is not the only large state with lower civic engagement than the US as a whole. Previous work has found that New York and Texas, the next two largest states by population, also lag in many of the same areas of civic engagement that California does (NCOC *et al.*, 2010). The comparison in section II above also confirms this. A natural question to ask, therefore, is whether these other large states lag for the same reasons as uncovered for California in section III. In particular, we have found that race,

ethnicity, and citizenship account for much of the California gaps—is the same true for New York and Texas? Or, to paraphrase Tolstoy,[36] is every lagging state disengaged in its own way?

We repeat the methodology of section III here, in brief, for New York and Texas. To begin with, examination of the 2009 demographic characteristics of the states in Table 8 shows that California appears to be somewhat more similar to New York than Texas. Like California, more than one-fifth of New York's population is non-White, although the latter has relatively more Blacks and fewer Asians than the former. Texas is 85% White, with Blacks making up the majority of the non-Whites. California and Texas have similar Hispanic contingents, about one-third of total population, while New York has only 15%. New York and Texas share with California a lower incidence of native citizens born in the US, although native-born citizens are least prevalent in California and most prevalent in Texas. At the low end of the educational attainment, Texas shares with California large numbers of residents without a high school degree or with only a high school degree. At the higher end, California looks more like New York than Texas, with more four-year college graduates and above than the national average, while Texas is below average in this regard. Income is higher in both California and New York than in the nation as a whole, but Texas has a lower proportion of its households in the higher income category. All three states are much more metropolitan than the rest of the US. The relative youthfulness of California is not mirrored in either New York or Texas. Marital rates are unusually low in New York.[37]

The relationships between the outcome measures of civic engagement and the demographic explanatory variables used to compute the explained part of the gaps are the same as described in section III. That is, the regressions for the reference group *US-3* as reported in Table 10 and Table 14 are still the relevant source for the coefficients used in equation (1), even when NY or TX replaces CA in the equation.

We can turn then immediately to the decompositions of the gaps in civic engagement for New York and Texas. The breakdown of the gaps for the measures of political civic engagement is in Table 18, with more detailed information available in Table 22 and Table 23. For political discussion and non-electoral political acts, the gaps in New York and Texas are not as large as in California and are not big enough to be significant in the sample. For these two measures, the same factors of ethnicity, race, and citizenship that were the most important for California also are the largest explanations of the New York gap. For Texas, ethnicity is an important factor, as in California, but the relatively poor education profile of Texas is also a major reason for the gaps in the state. Citizenship is also important factor for *Political Acts* in Texas. The voting gaps are larger in New York and Texas than in California. For voting, income joins ethnicity, race, and citizenship in New York as the predominant factors, while in Texas ethnicity, education, and age are the major causes of the explained gap. Overall, then, the big three factors of ethnicity, race, and citizenship are responsible for much of the gaps in these other states, but are joined

[36] "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way" (Leo Tolstoy, in the opening to *Anna Karenina*).

[37] We investigated to see if Florida, the fourth most populous state, would be a better comparison state than either New York or Texas. However, with the exception of having more Hispanics than average, Florida's demographic profile (in terms of the important factors of race, income, education) is more similar to the rest of the US than to California, New York, and Texas.

to other factors (income in New York, education in Texas) that play relatively larger roles than in California.

The summary decomposition of the gaps in social civic engagement is in Table 19, with more detailed information available in Table 24 and Table 25. Roughly speaking, there are some similarities among the three states in the general importance of some factors, particularly ethnicity and citizenship. However, New York's gaps in social engagement are also driven by its low marital rates while education plays more of a role in creating Texas's gaps. One large difference shows up in the importance of race, which is significant for California's gaps but not for these two other states. The difference appears to stem from the large proportion of Asians—and their lower social civic engagement—in the California population that are not present in the other states. In sum, as with political engagement, social engagement lags in New York and Texas for some reasons common to the three largest states (ethnicity, citizenship) and for other reasons unique to the state (low rates of marriage in New York, low educational attainment in Texas).

V. Conclusions

The empirical examination of the determinants of civic engagement in California shows that participation in the state differs from engagement elsewhere in the US in degree but not in kind. That is, for the most part people with similar socioeconomic profiles are as likely to be civically engaged in California as elsewhere. For involvement in non-electoral political activities, voting, group membership, and group leadership, California's lagging participation rates are fully explained by the differing demographics in the state. For two measures we consider, political discussion and exchanging favors with neighbors, California's unique demographics explain only half to one-third of the participation gap. However, even for these two measures, Hispanics, non-whites, and residents with citizenship status other than native born in the US are not significantly less civically engaged than elsewhere.[38] Perhaps the good news for those seeking to improve civic engagement in the state is that the uniqueness of California's challenge stems more from who lives here than from deficient opportunities to apply individuals' resources toward participation or from generally underdeveloped recruitment networks.

It may be scant comfort to know that California faces the same task as elsewhere in equipping, motivating, and recruiting minorities and those with nontraditional citizenship status. Nonetheless, one implication is that lessons learned in other parts of the country about increasing civic engagement may be more or less directly applicable to California. We conclude by mentioning three promising avenues to improve social capital and civic engagement: municipal leadership, civic education, and e-engagement.

[38] That is, the relevant components of *U* for these factors are generally not statistically significant in Table 20 and Table 21.

Local and municipal leadership to improve civic engagement

Community and municipal leaders may play an important role in encouraging civic engagement among groups with historically low participation rates, such as immigrants. Some initiatives aim at providing local leaders with practical information on how to encourage participation in public decision making. For example, the Institute for Local Government in California and the National League of Cities make available publications and programs designed to help local officials reach out to the immigrant community and encourage civic participation.[39]

New or rejuvenated forms of democratic governance have received much attention in recent years. Leighninger (2009) characterizes democratic governance as providing a "new relationship between citizens and government…by governing communities in participatory, deliberative, collaborative ways." Such governance structure can be temporary, as in day-long exercises in deliberative democracy focused on a specific community issue, or permanent, such as standing neighborhood councils. Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs (2004) review empirical studies on various experiments in deliberative democracy, which general find positive outcomes on civic engagement and political outcomes.

Civic education to stimulate civic involvement

A certain amount of civic knowledge is necessary for some forms of (primarily political) civic engagement. Without understanding of the powers and limitations of various elected offices in the US, how the government works, or even how to register to vote, the motivation to vote or to contact public officials may be low. Recent research indicates that civic knowledge indeed promotes political participation (Galston, 2007). Whether civic knowledge can be taught is another matter, and much of the older empirical work in the field came to the consensus that civic education has no effect on civic knowledge. However, one large-scale study of civic education of 14-year-olds in 28 democratic countries found that instruction in and use of democratic practices in the classroom was positively correlated with the students' knowledge of democracy and their intention to vote (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Other recent research has found particular pedagogical interventions that significantly improve participants' understanding of politics (Galston, 2007). Two examples are the *We the People* civic education program run by the Center for Civic Education (Atherton, 2000) and the non-governmental *Kids Voting USA* citizenship development program (Chaffee, 2000). Other work also shows that better civic education leads to action. Various educational interventions have been shown to improve social capital and civic engagement, particularly among minority communities (e.g., Michael *et al*., 2007).

The Internet and the promise of e-engagement

The internet potentially provides a low cost way to engage with the community and political life, and thus may be a democratizing and equalizing force (Lin, 2001). Some researchers see the Internet and cyberspace as fostering resources embedded in social networks to such a degree that they claim that

---

[39] See, for example, Greg Keidan (2008), *A Local Official's Guide to Immigrant Civic Engagement* Institute for Local Government, available online (for personal use only) at http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/ilgbackup.org/files/2008_-_Guide_to_Immigrant_Civic_Engagement-w.pdf; and Matt Leighninger and Bonnie C. Mann. (2010),*Civic Engagement and Recent Immigrant Communities: A planning guide for local officials and other community leaders*, National League of Cities Center for Research & Innovation, available online at http://www.nlc.org/file%20library/find%20city%20solutions/research%20innovation/governance-civic/discussion-guide-civic-engagement-immigrants-gid-jun10-pdf.pdf.

social capital has actually been increasing during the same period Putnam claims it diminished (Lin, 2001, ch. 12). Perhaps the internet and social media will play a role in changing the nature of civic engagement in America for all economic classes.

Existing research has found a positive association between internet use and some forms of civic engagement, such as voting, contributing to political campaigns, and contacting government officials.[40] Consumption of online news has been shown to increase civic engagement, even when controlling for selection bias in who goes online (Mossberger *et al*. 2008). The Pew Internet and American Life Project has also studied such effects, finding that the internet has not reduced the income gap in terms of active civic participation, such as signing a petition (Smith, et al., 2009). However, they are optimistic regarding the effects of social media, which are adopted disproportionately by the young. The Pew Report currently finds that about one-fifth internet users have posted material online about political or social issues or used a social networking site for civic engagement. Both forums, Twitter and Facebook, have exploded with blogs and social commentary, so research on these mediums will impact elections, political discussion, and community networks will be needed. However, the results are too early to determine the long term effects of the internet and social media on civic engagement.

