In 2003, under an initiative of the United Nations (U.N.), various nations of the world gave life to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)-a method by which consumers of all levels could know the origin of their diamonds-with the Scheme only certifying those harvested from legal, government-run mines. The Scheme's drafters believed that, if given the choice, consumers would choose to buy diamonds mined legally, with profits flowing to legitimate sources of power. However, the KPCS as it stands is voluntary and lacks the teeth needed to deter its violators. The KPCS lacks a binding arbitration agreement and needs a more articulate and sophisticated method of resolving disputes and violations among its signatory countries. This article will offer suggestions for increasing the efficiency of the KPCS.
Shannon K. Murphy,
Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and More Sophisticated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, the Kimberley Process Will Ultimately Fail in Ending Conflicts Fueled by Blood Diamonds ,
11 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol11/iss2/2
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