Just as the internet can help alleviate but is not a panacea for disparities in education or health care among various groups in society, neither does cyberspace provide the final solution for deficient resources and social capital. It remains to be seen whether virtual forms of engagement and contact with others in the anonymity culture of cyberspace will foster the same sort of trust that contributes to social capital as with face to face meetings (Kling, 1996). Some evidence is encouraging in this regard. Review of particular pilot project in Boston using a virtual world to engage citizens in urban planning found that it allowed "previously disempowered individuals … to form politically powerful groups" in cyberspace (Gordon and Koo, 2008, p.204). Monforti and Marichal (2011) find that acquiring digital skills improved generalized trust among Hispanics and blacks.[41] Some commentators question whether online communities will sap the health of physical communities (Kling, 1996) or "cyberbalkanize" society by encouraging communication only with like-minded people (Putnam, 2000; Sunstein, 2001). Given that evidence indicates that it is rare for individuals on the Internet to only be exposed to political perspectives with which they agree (Kahne *et al*., 2011), perhaps a more important concern is that not all groups in the US have equal access to the internet and broadband (Mossberger *et al*., 2008). So, until access diffuses evenly throughout society, the internet may accentuate differences in citizenship, digital or "real world," between groups.

[40] See the many sources cited on p.49 of Mossberger *et al*. (2008)

[41] See also Shah, Kwak and Hobert (2001), who find that using the internet to exchange information is positively correlated with increased generalized trust and higher levels of civic engagement.

References

Alexander, Damon T., Jo Barraket, Jenny M. Lewis, and Mark Considine (2010). "Civic Engagement and Associationalism: The Impact of Group Membership Scope versus Intensity of Participation," *European Sociological Review* (forthcoming).

Anderson, Christopher J., and Aida Paskeviciute (2006). "How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior," *Journal of Politics* 68(4):783–802.

Atherton, Herbert M. (2000). "We the People…Project Citizen," ch. 8 (pp.93-102) in S. Mann and J.J. Patrick (eds.), *Education for Civic Engagement in Democracy: Service Learning and Other Promising Practices*. Bloomington, IN: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education.

Bernstein, Robert, Anita Chadha, and Robert Montjoy (2001). "Over-Reporting Voting: Why It Happens and Why It Matters," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65(1):1–22.

Blinder, Alan (1973). "Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Variables," *Journal of Human Resources* 8:436-455.

Bobo, Lawrence and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. (1990). "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment," *The American Political Science Review* 84(2):377-393.

Chaffee, Steven (2000). "Education for Citizenship: Promising Effects of the Kids Voting USA Curriculum," ch. 7 in (pp.87-92) S. Mann and J.J. Patrick (eds.), *Education for Civic Engagement in Democracy: Service Learning and Other Promising Practices*. Bloomington, IN: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education.

Cho, Wendy K. Tam (1999). "Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and (Non-)Voting," *The Journal of Politics* 61(4):1140-1155.

Costa, Dora L. and Matthew E. Kahn (2003). "Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist's Perspective," *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1):103-111.

Curtis, James E., Douglas E. Baer, and Edward G. Grabb (2001). "Nations of Joiners. Explaining Voluntary Association Membership in Democratic Societies," *American Sociological Review* 66:783–805.

Davern, Michael, Arthur Jones Jr., James Lepkowski, Gestur Davidson and Lynn A. Blewett (2007). "Estimating Regression Standard Errors with Data from the Current Population Survey's Public Use File," *Inquiry* 44(2):211-224.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., Fay Lomax Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs (2004). "Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature," *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:315-344.

Dow, Jay K. (2009). "Gender Differences in Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Characteristics-Based and Returns-Based Differences," *Political Behavior* 31:117–136.

Downs, Anthony (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.

Easterly, William and Ross Levine (1997). "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4):1203-1250.

Eveland, Jr., William P., Andrew F. Hayes, Dhavan V. Shah, and Nojin Kwak (2005). "Understanding the Relationship Between Communication and Political Knowledge: A Model Comparison Approach Using Panel Data," *Political Communication* 22:423–446.

Flores, Glenn , Sandra C. Tomany-Korman, and Lynn Olson (2005). "Does Disadvantage Start at Home? Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health-Related Early Childhood Home Routines and Safety Practices," *Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine* 159:158-165.

Florini, Ann (2003). *The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World*. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Fukuyama, Francis (2000) "Social Capital and Civil Society," International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 00/74.

Galston, William A., and Peter Levine (1998). "America's Civic Condition: A Glance at the Evidence," in *Community Works: The Revival of Civil Society in America*, ed. by E.J. Dionne, Jr. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Galston, William A. (2004) "Civic Education and Political Participation,"*Political Science and Politics* 37(2):263-266.

Gittel, Ross and Avis Vidal (1998). *Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.

Gordon, Eric, and Gene Koo (2008). "Placeworlds: Using Virtual Worlds to Foster Civic Engagement," *Space and Culture* 11(3):204-221.

Heeringa, Steven G., Brady T. West, and Patricia A. Berglund (2010). *Applied Survey Data Analysis*. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman Hall/CRC Press.

Jann, Ben (2008). "The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Linear Regression Models," *The Stata Journal* 8(4):453-479.

Kahne, Joseph, Ellen Middaugh, Nam-Jin Lee, and Jessica Timpany Feezell (2011). "Youth Online Activity and Exposure to Diverse Perspectives," *New Media & Society*, forthcoming.

Kling, Rob (1996). "Synergies and Competition Between Life in Cyberspace and Face-to-Face Communities," *Social Science Computer Review* 14(1):50-54.

Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer (1997). "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4):1251-1288.

Ladd, Everett C. (1999). *The Ladd Report.* New York: The Free Press.

Lam, Pui-Yan (2006). "Religion and Civic Culture. A Cross-National Study of Voluntary Association Membership," *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 45:177–193.

Leighninger, Matt (2009) "Democracy, Growing Up: The Shifts That Reshaped Local Politics and Foreshadowed the 2008 Presidential Election," Center for Advances in Public Engagement, Public Agenda, Occasional Paper No.5.

Levine, Peter, and Mark Hugo Lopez (2002). "Youth Voter Turnout has Declined, by Any Measure," *Fact Sheet,* CIRCLE: The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement. Available online at http://civicyouth.org/research/products/Measuring_Youth_Voter_Turnout.pdf (last visited January 10, 2012).

Lin, Nan (2001). *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Macedo, Stephen, *et al*. (2005). *Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Undermine Citizen Participation, and What We Can Do About It*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

McDonald, Michael (2008). "2004 General Election Turnout Rates", United States Elections Project, George Mason University. Available online at http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2004G.html (last visited December 15, 2011).

McDonald, Michael (2010). "2008 General Election Turnout Rates", United States Elections Project, George Mason University. Available online at http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html (last visited October 6, 2011).

Michael, Yvonne L., Stephanie A. Farquhar, Noelle Wiggins and Mandy K. Green (2007). "Findings From a Community-Based Participatory Prevention Research Intervention Designed to Increase Social Capital in Latino and African American Communities," *Journal of Immigrant Minority Health* 10:281–289.

Milbrath and Goel (1977). *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* 2nd ed. Chicago: Rand McNally College Pub. Co.

Milligan, Kevin S., Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos (2004). "Does Education Improve Citizenship? Evidence from the U.S. and the U.K.,"*Journal of Public Economics* 88(9-10): 1667-1695.

Monforti, Jessica Lavariega and Jose Marichal (2011). "The Role of Digital Skills in the Formation Trust and Efficacy Among Latinos," paper presentated at the Western Political Science Association Annual Conference, San Antonio, Texas, April 23.

Mossberger, Karen, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Ramona S. McNeal (2008). *Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

National Conference on Citizenship (NCOC), California Forward, Center for Civic Education, and the Davenport Institute for Public Engagement and Civic Leadership (2010). *California Civic Health Index 2010: Financial Crises, Civic Engagement and the "New Normal."* Available online at http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/davenport-institute/reports/2010-california-civic-health-index/content/2010-ca-civic-health-index.pdf (last visited October 6, 2011).

Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg (2001). *Controversies in Voting Behavior, 4th Ed.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg (2010). *Controversies in Voting Behavior, 5th Ed.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Oaxaca, Ronald (1973). "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets," *International Economic Review* 14(3):693-709.

Oliver, J. Eric (2000). "City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America," *American Political Science Review* 94(2):361-373

Ong, Paul M. and Don T. Nakanishi (2003). "Becoming citizens, becoming voters: The naturalization and political participation of Asian Pacific immigrants", in *Asian American Politics: Law, Participation, and Policy,* Don T. Nakanishi, James S. Lai (eds.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) (2008). "The Age Gap In California Politics," *Just the Facts* series, August. Available online at www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=262 (last visited October 6, 2011).

Putnam, Robert D (1995a). "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 65-78.

Putnam, Robert D. (1995b). "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28(4):664-683.

Putnam, Robert D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Putnam, Robert D. (2007). "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2):137-174.

Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick and Mark Baldassare (2004). *The Ties That Bind: Changing Demographics and Civic Engagement in California*. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick and Celia Viramontes (2006) *Civic Inequalities: Immigrant Volunteerism and Community Organizations in California.* San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Robinson, John P. (1990). "The Time Squeeze," *American Demographics* 12:30-33.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and John M. Hansen (1993). *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America.* New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

Schofer, Evan and Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001). "The Structural Contexts of Civic Engagement: Voluntary Association Membership in Comparative Perspective," *American Sociological Review* 66:806–828.

Shah, D. V., N. Kwak, and R. L. Holbert (2001). "'Connecting' and 'Disconnecting' with Civic Life: Patterns of Internet Use and the Production of Social Capital," *Political Communication* 18(2):141-162.

Skocpol, Theda, and Morris P. Fiorina (1999). *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Skocpol, Theda (2003). *Diminished Democracy: from Membership to Management in American Civic Life*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Smith, Aaron, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady (2009). *The Internet and Civic Engagement.* Pew Internet & American Life Project, September. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.

Sunstein, Cass (2001). "Freedom of Expression in the United States: The Future," in Thomas R. Hensley, ed., *The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression and Order in American Democracy*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Tabellini, Guido (2010). "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(4):677-716.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (2002). *Democracy in America*. Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc.

Torney-Purta, J., R. Lehmann, H. Oswald, and W. Schultz (2001). *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge at Age Fourteen.* Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie (1972). *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equity*. New York: Harper and Row.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady (1995). *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Steven J. Rosenstone (1980). *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wollebæk, Dag, Strømsnes, Kristin(2008). "Voluntary Associations, Trust, and Civic Engagement: A Multilevel Approach," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 37(2):249-263.

Zak, Paul J. and Stephen Knack (2001). "Trust and Growth," *The Economic Journal* 111(470):295-321.

Zukin, Cliff, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins, and Michael X. Delli Carpini(2006). *A New Engagement?: Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006

Tables for the Main Text

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Political Discussion, 2009

How often were politics discussed when communicating with family and friends?	Proportion	95% Conf. Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Few times per week or more	34.9	(34.0,35.9)	
At least once per month but less than weekly	36.3	(35.3,37.2)	
Not at all	28.8	(27.9,29.8)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Few times per week or more	36.4	(35.4,37.5)	
At least once per month but less than weekly	36.8	(35.7,37.9)	
Not at all	26.8	(25.8,27.8)	
California			0.000*
Few times per week or more	27.4	(24.8,30.3)	0.000**
At least once per month but less than weekly	35.6	(32.8,38.6)	0.469**
Not at all	36.9	(33.9,40.1)	0.000**
New York			0.088*
Few times per week or more	33.4	(29.4,37.7)	0.164**
At least once per month but less than weekly	34.9	(31.0,38.9)	0.350**
Not at all	31.7	(27.6,36.2)	0.028**
Texas			0.016*
Few times per week or more	33.4	(29.4,37.6)	0.161**
Once per month or more	33.4	(29.5,37.6)	0.114**
Not at all	33.2	(29.1,37.5)	0.004**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.
** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.
Table notes: The denominator for the estimated proportions does not include respondents who did not answer or answered "don't know". Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Political Involvement, 2009

Have you contacted a public official or boycotted a product?	Proportion	95% Confidence Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Yes	17.0	(16.3,17.7)	
No	81.5	(80.8,82.3)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.5	(1.3,1.8)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Yes	17.7	(16.9,18.5)	
No	80.9	(80.1,81.7)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.4	(1.2,1.7)	
California			0.005*
Yes	14.2	(12.3,16.3)	0.001**
No	84.6	(82.4,86.6)	0.001**
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.3	(0.8,2.1)	0.618**
New York			0.086*
Yes	15.5	(13.0,18.5)	0.147**
No	81.7	(78.6,84.6)	0.598**
No response/Refused/Don't know	2.7	(1.6,4.5)	0.076**
Texas			0.489*
Yes	15.8	(13.2,18.9)	0.232**
No	82.7	(79.5,85.5)	0.261**
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.5	(0.7,3.0)	0.958**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.

** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.

Table notes: Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Voting, 2008 Presidential Election

Voted in the 2008 presidential election?	Proportion	95% Confidence Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Voted	63.6	(63.2,64.1)	
Did not vote	22.6	(22.2,23.0)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	13.8	(13.4,14.1)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Voted	64.8	(64.3,65.3)	
Did not vote	22.0	(21.6,22.5)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	13.2	(12.8,13.6)	
California			0.001*
Voted	63.4	(61.8,64.9)	0.089**
Did not vote	20.9	(19.7,22.2)	0.098**
No response/Refused/Don't know	15.7	(14.4,17.0)	0.000**
New York			0.000*
Voted	58.8	(56.7,60.9)	0.000**
Did not vote	22.0	(20.3,23.7)	0.913**
No response/Refused/Don't know	19.2	(17.5,21.1)	0.000**
Texas			0.000*
Voted	56.1	(54.2,58.0)	0.000**
Did not vote	31.2	(29.5,32.9)	0.000**
No response/Refused/Don't know	12.7	(11.4,14.2)	0.569**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.
** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.
Table notes: Each subpopulation is for 2008 and excludes noncitizens and individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Group Leadership, 2009

Have you been an officer or served on a committee of any group or organization?	Proportion	95% Confidence Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Yes	9.7	(9.2,10.2)	
No	88.3	(87.7,88.9)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	2.0	(1.8,2.3)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Yes	10.4	(9.8,11.0)	
No	87.7	(87.0,88.3)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.9	(1.7,2.2)	
California			0.001*
Yes	7.5	(6.3,9.0)	0.000**
No	90.6	(89.0,92.0)	0.001**
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.9	(1.3,2.8)	0.950**
New York			0.000*
Yes	5.8	(4.3,7.7)	0.000**
No	90.8	(88.4,92.8)	0.006**
No response/Refused/Don't know	3.4	(2.2,5.2)	0.052**
Texas			0.774*
Yes	9.6	(7.5,12.2)	0.508**
No	88.6	(85.9,90.9)	0.475**
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.8	(0.9,3.4)	0.811**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.

** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.

Table notes: Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Group Membership, 2009

	Proportion	95% Confidence Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Yes	35.5	(34.5,36.4)	
No	63.0	(62.0,63.9)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.6	(1.4,1.8)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Yes	36.4	(35.3,37.4)	
No	62.2	(61.2,63.3)	
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.4	(1.2,1.7)	
California			0.107*
Yes	33.0	(30.2,36.0)	0.035**
No	65.4	(62.4,68.2)	0.044**
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.6	(1.0,2.4)	0.715**
New York			0.034*
Yes	32.7	(28.9,36.7)	0.078**
No	64.4	(60.3,68.3)	0.309**
No response/Refused/Don't know	2.9	(1.8,4.7)	0.035**
Texas			0.265*
Yes	33.0	(29.1,37.1)	0.107**
No	65.4	(61.2,69.3)	0.138**
No response/Refused/Don't know	1.7	(0.8,3.2)	0.699**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.

** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.

Table notes: Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Dining with Family, 2009

	Proportion	95% Confidence Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Weekly	87.9	(87.1,88.6)	
Monthly	7.5	(7.0,8.2)	
Not at all	4.6	(4.1,5.1)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Weekly	88.1	(87.3,89.0)	
Monthly	7.6	(6.9,8.2)	
Not at all	4.3	(3.8,4.9)	
California			0.519*
Weekly	86.7	(84.1,88.9)	0.255**
Monthly	8.3	(6.7,10.3)	0.431**
Not at all	5.0	(3.7,6.8)	0.405**
New York			0.098*
Weekly	88.7	(85.2,91.5)	0.726**
Monthly	5.4	(3.7,8.0)	0.058**
Not at all	5.9	(3.8,9.0)	0.240**
Texas			0.584*
Weekly	86.7	(83.0,89.6)	0.390**
Monthly	7.9	(5.7,10.8)	0.788**
Not at all	5.4	(3.7,8.0)	0.319**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.

** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.

Table notes: The denominator for the estimated proportions does not include respondents who did not answer or answered "don't know". Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Helping Neighbors, 2009

How often did you and your neighbors do favors for each other?	Proportion	95% Confidence Interval	*P*-value
US average			
Weekly	15.4	(14.8,16.2)	
Monthly	40.8	(39.8,41.8)	
Not at all	43.8	(42.7,44.8)	
US without CA/NY/TX			
Weekly	16.0	(15.3,16.8)	
Monthly	42.1	(41.1,43.2)	
Not at all	41.8	(40.7,43.0)	
California			0.000*
Weekly	13.0	(11.1,15.1)	0.005**
Monthly	35.9	(33.0,38.9)	0.000**
Not at all	51.2	(48.0,54.4)	0.000**
New York			0.066*
Weekly	13.9	(11.4,16.9)	0.144**
Monthly	38.9	(34.9,43.1)	0.138**
Not at all	47.2	(42.7,51.7)	0.023**
Texas			0.043*
Weekly	14.9	(12.2,18.2)	0.483**
Monthly	37.3	(33.3,41.5)	0.027**
Not at all	47.8	(43.2,52.4)	0.027**

* *P*-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), all categories.

** *P*-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category.

Table notes: The denominator for the estimated proportions does not include respondents who did not answer or answered "don't know". Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 18 years of age.

Table 8: Demographics Characteristics for the 2009 Subpopulations

	California	*New York*	*Texas*	*Rest of the US*
Hispanic	35.6%	15.0%	33.1%	8.3%
Race				
White	76.5%	77.9%	84.6%	81.8%
Black	5.9%	15.1%	10.8%	12.5%
Native American	1.0%	0.3%	0.9%	0.8%
Asian/Pacific Islander	14.7%	5.2%	3.3%	3.6%
Multiracial	1.9%	1.5%	0.4%	1.3%
Citizenship				
Native, born in US	61.9%	72.0%	80.8%	88.2%
Native, born in PR etc.	0.1%	2.8%	0.0%	0.7%
Native, born abroad	1.7%	0.4%	1.0%	0.7%
Naturalized citizen	18.1%	14.3%	5.8%	4.8%
Not a citizen	18.2%	10.6%	12.4%	5.6%
Education				
Less than high school	17.9%	11.4%	18.3%	11.3%
High school	23.8%	30.8%	29.8%	31.8%
Some college, no degree	21.9%	15.3%	20.3%	19.3%
2-year college degree	8.6%	9.6%	7.1%	9.3%
4-year college degree	20.3%	21.5%	17.7%	18.5%
Advanced degree	7.6%	11.4%	6.7%	9.8%
Income				
(missing)	12.5%	19.3%	12.9%	14.4%
Less than $35K	26.6%	27.0%	33.2%	30.0%
$35K to $50K	10.8%	10.5%	13.8%	13.0%
$50K to $75K	18.8%	12.4%	19.8%	17.7%
More than $75K	31.3%	30.8%	20.4%	24.9%
In a Metro Area	98.4%	92.1%	92.2%	79.9%
Age				
18-25	15.7%	14.4%	12.7%	14.0%
26-35	20.3%	17.7%	23.3%	16.9%
36-45	17.9%	18.4%	18.9%	18.1%
46-55	19.3%	19.2%	16.9%	19.6%
56-65	13.7%	14.9%	13.4%	15.0%
66-75	7.5%	8.1%	9.6%	9.2%
76+	5.6%	7.3%	5.2%	7.2%
Gender				
Male	49.1%	47.4%	48.6%	48.3%
Female	50.9%	52.6%	51.4%	51.7%
Married	52.7%	48.6%	56.1%	54.5%

Notes: Each subpopulation is restricted to individuals aged 18 years or higher. The survey weights are employed in the estimates.

Table 9: Demographics Characteristics for the 2008 Subpopulations (from the Voting sample)

	California	*New York*	*Texas*	*Rest of the US*
Hispanic	23.8%	10.5%	29.9%	5.4%
Race				
White	77.2%	77.7%	83.5%	83.2%
Black	7.5%	15.2%	12.2%	12.5%
Native American	1.0%	0.2%	0.5%	0.8%
Asian/Pacific Islander	12.6%	5.8%	2.5%	2.4%
Multiracial	1.7%	1.0%	1.3%	1.2%
Citizenship				
Native, born in US	78.3%	81.3%	91.0%	93.4%
Native, born in PR etc.	0.2%	2.6%	0.2%	0.7%
Native, born abroad	1.3%	1.1%	1.7%	0.8%
Naturalized citizen	20.2%	15.0%	7.0%	5.1%
Not a citizen	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Education				
Less than high school	10.5%	11.4%	14.6%	10.9%
High school	24.4%	30.2%	31.0%	33.0%
Some college, no degree	23.5%	17.2%	22.6%	20.1%
2-year college degree	10.3%	9.9%	7.6%	9.0%
4-year college degree	21.2%	19.8%	17.5%	18.1%
Advanced degree	10.2%	11.6%	6.6%	8.9%
Income				
(missing)	18.7%	29.4%	14.4%	20.7%
Less than $35K	20.9%	20.5%	31.6%	25.6%
$35K to $50K	10.9%	10.1%	12.2%	11.7%
$50K to $75K	15.4%	14.1%	16.4%	16.7%
More than $75K	34.2%	25.9%	25.4%	25.2%
In a Metro Area	97.5%	90.1%	87.9%	79.8%
Age				
18-25	15.4%	14.9%	16.1%	14.0%
26-35	17.0%	16.0%	18.4%	16.2%
36-45	18.1%	17.0%	17.9%	18.1%
46-55	19.2%	18.2%	19.0%	20.2%
56-65	14.9%	15.6%	12.9%	15.2%
66-75	8.4%	9.9%	9.1%	9.0%
76+	7.0%	8.4%	6.6%	7.4%
Gender				
Male	48.4%	47.0%	48.0%	48.0%
Female	51.6%	53.0%	52.1%	52.0%
Married	53.4%	51.7%	54.9%	55.6%

Notes: Each subpopulation is restricted to individuals aged 18 years or higher who are eligible (but not necessarily registered) to vote. The survey weights are employed in the estimates.

Table 10: Reference Group (US-3) Regressions for the Political Civic Engagement Variables

	Y = Discuss Politics		*Y = Political Acts*		*Y = Voted*	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Hispanic	-0.048**	0.024	-0.029**	0.015	-0.028**	0.012
Black	-0.040**	0.017	-0.066***	0.011	0.098***	0.008
Native American	-0.016	0.050	0.012	0.035	-0.067***	0.024
Asian	-0.182***	0.028	-0.119***	0.016	-0.153***	0.017
Multiracial	-0.011	0.040	0.079**	0.036	0.004	0.020
Born in PR/other	-0.067	0.058	-0.071***	0.024	-0.094***	0.031
Native, born abroad	0.118**	0.053	0.016	0.041	-0.038	0.024
Naturalized citizen	-0.055**	0.025	-0.096***	0.015	-0.082***	0.012
Non-citizen	-0.009	0.027	-0.079***	0.014	†	
High school	0.039**	0.015	0.038***	0.008	0.155***	0.007
Some college	0.088***	0.017	0.112***	0.010	0.282***	0.008
2-year college	0.132***	0.020	0.118***	0.013	0.299***	0.009
4-year college	0.167***	0.018	0.195***	0.012	0.356***	0.008
Advanced degree	0.186***	0.021	0.250***	0.016	0.377***	0.009
Income: < $35K	-0.019	0.017	0.018	0.011	0.136***	0.008
Income: $35-50K	0.015	0.021	0.050***	0.014	0.187***	0.009
Income: $50-75K	0.014	0.020	0.048***	0.013	0.222***	0.008
Income: > $75K	0.076***	0.019	0.061***	0.013	0.249***	0.008
In a metro area	0.024*	0.013	-0.010	0.009	0.005	0.006
Age: 26-35	-0.017	0.018	0.024*	0.013	0.022***	0.008
Age: 36-45	-0.016	0.018	0.036***	0.012	0.067***	0.008
Age: 46-55	0.038**	0.017	0.077***	0.012	0.109***	0.008
Age: 56-65	0.073***	0.019	0.109***	0.014	0.166***	0.008
Age: 66-75	0.028	0.021	0.110***	0.015	0.233***	0.009
Age: >75	0.012	0.021	0.036**	0.014	0.230***	0.010
Female	-0.038***	0.007	-0.012**	0.006	0.040***	0.003
Married	0.035***	0.011	0.002	0.008	0.074***	0.005
Subpopulation obs.	16,969		17,361		77,504	
Strata	294		294		295	
F statistic (d.o.f.)	20.3 (27,62931)		44.3 (27,62931)		316.6 (26,58364)	
F stat. *p*-value	0.000		0.000		0.000	
R squared	0.051		0.085		0.149	

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Notes: Each column presents the results from separate regressions, where the dependent variable is as noted in the column heading. Regressions are weighted and the linearized standard errors account for the complex survey design and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table 11: Decomposition of California's Gap in Political Discussion

California average	27.43
Gap between California and *US-3* (percentage points)	9.01
95% confidence interval for the gap	(6.8,11.3)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	37.3
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…	
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	39.6**
Race	52.6***
Citizenship	21.1*
Education	9.2***
Income	-15.8*
Metro/non-metro	-13.5*
Age profile	6.8
Gender	-1.5
Marital Status	1.6

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Notes: The mean of the response variable for California and *US-3* differs from the statistics reported in section II because survey responses coded as N/A, "refused," and "don't know" are dropped from the sample here. Percentages given for a category of variables is calculated as the sum of the contributions to the explained gap from each demographic variable in the category, multiplied by 100 and divided by Δ. Significance stars are for the joint hypothesis that all the estimates of the explained portion of the gap for the group of demographic variables indicated are zero. The confidence interval accounts for survey design effects.

Table 12: Decomposition of California's Gap in Non-Electoral Political Action

California average	14.33
Gap between California and *US-3* (percentage points)	3.59
95% confidence interval for the gap	(1.4,5.8)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	123.5
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…	
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	18.3**
Race	19.2***
Citizenship	50.1***
Education	7.3***
Income	-6.1*
Metro/non-metro	4.3
Age profile	7.1*
Gender	-0.3
Marital Status	0.1

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

See notes to Table 11.

Table 13: Decomposition of California's Gap in Voting for 2008

California average	63.38
Gap between California and *US-3* (percentage points)	1.41
95% confidence interval for the gap	(-0.2,3.0)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	109.8
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…	
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	33.4**
Race	132.8***
Citizenship	78.5***
Education	-101.0***
Income	-73.4***
Metro/non-metro	-5.4
Age profile	23.7*
Gender	1.1
Marital Status	10.4***

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

See notes to Table 11, except that survey responses coded as N/A, "refused," and "don't know" are not dropped from the sample here, but are instead treated as "did not vote" (see footnote 32).

Table 14: Reference Group (US-3) Regressions for the Social Civic Engagement Variables

	Y = Group Leadership		*Y* = Group Participation		*Y* = Help Neighbor	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Hispanic	-0.013	0.010	-0.044*	0.023	-0.047*	0.026
Black	-0.011	0.008	0.037**	0.017	-0.095***	0.019
Native American	-0.024	0.022	-0.039	0.047	-0.051	0.058
Asian	-0.070***	0.014	-0.067**	0.031	-0.089***	0.034
Multiracial	0.008	0.025	0.041	0.041	0.032	0.042
Born in PR/other	-0.021	0.020	-0.068	0.045	0.073	0.074
Native born abroad	0.005	0.033	0.029	0.052	-0.125**	0.050
Naturalized citizen	-0.065***	0.012	-0.063**	0.026	-0.061**	0.029
Non-citizen	-0.028**	0.011	-0.068***	0.024	-0.083***	0.029
High school	0.019***	0.005	0.078***	0.014	0.005	0.017
Some college	0.067***	0.008	0.185***	0.016	0.030	0.019
2-year college	0.075***	0.010	0.185***	0.019	0.005	0.021
4-year college	0.117***	0.009	0.293***	0.017	0.047**	0.020
Advanced degree	0.196***	0.013	0.371***	0.020	0.050**	0.022
Income: < $35K	-0.013	0.008	0.008	0.015	0.007	0.019
Income: $35-50K	0.006	0.011	0.048**	0.019	0.077***	0.022
Income: $50-75K	0.012	0.011	0.060***	0.018	0.043**	0.021
Income: > $75K	0.050***	0.011	0.107***	0.018	0.073***	0.020
In a metro area	-0.032***	0.008	-0.012	0.012	-0.039***	0.013
Age: 26-35	-0.007	0.008	-0.006	0.017	0.084***	0.019
Age: 36-45	0.018**	0.009	0.059***	0.017	0.148***	0.019
Age: 46-55	0.048***	0.009	0.025	0.016	0.160***	0.018
Age: 56-65	0.062***	0.010	0.030*	0.018	0.158***	0.020
Age: 66-75	0.098***	0.012	0.114***	0.020	0.192***	0.022
Age: >75	0.049***	0.011	0.061***	0.020	0.101***	0.023
Female	0.014***	0.005	0.034***	0.007	0.003	0.007
Married	0.023***	0.006	0.097***	0.010	0.109***	0.012
Subpopulation obs.	17,268		17,346		16,950	
Strata	294		294		294	
F statistic (d.o.f.)	31.7 (27,62931)		50.1 (27,62931)		21.4 (27,62931)	
F stat. *p*-value	0.000		0.000		0.000	
R squared	0.075		0.108		0.062	

*significant at the 10% level. **significant at the 5% level. ***significant at the 1% level.

Table notes: see notes to Table 10.

Table 15: Decomposition of California's Gap in Group Leadership

California average	7.64
Gap between California and *US-3* (percentage points)	2.97
95% confidence interval for the gap	(1.5,4.5)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	108.6
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…	
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	11.4
Race	21.9***
Citizenship	37.6***
Education	8.7***
Income	-10.9*
Metro/non-metro	18.7***
Age profile	11.1**
Gender	0.4
Marital Status	1.2

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

See notes to Table 11.

Table 16: Decomposition of California's Gap in Group Participation

California average	33.57
Gap between California and *US-3* (percentage points)	3.31
95% confidence interval for the gap	(0.2,6.4)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	137.8
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…	
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	26.4*
Race	21.1*
Citizenship	35.7**
Education	13.2***
Income	-13.3**
Metro/non-metro	4.8
Age profile	8.1*
Gender	0.7
Marital Status	3.3

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

See notes to Table 11.

Table 17: Decomposition of California's Gap in Helping Neighbors

California average	48.82
Gap between California and *US-3* (percentage points)	9.35
95% confidence interval for the gap	(6.0,12.7)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	51.3
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…	
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	27.0*
Race	8.6***
Citizenship	42.8***
Education	-0.5
Income	-6.8*
Metro/non-metro	15.1***
Age profile	9.8*
Gender	0.1
Marital Status	3.9

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

See notes to Table 11.

Table 18: Decomposition of New York and Texas' Gap in Political Civic Engagement

	Y = Discuss Politics		*Y = Political Acts*		*Y = Voted*	
	New York	Texas	New York	Texas	New York	Texas
State average	33.42	33.40	15.97	16.07	58.83	56.09
Gap between the state and *US-3* (percentage points)	3.01	3.03	1.95	1.85	5.96	8.71
95% confidence interval for the gap	(-0.3,6.4)	(-0.3,6.4)	(-1.0,4.9)	(-1.1,4.8)	(3.8,8.1)	(6.8,10.6)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	26.0	75.3	102.4	145.3	36.2	19.6
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…						
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	45.3*	52.1**	10.4*	27.3**	6.6**	40.3**
Race	57.8	-7.5	19.8	-4.0	10.3***	1.7
Citizenship	99.5	0.5	74.8***	20.2**	46.7***	8.8***
Education	-49.0*	40.4***	-20.3	41.0***	-27.8***	64.1***
Income	-49.1	15.4	3.9*	2.2	65.0***	-52.0***
Metro/non-metro	-38.6*	-13.1*	6.2	4.7	-2.3	-2.3
Age profile	6.8	14.2	4.2	8.6	-10.2**	36.2***
Gender	3.7	0.2	0.5	0.0	-1.7	0.0
Marital Status	23.7*	-2.3	0.5	-0.1	13.4***	3.2

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: See notes to Table 11 for the first two dependent variables and Table 13 for the third.

Table 19: Decomposition of New York and Texas' Gap in Social Civic Engagement

	Y = Group Leadership		*Y = Group Participation*		*Y = Help Neighbor*	
	New York	Texas	New York	Texas	New York	Texas
State average	6.01	9.77	33.67	33.53	52.82	52.25
Gap between the state and *US-3* (percentage points)	4.60	0.84	3.20	3.35	5.35	5.92
95% confidence interval for the gap	(2.8,6.4)	(-1.5,3.2)	(-0.9,7.3)	(-0.7,7.4)	(0.8,9.9)	(1.3,10.5)
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/Δ)	24.0	262.0	44.6	111.1	51.6	41.1
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…						
Ethnicity (Hispanic)	8.6	15.0	21.7*	29.3*	12.3	48.0*
Race	13.0	-2.2	-1.5	1.6	16.5	-7.1
Citizenship	75.3***	10.2	78.3*	11.9	30.0**	28.4**
Education	-29.1	35.6***	-38.9	44.4***	-2.6	6.6
Income	-21.9	10.2	-10.0**	7.1	0.2	5.6
Metro/non-metro	36.1***	18.1***	10.1	3.9	17.7***	19.7***
Age profile	7.4	15.0*	5.5	6.1	4.3	6.0
Gender	-1.0	0.0	-1.9	0.0	-0.1	0.0
Marital Status	11.7**	-1.8	36.8**	-4.4	21.7**	-7.2

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: See notes to Table 11.

Figures for the Main Text

Figure 1: Comparison among Areas of the Frequency of Political Discussion, 2009



Figure 2: Frequency of Political Discussion in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009



Figure 3: Frequency of Political Discussion in the US by Citizenship Status, 2009



Figure 4: Comparison among Areas of Political Involvement, 2009



Figure 5: Political Involvement in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009



Figure 6: Political Involvement in the US by Citizenship Status, 2009



Figure 7: Comparison among Areas of Voter Turnout for 2008 Presidential Election



Figure 8: Voting in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2008 Presidential Election



Figure 9: Voting in the US by Citizenship Status, 2008 Presidential Election



Figure 10: Comparison among Areas of Group Leadership, 2009



Figure 11: Group Leadership in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009



Figure 12: Group Leadership in the US by Citizenship Status, 2009



Figure 13: Comparison among Areas of Group Membership, 2009



Figure 14: Group Membership in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009



Figure 15: Group Membership in the US by Citizenship Status, 2009



Figure 16: Comparison among Areas of Dining with Family, 2009



Figure 17: Dining with Family in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009



Figure 18: Dining with Family in the US by Citizenship Status, 2009



Figure 19: Comparison among Areas of the Frequency of Helping a Neighbor, 2009



Figure 20: Frequency of Helping a Neighbor in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009



Figure 21: Frequency of Helping a Neighbor in the US by Citizenship Status, 2009



Appendix

A. The survey data

All the non-voting variables are from the Civic Engagement Supplement to the Current Population Survey (November 2009). The voting sample is from the Voting and Registration Supplement (November 2008). Information on the sample sizes in shown in Table 26.

The survey data are from a complex survey design including stratified sampling.[42] The primary sampling units (PSU's) in the CPS consist of about 2,000 geographic areas in the US. The PSU's are stratified within each state. Some strata are singletons, and the sole PSU in such ends up in the sample with certainty. One PSU is drawn from each of the remaining strata, with selection probability proportional to the PSU's population. In a second sampling stage, housing units within the PSU are chosen to be secondary sampling units (SSU's). The households surveyed live in the SSU's.

To incorporate the survey design effects for calculation of the estimation error, standard methods in survey statistics require identification of the strata, the PSU's, and the selection probability of each respondent. Survey weights are available in the CPS, which account for unequal selection probabilities, noninterview adjustments, and other adjustments intended to correct for nonproportional sampling along various demographic dimensions such as race, age, and gender. Neither the strata nor the PSU's are identified in the publicly available data. Some analyses of CPS data use only the weights when accounting for survey design effects in the variance of estimates. However, ignoring the design effects from stratified sampling causes the estimated standard errors to be too large. Furthermore, ignoring the clustering of respondents within the PSU's has the opposite effect (Heeringa, West, and Berglund, 2010, p.35).

Davern *et al.* (2007) addressed the problem of creating pseudo-strata for another CPS dataset. They found that by making use of geographical identifiers available in the survey they could create approximate stratum identifiers that led to standard error estimates that were similar to estimates derived from the internal Census Bureau file. We followed their method to pseudo-stratify to respondents. The state of residence of the respondent is always identified in the public data. Additionally, the county or the CBSA (core-based statistical area) may also be available. The process to create the pseudo-strata is as follows.

1. If the CBSA of the respondent is identified, then the state and the CBSA uniquely create a stratum.
2. If the CBSA of the respondent is not identified but the county is, then the state and the county uniquely create a stratum.
3. If neither the CBSA nor the county are available, then all respondents in the state are grouped into a stratum for observations "not elsewhere classified."

[42] See page 2-2 of Current Population Survey, November 2009, Civic Engagement Supplement File, Technical Documentation, CPS—09.

In the absence of the PSU identifier, we cluster on the household, which accounts for correlation in the responses by individuals living in the same household but treats different households within the same PSU as independent. Thus, other things equal, this level of clustering biases the standard errors downward. However, Davern *et al.* (2007) suggest this procedure, and find that when such clustering is used along with the pseudo-stratification as described above, the estimated standard errors are close to those that would be calculated using the confidential PSU and strata identifiers available only to the Census Bureau. The number of strata and PSU's in each subsample are also shown in Table 26.

B. Technical Details of the Decompositions

Jann (2008) provides a good overview of the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology we use to decompose the engagement gaps between California and the rest of the US, as well as information on the Stata program we used to compute the estimates, `oaxaca`. In particular, we use the two-fold decomposition from equation (6) in Jann (2008), with the estimates for *US-3* playing the role of the reference coefficients.[43]

It is well known in the literature that the detailed decomposition results for categorical regressors depend on which category is omitted (as the base category) from the regressions (Jann (2008) provides several citations). Thus, instead of naïve coding of categorical variables as a set of dummy variables, we use deviation contrasts (see Jann (2008) for details), which remove the sensitivity of the results to a choice of base category.

All standard errors for the decompositions (as well as for all other statistics in the paper) are computed with the Taylor Series linearization method (Heeringa, West, and Berglund, 2010), and are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering within PSU's.

C. Additional Tables

[43] In particular, *US-3* is group A and California takes the role of group B in equation (6) of Jann (2008).

Table 20: Decomposition of California's Gaps in Political Civic Engagement – Detailed Results

	Y = Discuss Politics		*Y = Political Acts*		*Y = Voted*	
Summary of gap	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI
Ave. *Y* for *US-3* ($\bar{Y}^{US-3}$)	36.43***	(35.4,37.5)	17.92***	(17.1,18.7)	64.80***	(64.3,65.3)
Ave. *Y* for *CA* ($\bar{Y}^{CA}$)	27.43***	(24.7,30.1)	14.33***	(12.3,16.3)	63.38***	(61.8,64.9)
Total Gap (Δ)	9.01***	(6.1,11.9)	3.59***	(1.4,5.8)	1.41*	(-0.2,3.0)
Explained Gap (*Q*)	3.36***	(1.7,5.0)	4.43***	(3.3,5.6)	1.55***	(0.7,2.4)
Unexplained Gap (*U*)	5.65***	(2.5,8.8)	-0.84	(-2.9,1.2)	-0.14	(-1.7,1.5)
Detailed decomposition	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100
Hispanic	0.665**	1.194	0.406**	0.764*	0.259**	-0.351
Non-Hispanic	0.665**	-2.109	0.406**	-1.366*	0.259**	1.122
White	0.266**	-0.092	0.099	-1.816	0.142***	-1.286
Black	0.065	0.276	-0.305***	-0.461*	0.600***	0.126
Native American	-0.006	-0.069	-0.005	0.013	0.008	0.031
Asian	1.458***	0.215	1.112***	-0.186	1.326***	-0.451
Multiracial	-0.019	0.014	-0.048	0.183*	-0.014	0.006
Born in USA	0.066	-4.255**	1.217***	-0.919	0.649***	-1.188
Born in PR/other	-0.039	0.006	-0.015	0.013	-0.025*	0.012
Native born abroad	-0.108*	0.190	-0.064	-0.125	-0.003	0.036
Naturalized citizen	0.707**	-1.229*	0.668***	-0.586	0.596***	-1.375**
Non-citizen	0.081	-0.966	0.414**	-0.545	NA	NA
No HS degree	0.707***	-0.813	0.796***	-0.732**	-0.094	-0.681***
High school	-0.529***	-0.606	-0.647***	-0.031	-0.770***	0.551*
Some college	0.037	-0.628	0.018	-0.028	-0.125***	0.257
2-year college	0.023	0.113	0.000	0.157	-0.068***	0.166
4-year college	-0.129	1.166**	-0.145	0.477	-0.341***	0.230
Advanced degree	0.200***	0.217	0.301***	0.010	-0.170***	0.043
Income: missing	-0.034	-0.539	-0.066	-0.115	-0.333***	0.633*
Income: < $35K	-0.131*	0.840	-0.060	-0.101	-0.107***	-0.744**
Income: $35-50K	-0.005	0.366	0.031	0.474*	0.022	-0.057
Income: $50-75K	0.004	0.570	-0.015	0.053	0.081*	0.264
Income: > $75K	-0.365***	-1.496	-0.161**	-1.025	-0.803***	-0.345
In a metro area	-0.226*	8.692	0.095	3.875	-0.042	-1.874
Not in metro area	-0.226*	-0.133	0.095	-0.061	-0.042	0.048
Age: 18-25	0.023	0.516	0.082	0.252	0.167**	-0.278
Age: 26-35	0.119**	-0.864	0.113**	-0.318	0.082	-0.265
Age: 36-45	-0.002	-0.508	-0.002	-0.070	0.001	-0.275
Age: 46-55	0.006	0.943*	0.006	-0.335	-0.009	0.039
Age: 56-65	0.073	-0.028	0.063	-0.173	0.017	0.174
Age: 66-75	0.017	-0.231	0.087**	0.149	0.072	0.303*
Age: >75	-0.008	0.115	-0.035	0.073	0.039	-0.008
Female	-0.025	-0.493	-0.006	-0.463	0.008	-0.286
Male	-0.025	0.485	-0.006	0.449	0.008	0.268
Married	0.026	0.710	0.001	0.203	0.081***	0.672
Not married	0.026	-0.622	0.001	-0.179	0.081***	-0.586
Constant		4.702		1.649		4.929

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: Each pair of columns presents the results from separate regression decompositions of the gap between CA and US-3 in the dependent variable in the column heading. Refer to section III.A for notation and methodology of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.

Table 21: Decomposition of California's Gaps in Social Civic Engagement – Detailed Results

	Y = Group Leadership		*Y = Group Participation*		*Y = Help Neighbor*	
Summary of gap	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI
Ave. *Y* for *US-3* ($\bar{Y}^{US-3}$)	10.61***	(10.0,11.2)	36.88***	(35.8,37.9)	58.17***	(57.0,59.3)
Ave. *Y* for *CA* ($\bar{Y}^{CA}$)	7.64***	(6.3,9.0)	33.57***	(30.7,36.4)	48.82***	(45.7,52.0)
Total Gap (Δ)	2.97***	(1.5,4.5)	3.31**	(0.2,6.4)	9.35***	(6.0,12.7)
Explained Gap (*Q*)	3.22***	(2.4,4.1)	4.56***	(2.8,6.4)	4.80***	(3.0,6.6)
Unexplained Gap (*U*)	-0.25	(-1.7,1.2)	-1.25	(-4.5,2.0)	4.55**	(0.8,8.3)
Detailed decomposition	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100
Hispanic	0.183	0.144	0.602*	1.045	0.648*	0.835
Non-Hispanic	0.183	-0.256	0.602*	-1.866	0.648*	-1.495
White	0.102**	1.591	0.029	1.566	0.232**	-5.753*
Black	0.057	0.050	0.277**	0.096	-0.349**	-0.232
Native American	0.001	-0.126	0.006	-0.188	0.002	-0.045
Asian	0.557***	-0.076	0.675**	0.866	0.559	0.561
Multiracial	-0.013	0.179**	-0.022	0.160	-0.033	0.213
Born in USA	0.577**	-2.316**	0.896*	-8.019***	1.048*	-4.585**
Born in PR/other	0.000	0.008	-0.021	0.028	0.068*	0.038
Native born abroad	-0.026	-0.031	-0.061	0.028	0.087*	-0.182
Naturalized citizen	0.584***	-0.601*	0.385	-2.442***	0.294	-1.347
Non-citizen	0.077	-0.044	0.429	-1.531**		
No HS degree	0.527***	-0.657***	1.232***	-1.906***	0.149	0.671
High school	-0.481***	-0.325	-0.856***	0.137	-0.148*	-0.230
Some college	0.031	-0.162	0.000	-0.045	-0.019	0.414
2-year college	-0.003	-0.036	0.000	-0.007	-0.015	-0.401
4-year college	-0.071	0.116	-0.206	0.463	-0.051	0.614
Advanced degree	0.276***	0.417*	0.431***	0.603*	0.060*	-0.224
Income: missing	-0.021	0.313*	-0.089	-0.012	-0.068	-0.278
Income: < $35K	-0.078*	-0.675**	-0.122*	-1.360*	-0.125*	-2.294***
Income: $35-50K	-0.012	0.049	0.008	0.645	0.079	1.314***
Income: $50-75K	-0.001	-0.087	-0.019	-0.434	-0.004	-0.292
Income: > $75K	-0.239***	-0.029	-0.385***	0.487	-0.209**	0.149
In a metro area	0.301***	7.537*	0.110	12.764**	0.363***	5.796
Not in metro area	0.301***	-0.120*	0.110	-0.203**	0.363***	-0.095
Age: 18-25	0.058	0.142	0.063	-0.619	0.186	-0.518
Age: 26-35	0.160***	-0.218	0.164**	0.461	0.134**	-0.658
Age: 36-45	-0.004	-0.342	0.005	-0.002	0.007	0.140
Age: 46-55	0.002	0.068	-0.003	-0.855	0.013	-0.076
Age: 56-65	0.030	0.220	-0.013	-0.048	0.045	0.222
Age: 66-75	0.091*	0.133	0.117**	-0.153	0.119**	0.193
Age: >75	0.019	-0.091	0.037	0.464**	-0.035	0.106
Female	0.007	0.188	0.017	1.090**	0.002	1.100**
Male	0.007	-0.184	0.017	-1.061**	0.002	-1.083**
Married	0.019	0.252	0.075	0.431	0.094	0.745
Not married	0.019	-0.223	0.075	-0.382	0.094	-0.662
Constant		-5.061		-1.453		15.142**

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: see notes to previous table.

Table 22: Decomposition of New York's Gaps in Political Civic Engagement – Detailed Results

	Y = Discuss Politics		*Y = Political Acts*		*Y = Voted*	
Summary of gap	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI
Ave. *Y* for *US-3* ($\bar{Y}^{US-3}$)	36.43***	(35.4,37.5)	17.92***	(17.1,18.7)	64.80***	(64.3,65.3)
Ave. *Y* for *NY* ($\bar{Y}^{NY}$)	33.42***	(29.5,37.4)	15.97***	(13.1,18.8)	58.83***	(56.8,60.9)
Total Gap (Δ)	3.01	(-1.1,7.1)	1.95	(-1.0,4.9)	5.96***	(3.8,8.1)
Explained Gap (*Q*)	0.78	(-0.6,2.2)	1.99***	(0.7,3.3)	2.16***	(1.2,3.1)
Unexplained Gap (*U*)	2.23	(-1.6,6.1)	-0.05	(-2.8,2.7)	3.80***	(1.8,5.8)
Detailed decomposition	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100
Hispanic	0.177*	0.895*	0.104*	-0.397	0.071**	-0.512**
Non-Hispanic	0.177*	-4.802*	0.104*	2.189	0.071**	4.367***
White	0.234*	4.172	0.084	1.591	0.129***	-7.515***
Black	-0.034	1.701	0.138	-0.171	-0.338***	-0.488
Native American	0.018	-0.073	0.016	0.010	-0.024**	0.064*
Asian	0.238	-0.159	0.179	-0.326	0.449***	-0.652**
Multiracial	-0.005	0.156	-0.022	0.025	0.007	-0.041
Born in USA	0.042	0.716	0.766***	5.744	0.520***	-2.899
Born in PR/other	0.150	-0.090	0.057	0.339	0.099*	-0.272*
Native born abroad	0.035	-0.061	0.020	-0.151	-0.002	0.140**
Naturalized citizen	0.520**	1.156	0.481***	1.215	0.391***	0.787*
Non-citizen	0.031	1.085	0.167**	1.432**		
No HS degree	0.030	0.399	0.032	-0.459	0.129	-0.534**
High school	-0.037	-0.450	-0.043	-0.723	-0.251***	-0.487
Some college	-0.063	0.289	-0.030	0.255	0.111***	0.157
2-year college	-0.023	1.071**	0.000	-0.054	-0.045	-0.015
4-year college	-0.161	0.062	-0.209	0.735	-0.185**	0.572*
Advanced degree	-0.128	-1.695***	-0.156	0.186	-0.360***	0.307
Income: missing	0.076	0.884	0.165**	0.438	1.371***	1.152**
Income: < $35K	-0.094	0.702	-0.044	1.143*	-0.115***	-0.564
Income: $35-50K	-0.007	0.516	0.038	-0.147	0.045**	0.006
Income: $50-75K	-0.014	-1.897***	0.065	-0.128	0.165***	0.068
Income: > $75K	-0.345**	0.781	-0.146*	-1.245	-0.063	-0.445
In a metro area	-0.151*	-0.032	0.062	3.483	-0.025	-2.325
Not in metro area	-0.151*	0.003	0.062	-0.308	-0.025	0.256
Age: 18-25	-0.006	-0.163	-0.010	0.633	0.107	0.770**
Age: 26-35	0.031	0.646	0.022	-0.157	-0.017	-0.007
Age: 36-45	0.013	-0.714	0.008	-0.565	-0.056	0.433
Age: 46-55	0.019	-1.101	0.005	0.291	-0.017	-1.117***
Age: 56-65	-0.015	0.333	0.007	0.490	-0.016	0.061
Age: 66-75	0.009	0.393	0.046	0.201	-0.102	0.121
Age: >75	0.002	0.028	0.006	-0.596*	-0.119**	-0.267
Female	0.014	-1.248*	0.005	-0.153	-0.019	0.218
Male	0.014	1.129*	0.005	0.139	-0.019	-0.194
Married	0.093*	-1.036	0.005	0.421	0.145***	0.943*
Not married	0.093*	1.055	0.005	-0.435	0.145***	-0.881*
Constant		-2.418		-14.992**		12.597***

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: see notes to Table 20.

Table 23: Decomposition of Texas' Gaps in Political Civic Engagement – Detailed Results

	Y = Discuss Politics		*Y = Political Acts*		*Y = Voted*	
Summary of gap	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI
Ave. *Y* for *US-3* ($\bar{Y}^{US-3}$)	36.43***	(35.4,37.5)	17.92***	(17.1,18.7)	64.80***	(64.3,65.3)
Ave. *Y* for *TX* ($\bar{Y}^{TX}$)	33.40***	(29.3,37.5)	16.07***	(13.2,18.9)	56.09***	(54.2,57.9)
Total Gap (Δ)	3.03	(-1.2,7.2)	1.85	(-1.1,4.8)	8.71***	(6.8,10.6)
Explained Gap (*Q*)	2.28***	(0.8,3.8)	2.69***	(1.5,3.9)	1.71***	(0.7,2.7)
Unexplained Gap (*U*)	0.75	(-3.6,5.1)	-0.84	(-3.6,2.0)	7.00***	(5.2,8.8)
Detailed decomposition	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100
Hispanic	0.595**	0.739	0.367**	0.504	0.345**	1.319***
Non-Hispanic	0.595**	-1.484	0.367**	-1.014	0.345**	-3.098***
White	-0.148	20.098***	-0.057	6.473	-0.007	-2.467
Black	0.016	1.982**	-0.076	1.043	0.027	-0.568
Native American	-0.002	-0.493	-0.002	-0.168	-0.014	0.036
Asian	-0.072	0.227	-0.057	0.018	0.024	0.127
Multiracial	0.034	0.024	0.086**	0.005	-0.002	-0.070
Born in USA	0.018	-6.965**	0.326***	-1.948	0.102***	1.095
Born in PR/other	-0.044	NA	-0.017	NA	-0.022*	0.015
Native born abroad	-0.047	0.276*	-0.022	0.161**	-0.005	-0.101
Naturalized citizen	0.043	0.076	0.038	-0.018	0.075**	-0.230
Non-citizen	0.042	-0.452	0.218**	-0.397	NA	NA
No HS degree	0.682***	-0.637	0.817***	-0.150	0.915***	-0.577*
High school	-0.140	0.790	-0.183	0.675	-0.173**	0.395
Some college	0.018	-0.365	0.009	0.681	-0.094***	0.244
2-year college	0.059	0.395	-0.001	0.378	0.074***	-0.183
4-year college	0.048	0.474	0.063	0.308	0.070	0.118
Advanced degree	0.256***	-0.365	0.396***	-0.797**	0.306***	0.219
Income: missing	-0.026	-0.437	-0.069	-0.403	-1.012***	-0.307
Income: < $35K	0.108	-1.278	0.057	1.027	0.133***	0.077
Income: $35-50K	0.002	0.559	-0.013	-0.108	-0.015	0.322
Income: $50-75K	0.006	0.327	-0.026	0.485	0.021	0.207
Income: > $75K	0.263*	0.382	0.111	-0.293	-0.016	-0.510
In a metro area	-0.149*	0.698	0.063	0.271	-0.019	1.151
Not in metro area	-0.149*	-0.060	0.063	-0.023	-0.019	-0.158
Age: 18-25	-0.025	0.224	-0.067	0.077	0.248***	0.591*
Age: 26-35	0.222**	-0.742	0.214***	-0.918	0.213***	0.958***
Age: 36-45	0.015	-0.819	0.008	-0.161	-0.011	-0.498
Age: 46-55	0.051	0.595	0.057	-0.717	-0.010	-0.166
Age: 56-65	0.072	0.216	0.073	0.082	0.109***	-0.238
Age: 66-75	-0.002	-0.548	-0.013	0.304	-0.009	-0.424**
Age: >75	-0.010	0.345	-0.040	0.240	0.081*	0.084
Female	0.002	0.049	0.000	0.149	0.000	-0.148
Male	0.002	-0.045	0.000	-0.140	0.000	0.136
Married	-0.026	-0.177	-0.001	-0.748	0.027	0.087
Not married	-0.026	0.137	-0.001	0.583	0.027	-0.072
Constant		-12.994		-6.298		9.630**

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: see notes to Table 20.

Table 24: Decomposition of New York's Gaps in Social Civic Engagement – Detailed Results

	Y = Group Leadership		*Y = Group Participation*		*Y = Help Neighbor*	
Summary of gap	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI
Ave. *Y* for *US-3* ($\bar{Y}^{US-3}$)	10.61***	(10.0,11.2)	36.88***	(35.8,37.9)	58.17***	(57.0,59.3)
Ave. *Y* for *NY* ($\bar{Y}^{NY}$)	6.01***	(4.3,7.7)	33.67***	(29.7,37.6)	52.82***	(48.4,57.2)
Total Gap (Δ)	4.60***	(2.8,6.4)	3.20	(-0.9,7.3)	5.35**	(0.8,9.9)
Explained Gap (*Q*)	1.10**	(0.2,2.0)	1.43*	(-0.2,3.1)	2.76***	(1.3,4.2)
Unexplained Gap (*U*)	3.50***	(1.7,5.3)	1.77	(-2.1,5.7)	2.59	(-1.9,7.1)
Detailed decomposition	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100
Hispanic	0.048	-0.058	0.155*	-0.383	0.170	0.066
Non-Hispanic	0.048	0.319	0.155*	2.110	0.170	-0.363
White	0.089	1.607	0.025	-7.942***	0.194	1.803
Black	-0.027	-0.258	-0.126	-0.526	0.182	1.740
Native American	-0.003	-0.006	-0.019	0.004	-0.005	-0.081
Asian	0.091	-0.184*	0.109	-0.092	0.093	-0.459
Multiracial	-0.007	0.075	-0.012	0.216	-0.007	0.309
Born in USA	0.366**	6.957*	0.569*	1.527	0.669*	-0.734
Born in PR/other	-0.002	0.374**	0.077	0.173	-0.255	1.163***
Native born abroad	0.009	-0.175	0.020	-0.093	-0.025	-0.195*
Naturalized citizen	0.427***	1.630**	0.281	0.416	0.217	1.607*
Non-citizen	0.031	1.467**	0.173	1.556**		
No HS degree	0.014	-0.460**	0.031	-0.680	0.009	0.755
High school	-0.030	-0.720*	-0.048	-0.168	-0.018	0.516
Some college	-0.051*	-0.129	0.000	0.026	0.031	-0.049
2-year college	0.002	0.241	0.000	-0.464	0.010	0.004
4-year college	-0.110	-0.085	-0.317*	0.468	-0.066	-0.191
Advanced degree	-0.146	0.563	-0.223	0.968*	-0.037	-0.779
Income: missing	0.051	-0.109	0.208**	-0.926	0.181*	0.354
Income: < $35K	-0.058	-0.778*	-0.090	-0.053	-0.084	-0.002
Income: $35-50K	-0.014	-0.327	0.010	0.716	0.093	-0.896
Income: $50-75K	0.005	0.109	0.083	-0.297	0.015	-0.669
Income: > $75K	-0.226**	1.754***	-0.354**	0.216	-0.198*	3.695***
In a metro area	0.199***	-0.297	0.072	-0.710	0.245***	-2.288
Not in metro area	0.199***	0.025	0.072	0.061	0.245***	0.190
Age: 18-25	-0.005	0.148	-0.007	0.951	-0.005	-0.346
Age: 26-35	0.035	-0.722*	0.038	0.268	0.031	0.432
Age: 36-45	0.004	-0.224	-0.002	-0.550	-0.005	0.682
Age: 46-55	0.003	0.322	-0.003	-0.561	0.017	-0.770
Age: 56-65	0.004	0.464	-0.001	0.117	-0.001	0.110
Age: 66-75	0.045	-0.129	0.061	-0.642	0.073	-0.073
Age: >75	-0.004	0.073	-0.007	0.334	0.008	0.040
Female	-0.006	-0.096	-0.014	-0.408	-0.001	-0.765
Male	-0.006	0.087	-0.014	0.369	-0.001	0.691
Married	0.065**	-0.130	0.263**	1.261	0.299**	0.747
Not married	0.065**	0.135	0.263**	-1.304	0.299**	-0.771
Constant		-7.967		5.811		-3.234

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: see notes to Table 20.

Table 25: Decomposition of Texas' Gaps in Social Civic Engagement – Detailed Results

	Y = Group Leadership		*Y = Group Participation*		*Y = Help Neighbor*	
Summary of gap	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI	Estimate (× 100)	95% CI
Ave. *Y* for *US-3* ($\bar{Y}^{US-3}$)	10.61***	(10.0,11.2)	36.88***	(35.8,37.9)	58.17***	(57.0,59.3)
Ave. *Y* for *TX* ($\bar{Y}^{TX}$)	9.77***	(7.5,12.1)	33.53***	(29.6,37.5)	52.25***	(47.8,56.7)
Total Gap (Δ)	0.84	(-1.5,3.2)	3.35	(-0.7,7.4)	5.92**	(1.3,10.5)
Explained Gap (*Q*)	2.19***	(1.3,3.1)	3.72***	(1.9,5.6)	2.44***	(0.8,4.1)
Unexplained Gap (*U*)	-1.36	(-3.7,1.0)	-0.37	(-4.4,3.7)	3.49	(-1.2,8.1)
Detailed decomposition	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100	Q_j × 100	U_j × 100
Hispanic	0.165	0.217	0.545*	0.054	0.585*	0.923
Non-Hispanic	0.165	-0.436	0.545*	-0.108	0.585*	-1.864
White	-0.058	4.923**	-0.017	12.197**	-0.122	-16.422***
Black	0.014	0.834**	0.072	2.071**	-0.087	-0.534
Native American	0.000	-0.315	0.001	-0.652	0.001	0.066
Asian	-0.028	0.230*	-0.035	0.399	-0.030	-0.825**
Multiracial	0.024	0.062	0.041	0.114	0.064	0.197
Born in USA	0.157**	0.182	0.242*	-0.954	0.277*	-3.640
Born in PR/other	0.001	NA	-0.023	NA	0.078*	NA
Native born abroad	-0.010	0.013	-0.023	0.071	0.033	0.149
Naturalized citizen	0.034	0.088	0.023	0.245	0.018	-0.056
Non-citizen	0.041	-0.145	0.226	-0.255		
No HS degree	0.534***	-0.027	1.255***	-0.069	0.151	1.612*
High school	-0.139	0.676	-0.244	1.977**	-0.041	-0.245
Some college	0.016	0.487	0.000	0.626	-0.010	-1.319*
2-year college	-0.008	-0.266	0.000	-0.074	-0.035	0.587
4-year college	0.028	-0.349	0.082	-0.471	0.016	-0.707
Advanced degree	0.351***	0.076	0.558***	-0.388	0.080	-0.391
Income: missing	-0.019	-0.291	-0.082	-0.686	-0.065	0.190
Income: < $35K	0.072	-0.793	0.114	-0.835	0.097	-3.046**
Income: $35-50K	0.005	0.413	-0.004	0.482	-0.031	1.332*
Income: $50-75K	-0.002	-0.314	-0.033	0.100	-0.006	-1.000
Income: > $75K	0.169*	0.714	0.269*	0.880	0.141	0.630
In a metro area	0.198***	-1.642	0.072	-5.073**	0.240***	3.985
Not in metro area	0.198***	0.141	0.072	0.435**	0.240***	-0.343
Age: 18-25	-0.046	-0.136	-0.049	0.843	-0.174	-0.615
Age: 26-35	0.299***	-0.665	0.312***	-0.716	0.243**	0.013
Age: 36-45	0.009	-0.455	-0.008	-0.241	-0.012	-0.840
Age: 46-55	0.025	-0.201	-0.042	-0.319	0.099	-0.413
Age: 56-65	0.032	0.291	-0.014	0.739	0.050	-0.073
Age: 66-75	-0.013	0.318	-0.013	-0.424	-0.018	0.600
Age: >75	0.023	0.101	0.043	-0.067	-0.040	0.305
Female	-0.001	-0.356	0.000	-1.323*	0.000	-0.396
Male	-0.001	0.332	0.000	1.238*	0.000	0.371
Married	-0.020	0.046	-0.082	1.294	-0.088	0.977
Not married	-0.020	-0.036	-0.082	-1.004	-0.088	-0.758
Constant		-5.072		-10.479		26.417***

*** significant at the 1% level. **significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 10% level.

Table notes: see notes to Table 20.

Table 26: Size and Design of the Survey Samples

	Observations	*Strata*	*PSU's*
US sample			
Voting Supplement (2008)	92,360	348	51,023
Civic Engagement Supplement (2009)			
Discuss Politics	20,431	347	11,588
Political Acts	21,226	347	13,694
Group Leadership	21,226	347	12,020
Group Participation	21,226	347	12,020
Help Neighbor	20,412	347	11,551
California sample			
Voting Supplement (2008)	6,738	24	3,624
Civic Engagement Supplement (2009)			
Discuss Politics	1,796	24	892
Political Acts	1,868	24	1,063
Group Leadership	1,868	24	931
Group Participation	1,868	24	931
Help Neighbor	1,791	24	894

Table notes: The number of observations and primary sampling units (PSU's) differs for variables from the same survey due to missing responses. PSU's are households.